

**LABOUR GOES TO WAR: THE CIO, THE PEOPLE'S
WAR, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A "NEW SOCIAL
ORDER," TORONTO, 1939-1945**

by

Wendy Elizabeth Cuthbertson

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History in the
University of Toronto

© Copyright by Wendy Elizabeth Cuthbertson, 2007



Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-27974-8
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-27974-8

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.


Canada

**Labour Goes to War: The CIO, the People's War, and the Construction of a
"New Social Order," Toronto, 1939-1945**

Wendy Elizabeth Cuthbertson
Department of History
University of Toronto
Ph.D., 2007

ABSTRACT

The Canadian CIO's 1930s momentum had stalled by 1939, but by 1944 it was the country's largest labour organization and was influencing Canadian politics. Using union newspapers, organizing literature, minutes, correspondence, oral interviews, government and corporate records, and the daily press, this dissertation describes and analyzes how the CIO organized thousands of wartime workers into unions in spite of significant obstacles. This study then examines the institutions the CIO developed to create a union "mini-public sphere," where workers debated and developed union positions on issues facing them as workers, family members, citizens and military veterans.

The CIO's breakthrough was based not just on worker-empowering wartime labour shortages. Its skill in using modern communications was also a factor in its wartime success, as well as its use of the war as a central character in these communications efforts. CIO communications used a narrative that elided workers with warriors as partners in a "people's war" to defeat the nation's enemies and build a new social order. The CIO told workers that if they organized into unions, they would have the power to shape a peace that, unlike after the Great War, would benefit this worker-warrior partnership. Victory was thus defined not merely as defeating the Axis but

creating a modern, new Canada, where workers would have citizenship rights in the workplace and where citizenship entailed a fairer, more egalitarian society. The CIO's talk about rights extended to women workers, and its arguments for equal pay and women's seniority were increasingly based on women's human rights.

The CIO related this narrative to working-class Canadians through new, union channels of communication and through a myriad of union-minded social interactions. Together — the CIO's narrative of victory and its subaltern public sphere that communicated this narrative — helped the CIO overcome formidable obstacles to organizing.

The CIO was successful in turning private, workplace issues such as union recognition and bargaining rights into public issues that government was forced to deal with, and its organizing successes and its entry into politics witnessed burgeoning support for the social democratic CCF, a phenomenon that encouraged mainstream political parties to adopt more progressive platforms.

Acknowledgments

While a dissertation seems for most of the time a lonely pursuit, it is in fact a collective project, with the author as dependent as any newborn babe on the people around her or him. I would like to thank the dedicated and kind souls who have helped me along the way.

I wish, first, to thank my supervisor, Professor Ian Radforth, whose tact, expertise, and guidance made the difference between completing the marathon and not, and thesis committee member Professor Cecilia Morgan, for her encouragement and dedication, and Professor Rick Halpern for his enthusiasm and challenging questions.

I am also very much in debt to the archivists at the Library and Archives of Canada; the Archives of Ontario; the City of Toronto Archives; the Archives of Labour and Urban History in the Walter Reuther Library at Wayne State University; the University of Pittsburgh Archives; and the Toronto Public Library.

Thanks as well to the trade unionists I interviewed, Paul Siren and Charles Bonello, whose enthusiasm for organizing remains undimmed after more than 60 years. Thanks, too, to Canadian Auto Workers librarian Kathy Bennett and CAW Local 112 historian Sherry Hillman, and to Bill Reno and Vanessa Chivallo, also seekers of union history.

I also wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Government of Ontario (Ontario Graduate Scholarship), and the School of Graduate Studies and Department of History at the University of Toronto.

Many thanks to my friends and colleagues at the history department and in the Labour Studies Group, for all their support, advice, perspective, and good humour.

Thanks also to my colleagues at the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations for their support (and the time off!), especially Henry Mandelbaum and Mark Rosenfeld.

Above all, enormous thanks to my “four pillars”: my comrade-in-arms, the remarkable Melanie Brunet, my dear friend and soul sister Jane Adams, my loving sister Helen Dewling, and my best friend, ever-wise counsel, and beloved husband, Charles Campbell.

*To the memory of my uncle, Cameron Jaques
Founding Executive Board Member, UAW Local 397*

Table of Contents

Abstract
ii

Introduction
1

Chapter One
“A Trifle Depressing”: The CIO on the Eve of War
22

Chapter Two
Organizing the Unorganized in Wartime
46

Chapter Three
Wartime Organizing: Getting to a Majority
105

Chapter Four
Wartime Organizing: Three Case Studies
163

Chapter Five
“Becoming Unionized as Well as Organized”: Union Sociability, the Transmission of Ideas, and the Creed of Equality
216

Chapter 6
“The War for the Common Man”: CIO War Stories and the Narrative of a Fulfilled Democracy
265

Chapter Seven
“Equal Partners in This World Crusade”: Women, Equal Pay, and the CIO
341

Conclusion
386

Bibliography
395

Introduction

On the eve of the Second World War, a group of senior Canadian business executives journeyed to Britain on a trade mission. Their assurances to the British government that Canadian industry could supply the United Kingdom with the weapons and munitions needed in a war with Germany were well publicized back home in Canada.¹ These promises, however, drew a sharp retort from Silby Barrett, then the head of the CIO in Canada, who said the business leaders were in no position to make such guarantees because they had not taken into account the power of CIO members to determine how smoothly war production would proceed.²

Barrett's remarks were sheer, if game, bluster. The CIO's momentum, after a promising start in the 1930s, had sputtered to a virtual halt by 1939. CIO unions in Canada represented a few thousand coal miners in Nova Scotia, an even fewer thousand auto workers, and a handful of workers in a miscellany of plants, mostly in Ontario. In these scattered workplace, furthermore, the CIO's foothold was tenuous. In 1939, the Canadian CIO could no more interrupt war production to any significant degree than it could fly to the moon. Yet by 1945, it had become a real force in the country, having become the largest labour organization in Canada, enjoying a robust presence in many industries, even influencing, it can be argued, the shape of Canadian politics.

None of this was easy. Lacking the protective labour legislation enjoyed by their American counterparts, Canadian CIO leaders and activists faced significant obstacles to union organizing in spite of wartime labour shortages that increased workers' power.

The CIO organizers had to attract and retain the allegiance of workers in the face of employers' fierce hostility coupled with much government hypocrisy and stalling.

It is my contention that the CIO's breakthrough was not just based on the wartime labour shortages that decreased workers' fear of employer reprisal if they joined a union, although the importance of that factor cannot be overestimated. The CIO's skill in using modern communications was also a vital factor in its wartime success, and the war itself was a central character in these communications efforts. In this sense, the CIO's story in Canada is a war story. The CIO unions published a blizzard of union leaflets and newspapers, took to the radio waves, bought paid advertising, organized countless union educational workshops, socials, and recreational gatherings (in addition to an equally countless number of union meetings), creating, I argue, a union world, a union public arena, where workers could meet, learn about, discuss, and debate the ideas and issues of the day.³ Just as importantly, the CIO invented a narrative that leveraged the government's own characterization of the war as the "people's war" and used it to expand workers' sense of their rights and proper due and about the kind of post-war Canada that was possible — provided they unionized.⁴ In this narrative, union writers and speakers deployed symbols, motifs, myths, and language they drew from the war effort. As well, the CIO used the nation's war effort to market itself and its views to the general public. That these views were shared by many Canadians shows not just the power of such a narrative, but also the wisdom of labour's exploiting the "people's war" rhetoric and translating its promise into terms that would advance the CIO's strength and workers' expectations. Such force did CIO organizing exert that elections in 1943 and 1944 encouraged both the Liberal and Conservative parties to

adapt their political platforms to the narrative, a narrative the CCF had been using successfully in its campaigning.

This contention can only be asserted not proven, as one cannot enter the mind of another, let alone the mentality of hundreds of thousands of others. Yet, as historians have noted, the breakthrough in CIO strength during the war was paralleled by the inclination of working-class ridings, where the CIO was concentrating its efforts, to vote CCF.⁵ It can be argued that the CIO's communications efforts didn't just persuade workers to sign a union card, they also helped influence workers' political opinions.

II

A number of historians have studied the institutional and political growth of the Canadian CIO during the war, and their work takes the view, which I share, that the war was a critical factor not just in the CIO's growth as an economic player but also in its evolving ideas about the nature and extent of workers' rights, its views about the role of the state and, hence, its increased political activism and sophistication. Craig Heron calls the war a "watershed" in the history of Canadian labour, pointing out that workers for the first time could pose a real challenge, both politically at the polling booth and industrially on the picket line, to extract legal protections from the state.⁶ Irving Abella, in his brief history of Canadian labour, argues that the Canadian labour movement made its greatest advances during the Second World War. With wartime conditions "optimal for growth," unions grew in strength and militancy and their strong support for the war effort, he argues, was matched by their conviction that, unlike in the First World War, labour's contribution would have to be recognized.⁷ Charlotte Yates, in her study of the UAW, concludes that the war's significance was that government, more

than employers, was the adversary in labour's wartime battles on account of the state's unprecedented intervention in labour market affairs. As a result, Yates argues, the union entered party politics in an attempt to force government to pay attention to labour's demands. She describes how the CCF's political gains forced government to introduce collective bargaining regulations requiring employers to bargain.⁸

The notion that workers were entitled as citizens to greater workplace democracy was a central feature of CIO argumentation during the war, and studies about citizenship were an invaluable resource for this study. Peter Warrian, in his Ph.D. dissertation, discusses the effect of the war on workers' cultural and political attitudes. He describes how the war produced union demands for collective bargaining legislation that would recognize workers' *right* to bargain with their employers, thus raising workers' rights to a new status, with the CIO asserting that workers' shop-floor rights flowed from their rights as citizens.⁹ The work of T.H. Marshall, written very soon after the war, has been challenged recently by many commentators, but his contention that citizenship be defined as more than voting rights or even economic rights, but as the social right to make claims on the broader society for a decent life remains an important one for understanding the growing support during the war for more social democratic forms government policies and programs, a goal the CIO embraced increasingly as the war wore on. The worker-warrior partnership that was the central motif in CIO publicity during the war was rooted in the CIO's definition of workers' citizenship rights, which declared that democratic rights ought not to be suspended at the plant gate or that citizens be denied sustenance and security.¹⁰

Other histories helped give me the overview and context I needed to understand my own research better. Laurel Sefton MacDowell has published a number of studies

about the CIO during the war. Her monograph about the 1942 gold strike in Kirkland Lake provides, in addition to a case study of a landmark strike, a valuable overview of the war's impact on Canada's labour market, government labour regulation, and the CIO's reaction to these.¹¹ Her article, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two," a study of how Canada's labour laws and regulations changed over the course of the war as a result of the economic tensions created by the war economy,¹² joins with Jeremy Webber's "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation" to give readers a detailed look at the effect of Ottawa's reliance on conciliation to achieve labour peace and how it frustrated the CIO's drive to become recognized by employers in the workplace.

The so-called post-war compromise has preoccupied many historians writing about the war period. The controversy, at heart, is about the nature of the understanding between workers and union leaders on such issues as: support for the war effort, appropriate levels of union militancy, the CIO's relationship with employers and government, and the dynamic between rank-and-file worker and their union leaders. These issues joined others in my interrogation of the language and discourse of the wartime CIO, as the debate about the post-war compromise alerted me to issues I may have otherwise neglected.

The critics of the post-war compromise judge it harshly, arguing the compromise resulted in the alienation of the rank-and-file from union leaders, the consequent diminution of worker militancy, the bureaucratization of unions, and union acceptance of the status quo, whereby management retained its workplace power and control in return for giving workers high wages and good benefits. Peter McInnis, for example, in his *Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950*,

argues that decisions made by labour leaders during the war led to bureaucratization and complacency, that these leaders chose to tell workers that labour's only goal was larger pay cheques, an approach, he says, that fuelled consumerism, abandoned issues of worker control and class solidarity, and stifled rank-and-file initiative.¹³ Don Wells argues that the post-war compromise "and the kind of bureaucratic unionism it generated" undermined workers' defiance of their employers.¹⁴ Some critics' views about the motivation of wartime labour leaders in accepting this compromise are especially rigorous. Ron Crawley, writing about wartime Steel Workers in Nova Scotia, accuses the union's leaders of purging local activists in the interests of appearing as "responsible" trade unionists to government leaders, targeting Communists in particular.¹⁵

The other side of this debate is best represented by Laurel Sefton MacDowell. In her biography of J.L. Cohen, the wartime lawyer for many CIO unions, she argues that the industrial relations system that emerged during the war and afterwards was not a "hollow victory," as its critics have suggested, but rather essential to workers winning better conditions. She says the critics of this system, when accusing labour leader of being agents of social control, disregard the views of workers during the war, minimize the difficulty they encountered organizing, and ignore the hostility of employers.¹⁶ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker in their *Labour Before the Law* make the point that most unions could not muster the necessary worker militancy to force employers to the bargaining table without labour legislation compelling them to do so.¹⁷ The deal that labour leaders accepted, these scholars say, was that they would exercise control over their members – that is, "responsible" unionism – in return for protective legislation giving labour recognition and collective bargaining rights.¹⁸

The work of American historians was very helpful for this study, especially as the CIO was an American organization that maintained close ties with its Canadian affiliates. The post-war compromise, for example, has its American critics as well, such as Nelson Lichtenstein, who in his close study of the wartime CIO in the United States, *Labor's War at Home*, argues that the CIO's wartime support for the Democratic Party and its campaign for state protection from corporate aggressiveness diminished "the legitimacy of rank and file activity while institutionalizing leadership authority and increasing government influence in union affairs."¹⁹ Alan Clive, in his *State of War*, looks at Michigan workers during the Second World War. Unlike Lichtenstein, however, Clive says the conservative acceptance of the post-war compromise by unions such as the UAW was inevitable. Even if leaders had seen their members as the nucleus of a radical movement (which they did not), a more centralized command would have been necessary given the national scope of the employers the unions were bargaining with.²⁰ Peter Friedlander agrees, saying the bureaucratization of unions was a consequence, not of the motives of union leaders, but of the complex structure of the situation itself, particularly the many, sometimes contradictory, social and cultural influences on workers, such as Protestant conservatism, ethnicity, and loyalty to local political machine.²¹ Joshua Freeman in his review essay in *Labor History* reminds us how shaky even the American CIO was in 1939-40. Just as my study shows for the Canadian scene, he notes that American affiliates, too, were having difficulty collecting dues, establishing stable organizations, negotiating actual contracts, and organizing huge employers such as Ford, Goodyear, and Westinghouse. Given the war's high labour turnover and large numbers of new, unorganized workers, disruptions in production, increasingly conservative political atmosphere, concerns about a post-war depression, and public

animus against wartime strikes, Freeman argues, union leaders worried their unions could not survive and turned to government for maintenance-of-membership clauses, not as a corporatist turn but as a result of the failures of the previous decade. If the American CIO had been able to organize all its industries before the war, things may have turned out differently, he says.²²

Another debate about the motives of wartime labour leaders centres around women workers. The majority of historians who have looked at the position of women during the Second World War argue that, contrary to the myth of Rosie the Riveter and other wartime role models' transforming forever the status of women, the war accomplished little, if anything, of permanence for women. Ruth Roach Pierson, for example, in her fine history of Canadian women during the war, *"They're Still Women After All"*, takes the view the war's "slight yet disquieting reconstruction of womanhood" led to no permanent change in the status of Canadian women.²³ Her opinion is shared by many other Canadian and American historians who have also looked at women's status during the war.²⁴ Most of these historians, furthermore, argue that trade unions did not support women's equality in any meaningful way and in many instances sacrificed women's interests in favour of male workers. Jeff Keshen in his recent book about the Canadian home front, however, argues that the war did change society's perception of women and energized the long-term drive for workplace equality.²⁵ American historian William Chafe in his history of women in the United States also insists that the war permanently changed the social perceptions of women's capacities.²⁶ The debate represented in these studies prompted me, when I was doing my research, to stay alert to the issue of equality for women during the war, and I focused on the issue of equal pay for equal work as a case study. I found that the CIO

unions' wartime records show that CIO unionists *did* further women's interests during the war. They may have initially supported equal pay strictly as a pragmatic ploy to attract women workers to the union fold, but my look at the UAW, for example, reveals that by the end of the war, many male unionists had come to see women's equality as a fundamental human right and, contrary to much scholarly opinion, did make an effort, however unsuccessful, to defend not just equal pay but also women's seniority rights in the face of the widely held view that women should return to their kitchens following the war and give their jobs back to men. As Ruth Frager and Carmella Patrias point out in their study of Canadian working women, significant protest about the conditions of working women developed in the immediate aftermath of the war, especially in Ontario, long before the Second Wave of feminism.²⁷ Ontario, the CIO's stronghold, was the first jurisdiction in the British Commonwealth to pass post-war equal pay legislation, and it can be plausibly argued that the CIO's ethical evolution on this issue, its equal pay gains, and its publicity campaign, contributed to creating a public mandate for such legislation.

The CIO's increasing confidence in and reliance on government to protect its own members and working people is a theme explored in this study, and several Canadian histories were helpful in providing context for my own research. While J.L. Granatstein, in his *Canada's War*, does not deal extensively with the wartime labour movement, he devotes deserved attention to the emergence of the welfare state in the minds of Canadian politicians, especially the ruling Liberals in Ottawa, who were influenced by the CIO-supported CCF.²⁸ Gerald Caplan's *Dilemma of Canadian Socialism* traces the rise of the CCF and credits much of its wartime success to the growth of the labour movement, and the growing belief among the Canadian public that their post-

war society would have to be better than the one that had given them the Great Depression and a second world war.²⁹ He also points out that the growth in support for the CCF tracked the party's increasing belligerence: from near pacifism in 1939, to conscription of only wealth, to conscription of men and wealth by the end of 1941.³⁰ Desmond Morton and J. L. Granatstein's *Victory 1945* deals with the growth of public welfare ideas during the war, although the influence of wartime labour in this narrative is not explored. In his *Canada and War*, however, Morton credits labour militancy in part with forcing government to bring in labour protection laws.³¹

While the wartime studies noted above together provide the history of the CIO's challenges and growth during the war, none considers for the most part the influence of the war beyond the conflict's role as an economic factor that affected the balance of power between workers, business, and government.³² The war largely exists in these studies as background and context for the unfolding story. It is my contention, however, that the war had more than an economic role, that it was a central player as a *cultural* event in the history of the Canadian CIO during the war.³³ By looking at the material that union organizers and local union editors produced, I have tried to infer what moved workers to organize, beyond their immediate wages and working conditions. What I found was that the CIO created out of the war a narrative of progress that promised, above all, recognition, representation, and security, to be provided in the main by government, which, the war had shown, had enormous fiscal and moral capacity when it was forced to act. These may have been, from a later perspective, limited, even mundane, goals, but they were the goals that CIO activists from all unions — Communists, social democrat, and the apolitical alike — more or less agreed on. I believe, consequently, that it can be argued that these were the goals that workers were

comfortable demanding. Unions leaders' reassurances that unionization would help, not hinder, war production and that they would make every effort to avoid strikes are found everywhere in this early literature and indicate, I believe, that organizers found among workers not radicalism but a cautious conservatism and a dedication to the war effort that reinforced that caution. In this sense the war played a dual role of limiting workers' militancy while increasing their demands on the state.

My first task in the thesis, in order to highlight the importance of the CIO's creating a union world and union communications, was to depict the challenges its organizers — rank-and-file organizers as well as paid union staff — confronted, even during the wartime period of acute labour shortages. As Bryan Palmer notes, not much historical work devoted to the day-to-day efforts involved in a union organizing drive has been done.³⁴ But some studies do exist, and they provided me with a narrative framework by which to examine wartime organizing. In addition to that valuable service, Robert Storey emphasizes not just the precariousness of the CIO in Canada's position in Canada in the 1930s but also the conservatism, even anti-unionism, of many workers, who were also divided along ethnic, skill, and even income lines.³⁵ Doug Smith in his biography of United Electrical Workers leader C. S. Jackson devotes part of his study to the organizing efforts – and challenges – faced by unionists like Jackson before and during the war. Terry Copp and his students in Kitchener, Ontario, prepared a number of finely textured case studies of union organizing in that city in the late 1930s and during the war, while Copp himself looked at the rise of the CIO in Montreal in this period. John Manley and James Pendergest explore the story of organizing in Canada's automobile industry in the 1920s and 1930s, and Craig Heron joined with Storey and George MacEachern in examining organizing in the Canadian steel industry. Eileen

Tallman's memoir of the post-war Eaton's drive included her reminiscences of the wartime drives she worked on and provides useful insights into the organizing strategy and tactics she and others used. Tallman's memoir, along with those of CIO wartime activists Alf Ready and Bob Miner were important sources as they gave me first-person accounts of the organizing drives of the 1930s and 1940s.³⁶ Donica Belisle in her recent article about union consumerism looks at union organizing literature distributed to Eaton's workers in the late 1940s, and she provides valuable insights into the significance of these materials as historical sources.³⁷

It was my hope that in writing about organizing I would add to our understanding of this often clandestine enterprise while providing evidence that even in the labour-short war years, in the absence of any legal obligation for employers to recognize a union, organizing continued to be a daunting challenge. That this challenge persisted in spite of the power that wartime labour shortages gave workers accounts, in my view, for workers and union leaders' alike pushing for protective legislation and for union security provisions. I hope to show, as well, that wartime unionists were not naïve about the dangers of such government intervention. Rather, they were well aware of them, and they took, I believe, the course of action that would best safeguard the unions workers had built during the war.

III

For this study, I consulted the minutes of union meetings; the correspondence, reports, autobiographies, and oral interviews of CIO organizers; worker affidavits; and company personnel files, as well as such contemporary third-party sources as the *Labour Gazette* and the daily press. My main source, however, was the literature that CIO unions

distributed to their members and potential members, namely the organizing leaflets handed out at plant gates and the newspapers, both national and local union, that unions began to publish during the war, a source that has been largely unexplored in the labour history of the era.³⁸ For the most part, the publications that have survived from the period were issued in Toronto, and that happenstance accounts for the Toronto-centric nature of the thesis.

While union-sponsored publications have their limitations as historical sources, they also have their strengths. They were not independent publications; they were house organs, edited and published by the union's leaders (albeit elected), whether at the local or national level. As such, they were biased in favour of the leadership's views, and dissenting views were rarely published. But they were also biased in favour of the continued electoral success of these leaders, and this electoral discipline insured leaders — and their editors and publicists — did not stray too far ahead or too far behind the membership's views. Secondly, wartime workplaces were characterized not just by the influx of hundreds of thousands of workers new to unionism but also by repeated and large turnovers in labour as companies expanded their plants to meet production demands and men were drawn off to military service. Union organizers were, therefore, conducting permanent, unceasing, organizing drives, constantly appealing to new hires to join the union while persuading more senior hands to maintain their union membership status. Every piece of union literature and publicity was, as a result, an organizing tool prepared and distributed to persuade workers to sign a card or pay their dues. Literature that did not resonate with workers — that did not as a starting point reflect their concerns and priorities — would not have been persuasive. Thus, while the newspapers may have reproduced labour leaders' views about what Canada as a society

should look like after the war, for example, it can be asserted, nonetheless, that these views tracked, at least somewhat, workers' own views. In this sense, ordinary workers controlled the language and meaning of these union publications, and it could well be that union members influenced their leaders' views about the post-war social contract as much as leaders did theirs. Since much has been written about the bureaucratization and moderation of the post-war CIO, this examination of rank-and-file views, if only an indirect one through union communications, sheds, I hope, some light on that debate as I argue that wartime labour communications may well have responded to workers' pragmatism as much as it encouraged their rising expectations.³⁹

IV

Chapter One, in order to highlight the progress of the CIO during the war, deals with the fragile state of the CIO unions in Canada at the outbreak of war. Chapters Two, Three, and Four attempt to render a detailed picture of the day-to-day difficulties and sacrifices involved in wartime union building in the face of the almost complete lack of legal or political support for unionism in Canada at the time. Chapter Two analyzes the war's impact on Canada's industrial workplaces and how it affected CIO organizing for better and for worse. Chapter Three attempts to create, by pulling together the fragments of evidence scattered throughout union archives, a composite picture of a typical CIO wartime organizing drive. Chapter Four looks at three organizing drives in Toronto, two successful and one not. These case studies emphasize the effort and uncertainty involved in organizing and sustaining a union in a wartime workplace, even under the more advantageous conditions the war offered. Chapter Five describes how the CIO while organizing tried to construct a union world, a union public sphere, or

what one historian has called “workers’ common ground,”⁴⁰ where workers and their allies could meet to discuss and debate the issues of the day. Chapter Six looks first at the narrative and the language the CIO used in this union world — the CIO’s literature, oratory, and advertising — and then examines how the CIO deliberately and strategically leveraged wartime rhetoric to win workers as well as the general public over to the CIO’s cause. Chapter Seven focusses on how all these developments affected women workers in particular and argues that the CIO’s wartime discourse and record on women’s rights contributed to the enactment of post-war equal rights laws.

V

This thesis rests on the belief that language matters and that elites can only control meaning up to a point. While a government rallying its nation’s working-class citizens with the cry of the “people’s war” may have seen the slogan as only a call to arms summoning every individual Canadian to the cause, many citizens gave the war cry, and by extension the war, a greater, even nobler, meaning. “Language must be attended to seriously as it plays a role in ordering working-class conceptions of politics and social differentiation,” wrote Bryan Palmer in 1987.⁴¹ British historian Carol Morgan agrees, asserting in her study of women textile workers, moreover, that language is “integral to struggle” since “the construction of meaning is not controlled by those in power...it is embedded in experience and implies the agency of the subject.”⁴² Jonathan Vance, who studied how Canadians came to define the meaning of the Great War, also points to language as form of agency, writing that the “invention of meaning is a process and not an event and something people create on their own....”⁴³ My hope is that this thesis might provide evidence to support the notion that workers — and others outside the

power elite — can wrest language and meaning from the elite, and make them their own.

¹ *Industrial Canada* 40 (September 5, 1939), "The Canadian Industrial Mission," 51.

² LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, August 1939, "Barrett Wires London," 5. The CIO was first called the Committee for Industrial Organization when it was formed in 1935 and later came to be known as the Congress for Industrial Organization. In this text, unless referring specifically to the Canadian Congress of Labour (created by a 1940 merger of the Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization and the All-Canadian Congress of Labour) as an organization, I use the term "CIO."

³ Lizabeth Cohen in her *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), argues that union organizing in that city was aided by the CIO's creating just such a union world, what she calls the CIO's "culture of unity," the workers' "common ground." 332-360.

⁴ Julie Guard of the University of Manitoba and Mercedes Steedman of Laurentian University noted the importance of creating a sense of dignity and justice among workers in a contemporary Steel Workers organizing drive. See their "Organizing the Electronic Sweatshop," a paper delivered to the "Labouring Feminism and Feminist Working-Class History in North America and Beyond Conference," Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, September 30, 2005. At the same conference, University of Nevada-Reno scholars Jill Jones and Susan Chandler in their "Union Organizing and the Transformation of Immigrant Women," noted the same phenomenon among women workers in their city – as well as the power of placing their story in the history of women's struggles, so unionizing women understood they were struggling to carry on the work of their predecessors as well as fighting for their successors.

⁵ Gerald Caplan, *The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 88-90; Desmond Morton and Terry Copp, *Working People* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1980), 204; Craig Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Brief History*, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1996) 71.

⁶ Heron, *Ibid.*, 69-75.

⁷ Irving Abella, *The Canadian Labour Movement, 1902-1960*, Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 28 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1975), 19-20.

⁸ Charlotte Yates, *From Plant to Politics: The Auto Workers Union in Post-War Canada* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 37-38.

⁹ Peter Warrian, "'Labour is not a commodity': a study of the rights of labour in the Canadian post-war economy," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1984, 36, 79, 86.

¹⁰ For Marshall's notion of social citizenship, see T.H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," in T.H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Crossroads* (London: Heinemann, 1963), 87. While Marshall's ideas may have been ascendant in the post-war period, critics have emerged who see Marshall's "social citizen" as an anachronism: a white, Anglo-Saxon male, or a reformer too anxious to turn to statist solutions to social problems, and therefore politically impotent. For a discussion of citizenship and of Marshall, and his critics, see Robert Menzies, Robert Adamoski, and Dorothy E. Chunn, "Rethinking the Citizen in Canadian Social History," in Robert Adamoski, Dorothy E. Chunn, and Robert Menzies, eds., *Contesting Canadian Citizenship* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2002), 11-42.

¹¹ Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Remember Kirkland Lake": *The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

¹² Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two," *Labour/le Travail* 3 (Autumn, 1978), 175-196.

¹³ Peter McNis, *Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 190-193.

¹⁴ Don Wells, "From Fordist Worker Resistance to Post-Fordist Capitalist Hegemony," *Labour/Le Travail*, 39 (Spring 1997), 241-60. See also Don Wells, "The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The Formation of an Auto Worker Local in the 1950s," *Labour/Le Travail* 36 (Fall 1995) 147-173, 151. Wells cites the 1945 Ford strike, which received broad support from the rest of the labour movement, as an example of the kind of union militancy that the post-war compromise ended. Notably, Ford workers were striking to gain one of the key, and most criticized, elements in that compromise: union security.

¹⁵ Ron Crawley, "What Kind of Unionism: Struggles Among Sydney Steelworkers in the SWOC Years, 1936-1942," *Labour/le Travail* 39 (Spring, 1997), 99-123. For a summary of this debate, see Laurel Sefton MacDowell's epilogue to her *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). I am indebted to her for pointing the way to other key participants in this discussion. See, for example: Bryan Palmer, "The Rise and Fall of British Columbia's Solidarity," in Palmer, ed., *The Character of Class Struggle* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 176-200; Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, *The Assault on Trade Union Freedom* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); Kirby Abbot, "The Coal Miners and the Law in Nova Scotia:

From the 1864 Combination of Workmen Act to the 1947 Trade Union Act," in Michael Earle, ed., *Workers and the State* (Fredericton: *Acadiensis*, 1989), 25.

¹⁶ Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer* (University of Toronto Press, 2002), 294-296; _____ "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two," *Labour/le Travail* 3 (Autumn, 1978), 175-196.

¹⁷ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 227.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 262.

¹⁹ Nelson Lichtenstein, *Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 6.

²⁰ Alan Clive, *State of War: Michigan in World War II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979), 55.

²¹ Peter Friedlander, *The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939: A Study in Class and Culture* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), 131.

²² Joshua Freeman, "Delivering the Goods: Industrial Unions During World War Two," *Labor History* 19 (Winter 1978), 570-593, 577.

²³ Ruth Roach Pierson, *"They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 220.

²⁴ Canadian historians who have taken up Pierson's theme include: Gail Cuthbert Brandt, "Pigeon-Holed and Forgotten: The Work of the Subcommittee on the Post-War Problems of Women, 1943," *Histoire sociale/Social History* 15 (May 1982), 239-260; Ellen Scheinberg, "The Tale of Tessie the Textile Worker: Female Textile Workers in Cornwall During World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* 33 (1994), 153-186; Diane Forestell, "The Necessity of Sacrifice for the Nation at War: Women's Labour Force Participation, 1939-1945," *Histoire sociale/Social History* 22 (1989), 323-343; Jane Ursel, *Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family* (Toronto: Women's Press, 1993); Helen Smith and Pamela Wakewich, "'Beauty and the Helldivers': Representing Women's Work and Identities in a Warplant Newspaper," *Labour/Le Travail* 44 (Fall 1999), 71-107. For similar argumentation by an American historian, see Nancy Gabin, "Women and the United Automobile Workers' Union in the 1950s," in Ruth Milkman, ed., *Women, Work, and Protest: A Century of American Women's Labor History* (Boston: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 259-279.

²⁵ Jeffrey Keshen, *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 169-170. Magda Fahrni in her "Counting the Costs of Living: Gender, Citizenship, and a Politics of Prices in 1940s Montreal," credits the war with increasing

women's sense of economic citizenship, in *Canadian Historical Review* 83 (December 2002), 483-504, 483. Susanne Klausen argues the wartime work experience of women wood workers in British Columbia had a radical effect on the consciousness of many women. Susanne Klausen, "The Plywood Girls: Women and Gender Ideology at the Port Alberni Plywood Plant, 1942-1991," *Labour/Le Travail* 41 (Spring 1998), 199-235.

²⁶ William Chafe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Role, 1920-1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 195.

²⁷ Ruth A. Frager and Carmela Patrias, *Discounted Labour: Women Workers in Canada, 1870-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 154.

²⁸ See J.L. Granatstein's chapter devoted to the wartime politics of public welfare in his *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 249-293.

²⁹ Gerald Caplan, *op.cit.*, 88-90.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 88-90.

³¹ Desmond Morton, *Canada and War: A Military and Political History* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1981), 124.

³² American historian Alan Dawley makes a similar point of several American studies of wartime labour, arguing that historians harshly critical of the post-war settlement have "overlooked the politics of the masses" and neglected the effect of fighting a total war on nationalism of workers as citizens, which set limits to labour's demands. Alan Dawley, "Total War and Class Conflict: American Labor in the 1940s," *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labor History* 49 (Autumn, 1984), 77-80. James Green argues that while strikes did occur in the United States during the war, millions of workers did not strike, because "they were willing to sacrifice for the war effort." James Green, "Fighting on Two Fronts: Working Class Militancy in the 1940s," *Radical America* 94 (July-August, 1975), 7-48. American historian Gary Gerstle has posited that the Second World War in the United States produced a "language of Americanism" whereby only ideas and experiences mattered that were expressed in nationalist language. This co-optation meant workers lost control of language, and the wartime call for a inclusive democracy (to boost ethnic and racial minority support for the war) squeezed out the New Deal's potentially more radical formulation of "industrial democracy."

³³ Joshua Freeman makes a similar argument about studies of the American CIO during the war. Joshua Freeman, *op.cit.*, 590-591.

³⁴ Bryan Palmer, *Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1990* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1983), 243-244.

³⁵ Robert Storey, "Workers, unions, and steel: the shaping of the Hamilton working class, 1935-1948," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981, 235-236. See also Robert Storey, "The Struggle to Organize Stelco and Dofasco," *Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations* 42 (1987), 366-385; Doug Smith, *Cold Warrior: C.S. Jackson and the United Electrical Workers* (St. John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1997), 57, 62, 68. Kim Adair, "The URWA and the Struggle for Union Recognition, 1937-1939," in Terry Copp, ed., *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947* (Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976), 1-29; Bryan Mahn, "The Packinghouse Workers in Kitchener, 19340-47," in Terry Copp, ed., op. cit., 30-52; Terry Copp, "The Rise of Industrial Unionism in Montreal, 1935-1945," *Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations* 37 (1982), 843-875; John Manley, "Communists and Auto Workers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (1986), 105-133; James Pendergest, "The Attempt at Unionization in the Automobile Industry in Canada," *Ontario History* 70 (1978), 245-263; Craig Heron, "Work and Struggle in the Canadian Steel Industry, 1900-1950," in Craig Heron, Robert Storey, eds., *On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), 210-244; George MacEachern, "Organizing Sydney Steelworkers in the Thirties," *New Maritimes*, 2 (1983), 10-12; Donica Belisle, "Exploring Post-War Consumerism: The Campaign to Unionize Eaton's in Toronto, 1948-1952," *Canadian Historical Review* 86 (December 2005), 641-672. Memoirs of union organizers include such works as *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story*, edited by Wayne Roberts (Hamilton: Labour Studies Programme, McMaster University, 1979) and Bob Miner, *Miner's Life: Bob Miner and Union Organizing in Timmins, Kirkland Lake, and Sudbury* (Hamilton: Labour Studies Programme: McMaster University, 1979). See also Alicja Muszynski, "The Organization of Women and Ethnic Minorities in a Resource Industry: A Case Study of the Unionization of Shore Workers in the B.C. Fishing Industry, 1937-1949," *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'etudes canadiennes* 19 (1984), 89-107; and Ian Mackay, *Building a Union: Organizing the Bakery, Confectionery Workers of Nova Scotia* (Halifax: Local 446, Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union, 1986).

³⁶ Eileen Tallman, *Where Angels Fear to Tread: Eileen Tallman and the Labor Movement* (Hamilton: Labour Studies, McMaster University, 1981; Bob Miner op. cit.; Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse*.

³⁷ Donica Belisle, op.cit.

³⁸ A notable exception is Valerie Endicott's master's thesis about the wartime experience of women workers at the De Havilland Aircraft plant in Toronto. Valerie Endicott, "A woman's place (was) everywhere: a study of women who worked in aircraft production in Toronto during the Second World War," M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1991.

³⁹ See Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 5, 294-298; Peter Warrian, op.cit, 171. As we will see later, while UAW leaders in Canada voted against the American union's no-strike pledge, the union's Canadian members supported the pledge in a 1944 referendum.

⁴⁰ Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal in Chicago* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 323.

⁴¹ Bryan Palmer, "Response to Joan Scott," *International Labor and Working Class History* 31 (Spring 1987), 15.

⁴² Carol Morgan, *Women Workers and Gender Identities, 1835-1930* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 14.

⁴³ Jonathan Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 266.

Chapter One

“A Trifle Depressing”: The CIO on the Eve of War

It had rained heavily all night, and as marchers marshalled on the sodden lawns of Queen's Park for Toronto's 1939 Labour Day parade on September 4, the skies still threatened.

Nature was imitating life. The morning papers had been filled with the horrifying news that the “Athenia,” a British-owned liner, Montreal-bound with hundreds of Canadians aboard, had been torpedoed off the coast of Ireland four hours after Britain's declaration of war, with 347 lives lost. At home, Canada's armed forces were on active-service footing, and Toronto's famed regiments, which had been calling for recruits for more than a week, were struggling to cope with the deluge of volunteers. Great War veterans had been mustered, armed with rifles and bayonets, and told to protect the city's public utilities against enemy sabotage.¹ It had only been a day since Britain had declared war against Germany, and the trade unionists gathering at Queen's Park knew, as did the rest of the country, that it would only be a question of time before Canada was at war, too.

Canada's labour leaders were responding to the war patriotically, in support of liberal, if as yet imperfect, democracy. Robert Tallon of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC), said that unionists were “wholeheartedly behind the empire,” with workers determined to stop further Nazi encroachment on other democratic countries. “Trade unionism cannot live under an autocracy,” he said. “We in Canada have not

arrived at a perfect state of democracy, but it is only through the present form of government that it will be achieved.”²

Toronto during the Great Depression

The Depression, so close to the war in time, so enormous in its impact on the mentality of those who lived through it, was the context --- economic, social, cultural, ideological, and political – in which the war broke out. A study about union organizing and political developments in Toronto during the war must begin with at least a brief look at the Depression’s impact on the city.

Only the United States was hit harder by the Depression than was Canada. By 1935, national income was half that of 1929. Industrial activity was 57 per cent in 1933 of the 1925-1929 average.³ Canada's exports fell 27 per cent.⁴ Canadians were no strangers to economic downturn; the business cycle had taken its toll several times since Confederation. But by the 1930s, Canada's prosperity was more dependent than ever on its export markets, and the Depression devastated its key markets in the United States and Britain.⁵ By January 1931, the jobless rate in Toronto had reached 17 per cent; two years later it had soared to 30 per cent, higher than the 26.5 per cent national average. In the city's new suburbs, populated with young, working-class families with a relatively brief attachment to the labour force, it reached 45 per cent.⁶ In 1929, manufacturing in Toronto employed 102,406 workers, who earned a total payroll of more than \$133 million. In 1933 their number had dropped to 75,645 and their payroll had declined to \$80 million.⁷

Even those who worked were not well off. A Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) survey in 1939 reported the government’s estimate that a four-

person household needed \$21.50 a week for even a "minimum subsistence income." To insure "health and decency," \$26.50 a week was needed. People didn't get "comfortable" until \$37.50 a week. The average wage for industrial workers, however, was only \$20.00 a week, and 84 per cent of all workers averaged less than \$10 a week.⁸ With wages so low, it was difficult if not impossible for workers to save money. When Toronto's Massey-Harris plant laid off 300 workers in the summer of 1939, they were forced on public relief almost immediately. "Their average earnings make it impossible for them to save money for slack periods," said a union paper.⁹ People just stopped getting medical attention, according to a survey reported in another union paper. Only three in 10 ever saw a dentist; two per cent of the working-age population was too chronically sick to work; and one in three Canadians died "ahead of their time."¹⁰ People did not have enough to eat. The Ontario labour minister told the Legislature that of 166 men who applied for farm work under a provincial program, 61 "were not sufficiently well nourished" to pass the medical examination.¹¹ "We ate 130 million dollars less food in 1937 than we did in 1930," said one union paper, "even though Canada's population increased 912,000."¹²

Nonetheless, there was considerable resistance to anything but private charity to help people. When plans were made to transfer the privately-run House of Industry to the city's new welfare department in 1931, the *Toronto Evening Telegram* said that was not why the department was organized, "to facilitate the transfer of charity from private to the public purse." The British Imperial Association wanted the welfare department dissolved because "so far its chief accomplishment has been to discourage philanthropy as more burdens come back on the taxpayer."¹³ When a Toronto alderman proposed a special tax levy earmarked for relief, the city's mayor was opposed on the

grounds that it would destroy private philanthropy, although when Toronto's rich had dug deep they had come up with total donations of \$5,000 in 1932.¹⁴

There was no sign of the Keynesian ideas that had found expression in the American New Deal. As late as 1939, the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research in a white paper argued that human nature meant relief only led to increased unemployment. "There can be little doubt," it opined, "that the appetite for unemployment relief grows by what it feeds on." Between 1933 and 1935, when the Depression was at its fiercest, with the city levying the highest taxes in its history, with tax delinquency at record levels, with mass unemployment and devastated family incomes, with high vacancy rates, mass foreclosures and evictions, with drastic cuts to the city's job-creating capital budget, the city fathers still found a way to pay off \$17 million in debt. Said historian George Gathercole of the city's conservative "sound finance policy": "It was a policy shaped to a banker's or an investor's point of view."¹⁵

Labour representatives appeared before city council asking for measures to relieve distress as early as January 1930 but appeared scarcely more progressive than city fathers. Their demands included: a minimum wage for city construction work; food and fuel for the needy; that the city advertise outside Toronto about how bad conditions were there to discourage in-migration; that married women with employed husbands leave the workforce; and free passage home for British immigrants with less than two years in Canada and a ban on any new immigrants.¹⁶ Trade unionists were also conservative about public finance. An editorial in the *Canadian Unionist* reacting to federal finance minister Charles Dunning's 1939 budget shared his disappointment that he could not bring in a balanced budget, expressing the hope that one day deficits

would become “a nightmare of the past for the nation as well as for the individual citizen.”¹⁷

Working-class distress found little expression in unified or coherent movements of protest. The powers-that-were, facing a weakened working class, did not spare the rod. Between 1930 and 1935, 17,229 foreign-born residents were deported from Canada for the crime of becoming public charges, but no doubt, under the guise of indigence charges, some had been sent away for their radical views.¹⁸ Only later in the decade, as a slow recovery began over 1936 and 1937, did workers respond with more concerted collective action. And there was also the example of the stunning CIO success in the United States.¹⁹

The state of the unions, 1939

In spite of the booming economy in the 1920s and new organizing opportunities in the growing industrial centres, labour’s defeats of 1918-1919 and the repression that followed weakened the Canadian trade union movement, and organizing was virtually moribund. At the outbreak of the Second World War, organized labour represented only about eight per cent of Canada’s non-agricultural gainfully employed. In 1939, total union membership in Toronto, a city of 650,000, was 42,517 members.²⁰ The largest local union in Toronto at the time was the Toronto affiliate of the Seafarers’ International Union, with just over 3,000 members. Next was a local of the Canadian Retail Employees, with 2,500 members.

Neither was a CIO union. Most unionized workers belonged to the craft-dominated American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions, affiliated in Canada to the TLC. These status-conscious craft unions were opposed to admitting to their ranks the

industrial workers who toiled in the new and burgeoning mass industries of auto, steel, rubber, electrical, and chemical manufacturing, regarding them as unskilled riff-raff. In 1930, Communist Party activists formed the Workers Unity League (WUL), dedicated to organizing industrial workers. Strikes in Toronto reached a peak in 1934, thanks to WUL activity, and the actual percentage of union penetration increased from 13.1 per cent in 1930 to 14.5 per cent in 1935, thanks again mostly to WUL efforts.²¹ However, few, if any, of the fledgling locals could translate these organizing gains into actual contracts or recognition from employers.²² Then, in 1935, the government of the Soviet Union, alarmed by the rise of European fascism, through the Communist International ordered the WUL to dissolve itself and join the ranks of the TLC in order to strengthen labour's hand. Meantime, also in 1935, the United Mine Workers' (UMW) fiery leader, John L. Lewis, frustrated by the AFL's refusal to organize industrial workers, led like-minded American union leaders in 1935 into a new organization designed to organize mass industries: the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). Within a few months, the new CIO, aided by supportive New Deal labour legislation, organized several million American workers in the new mass production industries. By 1937, CIO unions in the United States had won key victories in auto and rubber industries. By the end of that year, encouraged by these successes, four million American workers had joined the CIO.²³

"The enthusiasm simply jumped the border," recalled George Burt, Canadian head of the United Auto Workers Union (UAW), which had organized the mammoth General Motors plant in Oshawa for the CIO in 1937. "It was quite natural... to be caught up in this wave of organization."²⁴ Canadian CIO activists, however, were on their own, in spite of deputations to CIO leaders in Washington, who claimed to lack the

resources to help organizing in Canada when their hands were so full in the United States. Nonetheless, Canadians, many of them former WUL organizers, began signing hundred of new workers in scores of new CIO locals with no help from, or even the knowledge of, the Americans. In 1936 Lewis finally bowed to Canadian CIO ambitions, appointing UMW activist Silby Barrett to organize Nova Scotia steelworkers into the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), which Barrett did forthwith.

Progress, however, was slow in the rest of Depression-struck Canada. Efforts in Hamilton's steel industry failed, as did drives in the mining industry in northern Ontario. By 1936, the CIO in Canada could only be found in two, already-established unions: the UMW with 16,600 members, and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), with 7,000. The Depression lifted somewhat in 1937, which helped organizing.²⁵ Canadian workers, especially in industrial Ontario, began signing up, much to the chagrin of the Premier Mitch Hepburn who vowed to keep the CIO out of Ontario "using the entire resources of the province."²⁶ To some extent Hepburn succeeded. The high-profile strike by UAW members in Oshawa in 1937 was successful in getting the local union recognized, but not the UAW itself. In Toronto, the hostility of the Hepburn Government found resonance with the Toronto police force who devised various ways of foiling organizing drives, such as finding relief work for activists and charging those who refused the degrading labour with vagrancy – or simply cutting them off relief altogether.²⁷ In addition to hostile governments, the CIO faced a hostile mainstream media and was supported only by the *Toronto Star* and the *Ottawa Citizen*.²⁸

Nonetheless, CIO organizing proceeded, with the Oshawa example providing a shimmering hope. After that victory, former WUL leader Alex Welch organized the large Silknit plant in Toronto into the CIO's Textile Workers Union, and within a week,

the several hundred immigrant women working in the plant were on strike.²⁹ C.S. Jackson began organizing in Toronto for the United Electrical Workers (UE), as did Dick Steele, Harry Hamburg, and Harry Hunter, all Community Party of Canada (CPC) activists, for the Steel Workers. Bill Walsh, another CPCer, organized rubber plants, including some in Toronto.³⁰ But the Silknit strike was lost, and by late 1937 organizing had come to a standstill, and Hepburn had won an election on an anti-CIO platform. The magic of the name CIO, according to one CIO historian, in fact had merely served to stiffen employer resistance and provide anti-CIO politicians with popular support.³¹

The coming war, however, and a schism in the labour movement, were about to spur the Canadian CIO into a renewed organizing effort. In 1938 the AFL in the United States suspended its CIO affiliates. Charlie Millard, then the head of the UAW in Canada, reported to Canadian UAW local union leaders in November 1938 that the recent American CIO convention had urged "peace" with the AFL – meaning no raiding on each others' locals -- but, he cautioned, "the question of organizing the millions of unorganized workers is the vital issue, and peace which means stagnation is not acceptable." As a result, he said, if the AFL were to force a similar split in Canada, "there would be no alternative but the building of a representative, central body for C.I.O." in Canada. ³² When the TLC ousted its Canadian CIO affiliates in September 1939, delegates to the CIO's constitutional convention in San Francisco the following month authorized their executive to set up a Canadian Committee of the CIO, whose focus would be organizing the unorganized. The convention charged the Canadians with proceeding "with a vigorous organizing campaign in various industries where workers are at present unorganized and to handle the affairs generally of the CIO in Canada." Lewis appointed Barrett to head up the new Canadian committee and gave

the Canadians the authority to set up their own congress of Canadian CIO affiliates as soon as it was feasible. ³³

In fact, Barrett had already been working on such a move for some time. Three months earlier, in June 1939, he had invited Canadian CIO leaders to a meeting in Toronto, calling the assembled union leaders the "Coordinating Committee of the CIO." Present were Barrett's CIO colleagues: Millard (now head of the Steel Workers in Canada); Burt, Millard's successor at the UAW; veteran Steel Workers' organizers Hamburg and Steele; C.S. Jackson from the UE; as well as representatives from the United Rubber Workers (URW), the United Shoe Workers, the Toronto Newspaper Guild, and the International Fur Workers.

Barrett explained that he had called the meeting so that CIO leaders in Canada, given the looming schism in the Canadian labour movement, could discuss ways of coordinating CIO activities in Canada, both at the local level and nationally. At the meeting the union leaders reviewed the obstacles they faced organizing the unorganized: a lack of "concerted action" on the part of the CIO affiliates in Canada; a lack of publicity on the need for unionization; the "slanderous" attacks by employers, who were being "encouraged by the AFL"; and the open and active hostility of the Hepburn Government in Ontario. On a more optimistic note, the representatives reported that workers in several key industries, such as textiles, meat packing, and chemical manufacturing, were actively seeking CIO representation. ³⁴

There was no question in anyone's mind that a vital task for the committee was obtaining American CIO support, especially financial, even if that did risk offending "the national sentiment of Canadian workers." There were not enough members in Canada paying dues to fund an ambitious organizing campaign, and there was as yet

no institutional infrastructure to gather or account for any money raised in Canada. The meeting discussed several ways and means, including asking the American CIO to pay a cent per Canadian member to the committee or to let the Canadians keep an additional cent of the per capita they remitted to the CIO. Those present soon realized, however, that any per capita arrangement wouldn't work. They needed new money — lots of it — from the Americans, not merely a small portion of a too-small Canadian per capita and certainly more than a penny per current member. Furthermore, they worried, the Americans might start believing the Canadians could fend for themselves financially, leaving the fledgling committee with an enormous task “which it could not possibly discharge” at this early — and hence cash-strapped — stage of CIO unionization in Canada.³⁵

To garner American financial support, the committee agreed to prepare a detailed report for Lewis laying out the CIO's organizing potential in Canada to give him some idea of the size of the task ahead and the need for resources. A fact-finding subcommittee was struck, headed by Millard, which wrote CIO affiliates in Canada asking for a summary of the union situation in their industry, including the number of workers at each plant in the industry; the kind of union they belonged to, if organized; the number of workers who belonged to the union; their average wages and hours of work; and their gender breakdown.³⁶ Cooperation appeared to be the by-word, and there is no record in the minutes of anything but unanimous agreement — including by such stalwarts of the Communist Party of Canada, as Jackson, Hamburgh, and Steele, who had been WUL organizers — about the direction the committee was taking.³⁷

Officially, the Canadian CIO had been putting a brave face on its stalled progress. In 1938, Millard had claimed “that C.I.O. is now firmly established as a

constitutional labor body, democratically controlled and ...in spite of the floods of misrepresentation and false propaganda [is seen] as a respectable organization."³⁸ The CIO asserted that it had established a new social movement in Canada and boasted "that in every single basic industry our unions are recognized by the workers as the champions of their rights," and pointing to the "thousands" of members who enjoyed higher wages, benefits, and job security as a result of CIO contracts.³⁹

Privately, CIO leaders' assessments were less robust, at least as revealed in the reports committee members submitted to the fact-finding subcommittee. Former chartered accountant Jackson's report was thorough and detailed, and the picture it drew was thoroughly bleak.⁴⁰ In Toronto, for example, there were no fewer than 84 plants in the electrical industry, but the union had managed to become active in only two, both owned by Canadian General Electric. In the company's Toronto Lansdowne Avenue plant, the United Electrical Workers (UE) had signed up about 275 of the plant's 375 workers in 1937, but thanks to the recession that followed in 1938, 140 of them had been laid off. The local collapsed that year. Furthermore, in spite of its 1937 strength, the UE had never been able to persuade CGE management to so much as meet with the union, let alone negotiate a contract. At the company's Ward Street plant in Toronto, the union had been able to sign up only 100 of 450 workers in 1937. By 1938 the local was down to 50 members, who were not able to enlist more of their co-workers, even though as a tiny rump group they could take credit for staving off wage cuts because, as Jackson said, "the sympathies of the workers are with the union." Particularly troubling to Jackson was that none of the plant's 225 women workers had ever joined the union. The UE had tried to organize the five radio manufacturers in Toronto, but its efforts had come to naught. Low wages may have accounted for workers' reluctance to join the

union, which was asking for \$1 a month in dues, after a \$2 initiation fee. The average wage in Ontario electrical plants was \$995 a year, less than \$20 a week, when, as we have seen above, a minimum of \$21.50 a week was necessary to enjoy even a subsistence level of existence. Women were paid even less.

After the high-profile strike at GM in Oshawa in 1937, the UAW had established a foothold in Canada, but by 1939 the union had not managed to expand much beyond this initial success. It claimed in its report a total of about 850 members at Chrysler in Windsor and in various auto-parts plants in Brantford, Windsor, Peterborough, and St. Catharines, even though, it estimated, there were 60,000 potential members in the auto and auto-parts industries alone.⁴¹ There were no UAW members in Toronto, even though in the United States the UAW was organizing workers in the aircraft and farm equipment industries, both of which were well represented in Toronto, including at the sprawling Massey-Harris works in the city's west end.⁴² The Rubber Workers' reported 1,280 members were concentrated in Kitchener and Stratford, and while the union estimated 4,000 potential members in Toronto, in 1939 it had only a handful of members in two plants in the city, with 75 of the Sieberling Rubber Company's 160 employees signed up and 75 of the Dundas Rubber and Tire Company's 550 employees.

The picture in the meatpacking industry was even worse.⁴³ Of Canada's estimated 14,000 meatpacking workers, only 200-300 were organized, even though wages in the industry ranked fourteenth in Canada, for some of the hardest, most unpleasant toil imaginable. A few of this handful of unionized meatpacking workers were in Toronto, organized in a federal TLC-chartered local, the United Packing Plant Workers Union Local 138.

As for the Steel Workers, they could claim in 1939, in all of Ontario, only 1,000 members.⁴⁴ There were three SWOC locals in Toronto: at the Swansea Stelco plant, at the General Steel Wares plant, and at Graham Nail and Wire Products. The largest and longest-standing CIO local in Toronto was the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), which had a membership of 2,200.⁴⁵ The strongest CIO presence proportionately in a Toronto industry scarcely seemed a like CIO-style mass industry at all: it was the Shoe Workers union, which boasted about 330 members, out of the city's estimated 550 shoe workers.⁴⁶

The CIO's strength was volatile, to say the least, as can be seen in the fortunes of various CIO local unions in Toronto. The mild recovery of 1937-1938 had a positive effect on organizing overall in Toronto, with local unions in the city, including non-CIO unions, rising from 212 in 1935 to 741 in 1938.⁴⁷ But the CIO locals were fragile. While the established ACTWU maintained its eight Toronto locals through the late 1930s, less-established locals were precarious. In 1937, the UE, for example, had chartered two locals in Toronto; in 1938 it had only one. The URW had set up five local unions in 1937; by 1938 the union was reduced to two locals. There were a handful of successes, though. The Fur Workers union grew from five locals in 1937 to eight by 1938, while the Toronto Newspaper Guild emerged in 1937 and survived.⁴⁸

The fact-finding committee did its work apace, presenting its seven-page report to the committee barely two weeks later. Its was a discouraging picture. Of the 1,288,000 potential CIO members in Canada, said the report, less than 2.5 per cent had joined the movement. The report noted, however, that other labour centrals were not meeting with success in their organizing efforts either; the AFL unions "have shown no organizational progress for some years."⁴⁹

Burt's report (in his own words, a "trifle depressing") to UAW's International Executive Board (IEB) in late 1939 reflected this discouraging picture. As he tried to explain the CIO's difficulties in Canada to his American colleagues, he reminded the UAW leaders that Canada had no laws similar to the Wagner Act and that, furthermore, when Canadian workers struck an American-owned branch plant, plants in the United States could ship product to Canada, thus breaking the strike. In fact, he told the IEB, the Canadian UAW was bearing the brunt of these corporate attacks. The union had sustained several serious defeats in Canada, such as five unsuccessful auto-industry strikes in 1938 in Windsor, including a 14-week strike at Walker Foundry, where 125 strikers had been fired and hadn't worked for more than a year. A high-profile strike at Chrysler in 1939 in Windsor was similarly unsuccessful. The result, Burt said of these unsuccessful strikes, was that they convinced workers that the union had "to show them something" before they would join up, as they "continually [held] up these horrible examples as proof" of the futility of joining a union. He reassured his colleagues that the new Canadian CIO Committee would try to deal with this challenge by coordinating organizing drives in all industries where the "CIO has a foothold," a pledge the new Canadian organization had taken at an historic meeting in November 1939.⁵⁰

"C.I.O. Stands for C-anada I-s O-rganizing!"

In September 1939, two months after the Millard subcommittee's report had been tabled, the Canadian CIO was expelled from the TLC. Canadian CIO leaders, who had held back from organizing their own central labour body in Canada in the hopes that the AFL-CIO schism could be averted at home, were convinced, now that CIO unions were no longer in the congress, TLC affiliates would launch raids against fledgling CIO

locals. Feelings were running high. "The A.F. of L. leadership had shown their treachery by conspiring with the manufacturers and it was quite clear [they] were waging open warfare on C.I.O. unions," read the minutes of the meeting of the CIO committee held almost immediately after the expulsion.⁵¹ Canadian CIO leaders were also concerned the AFL would use the war as a pretext to align with business to allege CIO "sabotage."⁵²

They agreed to hold a conference in order to constitute a Canadian CIO. The new Canadian CIO, they believed, should then launch a "coordinated and powerful organization drive." There were two forces at work behind this pledge to renew CIO organizing efforts. The first was the need to protect CIO locals from AFL raiding while making the most of the CIO's new freedom to organize within AFL jurisdictions.

The second was the war. Those at the meeting agreed that the war had created conditions favorable to organizing, noting in particular a rise in the cost of living and subsequent demands for higher wages from workers, as well as the propaganda possibilities of an anti-corporate campaign against war profiteering. (No mention was made yet, however, of the potential of wartime labour shortages, which would diminish workers' fear of employer reprisal while giving them more bargaining power.)

Speed was of the essence, and call letters for the conference were sent out October 30 to CIO locals in Canada, inviting them to send delegates to an "historic" gathering, to be held barely a week later.

That first Canadian CIO conference opened on a chilly Sunday morning in early November 1939 in Ottawa. Though the committee had given their locals less than a week's notice, 106 representatives from nine CIO affiliates attended, from 16 industrial centres. Conference organizers, who had estimated that only 80 delegates would attend, said they appreciated this "widespread representation" in the face of the "geographic

handicaps of Canada" and the inability of many union officials to attend on account of strikes or negotiations.⁵³ The enthusiastic response to the conference was invoked to lend legitimacy to the conference and to buttress its call for a stepped-up organizing effort. "The response of the CIO unions to this conference demonstrates that the membership wants action," said conference organizers.⁵⁴

The conference was a very Ontario-centric affair. Thirty-eight delegates were from Toronto. Only two other provinces were represented: Nova Scotia had sent 10 delegates, from its steel plants and coal mines; and Quebec had dispatched two, both from Steel Workers locals in Montreal. It was also a Steel Workers-dominated event, with the 42 Steel Workers representatives making up almost half the conference. It was, as well, a male-dominated affair, with only 11 women registered.⁵⁵

Nonetheless, Millard assured delegates, their gathering would "make articulate the needs and desires of Canadian industrial workers from the mines, the steel mills, the factories and offices of this nation." Though the CIO represented a minority of the minority of unionized workers in Canada, Millard was not diffident about the CIO's accepting "responsibility for the adoption and prosecution of a Canadian legislative and organizational program for Canadian workers." The new Canadian CIO's first task was coordination, Millard told delegates, or "how to unite our forces most effectively" for the task of organizing the unorganized and the "universal establishment of Economic Democracy through collective bargaining."⁵⁶

Barrett struck an optimistic note, by describing the just-ended and successful strike for union recognition by Steel Workers at the General Steel Wares plant in Toronto, whose delegation was introduced to the conference to sustained applause.

“Our task in Canada is to organize the unorganized workers of this Dominion. Let us take off our coats, roll up our sleeves and do the job,” Barrett exhorted in closing.⁵⁷

The organizing strategy the committee presented to the conference, however, called *C-anada I-s O-rganizing*, was vague.⁵⁸ No numerical organizing targets were set (although Barrett had told Lewis privately when making his pitch for a CIO umbrella organization in Canada that the CIO could look forward to doubling its membership within the year).⁵⁹ The paper was longer on self-congratulation than concrete proposals, opening with a preamble trumpeting the CIO’s success in Canada, saying the new movement had “established the foundations of a great social movement in Canada,” which in every industry was recognized by workers as “the champion of their rights.” The CIO had brought many advantages not just to CIO members but to unorganized workers as well, it said, such as higher wages, improved working conditions, and freedom from “the arbitrary rule of foremen and management.” No mention was made, however, of the fragility of CIO locals, their high attrition rate, and the fact that bargaining gains had been scarce upon the ground. No detailed strategy was offered up for discussion: no target regions or industries, no numerical goals, no schedule, no institutional structure, no budget, no personnel, no follow up. The CIO did not ask for Wagner Act-style labour law protection but only that the government require its war contractors to bargain with the union of their employees’ choosing; enforce its 1939 Criminal Code amendments outlawing employer discrimination against union activists; and direct the Department of Labour to provide the same degree of assistance to the labour movement that the Department of Trade and Commerce gave business; namely, funding and public education about the advantages of unionization.⁶⁰

The document emphasized the need to protect union standards, so its tone was somewhat defensive. Organizing new members was not so much about expanding union gains as protecting them. As a result, while the CIO struck a defiantly upbeat tone about its past; about its future it seemed less sanguine. The "atmosphere" in which they were meeting to plan future activities, said the authors, was an environment not at all friendly to either working people or labour. The paper's authors were mindful of the aftermath of the Great War, saying that any prosperity created by war was only a "hateful deception." "When a war boom ends, a nation is certain to be worse economically; and it is the ordinary man on the street who suffers worse hardships than before such a boom began. That we know from bitter experience." The authors feared that employers would use the war as a pretext to undermine CIO gains, demand longer hours, and impose speed ups. There was concern these backward steps would become precedents, encouraging employers to dilute many labour gains even into the post-war period.

With the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany recently allied, the authors, perhaps sensitive to the strength of the anti-war Communist Party members in their new organization, had adopted a less bellicose view of the war than the general public. There was no discussion, for instance, about why labour was supporting the war or about the nature of fascism and the menace of Nazism. It is also possible, as was the case with many Canadians, that the CIO would not realize the gravity and enormity of the war until the success of Germany's blitzkrieg war against Western Europe in Spring 1940.⁶¹ Held during the deceptive lull of the "phony war," the conference was, after all, called only partly in response to the war. Nonetheless, the foreboding tone of the strategy paper was reinforced by a note of self-reproof. Anticipating, perhaps, a resolution from

UAW Local 195 in Windsor lamenting the complacency and “hedonistic ... outlook” of CIO leaders in Canada, the paper demanded more “initiative” on the part of CIO affiliates and called for greater speed and efficiency in getting the CIO message out to the Canadian people.⁶²

On the other hand, the authors struck a rhetorical style the CIO would use throughout the war. Though the conference paper was scanty on details, vague on plans and, even for the era, surprisingly modest in its demands on government, it was rich in language and rhetoric, already displaying the fervour that was to characterize much CIO propaganda during the war. The language and tone were evangelical. The creed was “democracy.” “We must launch a CRUSADE to bring INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY into every Canadian plant...We must bring real democracy into the very home and souls of our people...Our influence, our time, our energies, our devotion to the cause of labour, everything we have that is possible must be thrown into this CRUSADE.”⁶³

CIO leaders, meeting a scant two months after war broke out, did not see at the time the extent of the war’s demands on Canada’s labour supply, as the military’s hunger for munitions, arms, and supplies spurred unprecedented industrial growth. It remained to be seen what obstacles and opportunities the war would create and whether the CIO would be able to muster a renewed vigour and capitalize on the coming wartime conditions.

¹ *Toronto Star*, September 5, 1939, “Armed Veterans to Stand Guard,”3.

² *Ibid.*, “Cannot Live Under Autocracy,” 6.

³ Michiel Horn, *The Great Depression of the 1930s*, Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 29 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1984), 3.

⁴ Ian Drummond, *Progress Without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario From Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 157.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 148.

-
- ⁶ James Lemon, *Toronto Since 1918* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1985), 59. Other works dealing with Toronto during the Depression include: Chris Cotter, *Toronto Between the Wars: Life in the City, 1919-1939* (Toronto: Firefly Books, 2004); Mike Filey, *A Toronto Album 2: More Glimpses of the City That Was* (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2002); Lara Campbell, "Respectable citizens of Canada: gender, family, and unemployment in Great Depression Ontario," Ph.D. dissertation., Queen's University, 2002. For the Depression's impact on Toronto women, see Katrina Srigley, "Working lives and simple pleasures: single, employed women in a depression-era city: 1929-1939," Ph.D. dissertation., University of Toronto, 2006, and Margaret Hobbs, "Gendering work and welfare: women's relationship to wage-work and social policy in Canada during the Great Depression," Ph.D. dissertation., University of Toronto, 1995. See also Ruth Frager, *Sweatshop Strife: Class, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Jewish Labour Movement of Toronto*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); and Marcus Klees, "Between the Scylla and Charybdis of anarchy and despotism: the state, capital, and the working class in Great Depression Toronto, 1929-1939," Ph.D. dissertation., Queen's University, 1998.
- ⁷ George Gathercole, "The City of Toronto in depression and recovery, 1929-1939: a study of public finance," Ph.D. dissertation., University of Toronto, 1945, 117
- ⁸ Library and Archives of Canada (LAC), MG 28 I 268, Vol. 1, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office National Director's Office, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee Report, July 12 1939, 13.
- ⁹ LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, July 1939, "Employees Fired Despite Profits," 1
- ¹⁰ *Canadian Congress Journal*, March 1939, "State Medicine in Canada," 3.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, June 1939, "In a Land of Plenty," 25.
- ¹² LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, January 1939, "We Must Have Jobs and Security," 1.
- ¹³ George Gathercole, *op.cit.*, 74.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 75.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.
- ¹⁷ *Canadian Congress Journal*, June 1939, "A Glimpse at Parliament," 19.
- ¹⁸ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155.
- ¹⁹ Michiel Horn, *op.cit.*, 16.
- ²⁰ Department of Labour, *Labour Organization in Canada 1939*, 124.
- ²¹ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *op.cit.*, 163.
- ²² Desmond Morton with Terry Copp, *Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labour Movement* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1980), 150.
- ²³ Irving Abella, *The Canadian Labour Movement, 1902-1960*, Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 28 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1975), 18.

²⁴ Archives of Urban and Labour Affairs, Wayne State University (ALUA), UAW Oral History Collection, Interview with George Burt, April 23, 1963, by Jack Steele, 1.

²⁵ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, *ibid.*, 1.

²⁶ Irving Abella, *op.cit.*, 14.

²⁷ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *op.cit.*, 155.

²⁸ Irving Abella, *op.cit.*, 14.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁰ For early CIO organizing in Canada, see Michael Earle, "The Building of Steel Union Local 1064, Sydney, 1935-1937," in James Cadow, ed., *Industry and Society in Nova Scotia: An Illustrated History* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001); Kim Adair, "The URW and the Struggle for Union Recognition: 1937-1939," in Terry Copp, ed., *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947* (Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976); Terry Copp, "The Rise of Industrial Unionism in Montreal, 1935-1945," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 37 (Winter 1982), 843-874; John Manley, "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism and the 'Third Period': the Workers Unity League, 1929-1936," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Society* 1994, 167-194; John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring, 1986), 105-133; Robert Storey, "The Struggle to Organize Stelco and Dofasco," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 42 (Spring 1987), 366-385; James Leach, "The Workers' Unity League and the Stratford Furniture Workers: The Anatomy of a Strike," *Ontario History* 5 (June 1967), 39-48; Mercedes Steedman, "The Promise: Communist Organizing in the Needle Trades, the Dressmakers' Campaign, 1928-37," *Labour/Le Travail* 34 (February, 1994), 37-73; Ruth Frager *Sweat Shop Strife: Class, Ethnicity and Gender in the Jewish Labour Movement of Toronto* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Howard White, *A Hard Man to Beat: The Story of Bill White* (Vancouver: Pulp Press Books, 1983); Tom McEwan, *The Forge Glows Red: From Blacksmith to Revolutionary* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1974); Cy Gonick, *A Very Red Life: The Story of Bill Walsh* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 2001); Rick Salutin, *The Organizer: A Canadian Union Life* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980); Bryan Palmer: *A Communist Life* (Toronto: Lugus Productions, 1988); Peter Hunter, *Which Side Are You On, Boys?* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1988); David Sobel and Susan Meurer, *Working at Inglis: The Life and Death of a Canadian Factory* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1994); Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story* (Hamilton: McMaster University Press, 1979); Wayne Roberts, ed., *Baptism of a Union: the Stelco Strike of 1946* (Hamilton: McMaster University, c. 1980).

³⁰ For company unionism in Canada, see Bruce Scott, "A Place in the Sun; the Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-1929," *Labour/Le Travail* 1 (Autumn, 1976), 158-192; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Company Unionism in Canada, 1915-1948," unpublished paper; Margaret McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-1939," *Canadian Historical Review* 71 (March 1990), 46-79.

³¹ Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 26-28.

³² ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: C.H. Millard, "Report of C.H. Millard, Director, Region #12, UAWA, Oshawa, Ont., November 26, 1938," 2.

³³ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File: 5, "Minutes of CIO Coordinating Committee Meeting, October 4, 1939," 1.

³⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 3: CIO Coordinating Committee Minutes, June 27, 1939, "Minutes," 1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁷ Such unity would not last. The Communist Party was a strong force in the Canadian CIO in this period, especially in the United Electrical Workers and the United Auto Workers. The Steel Workers also had a strong Communist presence until a 1940-1941 faction fight eliminated the Communist leadership inside the union. Later, during the war before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, CIO Communists opposed the war in contrast to other members of the CIO leadership. After the invasion, the Communists then campaigned for the CIO to adopt such pro-war measures as a no-strike pledge, which was rejected several times by the CIO conventions in Canada, in contrast to the United States CIO. The Canadian government outlawed the Communist Party in 1940 and interned many of its leaders, including Jackson and Steele. Communists then formed the Labour-Progressive Party to contest elections. For more on the Communist presence in the Canadian CIO, see Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); John Manley, "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism and the 'Third Period': the Workers Unity League, 1929-1936," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Society* 1994, 167-194; and John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring, 1986), 105-133; Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism During World War II." *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring 1986).

³⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: 1:C.H. Millard, "Report of C.H. Millard, Director, Region #12, UAWA, Oshawa, Ont., November 26, 1938," 1

³⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4, "Report of First Conference of Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, November 4-5, 1939," 13.

⁴⁰ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee, Reports, July 12, 1939, "C.S. Jackson to Coordinating Committee, July 6, 1939."

⁴¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: 2, "UAWA Conference Held at Brantford: Press Release," November 26, 1938.

-
- ⁴² Ibid., LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee, Reports, July 12, 1939, "General Report of the Rubber Industry in Canada," n.d. but circa July 1939.
- ⁴³ Ibid., LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee, Reports, July 12, 1939, "Canadian Meatpacking Industry, July 1939."
- ⁴⁴ Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour*, 55.
- ⁴⁵ Department of Labour, *Labour Organizations in Canada 1939* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), 187, 209.
- ⁴⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee, Reports, July 12, 1939, "Fragment of report from Shoe Workers Union," 1-2.
- ⁴⁷ Department of Labour, *Labour Organizations in Canada 1935-39* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940).
- ⁴⁸ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1937* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1938); Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1938* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1939).
- ⁴⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee Reports, July 12, 1939, "Report—CIO in Canada."
- ⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: Reports of Regional Director, 1939, "George Burt to George Addes, International-Secretary Treasurer," November 20, 1939," 3.
- ⁵¹ LAC, USWA MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office, Vol. 1, File 5: CIO Coordinating Committee, "Minutes, October 4, 1939," 2.
- ⁵² ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, November 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 1.
- ⁵³ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office Vol. 1 File 6: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs November 4-5, 1939. "The Conference Call."
- ⁵⁴ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, Nov. 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 4, 15.
- ⁵⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office Vol. 1, File 6: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs November 4-5, 1939. "Minutes," 17. More than half the women delegates were from United Rubber Workers, and women made up half the URW's own delegation, six out of a total of 12.
- ⁵⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office Vol. 1, File 6: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs November 4-5, 1939. "The Conference Call."
- ⁵⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, Nov. 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 4.
- ⁵⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, Nov. 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 13-15.

⁵⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, Nov. 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 1.

⁶⁰ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office Vol. 1, File 6: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs November 4-5, 1939, "Submission to the Hon. Norman McClarty, Minister of Labor," 1-2.

⁶¹ George Burt, reporting to the UAW district council in May 1940, said that the "war as it is now" would have "a great bearing" on the union's future activities. ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 70, File: District Council Meetings, 1940, "Report," May 1940, 4.

⁶² LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Canadian National Office, National Directors Office Vol. 1, File 6: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs November 4-5, 1939."Minutes, Resolutions Submitted by Local 195, UAW-CIO," 14.

⁶³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4. "Report of the First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, Nov. 4-6, 1939, Ottawa," 15.

Chapter Two

Organizing the Unorganized in Wartime

It is widely accepted among historians that union organizing, especially CIO organizing, accelerated dramatically during World War Two owing to three interrelated, wartime, economic trends that boosted workers' power vis-a-vis their employers: a rapidly expanding economy; a resulting acute shortage of labour; and a concentration of war-related industries that could not withstand lengthy strikes. CIO organizers, however, still did not find it easy to build and maintain new union locals because, in large part, historians argue, the federal government's labour policies, prior to introducing Privy Council Order 1003 – often referred to as Canada's "Wagner Act" – imposed a series of seemingly interminable procedures and consequent delays. These delays bottled up an inevitable explosion, which took the form of a wave of strikes in 1943, leading directly to collective bargaining legislation in Ontario and PC 1003 at the federal level.¹

While the question of why wartime workers joined unions has thus been addressed by many scholars, there has been far less attention paid to the strategies and techniques unions deployed to sign up workers, the means by which government and companies resisted union organizing efforts, and the difficulties unions faced in maintaining membership levels in individual workplaces.² This chapter and the two that follow attempt to shed new light on the activities and implications of World War Two union organizing, making extensive use of largely overlooked archival sources,

such as union newspapers and organizing leaflets; minutes of union meetings; the correspondence, reports, autobiographies, and oral interviews of CIO organizers; worker affidavits; and company personnel files. The new evidence presented in these chapters, I believe, adds nuance and refinement to our understanding of labour history during this period.

The evidence presented in this chapter and the next two adds to what we know about the difficulty workers faced organizing their unions by looking closely at the intensity of corporate opposition, the extent of employers' power, and the degree and nature of workers' militancy. Signing up workers initially was easier than during the labour-surplus era of the Depression, for example, but *maintaining* union membership numbers was a far more difficult and complicated business, forcing CIO unions to mount what were tantamount to permanent organizing drives. In hindsight, such dedication can be romanticized. There is little doubt that union activists' having to re-earn the allegiance of workers every day, week and month presents an ideal form of unionism, but the records put forward in these chapters support, I argue, the view that such intensity would be unsustainable in the face of corporate resistance, worker pragmatism, and human nature. Furthermore, the requirements of such unflagging and often frustrating effort strained union organizing resources beyond their limit and hindered union growth.

My findings also help explain why the CIO failed to meet its organizing targets in spite of apparently optimum conditions for unionizing workers and in spite of establishing a significant presence – and improving conditions for workers – in many industries. Part of my argument rests on evidence that details the nature of corporate

resistance to the CIO and how it played out on the shop floor, building on the fine work done by scholars on the phenomenon of company unionism.³

In addition to adding to our understanding of some of the broader issues of the era's labour history, these chapters also help deepen our understanding of the process of union organizing itself. The claim that union organizing is an area of Canada's labour history that has been "virtually unstudied," in the words of one of the country's leading labour historians, holds true for the World War Two period. Because the history of union organizing has not been extensively explored to date, there is much to learn about the "human sacrifice and effort" that went into such battles.⁴

In this chapter, I first describe the wartime changes in Canada's industrial workplace and industrial workforce and analyze their impact on CIO organizing. While the war offered fresh, new opportunities for CIO organizing, it also brought new challenges, which were added to the obstacles the CIO had been dealing with since its birth in the mid-1930s. I also attempt in this chapter to offer a collective "profile" of CIO organizers. The next chapter, Chapter Three, offers a generalized narrative of union organizing under the constraints of the wartime period, while Chapter Four tells the stories of three actual organizing drives. The detailed, day-to-day events described in these case studies aim to illuminate the general narrative, making it concrete and thus, I hope, bringing wartime organizing, and those who took part in it, to life.

Wartime changes in industry and the workforce

In 1939, the CIO claimed about 50,000 members across Canada, a figure that was, when compared to membership figures privately shared by individual affiliates, boldly inflated.⁵ By 1945, even that exaggerated figure had multiplied almost five-fold, to more

than 244,000 — no doubt another exaggeration, but nonetheless indicating an impressive, even astounding, rate of growth.⁶ There were considerable pre-war obstacles to CIO organizing: Depression-induced labour surplus; the lack of legislative protection for unions; anti-union governments and media; and the CIO's meagre resources and its relatively few successes in Canada. But the CIO also had some levers before the war: the very magic of its name on account of its success in the United States; a cadre of experienced Workers Unity League organizers; youthful energy and idealism; the example of New Deal labour legislation; business's slide in public favour on account of the Depression; and most important, poverty-level wages, long hours, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, and arbitrary supervision.

Most if not all of these conditions were still present during the war, but the almost explosive growth of the Canadian economy, especially its manufacturing sector, altered the balance of power between worker and employer. Percy Bengough, head of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, observed that during the war Canada underwent an industrial transformation of such dimensions that under normal conditions it would have taken 25 years.⁷ Bengough was correct: the war accelerated Canada's industrial development dramatically and permanently. Unlike the mature economies of Britain and the United States, whose industrial sectors expanded only temporarily during the war, Canada's war effort created an economic sea change that brought the country to industrial maturity.⁸

In 1945, the volume of Canadian manufacturing was two and a half times greater than in 1939.⁹ Steel production doubled,¹⁰ while aircraft production soared from a total of 40 planes built between 1935 and 1939 to 4,000 in 1944 alone.¹¹ In constant dollars, Ontario manufacturing ballooned from \$79 million of production in 1939 to \$1.7 billion

in 1945.¹² This surge of industrial growth produced a vast and critical need for manufacturing workers. By 1944, Canada's industrial workforce had increased by 900,000,¹³ at the same time as more than one million Canadians of working age were drawn out of the labour market into the armed forces.¹⁴

During the Depression, union organizing drives could be thwarted as managers, with thousands of the hungry unemployed looking for work, threatened to fire workers for union activity. But such threats lose their force when workers have the certain knowledge they can find another job with relative ease. Labour shortfalls empower and embolden workers. Canada, still suffering a 25 per cent unemployment rate in 1939, was facing labour shortages by 1941. By 1942, the shortages were acute. That year, for example, the Ontario labour department reported that the amount of overtime hours worked had mushroomed and that had it issued 6,800 work permits to children under 14 for factory work, double the usual number.¹⁵ The increase in workers' power can be illustrated by a vignette from the mammoth Inglis plant in Toronto, which manufactured Bren guns. A male worker asked for his second transfer within a month to another department. Wartime labour controls made it difficult to quit a job, so when the company refused the transfer, the worker asked to be fired. When the company replied that it didn't fire people who were doing a good job, he threatened to inform the National Selective Service that too many people were working in a certain department.¹⁶ This occurred even before the Steel Workers' successful organizing drive.

War industry — the source of 60 per cent of military recruits — felt the labour shortage keenly.¹⁷ "War production is strengthening labour's economic position with every passing day," noted the Canadian Congress of Labour's (CCL) leader Silby Barrett.¹⁸ Not surprisingly, war industry was the focus of most of the CIO's organizing

energies. And 1942, not coincidentally, was the year the CIO started making significant organizing headway in the country's burgeoning manufacturing industries, especially Ontario's. The increase in workers' confidence is evident in their willingness to strike. In Ontario, strikes numbered 109 in 1942, up from 55 the year before.¹⁹

Wartime organizing challenges

Although the war created the labour shortages that increased workers' confidence, it also added fresh challenges to labour's already difficult task of organizing new members. Some of these new challenges were posed by the changing nature of the workforce; some sprung up within the unions themselves; some were a result of anti-union employers, who often exploited and reinforced wartime government initiatives that discouraged unionization.

Wartime workers Because of the unprecedented wartime growth of the Canadian manufacturing industry and the consequent demand for labour, the war brought new kinds of workers into industry.²⁰ "We are organizing in a period which is unique in the history of the trade union movement," a United Electrical Workers Union (UE) leader noted in 1943. "We have in our shops and in the great war industries of this country many new workers who prior to the war had little or no industrial experience."²¹ One such new type was the middle-class hire, who proved to be a mixed blessing for union organizers. Where factory labour had been traditionally dominated by the working class, industry's insatiable wartime labour needs brought in many middle-class workers, including former small business owners and the self-employed, who were either attracted by manufacturing's rising wages or pushed by their own patriotism to "do their bit" for the war effort.²² In some cases these middle-class workers

were more confident and assertive than their working-class co-workers and less fearful of signing a union card. Most were unaccustomed to the harsh conditions of factory life, especially the Simon Legree management style of many supervisors. With so many inexperienced, and hence less than confident, managers in the expanding factories, abuse and harassment increased with the war. Middle-class workers often bridled indignantly at being treated in a way the working class had been enduring for generations and embraced unionism as a result.²³ It was perhaps the presence of middle-class workers that encouraged the CCL, for example, to see traditional middle-class assets as “a fine education” and “selling experience” as useful assets when it hired union organizers.²⁴

On the other hand, middle-class workers usually had less trade union experience and tradition in their background, so their presence could well have diluted an already-pallid working-class consciousness in the factories. Gunda Lambton, a German-born, British immigrant to Canada, recalled that her co-workers at the Inglis factory in downtown Toronto did not think of themselves as working class at all. “From what I hear around me, most of them think they are as good as the boss,” she observed in her wartime journal. “This self-confidence in some ways makes [the job] of organizing a union more difficult.”²⁵ She was surprised to see workers with cars and women workers wearing fur coats at union meetings, “unthinkable in a European union meeting.”²⁶

War also brought women into industrial workplaces, in unprecedented numbers. While the First World War saw about 35,000 women entering industry, mostly in munitions,²⁷ the Second World War would see female manufacturing employment reach more than 400,000 at its peak, with 250,000 working in war industries. Some women came from privileged backgrounds, noted Lambton, and worked for patriotic motives.

They were sometimes resented by union supporters, who saw them as “playing at war work.”²⁸ Most working women, however, were not privileged and came from taxing, female-dominated, working-class jobs: domestic service, laundering, waiting tables, sales and clerical work, and hairdressing.²⁹ The war’s long hours of work, however, coupled with women’s double day of work made it more difficult for women to attend union functions, and their low wages made it more difficult to pay union dues. As well, some women were making the “greatest amount of money they have ever known,” in the words of one UE organizer, and even though their wages fell short of a “union standard,” the pay was high enough to deter unionizing.³⁰ Nonetheless, women organizers remember women as not being slow to sign up, as long as they could be convinced of the union’s usefulness.³¹ Companies sometimes added to the difficulties by making gender an issue during organizing drives: management at the Cockshutt’s plant in Brantford, for example, promised low-paid women employees higher wages if they voted against the union.³²

Child labour was also a challenge, said many union organizers. During the war youngsters below Ontario’s legal working age of 14 were streaming into war plants, and most were too young to be interested in unions.³³ Workers arriving from rural areas were also seen as difficult to unionize. “The inflow of labour from farms is a special problem,” United Auto Workers (UAW) activist Joe Torosian reported from St. Catharines. “[I]t is very hard to persuade them to join the union.”³⁴

War also created an enormous turnover in labour, meaning unions lost wave after wave of members and activists either to the military or to better jobs. Local unions had to rebuild their steward body and their membership levels again and again. The UE, while organizing the Small Arms plant in Toronto, for example, faced a 100 per cent

annual labour turnover rate. The union started organizing there in January 1943 and had signed up 50 per cent of the plant's 2,000 workers by that May. In September, however, when the Ontario Labour Court heard the UE's application for union certification, more than half the union members had left the plant, and the court dismissed the UE's application.³⁵ In some cases, labour turnover meant, moreover, that new hires would come into a plant with no knowledge of what conditions had been like before the union. Such workers came in "under our agreements without any effort on their part and enjoy the privileges of the union without realizing the significance of maintaining these conditions in the plant by belonging to the union," lamented one union leader.³⁶

The war also divided workers' loyalties. Most workers supported the war; in fact, some worked solely for patriotic reasons.³⁷ With 10 per cent of the population in uniform, moreover, just about everybody was acquainted with a member of the armed forces. Between workers' newness to unions and their commitment to the war effort (and therefore uninterrupted production), labour leaders fretted, the level of militancy among Canadian workers was questionable.³⁸

As ever, some workers were anti-union, believing that a union would disrupt the "one big family atmosphere" they believed characterized their workplace. Others were only interested in joining a union if results were guaranteed, while others were simply uninterested, often saying they were preoccupied with family responsibilities or a husband overseas. Others, especially migrants from farms and women, making money for the first time after years of Depression, asked if it was worth rocking the boat.³⁹

Scarce resources. In 1939, the UE, with only a few hundred members in Canada, set itself a target membership of 60,000.⁴⁰ The UE's Canadian leader, C.S. Jackson, while asking unions headquarters in Pittsburgh for more money, pleaded that the sheer

dimension and urgency of wartime organizing in Canada required a larger organizing staff and more money than at any other period in the past.⁴¹ By 1942, though, the union still had only had six full-time organizers for the whole of Canada, at a time when the union was conducting 20 organizing drives in Toronto alone.⁴² The Ontario-centered UAW had only five organizers, while the Steel Workers, active in more provinces, had only 15.⁴³

Wartime labour shortages may have given workers the confidence to join a union, but the demand for unionization came so swiftly and so early in the Canadian CIO's development that it strained resources beyond their limits. This may have been a nice problem to have, but the lack of sufficient resources in both money and organizers meant unions could not take full advantage of wartime labour power. Local union activists and full-time organizers alike complained they had to turn down workers' calls for organizing because there were not enough organizers available.⁴⁴ It meant, further, constantly trying to find a balance between directing resources to organizing new members and devoting them to addressing current members' needs, thus insuring their continuing loyalty to the union. Organizing new plants was not pursued, Burt told the UAW's district council in late 1941, "because we have concentrated ourselves wholly with trying to increase what we had or hold it in plants already organized and attract our membership by more aggressive bargaining." Burt pleaded with locals to allow him to assign the limited number of the union's full-time staff to organizing new plants, a much easier task, he said, than trying to revive plants where workers had become indifferent or stewards ineffective.⁴⁵

For even if workers were eager to join unions during the war, they still needed "a minimum of leadership" to assist them in organizing their workplace, and that

assistance for the most part had to come from union staffers.⁴⁶ Jackson told his American colleagues that “the former methods of relying on volunteers work will no longer satisfy the situation.” The union simply had to hire more full-time staff organizers.⁴⁷ The lack of organizers was at least partly a function of a lack of money, since even the most dedicated organizer needed some kind of salary, however modest.⁴⁸ As early as July 1939, CIO leaders in Canada were wrestling with where the money for organizing was going to come from. The Canadian CIO Coordinating Committee was considering an organizing budget of \$5,000 a month, to cover publicity, research, travel, and the salaries of three full-time organizers.⁴⁹ Meantime, the total revenue for the Steel Workers, by far the largest and richest of the CIO affiliates in Canada at the time, was \$4,500 a month.⁵⁰ One suggestion was a per capita tax on Canadian locals to fund the CIO’s renewed organizing efforts, but the consensus was that while such financial independence might satisfy the “nationalist sentiments of Canadian workers,” it would result in the International CIO’s placing complete responsibility for funding organizing on Canada, a responsibility CIO leaders in Canada “couldn’t possibly discharge...at this stage of organization in Canada.”⁵¹ Financing organizing was again a major topic at the CIO’s November 1939 conference, with the steering committee suggesting that bonds be sold, an idea that was not followed up. Steel Worker H.H. Frick proposed that local unions, rather than full-time union staffers, organize nearby plants in order “to economically achieve our objectives.”⁵² In fact, the slogan, “Every union member an organizer!” signed off the conference.⁵³

Similar sentiments were repeated throughout the war, but locals appeared reluctant to support organizing campaigns other than their own. Since, in some cases, locals were expected to finance their own organizing drives, their parsimony was

understandable, since they often could not collect enough dues to cover their organizing expenses.⁵⁴ In 1940, the UAW asked its locals for a voluntary \$1-a-month increase in dues to fund organizing, but only one local reported that collections were going well.⁵⁵ In November 1942, the CCL executive agreed to levy a 10-cent per month per member special dues assessment for one year to finance CCL organizing efforts, but the response was not encouraging, the CCL's Secretary-Treasurer Pay Conroy reported.⁵⁶ This would not have surprised the United Rubber Workers (URW) activist at the 1939 CIO conference who told presciently at that meeting, "I don't believe the membership will pay an assessment for organization."⁵⁷ The contributions from affiliates to the CCL's Special Organizing Fund were not adequate to cover the salaries and expenses of the 20 organizers it had in the field by 1943-44. The CCL's organizing expenses were three to five times higher than the fund's receipts, and by 1944 the fund was running an \$86,000 deficit.⁵⁸

National union leaders pleaded with local union leaders to become more independent in running their local's affairs,⁵⁹ and locals in some cases responded by hiring their own full-time servicing staff.⁶⁰ Leaders encouraged locals to set up organizing committees to help paid organizers bring in new members in unorganized plants.⁶¹ Others proposed changes to union structures. The UE's organizing director, Ross Russell, for example, noting that more than half his organizers' time was spent on administrative work instead of organizing, proposed the union set up composite locals that could pool their funds to hire business agents and relieve organizers of servicing tasks.

Individual CIO affiliates sent frequent pleas to their international headquarters for money and organizers. In March 1942 Burt reported to the union's district council

that his requests for the Canadian union to boost its current staff of five organizers had been rejected. Burt, nevertheless, was able to persuade the UAW's International Executive Board to let him keep all five, even though the American union was laying its own organizers off as a result of a drop in dues as employers in that country furloughed workers when domestic market production was curtailed.⁶² Later that year, Burt again tried to persuade the International UAW for more help, arguing that Canada did not have its fair share of organizers and suggesting that Detroit was "not sensitive to the organizing sentiment that exists in Canada."⁶³ Overall, however, Canadian CIO affiliates began to benefit financially from the American connection during the war. In 1943, while the Canadian UAW's revenue was \$61,000, it spent \$71,000 on organizing alone, reversing an earlier trend where Canadian dues paid to American union headquarters outstripped the money flowing back into Canada. The Steel Workers union spent more on organizing in Canada than it received in Canadian dues.⁶⁴ The Canadian UE was able to claim that for every one dollar in dues it collected in Canada, the international union provided the Canadians with three dollars.⁶⁵

Nonetheless, organizers and union leaders alike believed they did not have enough organizers to meet workers' demands for unionization, and that shortfall probably caused the CIO members, perhaps entire industries. In 1944, for example, the CCL's hard-working Conroy, said he could not serve on a proposed organizing committee for the furniture industry. "I can tell you right now I have more work than I can handle," he said, suggesting the organizer making the proposal stick to organizing the textile industry, because his time, too, was limited.⁶⁶ Burt wrote the CCL about organizing opportunities in Sarnia, saying refinery workers were approaching the UAW and pointing out there were 2,000 workers at Imperial Oil alone. Burt said the UAW

organizer in the area had so many other drives on the go, he couldn't devote any time to Sarnia. The CCL replied that it, too, could not help, because "the calls we are receiving are beyond our capacity to handle."⁶⁷ The UAW's victory at De Havilland Aircraft in Toronto prompted calls for the union to organize aircraft workers in Montreal, but the union didn't have the organizers to send there.⁶⁸ The UE was even reluctant to assume 75 members the UAW had already signed up at the Robbins and Myers plant in Brantford. Jackson explained that while the union stood to gain 200 new members at the plant, it would also run up legal, travelling, and organizing expenses of two or three hundred dollars because a staff person would still have to be assigned to maintain union membership levels even after the union won recognition.⁶⁹

The scarcity of organizers also affected the pace and energy of drive, according to Burt, especially in large workplaces with thousands of workers. He regretted that the union could not "blitz" the De Havilland plant, for example, with a large staff of full-time organizers, whose sheer numbers could help maintain the union's organizing momentum. He feared that the "piecemeal" approach made necessary by having only one or two organizers dealing with a city the size of Toronto could put the drive into stalemate.⁷⁰

Maintaining the level of union members in a unionized workplace, a project the unions called "consolidation," was a constant preoccupation for unions, which at the time lacked union security provisions either in contracts or in law. The lack of organizers thus posed a problem even in units already organized. Organized plants still needed staff assistance: union activists in these plants were usually inexperienced in handling grievances and otherwise policing a contract. With their local union lacking union security protection, they were engaged in what amounted to an on-going organizing

drive within their plants. Even a union with a strong shop steward system, such as the UE, had trouble collecting dues from a majority of a unionized plant's workers, even after a contract had been signed. "This failure to consolidate," said UE leader George Harris, "has resulted in our inability to broaden out into new fields of organization because of the fact that forces and attention must be concentrated on the problem of consolidating a number of shops...."⁷¹

Inexperience CIO organizers recalled that young workers more than the middle-aged were interested in a vigorous challenge to the company that the youthful and dynamic CIO represented to them.⁷² But the CIO's newness and youthfulness at times created problems. CIO affiliates were unionizing workers who had little knowledge of, let alone tradition of, trade unionism. The organizers themselves often had almost no experience of the industry they were targeting, while rank-and-file organizers inside the plants were "fresh from the work bench."⁷³ The usual criterion that union organizers should be union veterans was difficult for the CIO, whose members and leaders were often very young. Teenage organizers were not uncommon: Charles Bonnelo was a volunteer organizer for the Packinghouse Workers at age 17. The UAW's Paul Siren was 22 when he started organizing, while Steel Worker Eileen Tallman was 26 when she started signing up chemical workers in Toronto.⁷⁴ Burt was an old man by CIO standards, assuming leadership in 1939 of the Canadian UAW at 36. Fred Dowling was 28 when he took leadership of the Packinghouse Workers in 1940. Often, this youthfulness led to mere condescension from the powers-that-be, with the CIO and its leaders being regarded as brash upstarts. Federal deputy minister of labour Bryce Stewart told a Canadian Manufacturers' Association meeting in 1941 that it was offensive when "a delegation in which the eldest member is 27 years of age will tell you

how society and the department of labour should deal with labour," and he deplored the CIO's lack of connection with the "old labour movement, in which it could have learned many valuable lessons."⁷⁵

There was a kernel of truth in Stewart's latter charge. The CIO was having to gain experience on the fly, under extreme pressure to make the most of wartime conditions, and it made mistakes. "We have to take organizers out of literally green territory," the CCL's Conroy said. "Some have not stood up, some have fallen down."⁷⁶ The CIO was prone to bluffing with a weak hand, a high-risk strategy when up against the "powerful and divisive forces" arrayed against newborn locals.⁷⁷ In 1941, the Steel Workers took workers at Dominion Wheel in Toronto out on strike, even though, as the CCL's Silby Barrett had tried to caution, "the men are not sufficiently grounded in the trade union movement." The strike was broken after eight days, when workers began to stream back to work. Management fired 45 of the strikers, and while the union was able to get them reinstated, the local union ceased to function.⁷⁸ The Packinghouse Workers, taking a "gambler's chance," applied for recognition at a board of conciliation in 1941 with only a minority of workers signed up. When the board demanded proof of membership strength, the union had to withdraw its application, meaning it had potentially jeopardized its credibility with both workers and the board.⁷⁹ In March 1943, the Steel Workers began organizing workers at the Toronto Shipyards, an AFL craft union stronghold. The CCL's Conroy had warned Steel Workers leader Charles Millard about "stepping into something you may not be capable of handling," one that might challenge the AFL to a "general raiding spree," but Steel forged ahead, signing up around 300 of the yards' 4,500 workers. In June the union was demanding a representation vote, but the labour department could not persuade either the company

or the seven AFL unions to agree. The Steel Workers then had their members congregate around the plant superintendent's office at quitting time demanding a recognition vote and saying they would demonstrate every day until they got one. Managers took workers' badge numbers down and the next day fired 289 of them for "serious misconduct." Steel made several appeals for the workers' reinstatement, including at Ontario's new Labour Court, but lost every appeal.⁸⁰

Factionalism Throughout the war, in spite of official union pleas for labour unity, unions adhered to the time-honoured practice of engaging each other in bitter jurisdictional disputes, complete with raids and counter-raids. The war no doubt intensified these disputes because, first, there was just more organizing happening and, secondly, unions were feeling the pressure of the clock. Since most unionists were convinced the war would be followed by a depression and consequent labour surpluses, aggressiveness was key to signing up as many workers as possible before war's end.

Thirdly, the Cold War came early to the labour movement, no small thanks to the shifting allegiances of the Soviet Union and the resulting adjustments made by Communist Party of Canada (CPC) activists in relation to the level of militancy it advocated. CCFers in the unions and the CPC had clashed over the years for historic reasons, but differences of opinion over the importance of the war effort for unions, including the use of the strike weapon, added to the conflict. After it became clear the Canadian electorate was shifting left, the historic antipathy deepened, as the parties struggled over which one would control the labour movement and, potentially, workers' votes. Many of these political disputes were played out in battles over jurisdiction.⁸¹ The disputes between the Steel Workers and the UE were often politically charged, with Millard, a strong CCF partisan, trying to contain the CPC by heading off UE growth. The

UE's Jackson responded in kind. With not enough UE organizers to sign up workers at the RCA and Marconi radio plants in Toronto, for example, Jackson chose to give "tacit agreement to the AFL's moving in and taking them over," rather than leaving them to the "death touch of the Millard group."⁸² Another version of this partisan warfare was the politically motivated disputes within the Steel Workers.⁸³ After Millard ousted several experienced CPC activists from the union's Canadian staff in 1940, they regrouped, calling themselves the Ontario Executive, and continued to sign workers up in the name of the Steel Workers and collect dues. Eventually the locals sympathetic to the Ontario Executive re-aligned with the Millard section of the union but, in the meantime, enormous energies had been wasted, and countless workers likely confused or disgusted.⁸⁴

At times, incursions and disputes were between AFL affiliates and CIO affiliates. The Steel Workers, for example, in addition to raiding the AFL craft unions at the Toronto Shipyards, also went after the International Association of Machinists (IAM), an AFL affiliate, at the John Inglis plant in Toronto. AFL affiliates just as regularly entered CIO jurisdictions, sometimes at an employer's request, the AFL being seen as less-radical than the CIO.⁸⁵ Suspicions of the AFL ran high within the CIO, with senior CIO unionists convinced the AFL was working hand in glove with both the Department of Labour and employers to "stifle all militant action of the workers during this period."⁸⁶

Just as serious were the disputes within the CIO itself. The rivalry between the UAW and the Steel Workers in Toronto, for example, was particularly intense, once the UAW began organizing in the city in 1942. It had been clear for years that as far as the CIO went, one of its affiliates tended to dominate a city: the Steel Workers in Hamilton, the UAW in Windsor, the URW in Kitchener. The Steel Workers had had a presence in

Toronto since before the war, but the UAW's entry into the city meant two of the CIO's largest affiliates began to compete with each other in several major Toronto plants.

When the Steel Workers began to organize Massey-Harris in Toronto, the UAW, having claimed jurisdiction over farm equipment workers, hit back by sending organizers into the Inglis plant, where the Steel Workers were already vying with the IAM. The CCL finally stepped in, and the two unions agreed to a compromise deal that gave Massey-Harris to the UAW, while granting Steel jurisdiction in Inglis and in a third contested plant, Acme Screw and Gear.

Following this dispute, the CCL persuaded its affiliates to agree to a jurisdictional process whereby all disputes would be sent to the CCL's jurisdictional committee, whose decisions would be final and binding, except that its decisions would be subject to the approval of the warring unions' respective international executive boards! As a result, in practice, despite the CCL's protests and policies, the disputes continued. The Steel Workers and the UE, for example, reached a bitter stand-off at the Anaconda Brass plant in Toronto in 1943, well after the CCL's jurisdictional policy was put in place, and it proved the CCL's virtual impotence in mediating many of the disputes.⁸⁷ The Steel Workers had signed up 188 workers at Anaconda while the UE had enlisted 129, "but many are duplicates, with some workers joining both organizations because the opposing union had prevailed on them to shift their allegiance." The CCL ended up asking the heads of the unions' respective American parents to work out a settlement.⁸⁸

On occasion, the jurisdictional issue was merely chaotic. Burt confessed to the UAW district council that while the UAW was helping the UE organize a plant in Welland, his personal opinion was that the plant "actually belongs to the USWA."⁸⁹

It is impossible to gauge with any accuracy how harmful to union growth inter-union and intra-union competition was. In some cases, competition may have resulted in more strenuous efforts on the part of all parties, thus giving an organizing drive more vigour and encouraging each union to do its best for workers. In other cases, the competition may have been empty of all such genuine debate and would be, therefore, pointless, even destructive. Rivalry often lead to superheated rhetoric, which could become damagingly hostile. The IAM at Inglis, led by CPC activist Fred Collins, accused the rival Steel Workers of collaborating with management to “betray Inglis workers.” Steel, for its part denounced the “smear” tactics of the IAM, which, it said, were designed to “stampede frightened workers and anti-union bosses” into supporting the IAM and potentially turning workers off all unions.⁹⁰ Sometimes the rivalry became very public, with angry letters-to-the-editor, written by rival union partisans, dueling in newspapers. None of this encouraged workers to join a union. One Inglis worker wrote the *Toronto Star* saying he had decided to join neither the IAM nor the Steel Workers “because unions are asking workers to get together and get organized yet can’t do the very thing they are asking us to. Are they jealous, or is this a fight for dues and wealth and power?”⁹¹ Most often, as Jackson acknowledged, two CIO unions vying for employees’ allegiance produced “confusion in the minds of workers.”⁹²

Management strategies and CIO response

As the war intensified union organizing, employers reacted by ratcheting up anti-union tactics. Within days of war being declared, for example, RCA Victor in Toronto was warning its foreign-born workers they would be deported as enemy aliens if they did not cease their union activity.⁹³ Although there was some division within the

ranks of capital about how to respond to the growing strength of the CIO, most employers remained loyal to their traditional anti-union strategies of carrots, sticks, and company unions.⁹⁴

Paternalism: the two faces of the employer-father “The myth,” wrote Steel Worker organizer Dick Steele in the union’s newspaper, “was that the employees of the company were made up of fathers and sons.”⁹⁵ Usually, the employer-father tried to keep his employee-children in line by combining benevolent indulgence with punitive sanctions. At Dominion Foundries in Hamilton, wrote Steele, the company spent large sums of money “that could have gone into workers’ wages” on banquets and brass bands, ex-soldiers’ clubs and sports teams, profit-sharing schemes and an employee newspaper full of pictures to show employees they were part of one big happy family. But, as he told his readers, these corporate welfare measures often masked the company’s attacks on the rights of employees because they were usually, for example, accompanied by the company’s firing union organizers.⁹⁶

With no law outlawing such practices, employers, furthermore, were free to change the terms and conditions of work in the middle of an organizing drive. Faced with a serious unionizing threat, companies frequently responded with the kindly side of the father, cutting work hours, raising wages, cleaning up unsanitary facilities, introducing safety measures, and bringing in sick leave and vacation plans. At a Goodyear Rubber plant in Bowmanville, the URW had signed up 300 of 350 workers. Instead of recognizing the union, though, the company gave everyone a five-cent raise. Similarly, at Wilson Motor Bodies in Toronto, the company gave everyone a five-cent-an-hour raise after a conciliation board had called for a government-supervised vote allowing workers to opt for the union or not.⁹⁷ At Massey-Harris in Toronto,

management gave workers a paid lunch when the union drive began and, after it continued to gain momentum, granted two, 10-minute rest periods.⁹⁸ At the Canadian General Electric (CGE) plant in Toronto, management awarded a five-per-cent night-shift premium after large numbers of workers joined the UE.⁹⁹ When that didn't slow the drive, the company offered a large wage increase in return for the union's dropping its demands for recognition. The local union accepted, and an agreement was signed between a company union and the company.¹⁰⁰

Unions, not surprisingly, were not hesitant about claiming credit for the gains made during organizing drives. After the Ford Motor Company in Windsor gave workers time-and-a-half overtime pay after eight hours' work during the UAW's 1941 organizing drive there, the union came out with a new slogan: "Keep the union going, boys! Get double time for Sundays and holidays!"¹⁰¹ "The union is getting all the credit for the increases and the boys are signing up pretty well," reported a Steel Worker activist after an employer increased wages midway in an organizing drive.¹⁰²

Frequently, companies would offer employees who were union organizers special favours, hoping to buy them off. The management of the Westinghouse plant in Hamilton offered UE activist Alf Ready extra wages again and again, "without my even asking."¹⁰³ Persuading union activists to join management's ranks was another employer tactic. At Coulter Brass in Toronto, the company put 24 union activists on salary. All 24 quit their union, the UAW, and wouldn't tell their former union colleagues why.¹⁰⁴

Just as frequently, the stern, ruthless, father emerged. Paternalism crept right into the language. One local union organizer testified that when he asked why he had been passed over for a promised promotion, his department head told him very firmly and gently that "when a little boy is naughty, you must slap his hand."¹⁰⁵ Hands were

slapped in a variety of ways. Employers threatened to cancel benefit plans if workers joined a union.¹⁰⁶ Supervisors told workers they would have their wages cut and be put on tough jobs if the union came in. Managers handed out dismissal slips, and three or four days later, told workers they would cancel the dismissals if workers withdrew from the union.¹⁰⁷ Supervisors demanded to know a worker's views on the union when a transfer or promotion came up. At times, they used ruthless intimidation. At Wilson Motor Bodies, a supervisor went to the fledgling local's financial secretary, a blacksmith who had lost five fingers in workplace accidents, and told him he didn't want any UAW men in his department. The blacksmith, worried about whether he could do any other job in the plant, "broke down" and signed up for the company union.¹⁰⁸ Wilson managers, armed with this recanting, warned other workers and urged them to tear up their union cards. Immigrant workers were especially vulnerable. If their English skills were not strong, for example, supervisors asked them to sign anti-union petitions, refusing to explain what the petition said but reassuring workers that signing the petition would not harm them.¹⁰⁹

In some cases, an employer was so determined to remain non-union that it would defy even the government. At Atlas Steels in Welland, where the UE was conducting a vigorous organizing campaign in 1943 among the plant's 3,000 workers, the company refused to meet with the industrial disputes commissioner brought in at the union's request to investigate the labour relations practices of the company. The commissioner was virtually thrown out of the plant. Company police tore down government notices announcing the recognition vote the commissioner eventually ordered, replacing them with posters calling upon workers to boycott the vote. The day

the vote was held, armed company police were present both on the street and in the polling stations.¹¹⁰

The war brought new weapons for employers to use against union activists. Deferments from military service were a precious commodity for both labour-hungry employers and employees who had no desire to join the armed forces, and employers frequently threatened activists with cancelling their deferments.¹¹¹ The occasional wartime layoff provided a pretext for getting rid of union activists, sometimes even where there were contractual seniority clauses; the employer would simply lay off people in order of seniority until the unionist they wanted to get rid of was reached.¹¹² Workers feared that after the war, there would be an economic depression and labour shortages would be replaced by labour surpluses. Playing on these fears, as the war's end neared and large layoffs started cropping up in late 1944 and early 1945, managers in plants where a union was still in the organizing stage told workers that anyone not belonging to the union would be given steady work after the war. Some warned that a union would mean the post-war closing of their plant.¹¹³

In spite of labour shortages, firings still did occur. Workers often risked their jobs in organizing drives, especially in the early stages, when only a handful of workers had signed up. The company could literally decimate the early activist ranks by firing individuals at will. Managers at Wilson Motor Bodies fired four workers the morning following the union's first undercover organizing meeting and warned others the same would happen to them.¹¹⁴ Faced with a Steel Workers' drive, the National Steel Car Company in Hamilton fired everyone on the new local's executive. Further, if a National Steel Car worker so much as complained that another worker was paid inequitably, both workers were fired.¹¹⁵ Managers used almost any pretext to rid themselves of

troublesome activists. One union activist was fired for "singing," after his supervisor found out he was signing up fellow workers.¹¹⁶ Companies would sometimes justify the firings to their other employees by accusing activists of being communists or fascists.¹¹⁷

The unions fought tenaciously to get workers reinstated, as a management firing strategy could quickly chill any union organizing drive, even in labour-short war plants.¹¹⁸ But the process of fighting for reinstatement was so long and arduous that the union could well collapse in the meantime.¹¹⁹ A three-year-long attempt by the Retail Clerks union, for example, to organize the Robert Simpson Co. in Toronto failed after the company fired most of the most active unionists, and union time and energy was diverted trying to get them reinstated.¹²⁰ A 1939 Criminal Code amendment outlawing the firing of workers for union activity or membership was unenforceable, especially in Ontario, where the provincial government had failed to implement any enabling laws. The bill had easily passed the Commons in Ottawa because, in the eyes of unionists, corporate Canada was confident it would have no effect at all.¹²¹ Steel Workers legal counsel Andrew Brewin testified to the 1943 Ontario Select Committee on Collective Bargaining between Employers and Employees that in spite of hundreds, if not thousands of cases, where employees had complained of discriminatory treatment on account of their union activity, there had been only a handful of prosecutions across Canada and only two convictions.¹²² Unions did better having firings redressed through industrial disputes commissioners, who did not require a criminal burden of proof to find an employer guilty of illegal firings. The UE was able to have 25 workers reinstated by appealing to a commissioner in 1942, for example.¹²³ Sometimes the unions would ask the National Selective Service to investigate a dismissal and force an employer to

reinstate the worker if it found he or she had been fired for union activism.¹²⁴ In other cases, unions appealed to the Department of Labour, with some limited success.¹²⁵

Occasionally, firings actually helped the union, by angering workers. At the Massey-Harris plant in Toronto, management fired 76 workers shortly after the drive started. One worker was physically ejected from the plant. The “goon” tactics, reported the organizer, prompted many workers to join the union in protest.¹²⁶ Management, nonetheless, often succeeded in stopping a union drive with firings and threats of firings. After the UAW lost a recognition vote at Motor Lamp in Windsor, Burt said that “employees [had been] so fearful after being worked on by the company, that we lost.”

127

A union defeat affected other organizing drives. During the bitter strike at Kirkland Lake in 1942, the UAW’s drive at one Windsor auto parts plant had been going well, and the union had received some encouraging signs the company was ready to negotiate. But when the Kirkland Lake strike was defeated, the plant’s management hardened its attitude, refused to recognize the union, and refused to negotiate. Instead, managers set up a company union, which promptly signed a “yellow dog” contract.¹²⁸

Company unions The company union was an almost universal response among Canadian employers faced with a CIO organizing drive during the war. The UE’s Jackson told the 1943 Ontario Select Committee that of 33 organizing drives his union had been conducting, a company union had been present in all but three.¹²⁹

Employers used company unions to foil organizing drives, rather than the more straightforward strategy of all-out opposition to a CIO union. Such a confrontational strategy in the midst of war popularly known as the “people’s war,” might have looked undemocratic. Management’s strategic decision, therefore, was to define the struggle for

workers' loyalties as being a tussle between different kinds of unions, as opposed to a contest between the company and a CIO union. In so doing, employers were admitting, tacitly, that workers had the power to extract from them some degree of representation, so they tried to limit that concession to a union they could control.

The objective of a company union was to avert bona fide trade union organization by creating a semblance of worker representation and some degree of grievance handling. Company unions, however, were rarely free of employer influence or domination.¹³⁰ Employers would often pay the salaries of full-time company union officers, give them offices in the plant, and provide them with secretarial, legal, and financial support. Company unions were thus usually public relations devices to be used as part of a campaign to counter the appeal of a real union.¹³¹ The company union was, further, a communications vehicle for management, giving managers a way to learn about worker unrest before it developed into serious trouble.¹³²

Company unions had proliferated in the 1920s, as employers developed a form of paternalism known as welfare capitalism. Most of these initiatives stagnated during the Great Depression, although a few company unions were revitalized during the 1930s to counter the organizing efforts of the new industrial unions. As a result, when the CIO began its organizing efforts during the Second World War, company unions already existed in some plants, although most, such as the one at Massey-Harris in Toronto, were all but dormant.¹³³ The Ontario government's announcement in late 1942 that it was considering bringing in Wagner-type labour legislation in response to mounting labour unrest and burgeoning support for the CCF, set off, according to Jackson, "a feverish degree of activity" on the part of employers, and "the fostering of various types of company unions."¹³⁴ Managers had no doubt noticed what Jackson called the "new

life" the proposed Ontario legislation was breathing into organizing drives, such as in Westinghouse in Hamilton, that had stalled.¹³⁵ Not coincidentally, the Canadian Federated Council of Employers appeared on the scene in early 1943, the first organized effort to build a company union "movement" on a continental scale, according to the *Canadian Tribune*.¹³⁶

Some company unions were hurriedly set up even before a CIO organizing drive began, when a plant's managers learned the CIO was organizing in a nearby plant.¹³⁷ In most cases, though, management started its company union once a CIO drive had started. At the Parker Pen Company in Toronto, the company knew within a week that the UE was trying to organize and immediately sponsored an energetic campaign to establish a company union. Management then conducted its own recognition vote and, after a management campaign featuring threats and intimidation, the company union won the vote over the UE and negotiated an agreement with the employer.¹³⁸ Having no legislated duty to bargain with a recognized union, employers organized company unions even *after* a CIO union had won a recognition vote. At the Sawyer-Massey plant in Hamilton, the UE won a 1943 government-supervised vote 253 to 131. The company, however, encountered "a great deal of difficulty" in scheduling a meeting with the union. Three weeks later the Sawyer-Massey Employees' Association made its appearance and puts "lots of pressure on employees to join."¹³⁹

Supervisors frequently intimidated workers into joining a company union, using various inducements, threats, coercion, and even bribery. Workers were promised higher wages and army deferments if they signed with a company union. Atlas Steel Products in Welland paid workers \$20 to sign with the company union.¹⁴⁰ One CIO local union leader testified that in his workplace the intimidation was aimed at women in

particular, with supervisors warning them it would be “unfortunate” if they became involved in any CIO meetings.¹⁴¹

Workers, however, often continued to support the CIO in spite of coercion because, Jackson explained, they knew that only through an independent union could they secure the help of experienced people who were unconnected to their particular workplace. “That is principle No. One in joining a union,” he said. “There are so many avenues open to management from the foremen up to exercise discrimination....[Workers] just feel they need protection from someone outside the plant...someone who can come in and sit down with their committee and help them balance up the bargaining power....That is the reason 99 times out of 100 a worker joins a union, to secure that protection.” Jackson cited employer attempts to exclude union staff representatives from the bargaining table as proof of the importance of union independence to workers.¹⁴²

Unions often advised workers not to “stick their necks out but to join the company union,”¹⁴³ and then, following a commonly used CIO strategy in response to a company union, take it over by running a CIO slate when elections were held for company union office. In some cases, the CIO supporters, once elected, won concessions from management and publicized such victories as CIO victories. Kitchener URW activist Joan Dowden spoke about the value of CIO activists’ taking over the company union, hinting at the shop floor power she had gained. Elected as the company union’s “women’s representative,” Dowden told the 1943 Select Committee that “management could [now] not very well get rid of me. I still have control of these girls, even if they shift me to another department.”¹⁴⁴ In many cases, however, employers saw the danger

in allowing a CIO union to derive any credit for employer concessions and banned CIO supporters for running for company union office.¹⁴⁵

Another CIO strategy was to launch a publicity campaign exposing the weakness of the company union. Steel Workers organizer Dick Steele told activists at one steel plant where a union slate had taken over the executive of the company union to put on a “powerful propaganda campaign explaining clearly to the workers the fact that the works council has not earned them a wage increase in spite of the company’s record profits....” After the propaganda campaign, he advised, the union representatives on the works council should very publicly resign and tell workers that after their “miserable experiences” with company unions, they were confident that the only way was through the Steel Workers.¹⁴⁶ Workers were influenced by union propaganda and, once aroused, made no secret of their scepticism of their employers’ sudden affection for in-house unions. At the Inco complex in Sudbury, where management had hurriedly organized a company union in 1942, the company inserted a copy of the collective agreement it claimed it had negotiated with the company union in workers’ pay envelopes. Recalled CCL organizer Ernest Evans: “The next day the pay office was just littered with them. The men dropped them where they stood and refused to have anything to do with them.”¹⁴⁷

In cases where the CIO union was very strong in a plant, a company would try to meet with both the CIO committee and the company union committee in an effort to deny the CIO exclusive bargaining rights.¹⁴⁸ Often government conciliation boards reinforced this employer strategy, as at De Havilland Aircraft, when an industrial disputes commissioner ordered the employer to deal with both the UAW and the company union. Conciliation boards recognized company unions even when the CIO

union had majority support if, for example, the company union executive's term of office or its contract with management had not expired.¹⁴⁹ The UAW faced such a situation at Brantford Coach and Body, where the recognition vote was delayed by government order until a newly minted company union's quickly negotiated contract with the employer had expired. "There is no reason why companies could not use this as a precedent and sign agreements with company associations for five or 10 years ahead, thus keeping out legitimate unions....," Burt argued, saying such rulings showed to what extent the government was supporting the company union model, and noting that the same tactic was being used by other employers.¹⁵⁰

Wartime government controls on labour

The wartime CIO believed that both provincial and federal governments were on capital's side, not labour's. Labour leaders believed employers were emboldened by their conviction that they could rely on the government to defend capital against CIO incursions, under the guise of aiding the war effort. After all, they noted, the government's industrial war effort was being largely directed by "dollar-a-year men," former private-sector industrialists with an antipathy to labour. "The employers can be confident," said Jackson, "that the government will take the full responsibility of acting against the employees' organizations."¹⁵¹ Labour's suspicions were borne out by such practices as the Ontario government's arranging transport and housing for 100 replacement workers at the Campbell's Soup Co. in Toronto, when Packinghouse Workers members struck in September 1941 for recognition.¹⁵² Federal officials sprung to help besieged employers as well. During the UAW's three-week-long recognition

strike at Motor Products in Windsor in 1942, federal employment officials brought in the 160 replacement workers the company hired in an attempt to break the strike.¹⁵³

Wartime extension of the IDIA It was only shortly after the war started, in November 1939, that the federal government showed the direction of its labour relations policy by extending 1907's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) to all war industry. The IDIA would now cover 80 per cent of Canadian manufacturing and, therefore, most workplaces with CIO potential. The IDIA required the parties in a dispute to submit to government conciliation before any strike or lockout; this delay, the act's framers had hoped, would dampen workers' enthusiasm for strike action. As union lawyer J.L. Cohen pointed out, the IDIA was designed to deal with disputes arising where employers had recognized the union in a workplace and where the union and employer had established a collective bargaining relationship.¹⁵⁴ Its purpose was to force a cooling-off period in a labour-management dispute between two recognized entities; it had not been drafted to deal with disputes where the employer refused to recognize a union as its employees' representative. The delays imposed by IDIA conciliation, labour leaders claimed, represented far more than a cooling-off mechanism: they could fatally undermine a new union by giving an employer time to move against it.

The federal Minister of Labour had 15 days to decide to establish an IDIA conciliation board. Then, labour leaders noted, if the minister decided that a board was warranted, another three to five weeks usually elapsed before it was actually set up. By the time the board's report came down, as many as six months could have passed. Burt noted that 13 of the 27 board reports involving war industries were delayed by at least two months. He said that such a record of delays had to be seen as an "indication of a tendency to weaken the organization of the workers by means of protracted

proceedings, particularly where new industrial unions ... have yet to win recognition in their plants."¹⁵⁵ In 1942, Windsor workers were waiting at least three months for a board even to be set up, "during which time, managements use every opportunity to discriminate and discourage continued membership in the union."¹⁵⁶ Burt noted that AFL affiliates were getting speedier boards than CIO unions. The Steel Workers at Algoma Steel in Sault Ste Marie waited more than a year for a conciliation board's report, while the same board had given "favorable consideration to [AFL] minority groups in the same plant."¹⁵⁷ There was, he said, "a definite disinclination on the part of board to bring a speedy settlement in the case of the majority of industrial unions." Further, there was no guarantee that the government would even set up a board. In 1942-43, unions filed 145 applications for conciliation boards. The main cause of most of these disputes was union recognition, but the labour department set up only 36 boards. In only six cases was the application denied because the department found the union did not have majority support of workers.¹⁵⁸

In June 1941, the federal government introduced an order-in-council creating a tripartite Industrial Disputes Inquiry Commission (IDIC) to answer labour's complaints about IDIA delays. The IDIC had the power to appoint a commissioner to investigate and try to effect a settlement of the issue upon which an application for a board of conciliation had been based. If the commissioner failed to find a resolution, he or she could recommend to the labour minister that a board be set up. Labour initially supported the IDIC because it appeared to a mechanism that could clear up the IDIA backlog and create a path to recognition that would not involve taking a strike vote, but it soon came to see the IDIC as just another bureaucratic source of delay, and worse, one

that seemed biased in favour of setting up company unions as a means of resolving disputes.¹⁵⁹

Wartime orders-in-council The IDIC was just one in a long series of orders-in-council (PCs) that labour believed hurt its cause. PC 2685 of June 1940 expressed support for workers' right to organize and urged companies to bargain with their employees. At first, labour greeted it warmly, with Barrett saying it "opened the gates for a union drive..."¹⁶⁰ By 1941, however, the labour movement was calling it "worthless" because of the government's failure to enforce it.¹⁶¹ "Big business laughed at it and laughed at us," read one union editorial.¹⁶² The IDIC also gave equal status to company unions, which incensed labour.¹⁶³

Other orders-in-council followed PC 2685, including ones restricting picketing, limiting labour mobility (thus reducing the impact of worker-empowering labour shortages), and requiring unions to hold government-supervised strike votes before they could call a strike, even after an employer had failed to follow a conciliation board's recommendations.¹⁶⁴ To beat back inflation, the spectre that haunted those who remembered the inflation-fueled labour unrest of the First World War and its aftermath, the government also brought in PC 8253 in October 1941, which froze wages to pre-Depression levels, a measure mitigated only by an inadequate cost-of-living provision. It also called for wages to be on a par with the average wage in a particular community and set up a system of tripartite regional war labour boards, which ruled on applications for increases.

Wage freezes had the potential of rendering hollow any union vow to negotiate wage increases, an almost universally used argument for joining a union. As Burt said, in early 1942, a few months after PC 8253 was introduced, wage freezes reduced the "the

attraction for unionism" among workers.¹⁶⁵ The UAW's first contract at the Ford plant in Windsor, had won a 26 per cent wage increase for some workers. But armed with the wage freeze order, Ford began cutting wages to the Windsor average. Said one Ford local union leader: "It is very embarrassing to face wage cuts in the middle of a drive for new members."¹⁶⁶ What was happening at Ford, however, could also go the other way, with unions demanding community-average wages. The UE reported success in winning community-average wage adjustments from employers through in-plant wage committees, when the union was strong enough to force an employer to settle. The UE won more increases for more than 1,000 workers in this manner at the Small Arms plant and 160 at Coulter's Brass, both in Toronto.¹⁶⁷

In spite of the freeze order, furthermore, wartime labour boards did grant wage increases. From November 1941 to February 1943, 6,891 applications for increases in wages, cost-of-living, and various benefits were made to the Ontario war labour board, and 5,557 were granted. About 77 per cent of these were requests for wage increases, and 89 per cent were granted. Employers accounted for more than 80 per cent of applications, and employees six per cent; 11 per cent were made jointly.¹⁶⁸ As unions organized more plants, more joint applications occurred. In 1945, half the UE's submission for increases, for example, were made jointly with the employer.¹⁶⁹ Since boards were allowing wage increases, unions made the argument to workers that joining a union would help them make gains. In fact, as unions gained experience advocating for workers before war labour boards, labour leaders began to believe that wage controls made unions *more* appealing to workers because of the money and expertise it took to take a case to a war labour board. "It was very easy for unorganized workers to see that organized workers were successfully appealing some of their cases

and obtaining wage increases, because these things were reported in the press, and therefore it became somewhat easier to organize workers into the unions," Burt recalled later.^{170,171}

Repression In addition to laws and regulations discouraging unionization, labour faced police intimidation and wartime restrictions on civil liberties. Under the Defence of Canada Regulations, issued September 3, 1939, a week before Canada declared war, civil liberties in the country were curtailed, including the banning of more than 30 groups, including the CPC, the political home of many CIO organizers. In 1940, the government interned members of the CPC, many of who were skilled union organizers. Steele went into hiding for almost two years, after which he asked to join the army, provided he wouldn't be arrested. As soon as he surfaced, though, he was sent to the Don Jail.¹⁷²

Unionists also faced a heavy police presence. In December 1940, Chrysler workers in Windsor took a strike vote to protest the company's refusal to discuss a worker's grievance with the UAW. Chrysler police and Windsor police made themselves known outside the union hall where the vote was taken. With the vote a success, the company fired 47 in-plant union leaders. Workers set up a picket line, which Burt joined. He was arrested and spent a night in jail with the other 47 leaders. Burt reported that police were inside the plant breaking up conversations, while outside the plant "they were everywhere." They stopped picketers from using a sound truck and distributing leaflets. In addition to police, the Chrysler drive saw "members of his Majesty's armed forces [parading] through the plant."¹⁷³ At the CGE plant in Toronto in early June 1941, when management refused to negotiate with the union, UE members walked out on a "holiday." The Department of Labour sent no officials to provide

conciliation or mediation services, saying, the union claimed, that it would not until strikers returned to work. After a week, Jackson recommended a return to work, which workers followed. For his pains, he was arrested and jailed for leading an illegal strike, and 14 strikers were fined \$20 a day each for every day of the seven -day strike — a small fortune for workers — for violating the IDIA. The verdict was quashed in December 1941, about the same time Jackson was released from interment.¹⁷⁴

Local police arrested Millard and other organizers for distributing union leaflets outside a New Toronto plant in the city's west end in October 1940. When the Ontario Supreme Court repudiated their convictions and forced New Toronto to pay the unionists' legal costs, the municipality promptly rewrote its by-laws to require anyone wanting to distribute leaflets to apply for a permit, arguing they were littering the streets.¹⁷⁵ Millard was arrested a second time for allegedly saying that men were enlisting so that they could eat regularly; he was accused of "agitating public opinion against Canada's war effort."¹⁷⁶ North York police, in the north-central section of the city, seized literature from union organizers' parked cars,¹⁷⁷ and police routinely broke up meetings of workers outside the CGE plants in downtown Toronto.¹⁷⁸ In addition to company and city police, the Ontario Provincial Police appeared during disputes, and labour leaders believed they were "using every effort their authority gives them to break our organizations."¹⁷⁹

The organizers: a profile

This degree of state repression combined with employer resistance made the task of organizing workers a risky business, and the outcome of an organizing drive depended not upon full-time union staff organizers but upon a vanguard of workers

inside a workplace who were willing to risk their jobs, and sometimes their relationships with family, friends, and co-workers, to persuade fellow employees to sign a union card. Such workers were in the best position to talk to their co-workers about the conditions they shared and the common risks they faced if they supported a union drive. These “inside organizers” could gauge the balance between their co-workers’ anger towards, and fear of, the employer, and shape the union drive accordingly. Wrote one union editor: “[No staff] organizer can do more than suggest to a group of workers the [possibility of] being organized... Unless it is within their own ranks the crusading spirit, the willingness to take risks, and to stick together at all costs for developing and using the economic power of [union members], there can be no success.”¹⁸⁰ Recalled Steel Workers staff representative Murray Cotterill: “The labour movement was not created by people like me, but by people at the bottom who really stuck their necks out. They were the guys who took the chance of losing their jobs because [they felt] ‘we need some damn justice around here’.”¹⁸¹

Experienced staff organizers knew that once a group of workers had contacted them about organizing a plant, workers should, as their first step, recruit inside organizers from the ranks of workers who already had some union experience, because workers who had come from a unionized shop were often particularly effective. “Who else but a guy who had been in a union could organize the boys into a union?” asked UAW organizer John Eldon in a 1973 interview. “These were always the first guys to join the union. We used to ask them, ‘Ever been in a union before?’ So, the first workers to join the union were the union men of other trades from other industries and from other countries and cities....” The lead inside organizer at De Havilland Aircraft, for example, was Vince Coulson, who had worked at Chrysler in Windsor as a UAW

member. Coulson often referred to his UAW experience and that union's contract gains when talking to De Havilland workers.¹⁸² Another veteran unionist involved in the De Havilland drive was Ron Chabassol, who had been active in the United Mine Workers in Nova Scotia.¹⁸³ One worker who had worked at the unionized Brantford Coach and Body plant went to work at a nearby Mott's plant and, "preach[ing] the gospel of unionism" to his new workmates, promptly started signing up new members, handing the surprised union staff organizer 40 cards in short order.¹⁸⁴ Another source of good inside organizers was long-service employees who were "natural leaders" and who could approach other workers easily, usually with success.¹⁸⁵

Eldon remembered that many inside organizers who were union veterans were also politically active. "Since the AFL had not shown any interest in organizing, the only people who knew about organizing were those connected to left-wing political groups," he said.¹⁸⁶ Political activists played important roles in organizing drives even in politically conservative Toronto, not for the least reason that the city's size and political importance insured the presence of robust left-wing groups.¹⁸⁷ Harry Hamburgh and Harry Hunter, staff organizers with the Steel Workers, had been appointed to the union's staff in the late 1930s thanks to a recommendation from the CPC group in Hamilton. Fred Collins, initially an inside organizer with the IAM at Inglis but who later went over to the Steel Workers, was a CPC activist. He had been president of a Workers Unity League affiliate, the Chesterfield Furniture Workers Union in Stratford, Ontario, and led workers there during their 1933 strike, which had been brutally repressed by troops armed with machine guns.¹⁸⁸ The UE's key organizer at Westinghouse in Hamilton, Alf Ready, was a CPC adherent, as was Alf Mustin, an organizer with the United Rubber Workers. The social democratic CCF also produced union organizers.

Fred Dowling was an activist in the CCF's youth wing when fellow CCFer Millard hired him as chief organizer for the Packinghouse Workers in 1940.¹⁸⁹ Some activists, such as British-born George Martin at Stelco, had been radicalized by the surge of labour militancy in 1919, still a fresh memory during the Second World War only 20 years later.¹⁹⁰

Their political activism also may have allowed women to enter more readily the male-dominated world of union organizing. A key UAW inside organizer in the union's drive at Massey-Harris was Marjery Ferguson, a CPC activist. Steel Workers organizer Eileen Tallman was born into an upper-middle class, Conservative-voting family, but her involvement in the CCF's youth wing led her to the labour movement, since she believed that a solid base of organized workers was vital to the success of a socialist party.¹⁹¹ Another CCF youth member, Margaret Sedgewick, was hired to do secretarial work for the Steel Workers in April 1941.¹⁹² By 1942, she was secretary-treasurer of the Packinghouse Workers.¹⁹³

Union staffers usually came up from the shop floor, however, and shared much the same background as inside organizers. Eldon immigrated as an adult from Britain, where he had been active in his own union, the Cumberland Iron Ore Miners Union, and was hired by UAW in 1934.¹⁹⁴ Burt was a skilled worker who had belonged to the United Journeymen of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, working with his contractor father before hiring on at the General Motors plant in Oshawa.¹⁹⁵ Millard had been a GM worker in Oshawa and had been a strike leader in the historic 1937 UAW strike there. Paul Siren had worked at the GM facility in St. Catharines and had been appointed to the union's staff after his success as a local union negotiator there. Steel Workers organizer Steele had been born into poverty in Montreal; his father supported a large

family by collecting and selling empty soft-drink bottles. Organizers, however, were also drawn from the ranks of privilege. The UE's Jackson was born into an upper-class family in Port Arthur, Ontario, and rebelled against his upper-crust parents by studying accounting, seen then as a down-market profession.¹⁹⁶ CPC activist and union organizer Bill Walsh, first an organizer with the Workers Unity League rubber workers affiliate and later Mine, Mill, was the son of a prominent Montreal publisher and had attended New York University and Columbia University before travelling with fellow Montrealer Steele to the Soviet Union in 1930, an experience which led them both to the CPC.¹⁹⁷ Jake Isbister, an inside organizer at Stelco had been raised in a prominent Hamilton family, but his father's contracting business failed during the Depression, and Isbister had to quit school and go to work at Stelco at age 16.¹⁹⁸

Because the war had attracted so many middle-class workers to industry, many in-plant activists has notably non-union backgrounds. De Havilland union activist George Avent, for example, went to work at De Havilland in 1941, after having been a stockbroker and owning and operating the Ottawa Secretarial College.¹⁹⁹ Another De Havilland activist, and Vince Coulson's successor as president of the local there, was Garfield McPhee, a former executive with the Borden Milk Company.²⁰⁰

Religious conviction sometimes fueled an organizer's passion. Millard, who over a few short years led three major labour organizations in Canada, the UAW, the CIO, and the Steel Workers, was active in the United Church of Canada. He said his union activism was a matter of putting his religious convictions to practical use and believed his religious conviction appealed to workers. The church he attended was patronized largely by Oshawa's GM workers, and Millard believed this gave workers confidence in his leadership.²⁰¹ Dowling also came to socialist politics and union organizing through

religious connections. While attending St. Michael's School in Toronto, he responded to a coupon about socialism in a book a priest had given him. When the CCF was formed, he set up the CCF's trade union section and eventually devoted all his time to union organizing.²⁰² Reg Gardiner, an inside organizer at the Stelco plant in Hamilton, came to union activism as a religious radical who felt the human mission on earth was "to build the Kingdom of God," a mission he also expressed, as did Millard, through his activism in the United Church and the CCF.²⁰³

Community organizing was often in an organizer's background as well. Millard began his work as an agitator while on relief in Depression-struck Oshawa, skills he transferred to union organizing when he was hired at GM in 1936. In fact, his work as a relief activist made him well-known in Oshawa, which helped his organizing efforts at the giant automaker. During the Depression the young Paul Siren had organized other single, unemployed men working in what he called "Bennett's slave camps."²⁰⁴

Organizers brought an assortment of skills and attributes to their work. Communication skills of all sorts were crucial. Tallman placed the ability to communicate at the top of her list of attributes of a good organizer, not just the ability to convey information clearly but also "the talent to persuade workers to risk their jobs and to inspire them to approach their co-workers and ask them to take the same risk."²⁰⁵ Steel Workers inside organizer Paul Krmpotich recalled organizing as "the most educational aspect of trade unionism." When talking to potential union members, he said, "one must convince the worker the idea has merit. One must convince the worker that it is safe and that if he is discriminated against, the organization will support him... One must be able to convince the worker to have faith in his fellow man..."²⁰⁶

Marie Pinon, an insider organizer at De Havilland, attributed her organizing talent to her ability to communicate. "I liked to talk and meet people," she recalled years later. "I must have been mouthing off somewhere along the line, and the union chair approached me and asked if I would like to help organize the union."²⁰⁷ Oratory was valued. At the open air meetings at the Westinghouse plant in Hamilton, which attracted thousands of workers on their lunch break, Ready recalled UE organizer George Harris's spellbinding oratory. "He could thrill you," said Ready.²⁰⁸ With printed leaflets being a vital communications vehicle, organizers had to be able to write persuasively, and inside organizers, such as Ready, who could produce humorous cartoons that mocked management or illustrated the union's arguments, were a treasure. A language besides English was valuable, especially in the ethnically diverse meatpacking industry, where immigrant labourers often found work. Packinghouse Workers organizer Adam Borsk was born to Polish immigrants, and since so many of Toronto's packing plants were almost dominated by Poles, "it was easier for him to get them to become members."²⁰⁹ Charlie Bonnelo, who was as an inside organizer at the Swift's meatpacking plant, was a Maltese immigrant. The first person he signed up was his non-English-speaking father. He recalled that when organizing a plant, inside organizers would make every effort to have someone who could speak the worker's own language talk to a potential recruit.²¹⁰ Ethnic discrimination could create an organizer. A Steel Workers inside organizer, Tony Gervasio, hired by Stelco in 1936, became active right after the war started, when he was singled out because of his Italian roots. He had been a foreman but was demoted when management feared that "English" workers would no longer obey him when Italy became an enemy country. Adding to Gervasio's anger was the RCMP's arresting some Italian workers in Stelco for

their membership in an Italian cultural group run by fascists and the relegating of other Italian Canadians to the poorest jobs.²¹¹

As for workplace skills, the record is mixed. While Ready believed his journeyman status helped him as an organizer, since other workers looked up to him, Burt recalled that inside organizers who were journeyman like Ready were not typical and that skilled workers did not usually become involved in organizing drives.²¹² It appears, though, that the majority of union staffers were white, male, native-born Canadians, most of British extraction, with some education or a trade. Even though ethnic workers played an important organizing role as they could communicate with non-English speakers, and many women workers were talented in-plant organizers, union staffs rosters were male-dominated, white Anglo-Saxon bastions.²¹³

Union organizing also took commitment, explaining, perhaps, the success of politically active or religiously devout organizers since, as Tallman observed, union organizers had to be committed to more than just organizing a local or bargaining a contract. They had to be committed to the long-range goal of a more equitable society, she believed, and the depth of their commitment would determine how long they would last.²¹⁴ The commitment often meant personal sacrifice. Steele urged fellow organizer Hamburgh to take an assignment in Toronto, even though it meant his family's moving from Hamilton where they had lived for decades. Wrote Steele: "If we ever expect to attain anything in the labour movement, we must be prepared to make certain personal sacrifices."²¹⁵ Steele was as exacting on himself. Even though his own wages as an organizer had been cut to \$75 a month, down from \$100, Steele was nevertheless giving \$20 of his wages to the part-time organizer helping him in Toronto.²¹⁶ The hours were always onerous. CCL organizer Elroy Robson pleaded with his headquarters to sponsor

him for more gas rations, saying in addition to handling 14 locals and working seven days and six evenings a week, he was working on Victory Loan campaigns and toting projectors and educational films from Hanover to Listowell to Wingham to Toronto on the era's rudimentary roads.²¹⁷ "When you are organizing a union, you don't call a meeting once a month," recalled Ready. "You are going at it seven days a week."²¹⁸ More than once the UAW reported that an organizer had collapsed on the job.²¹⁹ The Steel Workers Larry Sefton, who rose to head the union's Ontario section, helped organize workers at the Inglis plant while working there full-time. At the same time he was president of the union's Local 1457 at Acme Screw and Gear and helping that Leaside local in its negotiations. An Inglis manager described him as an "intelligent individual whose work has been entirely satisfactory, but it is obvious his whole heart is in the CIO, and I know for a fact that he spends all his spare time in connection with those activities."²²⁰

Courage was critical as well, especially for inside organizers who faced firings, harassment, intimidation, and blacklisting from company managers. There is also evidence they faced police harassment as well, with constables showing up at workers' home and shoving them around.²²¹ Their courage needed to be visible, in order to instill confidence in others. At one union meeting in Hamilton, someone called for volunteers to donate blood for the war effort. Ready volunteered, knowing perfectly well he would faint. And he did. "But you had to do it," he recalled.²²² Union staffers were not exempt from fearful situations, as demonstrated by the arrests of Jackson, Millard, and Burt for union activities during the war.²²³

Given the challenges facing a union organizer, said Alf Mustin to the 1939 CIO conference in Ottawa, "a union leader must be an incurable optimist."²²⁴ Organizers

were also often scrappy and pugnacious, exhibiting an anti-authoritarian streak that was sometimes directed against union leaders. Borsk, the Packinghouse Workers talented organizer, was hired as a pork butcher at Canada Packers in Toronto in late 1936. During the wartime organizing drive at "the Packers," he clashed several times with the firm's head, J.S. Willis, who eventually fired him. The union's head, Fred Dowling, then put him on staff, and Borsk promptly set up an office next to the Swift meatpacking plant in Toronto and organized it. Dowling then sent Borsk to Winnipeg, where he organized that city's Canada Packers plant. Said Willis later: "Had I thought for one minute that Adam Borsk would have done all this, I never would have fired him." As Dowling recalled later, though, Borsk was "not an organization man," and he had to fire the insubordinate Borsk from the union's staff in 1948. But, said Dowling as well, Borsk was the type of person workers "instinctively trust, open and honest, and devoted to the union." ²²⁵

Conclusion

The war changed conditions for union organizing dramatically; some changes, such as a war-induced labour shortage, helped union organizers; others, such as government labour and wage controls, the resurgence of company unions, labour turnover, new types of workers, union in-fighting, and a lack resources to meet the explosive wartime demand for unionization, hampered them. Nonetheless, the CIO was able to recruit dedicated organizers in hundreds of plants who signed up hundreds of thousands of workers. The next chapter studies how these organizers went about that work and the strategies and tactics they used to deal with employers, government — and workers.

¹ For the CIO during the Second World War, see: Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Ron Crawley, "What Kind of Unionism: Struggles Among Sydney Steel Workers in the SWOC, 1936-1942," *Labour/Le Travail* 39 (Spring, 1997), 99-123; Stuart Jamieson, *Time of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-1960* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1968); H.A. Logan, *Trade Unions of Canada: Their Development and Function* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948); John Tait Montague, "Trade unionism in the Canadian meatpacking industry," Ph.D. dissertation., University of Toronto, 1950; Douglas Smith, *Cold Warrior: C.S. Jackson and the United Electrical Workers* (St John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1997); Peter Warrian, "Labour is not a commodity": a study of the rights of labour in the Canadian postwar economy," Ph.D. dissertation., University of Waterloo, 1984; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Labour Relations System During World War Two," *Labour/Le Travail* 3 (1978), 175-196; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The 1943 Steel Strike Against Wartime Wage Controls," *Labour/Le Travail* 10 (Autumn, 1982), 65-85; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Desmond Morton, *Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labour Movement*, 4th ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998); Bryan Palmer, *Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992); Craig Heron, *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989); Bob Russell, *Back to Work: Labour, State, and Industrial Relations in Canada* (Toronto: Nelson, 1990); Brian Williams, "Notes on the Evolution of Compulsory Conciliation in Canada," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 19 (July 1964), 298-323; Jeremy Webber, "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada during World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* 15 (Spring, 1985), 57-88.

² For organizing, see Michael Earle, "The Building of Steel Union Local 1064, Sydney, 1935-1937," in James Cadow, ed., *Industry and Society in Nova Scotia: An Illustrated History* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001); Kim Adair, "The URW and the Struggle for Union Recognition: 1937-1939," in Terry Copp, ed., *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947* (Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976); Terry Copp, "The Rise of Industrial Unionism in Montreal, 1935-1945," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 37 (Winter 1982), 843-874; John Manley, "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism and the 'Third Period': the Workers Unity League, 1929-1936," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Society* 1994, 167-194; John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring, 1986), 105-133; Robert Storey, "The Struggle to Organize Stelco and Dofasco," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 42 (Spring 1987), 366-385; James Leach, "The Workers' Unity League and the Stratford Furniture Workers: The Anatomy of a Strike," *Ontario History* 5 (June 1967), 39-48; Mercedes Steedman, "The Promise: Communist Organizing in the Needle Trades, the Dressmakers' Campaign, 1928-37," *Labour/Le Travail* 34 (February, 1994), 37-73; Ruth Frager *Sweat Shop Strife: Class, Ethnicity and Gender in the Jewish Labour Movement*

of Toronto (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party of Canada: A History* (McClelland and Stewart, 1975); *Canada's Party of Socialism: History of the Canadian Communist Party, 1921-1976* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1982); William Rodney, *Soldiers of the International: A History of the Communist Party in Canada, 1919-1928* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968); Howard White, *A Hard Man to Beat: The Story of Bill White* (Vancouver: Pulp Press Books, 1983); Tom McEwan, *The Forge Glows Red: From Blacksmith to Revolutionary* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1974); Cy Gonick, *A Very Red Life: The Story of Bill Walsh* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 2001); Rick Salutin, *The Organizer: A Canadian Union Life* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980); Bryan Palmer, *A Communist Life* (Toronto: Lugus Productions, 1988); Peter Hunter, *Which Side Are You On, Boys?* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1988); David Sobel and Susan Meurer, *Working at Inglis: The Life and Death of a Canadian Factory* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1994); Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story* (Hamilton: McMaster University Press, 1979); Wayne Roberts, ed., *Baptism of a Union: The Stelco Strike of 1946* (Hamilton: McMaster University, c. 1980); Eileen Sufrin, *The Eaton Drive: The Campaign to Organize Canada's Largest Department Store 1948-1952* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1982).

³ For company unionism in Canada, see Bruce Scott, "A Place in the Sun; the Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-1929," *Labour/Le Travail* 1 (Autumn, 1976), 158-192; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Company Unionism in Canada, 1915-1948," in Bruce Kaufman and Daphne Taras, eds., *Non-Union Employee Representation: History, Contemporary Practice and Policy* (M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 96-120; Margaret McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-1939," *Canadian Historical Review* 71 (March 1990), 46-79.

⁴ Bryan Palmer, *Working-Class Experience*, 243.

⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4: Report of First Conference of Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization," November 1939, 13. The membership reports of individual affiliates filed with the CIO Canadian Coordinating Committee in 1939 are incomplete, but they indicate a total CIO membership of only a few thousand outside the miners of Nova Scotia and clothing workers in Toronto and Montreal. The UAW, for example, reported a membership of 850 in Windsor, out of 11,000 auto industry workers in that city. The UE reported 400 members, and the Rubber Workers 1,280. LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee Reports, July 12, 1939.

⁶ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 50.

⁷ *Labour Gazette* 1944, "Addenda," 21.

⁸ Alan S. Millward, *War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 233, 355..

⁹ *Ibid.*, 355.

¹⁰ K. J. Rea, *The Prosperous Years: The Economic History of Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 211.

-
- ¹¹ Alan Millward, op. cit., 172.
- ¹² Ian Drummond, *Progress Without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario From Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 163.
- ¹³ K.J. Rea, op. cit., 194-195.
- ¹⁴ Ian Drummond, op.cit, 107.
- ¹⁵ *Labour Gazette* 42 (January 1942), "Child labour," 55.
- ¹⁶ City of Toronto Archives (CAT), SC 297 Series A, John Inglis Papers, Box 18, File: Labour Troubles, "Memo from W.R. McLachlan to Al Scott, Supervisor, December 30, 1942."
- ¹⁷ Alan Millward, op.cit., 233.
- ¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 1, 1940, "2 Canadian Labour Bodies Ready to Merge," 1. In 1940, the Canadian CIO merged with the All-Canadian Congress of Labour to form the Canadian Congress of Labour.
- ¹⁹ *Labour Gazette* 42 (December 1942) "Ontario Department of Labour Report on Labour and Industry," 1424.
- ²⁰ *Labour Gazette* 43 (March 1943), "Absenteeism," 421.
- ²¹ University of Pittsburgh Archives (UPA), United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File:11, "Report of Recreation Committee, July 25, 1943," 8.
- ²² The average weekly wage in manufacturing was paying \$3.00 a week more in 1942 than in 1941, for example (*Labour Gazette* 43 January 1943, 127). Gunda Lambton's wartime journal confirms Paul Siren's observations (see below). She saw factory overalls being everywhere, even in the upscale Toronto neighbourhood of Forest Hill. Gunda Lambton, *Sun in Winter: A Toronto Wartime Journal, 1942-45* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 35.
- ²³ Author's interview with Paul Siren, February 21, 2003.
- ²⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Vol. 162, File, Correspondence of Elroy Robson, CCL Director of Organizing, "Robson to George Ironside, March 21, 1944."
- ²⁵ Gunda Lambton, op.cit., 34.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, 46.
- ²⁷ Alison Prentice, et al., *Canadian Women: A History*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: HarcourtBrace Canada, 1996), 144.
- ²⁸ *Ibid*, 54.
- ²⁹ *Labour Gazette* 43 (March 1943), 363.
- ³⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District Five, Box 1385, File 11, "Recreation Report, July 25, 1943," 8.
- ³¹ Valerie Endicott, "A woman's place [Was] everywhere," M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1991, 116.
- ³² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, June 5-6, 1943, "Burt Report," 9.
- ³³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, March 1942, "Minutes," 8.
- ³⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Minutes and Reports May 1940-41, "Minutes, February 1941," 2.

-
- ³⁵ LAC, MGI 190 United Electrical Workers, Vol.54, File 12, *Globe and Mail* clipping, "Ask Investigation at York Arsenals," December 31, 1943.
- ³⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings and Reports, "Burt Report, September 1941," 3.
- ³⁷ Ian Miller, "Toronto's Response to the Outbreak of War, 1939," *Canadian Military History* 11 (Winter 2002), 5-23, 22.
- ³⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: Report of Regional Director, 1939, "George Burt to George Addes, International Secretary-Treasurer, November 30, 1939," 3.
- ³⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, March 1942, "Minutes," 8.
- ⁴⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, Officers' Reports, "October 1944," 8.
- ⁴¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 68, "Jackson to James Matles, International Organizing Director, April 1942."
- ⁴² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136: Officers Reports, "October 1943," 9.
- ⁴³ ALUA, *Proceedings of 1942 Convention of the International Union, UAW*, 228.
- ⁴⁴ ALUA, R.J. Thomas Collection, Box 2, File 2: IEB Minutes, June 1942, 36.
- ⁴⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, May 1940-1941, "Report, November 30-31, 1941," 1.
- ⁴⁶ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 10: District Council, April 1943, "Secretary's Report," 3.
- ⁴⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 68: "Jackson to Matles, International Director of Organizing, April 1942."
- ⁴⁸ The head of the UE in Canada, C.S. Jackson, made \$90 a month, for example. (UPA, *UE News*, July 19, 1941, 1).
- ⁴⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, Vol. 1, File 5: CIO Coordinating Committee, "Minutes, October 4, 1939," 3.
- ⁵⁰ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, Vol. 4, SWOC Correspondence, File 1, "C.H. Millard to Philip Murray, September 29, 1940."
- ⁵¹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, Vol. 1, File: 3: CIO Coordinating Committee Meeting Minutes, June 27, 1939, "Minutes," 2.
- ⁵² ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4, "Report of First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization," November 4-6, 1939, 15.
- ⁵³ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, Vol. 1, File 6: CIO Conference, Minutes and Report, November 4-5, 1939, "Canada Is Organizing," 3.
- ⁵⁴ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting August 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 2.

-
- ⁵⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 25, 1940, "Local 199," 8.
- ⁵⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Elroy Robinson Correspondence, CCL Director of Organizing, Part IV, "Pat Conroy, CCL Secretary –Treasurer to Elroy Robinson," December 23, 1942.
- ⁵⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4, "Report of First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization," November 4-6, 1939, 13.
- ⁵⁸ H.A. Logan, *Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Function* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948), 149.
- ⁵⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, August 1943, "Burt Report," 7.
- ⁶⁰ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, June 1943, "Burt Report," 5.
- ⁶¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 148: "Organizational Report, Ross Russell, January 28, 1945," 7.
- ⁶² ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: Meetings and Reports, March 1942, "Burt Report," 8.
- ⁶³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: Meeting November 1942, Minutes and Report, "Burt Report," 5. 19
- ⁶⁴ H.A. Logan, *Trade Unions in Canada*, 243, 255. This was an improvement over earlier days when the UAW, for example, provided their Canadian colleagues with no financial help at all. During the 1937 strike at General Motors in Oshawa, the UAW in the United States paid the salary of organizer Hugh Thompson, and that was it. Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 20.
- ⁶⁵ Legislative Assembly of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1943), 296.
- ⁶⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Correspondence of Elroy Robinson, CCL Director of Organizing "Letter from Pat Conroy, CCL Secretary-Treasurer, to Elroy Robinson, April 15, 1944."
- ⁶⁷ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Correspondence of Elroy Robinson, CCL Director of Organizing, Part I, "Letter from Aaron Mosher, CCL president to Elroy Robinson, November 17, 1943."
- ⁶⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, April 1943, Minutes and Report, "Burt Report," 8.
- ⁶⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File: 68, "Letter from C.S. Jackson to International Director of Organizing James Matles, July 1942."

-
- ⁷⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, June 1942, "Report," 8.
- ⁷¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 10 District Council Meeting, April 1943, "Secretary's Report," 1.
- ⁷² Valerie Endicott, op.cit., 102.
- ⁷³ H.A. Logan, op.cit., 396.
- ⁷⁴ Author's interview with Charles Bonnelo, February 2003, and Paul Siren, February 2003. Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade: The Eileen Tallman Sufrin Story* (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1983), 16.
- ⁷⁵ *Labour Gazette* 42 (July 1942), "Industrial Relations as a Function of Management," 800.
- ⁷⁶ LAC MG 28 Series I 103, Volume 319, File: Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 1943-45, "Minutes of TWOC Conference, April 22, 1944," 4.
- ⁷⁷ H.A. Logan, op.cit., 235.
- ⁷⁸ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Vol. 319, File 5: "Report from Silby Barrett, October 4, 1941," 3.
- ⁷⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Minutes and Report, November 1942, "Report," 6.
- ⁸⁰ *Labour Gazette* 43 (July 1943), "Disputes," 935.
- ⁸¹ For more about the battles between Communists and social democrats in the Canadian CIO, see Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 66-85; John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring, 1986), 105-133; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Career of a Canadian Trade Unionist: C.H. Millard, 1937-1946," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 43 (Fall, 1988), 609-631.
- ⁸² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 68: "Letter from C.S. Jackson to James Matles, UE Director of Organizing, April 20, 1942," 2.
- ⁸³ H.A. Logan, op.cit., 150.
- ⁸⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, Volume 4, SWOC Correspondence, File 1, "Letter from C.H. Millard to David MacDonald, International Director of Organizing, November 18, 1940."
- ⁸⁵ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic Roofing, 1941-1942, "Memo from G.G. Complin, Manager, Metallic Roofing, to the Metallic Shop Committee, November 7, 1942."
- ⁸⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, Volume 4, SWOC Correspondence, File 1, "Letter from SWOC Organizer Dick Steele to Silby Barrett, February 16, 1940."

-
- ⁸⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 71, "Letter from C.S. Jackson to James Matles, UE Director of Organizing, November 6, 1942."
- ⁸⁸ MG 28 I 103, United Steelworkers of America Canadian Office, Volume 162, File, Correspondence of Elroy Robinson, CCL Director of Organizing, Part IX, "Letter to Pat Conroy, CCL Secretary-Treasurer, from David Dickson, CCL organizer, January 15, 1943."
- ⁸⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Burt Report," 7.
- ⁹⁰ CTA, SC297 Series A John Inglis Papers, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Clippings Leaflets Distributed 1943, "Production Workers!" an IAM leaflet dated April 16, 1942; and "Ten Reasons to Vote Steel Workers-CIO," a Steel Worker leaflet dated April 16, 1942.
- ⁹¹ *Toronto Star*, November 28, 1942, "Union Competition," 6.
- ⁹² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 71: "Letter from C.S. Jackson to James Matles, UE Director of Organizing, November 6, 1942," 1.
- ⁹³ Doug Smith, *Cold Warrior: C.S. Jackson and the United Electrical Workers* (St John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1997), 68.
- ⁹⁴ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 227.
- ⁹⁵ LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, May 1939, "Steel Notes," 8.
- ⁹⁶ For corporate welfare programs in Canada, see Margaret McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-1939," *Canadian Historical Review* 71 (March 1990), 46-79.
- ⁹⁷ Legislative Assembly of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1943), 1165.
- ⁹⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 16, File 9, *Massey-Harris Organizing Bulletin*, January 1943.
- ⁹⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, August 1, 1940 "CIO Notes," 8. Today companies cannot change the terms and conditions of work once a drive is out in the open.
- ¹⁰⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 70, "C.S. Jackson to Matles, February 1, 1943."
- ¹⁰¹ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 17, *Canadian Ford Facts*, January 1, 1941, "Flash!", 1.
- ¹⁰² LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, Volume 4, SWOC Correspondence, File 1, "Letter from C.H. Millard to Philip Clowes, Director, SWOC, Pittsburgh, October 26, 1940."
- ¹⁰³ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story* (Hamilton: Labour Studies Programme, McMaster University, 1979), 9.

-
- ¹⁰⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection Box 1, File: District Council Meetings Minutes and Report, March 1942, "Minutes," 11.
- ¹⁰⁵ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 1133.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1142.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1136.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 1165.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 1260.
- ¹¹⁰ The UE won the vote handily. UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1387, File 168, "C.S. Jackson Report, July 24, 1943," 12.
- ¹¹¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 302.
- ¹¹² Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse*, 11.
- ¹¹³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings and Report, February 1944, "Minutes," 15.
- ¹¹⁴ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, December 5, 1942, "Howe Denies Story," 4.
- ¹¹⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268 United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 2, "Letter from Murray Cotterill to International Director Clowes, March 24, 1941."
- ¹¹⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, November 1942, "Minutes," 10.
- ¹¹⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 10, 1940, "Companies Have Become Corporations," 3.
- ¹¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Research Department Collection, Box 23, File: Regional Directors, "George Burt Report to IEB, March 1941."
- ¹¹⁹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 52.
- ¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.
- ¹²¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 28, 1940, "Burt Asks For Prosecutions," 1.
- ¹²² Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 493.
- ¹²³ UP, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October 9, 1943."
- ¹²⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings and Report, November 1942, "Minutes," 10.
- ¹²⁵ ALUA, UAW Research Department Collection, Box 23, File 23-4: Regional Directors, "Report from George Burt to UAW International Executive Board, March 7, 1941," 2.
- ¹²⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8: *Massey-Harris War Worker*, November 23, 1942, "Selective Service to Investigate," 1.
- ¹²⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council January 1942 Meetings and Report, "Report," 6.

-
- ¹²⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report "Minutes," 5.
- ¹²⁹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 300. The company union scheme is usually credited to Canada's own William Lyon Mackenzie King, who advocated the idea when advising the Rockefeller family on its industrial relations policies after the lethal violence of a 1914 strike at the Rockefeller Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.
- ¹³⁰ Laura Sefton MacDowell "Company Unionism in Canada, 1915-1948." Unpublished paper, 5.
- ¹³¹ Ibid.
- ¹³² Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 864.
- ¹³³ Laura Sefton MacDowell, "Company Unionism in Canada," 1-2
- ¹³⁴ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 341.
- ¹³⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 72, "Letter from C.S. Jackson to James Matles, International UE Director of Organizing, April 26, 1942."
- ¹³⁶ TPL, *Canadian Tribune*, February 7, 1943, "Name is McMaster, 18."
- ¹³⁷ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 1158.
- ¹³⁸ Ibid., 301.
- ¹³⁹ Ibid., 302.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 309.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid., 1131.
- ¹⁴² Ibid., 354.
- ¹⁴³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 79, File 1, "Letter to all UAW locals from George Burt, March 4, 1942."
- ¹⁴⁴ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 1151.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 312.
- ¹⁴⁶ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 1, SWOC Correspondence, "Letter from Dick Steele to Silby Barrett, February, 16, 1940."
- ¹⁴⁷ LAC, MG 28 I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 143, File 17, "Letter from Ernie Evans to Pat Conroy, November 27, 1942."
- ¹⁴⁸ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 310.
- ¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 1158.
- ¹⁵⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 15.
- ¹⁵¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 263: Local 507, "C.S. Jackson Report, June 1941," 1.
- ¹⁵² *Labour Gazette* 41 (October 1941), 1221.
- ¹⁵³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 79, File , "Letter from George Burt to UAW locals, March 23, 1942."

-
- ¹⁵⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, July 19, 1941, "Cowardly Attack," 2.
- ¹⁵⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting April 1941 Minutes and Report, "Statement on Boards of Investigation, April 1941," 2.
- ¹⁵⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 79, File 1, "Letter from George Burt to UAW locals, March 6, 1942."
- ¹⁵⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings and Report, April 1941, "Report," 2.
- ¹⁵⁸ Canada. *Department of Labour Annual Report 1942-42* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), 18-20.
- ¹⁵⁹ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 201), 247.
- ¹⁶⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, July 1, 1940, "Collective Bargaining Declaration of Government Opens Gates," 1.
- ¹⁶¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 6, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 15, 1941, "Protest Freezing Wages," 1.
- ¹⁶² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 6, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 1, 1941, "Labour Demands a Square Deal," 1.
- ¹⁶³ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 51.
- ¹⁶⁴ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, op.cit., 253.
- ¹⁶⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 4.
- ¹⁶⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 5.
- ¹⁶⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 10: District Five Council Minutes, April 1943, "Secretary's Report," 3.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Labour Gazette* 1943 (May 1943), "Application to War Labour Boards," 580.
- ¹⁶⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 148: "Organizational Report, Ross Russell, January 28, 1945," 5.
- ¹⁷⁰ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with George Burt," 14.
- ¹⁷¹ Desmond Morton says the war's wage-and-price-control regime stirred up controversy within the labour movement and in time unconsciously paved the way for the greatest advances in Canadian trade union history. Desmond Morton and Terry Copp, *Working People*, 174.
- ¹⁷² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, April 1, 1942, "Former SWOC Official Arrested," 1. Steele did join the army and was killed in France in 1944, leaving a widow and two young sons. His widow, Esther Steele, was hired by the UE.
- ¹⁷³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 15, 1940, "Intimidation at Chrysler," 1.

-
- ¹⁷⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, July 19, 194, "RCMP Aid Cowardly Attack," 1. Doug Smith, *Cold Warrior*, 78-79, 94.
- ¹⁷⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 128 United Steelworkers of America, Volume 85, "Scrapbook, 1940-41," Clipping from October 3, 1940 *Globe and Mail*, "Suburban Leaflet Law Invalid."
- ¹⁷⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 27, 1940, "Millard Arrested," 1.
- ¹⁷⁷ LAC, MG 28 I128, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 85, "Scrapbook." Clipping from *Globe and Mail*, February 12, 1941.
- ¹⁷⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, June 12, 1941, "Firm Stand by GE Workers," 1.
- ¹⁷⁹ ALUA, R.J. Thomas Collection, Box 1, File 21, Reports to IEB, December 16-20, 1940, "Report of George Burt to IEB Meeting, December 16, 1940," 2.
- ¹⁸⁰ *Canadian Unionist*, September 4, 1939, "President's Convention Address," 108.
- ¹⁸¹ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Interview Collection, "Interview with Murray Cotterill," n.d but circa 1973.
- ¹⁸² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10: *Aircraft Worker De Havilland Edition*, August 28, 1942, "From the President's Pen," 1.
- ¹⁸³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 27, File 1, *Aircraft Worker*, October 22, 1942, "Ron Chabassol," 1.
- ¹⁸⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10.
- ¹⁸⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1943, "CBC's Production Front," 8.
- ¹⁸⁶ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with John Eldon by Jack Steele," n.d but circa early 1960s, 14.
- ¹⁸⁷ Ivan Avakumovic, in his *The Communist Party of Canada: A History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 156, says both CPC and CCF activists made rapid progress in the trade unions, and often worked side by side in the same union. The CPC, especially, targeted industries it considered vital, and directed its activists, with their legendary drive and organizing skills, to such unions as the UAW, the UE, Mine, Mill, the International Woodworkers, and the Fur and Leather Workers.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Canada's Party of Socialism: A History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1976* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1982) 87.
- ¹⁸⁹ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Collection, "Interview with Fred Dowling," c. 1973.
- ¹⁹⁰ Wayne Roberts, *Baptism of a Union: The Stelco Strike of 1946* (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1980), 41.
- ¹⁹¹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade: The Eileen Tallman Sufrin Story* (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1983), 8-9, 14.

-
- ¹⁹² LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 2: "Letter from C.H. Millard to David McDonald, International Union, April 14, 1941."
- ¹⁹³ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 864.
- ¹⁹⁴ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with John Eldon by Jack Steele," 1.
- ¹⁹⁵ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with George Burt by Jack Steele," April 1963, 1.
- ¹⁹⁶ Doug Smith, *Cold Warrior*, 7.
- ¹⁹⁷ Cy Gonick, *A Very Red Life: The Story of Bill Walsh* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 2001), 48. Steele and Walsh changed their birth names — Moishe Kosawatsky and Moe Wolofsky respectively — to Anglo-Saxon ordinariness after they became politically active.
- ¹⁹⁸ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse*, 40.
- ¹⁹⁹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 24, 1943, "Workers' Who's Who," 2.
- ²⁰⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 24, 1943, "Workers' Who's Who," 3; *Aircraft Worker*, September 1, 1944, "Garfield McPhee," 5.
- ²⁰¹ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Interviews Collection, "Interview with C.H. Millard," 1. n.d but circa 1973.
- ²⁰² Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Interviews Collection, "Interview with Fred Dowling," n.d but circa 1973.
- ²⁰³ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse*, 39.
- ²⁰⁴ Author's interview with Paul Siren, February 2003.
- ²⁰⁵ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 37.
- ²⁰⁶ Paul Krmpotich, *A Tribute to the Members of Local 2251 United Steel Workers of America* (Sault Ste Marie, ON: Local 2251 USWA, n.d.), 13.
- ²⁰⁷ Valerie Endicott, 114. "A woman's place [was] everywhere": a study of women who worked in aircraft production in Toronto during the Second World War." M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1991.
- ²⁰⁸ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse*, 12.
- ²⁰⁹ Unpublished interview with UPWA organizer Charlie Borsk by Vanessa Chuallo, July 3, 2002. In author's collection.
- ²¹⁰ Author's interview with former UPWA organizer Charlie Bonello, February 2005. In author's collection.
- ²¹¹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Baptism of a Union: The Stelco Strike of 1946*, 14-15.
- ²¹² Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Collection, "Interview with George Burt," n.d. but c. 1973, 1.
- ²¹³ For a contemporary appraisal of the backgrounds of CIO leaders in the United States, see C. Wright Mills, "The Trade Union Leader: A Collective Portrait," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1945), 158-176.
- ²¹⁴ Wayne Roberts, *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, 37.

-
- ²¹⁵ LAC MG 28 I 268 United Steelworkers of America, microfilm reel C 13104, Volume 4: SWOC Correspondence, File 1, "Letter from Dick Steele to Harry Hamburgh, September 19, 1938."
- ²¹⁶ Ibid., "Letter from Dick Steele to Silby Barrett, June 20, 1938."
- ²¹⁷ LAC, MG 28 I103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Correspondence of Jack Robinson, CCL Organizer, "Letter from Jack Robinson to Pat Conroy, November 15, 1943."
- ²¹⁸ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Organizing Westinghouse*, 12.
- ²¹⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 8.
- ²²⁰ CTA, Series 297, John Inglis Co. Papers, Box 22, File: Union Agreement CIO: General File 1941-43, "Letter from Ainsworth to N. Peterson of Acme Screw and Gear, December 31, 1942."
- ²²¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 365.
- ²²² Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse*, 12.
- ²²³ Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Career of a Trade Union Leader: C.H. Millard, 1937-1946," *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 43 (Fall, 1988); ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1940, "We Spend Night in Jail," 1.
- ²²⁴ MG28 I 268 , United Steelworkers of America, Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, Vol. 1, File 6: CIO Committee, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report: CIO in Canada," 13.
- ²²⁵ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Collection, "Interview with Fred Dowling," 2; unpublished interview with UPWA organizer Charlie Borsk by Vanessa Chivallo, July 3, 2002. In author's collection, 2.

Chapter Three

Wartime Organizing: Getting to a Majority

There were two hurdles for union organizers during the war, in those days before collective bargaining legislation and the automatic dues check off that we now regard as almost elemental fixtures in the labour relations firmament. The first hurdle was winning recognition of the union in the face of employer resistance and government-imposed delays. The second was maintaining union membership levels — a process the unions called “consolidation”—in the face of tenacious employer resistance and worker pragmatism. By knitting together what evidence survives about organizing, found in wartime union files, union newspapers, and government records, this chapter constructs a composite and general narrative of a CIO wartime organizing drive in an attempt to illuminate the context in which wartime CIO labour leaders developed the policies and programs that formed part of labour’s so-called “post-war settlement” that and contributed to an emerging public consensus about the nature of a post-war social contract.

Union organizing is, at least in the first stages of a drive, a clandestine enterprise, and few records survive that shed light on the initial stages of even the biggest organizing drives. Wartime union records, for example, do not tell us how and when CIO staff organizers first made contact with potential inside organizers, but in

most instances, it appears, workers were calling the CIO unions and not vice versa. As Packinghouse Workers' Secretary-Treasurer Margaret Sedgewick testified to the 1943 Ontario Select Committee on Collective Bargaining, "We are overwhelmed with requests for organizers, and our small staff cannot begin to cover all the ground."¹ Later recollections of wartime activists support the view that workers were lining up for unionization. Siren recalled the "phone ringing off the hook" in the UAW's Oshawa office as Toronto-area workers called for an organizer.² "Everybody was joining a union in those days," recalled Eldon. "We could hardly keep up with them."³

Yet in some case, it appears, the labour movement also organized proactively. The original design of the CIO, developed in the United States, was copied to some extent in Canada, with the CIO providing funds and resources to industry-wide organizing committees, such as the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee. These "intermediary" organizations would become independent, albeit affiliated with the CIO, once they had become strong enough to run their own affairs. By 1944, the CCL was supporting a half-dozen such committees,⁴ and had researched entire industries to estimate their organizing potential. In 1941, CCL organizer Arthur Williams, in a lengthy report recommending that the Congress organize the textile industry, used a wide range of government data as his sources, supplemented with research into workers' attitudes towards unions, their treatment at the hands of employers, and what had occurred in previous organizing attempts.⁵ The CIO kept a keen eye on the future, with unions targeting industries that would survive the war and thus be an element in their long-term strength. UAW organizer Paul Siren at a 1943 UAW district council meeting, argued that organizing farm equipment plants such as Massey-Harris was every bit as important as unionizing aircraft plants: "We are sure there will be farm equipment

plants with large numbers of employees after the war is over, and the companies themselves have been in business in Canada for a great number of years.”⁶ The UE had a similarly hard-headed assessment of the long run, noting in 1943 that its growth in the war industry plants would not necessarily stand it in good stead once peace arrived, so decided to concentrate on the electrical industry, especially Canadian General Electric and Westinghouse, the unionizing of which would encourage workers in smaller companies to sign up with the union as well.⁷

Working pro-actively, CIO organizers harnessed the energies of pro-union workers in one plant to recruit members in other plants. The Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) developed cards in 1942 to be distributed to workers who had joined an affiliate in a given plant. The cards asked workers to provide the names of people they knew in nearby plants who might also be interested in joining a union. Many workers responded, giving the union organizer names of potential contacts.⁸

The most ambitious of the CIO’s proactive measures, however, were its community-based organizing drives. The 1939 CIO inaugural conference’s official goal was to coordinate CIO organizing efforts, and the strategy for doing that, the paper proposed, was for the main union in a given community to take on the lead responsibility for unionizing that community.⁹ Joe Mackenzie from the United Rubber Workers (URW) in Toronto told a CIO conference in November 1939, while arguing for a community-based approach, that his union’s success in Kitchener showed that, “Organization efforts should be concentrated in areas rather than industries.”¹⁰ The CCL made a few attempts, with mixed success.

One such campaign was launched in the spring of 1941, in Kitchener, where the only CIO affiliate with any presence was the URW. The CCL had sent Williams to

Kitchener, and he had begun working on contacts one by one, calling on their homes, using the "slow tedious process, necessary under certain circumstances but useless if one is to get to the heart of things." The CCL then asked him to publicize the CIO's coming to Kitchener by mounting a publicity campaign, which included cultivating local reporters, producing radio advertising that talked about local wages and working conditions, and sponsoring a radio drama series about a working-class family called "Jimmy Higgins and Family." The publicity campaign was to educate the public in Kitchener about the merits of unionism and to overcome feelings of isolation and weakness in minds of key inside organizers workers while "softening up the mass of workers to a point where they [were] more receptive to a direct appeal by leaflet or personal interview." Williams also recommended public opinion surveys, to give unions an accurate picture of the attitude of the local public and, therefore, workers, to unionism.¹¹ The campaign was an immediate success, up to a point. "All hell broke loose," said Williams later. The CCL was holding five and six meetings with interested workers every night, and extra organizers had to be sent in to help local URW activists sign up new members for the CIO. Workers were walking out of plants every couple hours, and one or two strikes that lasted a day or two took place. The local newspapers were full of these CIO activities, which the Toronto newspapers picked up. Government conciliation officers were frantic, Williams said, and then "a bombshell" dropped. The CCL called a halt to the campaign because the strikes and attendant publicity were thought to be harmful. Complaints were streaming in to the CCL from affiliates that new locals were going to the Congress and not to them, and the campaign was called off before the four-week run of radio time had been completed. The upshot, said Williams, was little progress was made as there had not been the organizational capacity to handle

the “awakened worker population.” Union staffers were swept off their feet by the sudden results, while the workers’ enthusiasm left unprepared union head offices completely bewildered. Williams regretted the halt. “A campaign may be controlled,” he wrote later, “but its results may not be controllable.” He argued that the labour movement should go ahead even if there were sporadic strikes, and “frowns from persons in high places,” such as the Minister of Labour. ¹²

Another community-based organizing effort was tried in Hamilton a year later, in the spring of 1942. It copied part of the Kitchener campaign: a six-week central publicity “blitz,” featuring newspaper, billboard, and radio advertising. Meantime, in a distinctive difference from the Kitchener campaign, individual affiliates were to conduct their own organizing campaigns, leveraging the momentum created by the CCL central campaign. In Kitchener the idea had been that workers would just see “CIO” in action, and organizers would only raise affiliation with an actual union well into a drive. Until that point, workers would just join the CIO; organizers like Williams believed that in those early days of the CIO, before its affiliates were well known as individual unions, their myriad names and acronyms just confused workers and thus “dissipated their interest.” ¹³

Relying on individual affiliates to do the follow-up organizing proved to be a less fruitful strategy for the Hamilton drive, which was less successful than Kitchener. CCL organizers accused affiliates, except for the Packinghouse Workers, led by the irrepressible Adam Borsk, and the URW, of not putting enough energy into the campaign. The UE effort was “flatter than a pancake,” said Williams, and the Steel Workers’ efforts at National Steel Car little better. He accused the affiliates of complacency and said they refused to get involved “for fear of having their previous

failed efforts shown up." Williams might have been scape-goating the affiliates, but in a letter to the CCL's Conroy, the UE's Jackson, on the eve of the Hamilton campaign's launch, expressed concern about the campaign's message. He complained that the publicity "put too much emphasis on the economic problems of workers without relating them in the proper way to the war needs of our country and, in fact, putting them forward as conditional to our support of...an all-out war effort."¹⁴ The less-than-energetic Hamilton campaign may have been at least partly owing to the UE's less-than-militant stand with employers after Germany had invaded the Soviet Union, after which the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) had begun to call for all-out production to defeat Hitler, the CPC being strong in several Hamilton locals.

For the most part, the CCL favoured the industry-based model of organizing where a CIO affiliate would organize a number of local across the country in a given industry and then convert them into a national organization.¹⁵ The idea of community-based organizing at least paralleling industry-based organizing, however, never entirely disappeared. The UAW and Steel rarely competed in Hamilton, where the latter was strong and, similarly, Windsor was mostly left to the UAW. Toronto, however, was fought over, and there were several bitter jurisdictional battles, as were described in Chapter Two. Unions often called upon workers' sense of community identity when organizing. "Toronto is going union," shouted a union newspaper headline in January 1943 introducing a story about Steel Worker victories at the city's Research Enterprises Ltd. and the UAW's first contract at De Havilland Aircraft. ¹⁶ "Toronto is fact becoming union conscious," proclaimed another union newspaper in 1942.¹⁷ "On guard for Windsor and Canada," read one UAW leaflet. "Mark your ballot for freedom."¹⁸ The community-based model created organizing momentum "as neighbour talked to

neighbour,” and workers in heavily-unionized locales “sensed that everyone in town was joining a union,” reported one organizer.¹⁹ By November 1942, Burt could assert that in the Windsor area, where the UAW had organized tens of thousands of workers, companies had come to the conclusion that it was useless to go through the procedure of a conciliation board when they never won a vote against the UAW. “Resistance has been broken down in the Windsor area to the point where companies [are] agreeing to a vote without a board,” he said.²⁰ The UE was so assured of community support in Welland that when two employers refused to grant union security clauses in two UE plants, “we are confident the people of Welland will help us.”²¹

But whether the first overture was from a union organizer or from workers themselves, once contact had been established, the resulting organizing drives had essentially the same structure. The union staff organizer — the “outside” organizer — advised interested workers to recruit an “inside” organizing committee: an informal group who would meet in secret. The inside committee was composed of a key person in each of the plant’s departments, who would then talk to everyone else in that department about the union. It was this group of people who led the drive. Recalled Packinghouse Worker inside organizer Charles Borsk, “You must find one person and let them listen to what you have to say. Then they go to their mates and talk to them.”²²

Sometimes the inside organizer’s approach to a co-worker would take place at or near the worksite, during breaks or before or after shift change. Sometimes organizers would visit potential recruits’ houses and talk to workers in the comparative privacy of their home. The Aluminum Workers’ local in Kingston organized “After Work” crews to visit workers homes – and neighbourhood pubs – to talk about the union with potential recruits.²³ One Steel Workers inside organizer remembers this one-by-one contact with

workers as being a “time-consuming, difficult task,”²⁴ since the names and addresses of workers — especially in the larger plants where not everyone knew each other — were so difficult to obtain,²⁵ but the very process of developing these contacts supplied organizers with information about conditions and grievances in the plant that could be used in conversations with potential recruits and, eventually, in union literature.²⁶ Other vital information included an accurate picture of how many workers there were in a plant, as this knowledge gave organizers the number of workers they needed to sign up in order to win a vote.

Initially, the inside organizers would report their progress to other organizers at meetings that were held in secrecy, if at all; no literature was distributed; no union cards were released for signing. The constant fear was being infiltrated with company spies, stool pigeons, and “stooges.” Workers attending even the earliest meetings were vulnerable to being fired.²⁷ Marie Pinon, an inside organizer at the De Havilland plant recalled meeting with two other organizers secretly because they had been warned that “the minute you open your mouth, we can be fired.” She did not even tell her roommate about her activities. To allay fears, organizers would tell workers that the drive would not come out into the open until a minimum number of workers had committed themselves to helping the drive. Until then there would be no open meetings.²⁸ Recalled Eldon of the 1941 drive at the Ford Motor Company in Windsor: “The early meetings were not open....There were rumours being spread that were so many stool pigeons, no one would be able to join the union without being found out.”²⁹

At a CIL plant in Toronto, CCL organizers had enough contacts to call a preliminary meeting, but the inside organizers at the plant told them the company had “so many stooges in the city watching the union halls to see if we had any meetings that

we decided to lie low for three weeks and let the company get tired of watching, so we can get them off guard.”³⁰ The Massey-Harris management had torn a page from the book of Cockshutt’s management in Brantford, where the UAW had lost a recognition vote. The works manager at Massey-Harris told the UAW he had studied what happened at Cockshutt’s and handed Eldon a file, saying, “I get complete reports of all your meetings and everything you do in the plant.”³¹ Similarly, at Inglis in Toronto, where the Steel Workers were organizing, H.V. Waterhouse, the company’s head of security, had agents at every union meeting, and he filed reports to management the morning after every meeting.³² Waterhouse, for example, reported on one woman worker, Pearl Lewis, noting that she was “born in Russia,” and was very active, coming in at 10 p.m., two hours before her shift started to “get the women in the rest rooms and talk CIO and give out application cards.” In Waterhouse’s opinion, Lewis “was a person who has been sent into the plant for the sole purpose of organizing the CIO.”³³ He reported faithfully on who had attended the meeting, how many, who the speakers were, what they had said, and issues workers were raising. His reports show the union was not naïve about the presence of company spies: questions about how many workers had so far signed up were answered carefully; “not far off 50 per cent” was the response even very early in the drive.³⁴ So vigilant were organizers that in the early stage of organizing that an inside organizer had to vouch for new stewards the committee appointed or who volunteered to help.³⁵

Eventually, however, organizers had to bring the drive out into the open, but they waited until the union was strong enough that workers, knowing there was safety in numbers, would no longer fear being seen as union supporters.³⁶ In a plant the size of De Havilland Aircraft with almost 4,000 workers, for example, the union wanted at least

100 workers were prepared to recruit others before releasing membership cards and holding open meetings. Going public was a risk for if, by some chance, no company spies had infiltrated the underground organizing meetings, then going public would expose the unions' lead organizers to company reprisals.³⁷ There were, however, several advantages to ending the clandestine period. One was that if there had been spies at work, it became more difficult for them to make themselves useful, as there were fewer secrets. "Once the meetings were open, that put an end to anything a stool pigeon could do," said Eldon.³⁸ The open meetings also created a sense of momentum. Tallman recalled how vital it was to graduate from organizers having one-on-one conversations with prospects to holding meetings, sometimes for every department in a plant. "Involvement with a group gave workers more confidence and a sense of accomplishment as progress reports were made," she said.³⁹ Such meetings also allowed organizers to gather the information they needed about wages and working conditions in the plant, as material for union organizing literature.⁴⁰ An inside organizer remembered how important it was for more than one organizer to approach a reluctant worker, because after having been talked to by several pro-union co-workers, the worker would have the "feeling that [they] were not alone."⁴¹

With the drive out in the open, the union could enlarge their repertory of tactics. Organizers could distribute leaflets, convene mass meetings, buy radio and newspaper advertising, erect billboards near the plant, and organize socials and educational events. Unions, not wanting to delay action until enough workers in a department had signed up to hold a meaningful election, would appoint a steward body so that the union could begin to agitate for issues in the plant.⁴² Once out in the open, unions could pressure the employer on a grievance and then take credit for winning it after an employer had tried

to neutralize the issue by conceding to it. "Plants have been organized in a number of instances around very small issues," said the UE's Ross Russell.⁴³ At one workplace, the union committee leafleted workers about the lack of privacy in the women's washroom. By noon the same day, the company was installing partitions. At another plant, workers had been asking for dedicated smoking and eating areas. After years of ignoring these requests, the company relented once it found out a union was talking to workers about their grievances.⁴⁴ Another local, well before it was recognized, was able to pressure management for more toilets, new washrooms, better lighting, a smoking room, even overtime pay.⁴⁵ These "little things," said one organizer, showed workers what a union could do.⁴⁶ Union members could display their affiliation openly and start wearing union insignia in the plant, to encourage others. Pinon said her fellow inside organizers at De Havilland persuaded people to start sporting union buttons all on the same day. "The idea was to start wearing them on the same day, so they couldn't fire everyone...This is the way it started, in one big burst."⁴⁷

Most important, once the drive was in the open, unions could start training stewards in such skills as parliamentary procedure, public speaking and, most notably, grievance handling, meaning the union could begin to represent workers in the workplace "as soon as we knew the membership was serious," in the words of one union leader.⁴⁸ The UE, considering it impossible to organize large plants without representatives in each department, established temporary, unelected steward bodies as part of its organizing strategy.⁴⁹ The CIO's antecedents had been the AFL craft unions, and contemporary CIO activists would have been familiar with the craft union model of representing only a minority of workers in a given workplace; namely, their members only. That minority position, however, gave the union a platform for representing

workers, and in this way a union organizing committee became an often-militant source of shop floor activism. "No organizer can tell in advance precisely what the issue may be that will bring success to an organizing drive," said the UE's Russell, but what he thought most important was that workers see the union "at all times to be a fighting organization."⁵⁰ The UE believed that strength on the shop floor gave the union "virtual union recognition and [used it as] a prelude to formal recognition."⁵¹ Long before it won recognition at the CGE plant on Lansdowne Street in Toronto, the UE encouraged workers in a department to act as a group, under the leadership of UE stewards, to defend anyone who was being mistreated or not having their grievances attended to.⁵² At the company's Ward Street plant, although the company had not recognized the UE per se, but only a "general committee," the union succeeded in persuading the company to bargain with UE stewards, even though union membership was less than 50 per cent of the workers. Under this system of "virtual recognition," the UE was able to settle grievances for almost four years before finally achieving official union recognition at Ward Street.⁵³ When the UE shop stewards encouraged workers at the Ward Street plant to down tools in the winter of 1941 to protest the lack of heat in the building, the company finally turned the heat on and so did the union, signing up 70 per cent of the workers there.⁵⁴

The UE was not alone in representing workers using "virtual recognition." UAW locals, for example, once a drive was out in the open, would put in place as large a steward as body possible and appoint a pro tem executive and bargaining committees, who together would attempt to represent workers as though the union had already won majority support and recognition. The union saw this as one way of maintaining workers' enthusiasm through the long delays caused by the cumbersome IDIA

machinery. If companies refused to deal with the union committee, Burt told the union's district council, then the membership should "back up their union committee" by defining the committee as including the entire membership.⁵⁵ At the Massey-Harris plant in Toronto, the union was settling grievances satisfactorily with the company as early as April 1943, six months before it won a recognition vote.⁵⁶ Similarly, at Chrysler in Windsor, the UAW reported bargaining very successfully with the company and settling several grievances even though it had yet to bargain a collective agreement.⁵⁷ When an IDIA commissioner gave the UAW bargaining rights along with the company union at De Havilland Aircraft, the UAW was able to pressure the company to recognize UAW stewards for each department and to settle numerous grievances.⁵⁸

There is also evidence that in some cases CIO unions signed collective agreements giving them members-only bargaining rights. As an organizing strategy, members-only contracts were seen as useful stepping stones to exclusive recognition, since they gave the union a "bully pulpit" and allowed it to negotiate improvements that would increase support among non-union workers, thus increasing the chance of winning exclusive bargaining rights.⁵⁹ The proportion of such contracts ranged widely from industry to industry. A survey conducted by the federal labour department of 1943 contracts in the iron and steel industries showed that about 10 per cent of collective agreements in 1943 were members-only agreements. Members-only agreements were in fact the majority of agreements in the auto and auto parts industry, but only one-quarter of agreements in basic steel, and one-tenth in sheet metal. The dominance of members-only agreements in auto and auto parts may have been reflection of those industries' high degree of American ownership, where many of the plants in Canada were subsidiaries of United States parent companies (unlike farm equipment and steel

making) and where, until 1940, members-only agreements were in the majority.⁶⁰

Employer implacability could also have been a factor in determining the number of members-only agreements in an industry, for employers' resistance to union-recognition clauses covering all eligible employees tended to parallel their resistance to a dues check-off clause. Thus, in auto and auto parts, only one of the UAW's 25 contracts contained a check-off clause, while in sheet metal, six of the Steel Workers' 16 contracts had check-off clauses. Union strategy or policy does not seem to be a factor. In the aircraft industry, for example, where the UAW was strong, members-only agreements appeared in only a handful of cases, while the dues check off existed in more than a quarter of the industry's 25 collective agreements. In the farm equipment industry, where the UAW held 70 per cent of the contracts, only one was members-only.⁶¹

There is also evidence unions went to regional war labour boards and pleaded for workers long before they won union recognition in a workplace. CCL organizer Evans appealed to the war labour board on behalf of the brewery workers he was organizing in Sudbury, who were not getting their full cost-of-living bonus. The labour board ruled in favour of the workers.⁶² Before the UAW had won recognition at Chrysler in Windsor, it appealed to the war labour board after the company announced it was cancelling vacation bonuses. Using the issue as an organizing lever, the union called a mass meeting, and hundreds jammed the union hall. The appeal to the board was successful, and the victory "infused new enthusiasm" into the drive, and hundreds joined.⁶³

Similarly, fighting for workers employers had fired for union activity was vital during a drive and, as we have seen, unions pursued such cases energetically, usually by demanding an investigation from the National Selective Service or from the Department

of Labour. Unions dealt with firings outside official channels, too. When union strength in a plant was robust enough, the union could “instill militancy in the organized group by telling them not to let anyone be fired, laid off, or discriminated against, but to bargain these matters as they occur,” advised Burt. If the bargaining committee was not successful in having the company rescind a firing, then the union could declare that it was “enlarging the bargaining committee to include all union members,” meaning the union was prepared to call a work stoppage. These strikes were often successful, since, as Burt observed, “[o]nce workers find their strength and have successfully settled a case, they automatically unite themselves and stick together.”⁶⁴ He was often proven right. At the W.D. Beach Company in Toronto, following a brief strike in 1941, the employer reinstated four union activists it had fired.⁶⁵ Such tactics also had the added benefit of increasing a new local’s strength.

Success tended to breed success. The UAW was able to organize Ford in Windsor after a sputtering start when Ford in the United States signed a good contract with the UAW for the first time, in 1941. “We had a committee of only 21 people,” recalled Burt, “but after that U.S. contract, we couldn’t fit them in a big hall.”⁶⁶ A successful recognition vote in October 1943 at the mammoth and venerable Massey-Harris plant in Toronto increased the UAW’s membership in all the Toronto plants it was organizing, as well as at Massey-Harris facilities in Brantford.⁶⁷ Success at the bargaining table was vital, too. Good contracts made it easier to organize other workers, especially those working in the same industry.⁶⁸

Workers in one plant were influenced by unionization in another plant owned by the same company. Sometimes this happened inadvertently as in one 1942 incident in Brantford when workers struck at a non-union plant. A rumour spread that a UAW-

organized plant of the same company had struck in sympathy, although it hadn't. The wildcatters sent a delegation to the UAW plant in gratitude and, unfazed by their discovery that workers there were in fact still working, let union leaders there talk to them about joining the union. The strike was eventually called off, but the UAW foresaw no difficulty in organizing the plant. The big gain, said the UAW local union leader, was that, "Employees learned about each other, learned they wanted the same things."⁶⁹

Winning recognition

Once a union had signed up a substantial number of workers, it moved to win recognition as their bargaining agent. With no legislative framework like the American Wagner Act guaranteeing a legal and orderly process of union recognition, the CIO unions in this period faced a tortuous route in forcing a company to recognize the union and bargain with it. The CIO's most commonly-used method to win recognition was to force the government to set up a board of conciliation under the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA), a law originally designed to mediate disputes where a union had already been recognized by the employer. When employers began to complain during the war that CIO unions were using the machinery of the IDIA not as it was originally intended but to gain recognition for newly organized plants,⁷⁰ their complaints were well founded: IDIA conciliation boards had the power to investigate the causes of a dispute and thus had to talk to the union involved, in effect tacitly recognizing it as an entity. The only way to get such a board, however, was to tell the Department of Labour a dispute existed between the union and the employer that could lead to a strike. This was not a straightforward matter. First, the union had to approach the company, saying it had signed up a majority of workers, and ask the company to

recognize the union for collective bargaining purposes. The reason for the letter was to show an eventual conciliation board that the union had made an effort to settle the dispute before applying for a board.⁷¹ (The unions were being more realistic than cynical when laying down this paper trail: of the 21 first contracts the UAW signed in one, 15-month, period, 15 had their start with a conciliation board because the employer refused to recognize the union.⁷²) The companies were under no obligation to make any response to this overture. The union could wait for weeks to get the company's refusal. One local union leader told the 1943 Ontario select committee that his employer took three weeks to respond and used that time to organize a company union.⁷³

When the companies refused recognition, the unions then had to prove the existence of a strike threat.⁷⁴ Organizers usually called a mass meeting of union members, where they asked workers to authorize a strike call if the government failed to set up a board. Jackson pointed out to the 1943 Ontario select committee the irony of such strike votes, which raised in plants "the issue of a strike in order to achieve conciliation, which is the means of avoiding a strike, an anomalous position, I believe."⁷⁵ Furthermore, that the first collective decision faced by a brand-new membership was a strike vote had an emotional impact on workers, many of whom were novices in industrial workplaces and unions. "When workers are told they must take a strike vote to obtain a conciliation vote," Burt testified, "the natural result is that relations in the plant approach a feverish state..."⁷⁶ Moreover, many workers had friends and relatives fighting overseas, which often presented them with conflicting loyalties.

Jackson summed things up. "What is the lot of the worker under the IDIA?" he asked. "First, he must build his union under the most difficult conditions of discrimination and intimidation, while deprived of the right to strike, thus arming the

employer in his attacks on the organizing workers. Then he must take a strike vote and secure a majority of the eligible votes for strike action. This action is mandatory first because the Act so sets forth and second because an employer will seldom, if ever, negotiate directly when he knows his workers cannot strike anyway, and the Board procedure is long and drawn out, thus giving him time to further weaken and divide the workers. Having secured a majority strike vote, the workers then must apply for a Board and set forth their demands in a highly technical language and precise detail on wages, etc. Then the workers must wait for weeks and months while the Board deliberates and brings in a report. In most cases, the report will be a weak compromise from the workers' point of view, but even to secure that much of a compromise he will probably have to take strike action. Not a very glowing picture of workers' rights."⁷⁷

Nonetheless, most strike votes were successful, an indication of the degree of worker dissatisfaction with their employer and confidence in their union. The union, armed with the results, would again approach management and ask the company to recognize the union for collective bargaining purposes. If the company refused, which it usually did, it had created the dispute that would allow the union to apply for a conciliation board which, the activists hoped, would investigate their claim of majority support, call for a representation vote, and recommend the company bargain with the union. Unions knew they had to have significant numbers signed up because conciliation boards "will be guided only by the strength or weakness displayed by the union."⁷⁸In some cases, it appears some unions were prepared to take this step without a majority of workers, but others insisted that organizers only seek recognition when a majority of workers had made a commitment to the union. The UAW's policy, for example, was not to apply for a board unless it knew it had a majority, believing a

conciliation board would only recommend a vote when it was evident the union was strong.⁷⁹ (What this lengthy and complicated procedure meant for unions was that they had to muster majority votes no fewer than three times: for the strike vote, then to convince a conciliation board to order a recognition vote and then, if successful in that, to win the actual vote.)

If the Department of Labour was satisfied there was a bona fide strike risk, it would convene a board, but the IDIA's bureaucratic machinery was slow and compounded the delays caused by employer foot-dragging. After a union had applied for a conciliation board, it could wait months for a response. Burt said that delays of five to six months between applying for a board and finally receiving a report from it were common and caused worker to "fall away from their union membership."⁸⁰ Through all the weeks and months of waiting, a union had to maintain workers' commitment, even as an employer made every effort to weaken it and so foil any recognition vote a board might recommend. The Steel Workers had organized the Canadian Bridge plant in Hamilton in May 1941 and applied for a board that August. The board was not established until December, four months later. By that time, it appears, the union's position in the plant had weakened to the point where it was forced to sign a contract where the company did not have to recognize the union or allow the union staff representative to participate in negotiations.⁸¹

Part of the delay was the department's trying to win agreement from the companies to hold a vote. Companies would make various arguments against holding a vote, the most frequent being that the CIO did not represent a majority. Since the IDIA had been enacted to intervene in disputes where union was already recognized by the employer, it had no precedents upon which to base its voting rules. Unions and

employers fought in front of conciliation boards about what constituted a majority of union supporters when unions applied for recognition votes, and similar disputes erupted even after a company had agreed to a vote. Companies, as a condition of agreeing to hold a vote, would insist that at least half of all eligible voters had to opt for the union, often including office workers and others in the definition of eligible voters. For a time, unions were able to push back but, as Burt reported in June 1943, the Department of Labour brought in a regulation requiring a union to win 51 per cent of eligible voters, a requirement not imposed on the elected officials making the rules.⁸² Thus, inside organizers had to assemble and maintain an accurate picture of the number of workers in a plant, in the face of high wartime labour turnover.^{83,84}

In order to get around the delays caused by the IDIA machinery, unions in some cases were able to persuade companies to agree to a Department of Labour vote without having to call a conciliation board. What persuaded companies more than any other factor was their sense of the union's strength. If the union was strong enough, some employers decided it would be wiser to negotiate with the union, wait for the war to end, and then let post-war unemployment weaken the union as labour shortages turned to labour surpluses.⁸⁵ In other cases, union militancy played a role. In late 1941, thanks to Windsor Ford workers' militancy, Ford of Canada had been pressured to recognize the UAW by both the Canadian government and the company's American parent, neither of whom wanted to risk interruptions in production.⁸⁶

Other Windsor employers may have been deterred by the union's success at the Motor Products Company in that city in early 1942, when the UAW fought an illegal strike for recognition without first applying for a board of conciliation. A majority of workers had already joined the UAW when the company tried to set up a company

union, including holding an election for the company union executive. Workers elected a union slate to the “stooge” union’s executive. The UAW-controlled executive then demanded management recognize their union, but the company refused to recognize them and replaced them with their own, handpicked executive. When the company union tried to act as the workers’ representative before the war labour board on a wage issue, workers had had enough and walked out. The company brought in out-of-town strike breakers,⁸⁷ and fired the 300 strikers, men and women. The UAW “expressed concern” that 10 neighbouring plants might join the strike, making it city-wide.⁸⁸ Since there was a dispute going on, a conciliation board was convened and a recognition vote recommended, which the UAW won handily. However, leading up to the vote, the union still maintained “a strike position” just in case the company did not accept the board’s recommendation for a vote.⁸⁹

In most cases, though, recognition was decided by a conciliation board’s recommendation for a Department of Labour-supervised vote. None of the IDIA boards’ recommendations, however, could be enforced, meaning companies could flout them in spite of vehement union protests. At Toronto’s Sangamo Electric plant, management simply ignored board recommendations for a vote no fewer than three times, causing the UE to finally give up trying to organize the plant.⁹⁰ A company could also refuse to allow the vote to be conducted in the workplace so, as Jackson said, “either there was no vote or a vote outside the plant under extremely difficult circumstances, where it is problematical as to how many employees would actually have a full opportunity to cast a ballot.” Since, in most cases, unions were required to win a majority of all those eligible to vote (and not just a majority of those who cast ballots), the result, as Jackson

pointed out, was that very few ballots were taken outside, "so nine times out of 10, if an employer says 'No vote,' there is no vote."⁹¹

Once a vote had been ordered, the Department of Labour took charge, mediating disputes among the parties — between the company union and any number of vying bona fide unions or between the unions and the employer — about the rules of the election campaign, printing notices about the vote that were posted in the plant; printing the ballots; and providing ballot boxes. The agreement amongst the parties usually stipulated when campaigning would halt. Voting hours were extended to meet the needs of shift workers. All parties were allowed scrutineers to witness the balloting and the count.

Even with majority support, the unions did not always win. The IDIA delays gave management time enough to mount concerted anti-union or pro-company union efforts that eroded support for the union. A defeat at Motor Lamp in Windsor was blamed on management resorting to "outright bribery," Burt said in April 1943, demoralizing workers and bringing UAW organizing there to a standstill.⁹² Management tactics leading up to a vote could border on the bizarre. Supervisors at the London Concrete Machinery Company held "beer parties" before the vote, which culminated in a "real burn up" the eve of the vote. The next morning, the company sent cars to pick up hung over workers from their homes. The Department of Labour also allowed foremen to vote in this election. "Hitler himself could have gotten elected under such conditions," said the *Canadian Tribune* of the Steel Workers' defeat in the vote, 47 to 28.⁹³

The unions had to be tenacious. The Packinghouse Workers lost a September 1941 recognition vote by a wide margin because it had been required to win a majority

of all Canada Packers' workers in all the company's Toronto plants and not just the three where it had conducted organizing campaigns. The lead inside organizer, Adam Borsk, was worried about union supporters being fired, so the union went underground, battling the company only through its newspaper, which attacked the company union. The company fired Borsk on account of the newspaper's editorials, but Borsk turned to his firing into a union advantage by calling his whole department out on strike in protest. The workers were back at work the next day, but workers' support for the strike proved the union's strength even after it had gone underground. Borsk's firing also allowed the union to seek legal redress under the Criminal Code, and the prosecution of the case through the summer of 1942, while unsuccessful, in addition to shedding light on company practices, showed workers the union as a national player, one that could deal with management at a "higher plane."⁹⁴ Later, the company tried force a collective agreement on the company union, which by this time Packinghouse Workers Union activists had taken over. They threatened to call a strike, and the company finally agreed to another government recognition vote, which the union won handily in the fall of 1942. Meantime, Borsk had gone on to organize workers at the neighbouring Swift plant, and the Packinghouse Workers won a recognition vote there a few months later.⁹⁵

Winning the right to negotiate

The campaign leading up to the vote, coupled with a successful vote, stimulated support for the union among workers, often, in Burt's words, changing workers' "fear into militancy."⁹⁶ That commitment would be necessary in order for the union to maintain its membership strength while trying to negotiate a collective agreement with

the employer. This was by no means guaranteed, because with no legally mandated duty-to-bargain obligation on employers, there was no guarantee employers would agree to negotiate, even after the union had won a representation vote. "We have gained a great victory to date at Massey-Harris in Toronto but the final battle is before us," said a UAW newspaper editor after the union won a recognition vote there.⁹⁷

Often employers stalled or simply refused to negotiate with the union and, as will be discussed later, workers often had to strike to force employers to the table, for failure to get a contract posed a real threat to a union's very survival. With no gains to point to, unions found it hard to maintain the number of dues-paying members in a plant, let alone increase it. So that workers would see quick gains, the UAW's immediate post-vote strategy was to establish a formal collective bargaining relationship as quickly as possible "because there is nothing more attractive to the membership than to have a committee recognized by the company carry on collective bargaining."⁹⁸ The union would negotiate a preliminary collective agreement that did not contain provisions that had to go to the war labour board for approval (such as increases in wages and overtime pay). This first agreement would be a relatively simple document, establishing the union in the plant, with a grievance procedure, a seniority system, and provisions for a recognized steward body; all were seen as vital for maintaining the union. The union would then try to negotiate an "economic package," which would have to be approved by the RWLB. The union reasoned that if it waited until these economic matters were dealt with by the board before starting a bargaining relationship with the employer, months would pass before working conditions were improved in the plant. The delay could mean workers would lose interest in the union, since they had seen no progress, although they were paying dues,⁹⁹ so consolidating the union's

strength inside a plant was much easier once this contract was signed. The strategy was a sound one. When De Havilland workers, for example, submitted wage proposals to the RWLB, management refused to make it a joint proposal, meaning the board would then have to contact the company and ask for a submission, allowing the employer another chance to delay. "It looks like the age old 'gag,' stall, stall, stall, so that workers will get fed up with the union," the editor of the *Aircraft Worker* told readers.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, even if the union was able to win a contract, its victory was still no guarantee of a union's survival. For all practical purposes," said the UE's Jackson, "organization begins after we have won an election...." ¹⁰¹ The first peril a new union faced was on-going employer resistance to the union, with companies making every effort to either undermine the union or take advantage of any weakness. The fate of the union at the Skinner's plant in Oshawa showed the necessity of maintaining the union's strength. The UAW had organized Skinner's in 1937 and had negotiated a contract that included a grievance procedure, seniority, and collective bargaining rights. But the local union had allowed its memberships to lapse, and the employer, taking advantage of the union's weakness, was gradually able to erode the union's contractual gains, even risking introducing 13-hour work days. In September 1940, Skinner's workers struck in protest over the lengthened work day and called the UAW after the company had fired four of them. Tommy McLean, a veteran UAW organizer, told them the union would help out but only if they re-joined. The vast majority signed up immediately.¹⁰² "Don't let your union slip, because the concessions you have won are only maintained through a strong, militant membership," the UAW's newspaper warned its readers after the Skinner strike.¹⁰³

The second peril was weakness in the new union itself. The first year of organizing and securing and working under a first contract was the most difficult, unionists attested. The membership had to be educated in the ways of unionism and consolidated. "Consolidation" was the CIO's term, in the days before the automatic dues check off, for maintaining and increasing the number of dues-paying union members, with dues payment being considered the best indicator of the new union's strength.¹⁰⁴ It was, in effect, "the re-treading of ground that was originally covered in organizing the plant but is now done on a monthly basis," explained one organizer.¹⁰⁵ "We can liken ourselves to a modern army," said Burt, using a wartime military metaphor, "who have made a tank attack and driven a wedge in the enemy lines. In order for us to safeguard our wedge, it will be necessary for us to bring up the rear."¹⁰⁶

Consolidation depended on a robust steward body, which needed to be active and aggressive to maintain the union's numerical strength so that it could represent workers effectively with management.¹⁰⁷ Stewards brought to "workers each and every day the living proof of the value and necessity of the Union by taking up the problems of the workers and fighting them through," UE organizer George Harris explained. "A local cannot function at all without the steward system"¹⁰⁸ Union members often elected stewards to act as their representatives even before the employer had recognized the union, and once a contract was signed, it was the steward body that had to enforce the collective agreement, lest the union lose credibility and legitimacy with the membership.

Companies recognized the importance of the steward system and did their best to weaken it. Ford, for example, refused to allow stewards to act for workers during overtime hours.¹⁰⁹ Stewards were frequently the targets of transparently anti-union dismissals or layoffs, and the unions had to bargain to special seniority status for

stewards to try to protect their in-plant leadership from employer efforts to weaken the union.

Often though, weakness in the steward body was not employer related. Building a steward body was not always easy. Workers were commonly working 10-hour days, six days a week (and sometimes seven), rotating through two or three shifts, all of which restricted the time and depleting the energy workplace activists could devote to the union. At the Hayes-Dana plant in Merritton, organized before the war, the steward body had atrophied by 1942, and union membership had plunged to less than half the workforce.¹¹⁰ The union sent an energetic, young organizer into the plant and his first task was to re-invigorate the steward body, largely through plant-wide stewards meetings. Months later the local could report that the union was "humming" in the plant with grievances handled promptly and membership increasing.¹¹¹ Sometimes a weak steward body was due to the union's success. A local union leader observed in one war plant that new employees came into a plant where the union had improved conditions, "which they failed to appreciate." Consequently, he said, "there is lack of sentiment that is required to build up a good steward body."¹¹² Another factor was the high rate of labour turnover. At McKinnon Industries in St Catharines, it became so difficult to form a steward body out of the enormous number of new hires unacquainted with the union's previous struggles with the company, that local union leaders conducted house-to-house canvases in an effort to recruit stewards.¹¹³

In addition to representing workers with the company, stewards collected dues. Much has been written about the bureaucratization of the labour movement following the war – often called the "post-war settlement" – one feature of which was "union security," which guaranteed unions both members and members' dues. Some historians

and labour analysts have argued that the payroll dues-check off allowed unions to become complacent.¹¹⁴ When unions had to collect the dues themselves from members, they faced what was tantamount to a weekly or monthly “referendum” on the quality of representation the union was offering. They were, in effect, conducting what amounted to permanent organizing drives. Activists at the time argued that while difficult, the constant obligation for stewards to be accountable to every union member when asking them to pay their dues was beneficial.¹¹⁵ “The bargaining committee is trying to [retain] members by taking up every grievance with management they can get hold of,” explained one local leader.¹¹⁶ The dues check off, warned CPC activist A.A. Macleod, head of the Toronto Newspaper Guild, was “likely to lead to the disease of bureaucracy.”¹¹⁷ Even some who agreed with the check-off expressed concern. “We must fight against the check off being the cause of our union stewards’ losing contact with the workers in the plants,” wrote the UE’s Ross Russell, worried that without daily contact with workers, grievances would go unreported and a “false impression” created that workers were satisfied with the union when “actually there may be considerable discontent.”¹¹⁸

MacLeod and others who opposed the check off, however, were in the minority. Most union leaders at the time were desperately trying to win some form of union security. The Packinghouse Workers’ Margaret Sedgewick answered MacLeod’s warning by pointing out that while union security provisions had been part of Nova Scotia’s labour laws for years, the province was the site of the perhaps the most active labour movement in the country.¹¹⁹ Union advocates of union security pointed to the despised “free loader,” a worker who accepted the benefits won by the union but who would not pay dues. Seen as contemptible in itself, this behaviour was also worrying

because of its effect on dues-paying workers, who would regard it as unfair that they paid dues while others did not, thus encouraging even more free-loading. The advocates of union security argued, above all, that no union could long survive without a reliable a revenue stream because without the money to provide effective representation – experienced negotiators, legal counsel, education and research functions -- an organization was vulnerable to employer attack. Unions also saw a steady revenue stream as an organizing tool in itself, because organizing cost money. Burt pointed out that the check-off legislation in Nova Scotia gave unions there a “free hand in developing the union to meet the problems of the unorganized worker.”¹²⁰

The unions may have been most motivated to fight for union security after they had a few years’ experience with dues collections. The records show that number of dues-paying members could vacillate alarmingly. Here, for example, are the number of paid-up members claimed by the UAW local at De Havilland over a five-month period in 1943¹²¹:

April (1,412)

May (973)

July (1,908)

August (1,731)

The total UAW membership showed similar variances. For purposes of determining the union’s per capita to the CCL, the UAW reported a membership in January 1943 of 18,792. By June 1943 the figure had risen to 25,473, but by September it was down to 12,104, but back up in December, to 22,349.¹²² A UE report showed that in the Ward Street CGE plant in 1945, well after certification and after a contract had been signed, only five of the local’s 19 stewards were collecting dues. Only 113 of 508 workers

eligible for the union were paying dues in October 1944, and that number had dropped to 41 by February 1945.¹²³ In fact, in September 1945, the UE was bargaining for 13,000 workers but receiving dues from only 6,000.¹²⁴ The URW reported in May 1940 that only 600 members had paid their dues out of a membership total of 1,036, down from April's 659. By July, only 287 had paid up.¹²⁵

At times, it appeared to union leaders, dues revenue vacillated regardless of the union's performance. Even union successes did not guarantee workers would pay their dues. One UAW auto parts plant in Windsor reported a dues paying membership of 100 out of 550 workers in spite of having what Burt described as "one of the best contracts and the right to collect dues on company time."¹²⁶ Moreover, failure to pay dues could seriously weaken a union's bargaining position. Steel Worker activist Reg Gardiner recalled Stelco workers' fear of using a grievance procedure the union had won in 1944 because, with only 290 paid-up members out of 4,000 workers, they believed the union was too weak to defend them from management reprisal.¹²⁷

As well, there were many objectively good reasons for the dues problem. One was the high rate of labour turnover during the war, which in manufacturing averaged more than eight per cent a month before Ottawa curtailed labour mobility.¹²⁸ "The biggest setback," reported one local union in mid-1942, "has been that most of good union members have quit the plant or joined the armed forces, and the plant is now four times its pre-war staff." In a Merritton war plant, for example, union membership dropped from 97 per cent before the war to less than 50 per cent in 1941 because of high labour turnover.¹²⁹ Plants could see a quarter of their workforce quit within a few weeks.¹³⁰ One local union leader reported that in just one month, 300 workers had quit either to enlist or to move to a higher-paying job. The local had succeeded in signing up

a few of the new hires, but "it was the same old story. One joins up, and two or three drop behind in their dues."¹³¹ The high turnover also meant, according to some unionists, that many workers failed to appreciate that it was the union that had won them the workplace rights they had.¹³²

Government wage freezes persuaded some workers that with its first collective agreement the union had won them all it could, so they stopped paying dues.¹³³ Meantime, other workers were unhappy with the union because it had failed to gain them wage increases. "Others are friends and relatives of both these groups," said one union leader sardonically.¹³⁴ Another problem was the union's own success. "The men are now hard to convince of the union advantage as they receive good pay cheques," said one local leader. "It will take some kind of big issue to wake them up."¹³⁵

Child labour also posed a problem, with unions finding so many youths under 14 years of age working in some plants, that it was hard "to even keep things going."¹³⁶ Union leaders also had complaints about women. Leaders at the newly organized Metallic Roofing plant in Toronto reported that although women workers there were strong supporters of the union, they did not pay their dues. Women's low wages may have had something to do with women's failure to pay up: equal pay was a major organizing issue at Metallic.¹³⁷ Another reason may have been the union's failure to represent its female membership in its leadership ranks. Burt finally appointed a woman, Ruth Thompson, an activist on the Merriton local union executive, to collect dues in the plant. She had her work cut out for her: the union had been trying to win equal pay women workers but had failed.¹³⁸ In some well-established unionized plants, a "false sense of patriotism" could weaken the union as union leaders who had become

active before the war expressed reluctance to be aggressive with management during a war.¹³⁹

Union leaders wearied of the frustrating task of maintaining membership figures in the face of so many obstacles. "Sometimes I wonder if it's worth fighting for them at all," said one local official, "money seems to be the only thing that matters."¹⁴⁰ It is possible at least some union leaders may have failed to win workers' respect and allegiance, but the record is too full of local union leaders expressing frustration for that to be the sole reason for the dues problem.

Unions adopted various methods to contain the problem. Locals set up organizing committees to supplement the stewards' efforts.¹⁴¹ New hires were pursued aggressively, with stewards "quietly" giving every new employee a union application form and a letter of invitation to join the union.¹⁴² In some cases, unions applied simple peer pressure. At Kelsey-Hayes, a strong union shop in Windsor, stewards, knowing a few members had let their dues lapse, called a general membership meeting at lunch hour and then told the free loaders to pay their dues by 2 pm "or else." Everyone had paid up by 12:10, and the "matter was cleaned up to everyone's satisfaction."¹⁴³ Sometimes unions granted amnesties on dues in an effort to re-sign lapsed members whose accumulated dues were so high they could not afford to re-join the union without such an amnesty.¹⁴⁴

By late 1944 union security had become a preoccupation with the CIO. A survey by the *Labour Gazette* of contracts in the iron and steel industry that of the 336 collective agreements on file with the labour department in 1943, 85 per cent had no requirement at all for union membership. Maintenance of membership clauses covered 4.7 per cent; union shop provisions 2.2 per cent; and closed shop clauses 8.1 per cent.¹⁴⁵ A dues

check-off clause was present in 18 per cent of the agreements, but most did not call for an automatic, cross-the-board check off but, instead, required workers to give their written authorization.¹⁴⁶ The UE reported in 1943 that while it had secured paid vacations in more than 93 per cent of its contracts, only .4 per cent of its agreements contained a check off provision.¹⁴⁷ Burt reported to the UAW's February 1945 district council meeting that the lack of success in winning union security from employers was the reason for most of the applications for conciliation boards the union was making by that time. An ultimate Allied victory was no longer in question, and unions leaders were only too aware of what the end of the war could mean. "Our strategic advantage is that we have no unemployment problem," Burt reminded local union leaders in 1945, "and we need to act now...." Employers were counting on a wave of post-war unemployment, which would switch the "strategic advantage" to them and were thus refusing to concede union security at the bargaining table to ensure the CIO's wartime unionizing gains would not survive the war.¹⁴⁸

The strike weapon in wartime

The wartime dilemma At the beginning of the war, union leaders were acutely aware of the comparative lack of success of CIO strikes in the recent past. Burt reminded fellow UAW leaders in November 1939 that the union had conducted only two successful strikes in Canada, while five walkouts in Windsor, the union's stronghold, had hurt the union's fortunes. One of the Windsor companies the union had struck, for example, fired 125 strikers, and none of them was able to find other work. "The unfortunate result is that our members and prospective members take the stand that you have to show us something because we cannot afford to take another chance and they

continually hold up these horrible examples as proof," Burt said.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, Burt pointed out, "to relinquish the right to strike entirely would leave workers at the mercy of anti-union employers."¹⁵⁰ Without what he called a "Canadian Wagner Act" guaranteeing union rights to recognition and collective bargaining, in Canada, he believed, the strike weapon was necessary to force employers to recognize unions and then to force them to the bargaining table.

The war presented new dilemmas for unions weighing the pros and cons of using the strike weapon. Strikes rarely enjoyed public support and even more rarely during wartime.¹⁵¹ Unions, furthermore, could not count on balanced let alone sympathetic coverage of strikes in the press.¹⁵² The media portrayed strikes as more than nuisances: they were direct challenges to the war effort.¹⁵³ Newspapers such as the *Globe and Mail* used overheated rhetoric to argue for denying workers the right to strike, alleging that strikes, for example, had prevented the French from mounting an effective defence, and "now France and French labour are paying the price." Strikes during wartime were unpatriotic, the *Toronto Telegram* said, and a country at war could not allow strikes "any more that the Fire Department can go on strike when there is a fire."¹⁵⁴ Unionists were aware of media and public sensitivities about strikes during wartime and factored in public reaction when making a decision about whether or not to strike. The Steel Workers local at Algoma Steel in Sault Ste Marie faced considerable public anger in their community about the possibility of that Algoma workers would strike over a number of contentious issues, including overtime pay. The local proposed that "in the interests of the national emergency" instead of striking for their demands, union members would work the necessary overtime hours without overtime pay -- providing the company turned all its profits over to the government.¹⁵⁵ A UAW local in

Brantford showed a similar sensitivity to public opinion when it reported that sit-down strikes at Brantford Coach and Body were being conducted mostly by non-union workers, galvanized by the actions of high-handed foremen. The local was concerned that it would be held responsible for the consequent loss of production and the sight of men "standing by, smoking."¹⁵⁶ There were other, more pressing, concerns, too.

Unionists believed they had to be careful not to respond to employer's provoking wildcat strikes because such strikes had the potential of nullifying a collective agreement containing a no-strike clause.¹⁵⁷ Workers, too, would have been aware of the potentially high costs of striking. Even if their employers did not fire them for striking, strike pay was almost non-existent during this period.¹⁵⁸ Nor could unions always count on support from the rest of the labour movement. "The difficulty," said Burt, "was that the labour movement in Canada is extremely hard to rouse," lamenting about how he had sent out hundreds of letters seeking financial support for a groups of strikers in St Catharines with only other UAW locals responding.¹⁵⁹

At times, the labour movement – even an individual union – was bitterly divided internally over the role of strikes in wartime. The Dominion Glass Company in Wallaceburg had vowed it would never under any condition recognize a CIO union. The UAW struck the company in early 1943 over union recognition, with all but 40 of the 900 workers joining the strike. A delegation of strikers travelled to Hamilton, where the CCL had launched an organizing drive at that city's Dominion Glass plant. The Wallaceburg strikers were hoping to persuade the Hamilton workers to strike in sympathy and thus force the company to recognize the union in both plants. While some UAW local leaders supported the strike and the strikers' overtures to Hamilton workers, other UAW leaders were outraged. "With the Allies on the offensive the union should be planning

ways to increase production,” argued Ford local 200 president Roy England at the union’s district council meeting, “but here we are talking about strikes....”¹⁶⁰ Burt, however, defended the strike, saying unions had to strike if they wanted to organize workers or win decent contracts.¹⁶¹

The UAW’s division on the issue was at least in part a reflection of the division between those who supported the CPC’s 1941 no-strike pledge and those who did not. The CPC-led UE in Canada adopted a no-strike pledge after the Soviet Union’s joined the Allied side in June 1941. Six months later, following the American entry into the war in December 1941, most Canadian CIO affiliates rejected their American counterparts’ adoption of a no-strike pledge, arguing that corporate Canada’s intransigence and the country’s not having Wagner-Act-like protection for their unions sometimes made recourse to the strike weapon vital. Time and again, the CCL and the majority of its affiliates pledged to “take all necessary steps to prevent unauthorized and wildcat strikes” but always stopped short of adopting a no-strike policy.¹⁶² “The CCL does not have a no-strike pledge,” one Canadian CIO leader said. “We have a Victory Pledge... to do as much as is humanly possible to avoid strikes.”

Jackson was as aware of the dangers of the no-strike pledge as any other CCL leader. The UE, he said, had taken the pledge knowing that “unscrupulous employers would take advantage of this policy”¹⁶³ and demanded, in return, that the government act to level the playing field for unions. Jackson wanted a “deal” with the government: in return for a no-strike policy, “[L]abour, [which] has given up its fundamental economic weapon for the securing of justice and equality in bargaining power, should be protected ... [through] a guarantee that employers will negotiate in good faith once the bargaining agent has been determined.”¹⁶⁴

All CIO unions, including the fractious UAW, often presented themselves and saw themselves as strike averters. Union newspapers would report with some satisfaction that there had been fewer work days lost to strikes during the Second World War than in the 1914-1918 struggle.¹⁶⁵ Union leaders talked about how difficult it was for them to avert wildcats during the war, and praised workers for their forbearance: it was "a credit to the workers that they bear their burden without more resistance."¹⁶⁶ Burt claimed the UAW had stopped more strikes than it had started since the war began,¹⁶⁷ but that mass firings such as the 150 workers dismissed during the drive at Dominion Glass caused such "resentment against the company, and you would have to be a magician to avoid a strike."¹⁶⁸ Workers at Imperial Iron had struck several times to win recognition and a collective agreement and had conducted several wildcats as well. But once the agreement was signed, Burt believed it would be necessary to discourage further wildcats while continuing to settle grievances.¹⁶⁹ There are indications that unions believed that dampening worker militancy many have hurt organizing efforts. When the UAW failed to persuade a war labour board to give it a union security clause at De Havilland on account of the union's not having a substantial majority of the workers signed up, the union worried that its membership would have been higher if it had "not adopted placatory methods at critical times."¹⁷⁰

UAW activist Joe Torosian from St Catharines said workers, however, would do what was necessary, whatever their leaders' strike policy was. "Conditions will provoke strikes regardless of union leaders and laws," he said, "and workers will take whatever action is necessary to rectify conditions in spite of leaders and laws."¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that union leaders were more militant than rank-and-file workers. In 1944, the International UAW conducted a referendum on whether or not to

retain its no-strike policy, which had never been endorsed in Canada. During this campaign, senior officials from the American branch of the UAW visited Canada to persuade the Canadians to endorse the no-strike pledge. Richard Frankenstein, who headed up the UAW's aircraft department, told the Canadians to remember the soldier in the foxhole, "who is also sick of all this war talk and wants to be back with his loved ones at home. We can help these soldier brothers of our by staying on the job every day."¹⁷² The UAW's Canadian leaders, however, in spite of a strong CPC presence in their ranks, were largely opposed to the pledge. Burt and his assistant Tommy McLean both argued that in Canada the union had "to fight both management and government." Burt warned the union's membership that if they voted in favour of the no-strike policy, he would "not be responsible for what happens." The union's district council voted on the issue, and the no-strike pledge lost decisively, 24 to 13.¹⁷³ The union's membership was more supportive of a no-strike policy: in the referendum vote taken among the rank-and-file members in Canada, the pledge carried narrowly, 54 to 45 per cent.¹⁷⁴

The wartime strike record In 1940 Burt predicted that his union's progress in organizing would depend on whether it was prepared to take "a militant stand against the companies regardless of the war" or work under the "doubtful benefits of the Industrial Disputes Act."¹⁷⁵ While the no-strike debate in Canada centred around the necessity of striking for recognition and collective bargaining rights, strikes, however, often occurred during organizing drives well before issues of official recognition and collective bargaining were reached. Days before the German invasion of the Soviet Union and its subsequent adoption of its no-strike pledge, the UE struck CGE in Toronto for recognition, with Jackson arguing that, with employers flouting Ottawa's privy council order 2685 recommending that management allow collective bargaining, union

members had a choice: give up on winning collective bargaining rights or take strike action. "In the latter event, as employers planned," said Jackson, "the issue then becomes one of employees versus government under the IDIA, with the Order 2685 forgotten and the employees charged with breaking the law."¹⁷⁶ Organizing strikes were by definition illegal, since they occurred before a conciliation board had reported. Even though Burt had expressed concern about strikes early in the war,¹⁷⁷ by 1942 UAW members were striking during organizing drives, and although the union often disavowed any responsibility, it offered no criticism of the leaders of these strikes.

Strikes could build workers' militancy and boost support for the union. In early 1943, women in the tank division of the Massey-Harris plant in Brantford, only eight of whom were UAW members, struck over a wage dispute. The UAW staff representative urged them back to work, but the resulting negotiations gave the women an improved wage – and the union gained 86 more members in the department.¹⁷⁸ In late 1942, 95 per cent of the workforce at the fledgling UAW unit at the Mott's plant in Brantford walked out over the non-payment of their Christmas bonus. The strike lasted only one day because the company immediately backed down. The union drive had strengthened the workers to the point of a strike, and the strike's success in turn strengthened the organizing drive.¹⁷⁹

Firings that were transparently for union organizing activity provoked the ire of all workers, union and non-union alike, and union organizers exploited the resulting upsurge in worker anger. At a plant in Windsor, management fired union activists, allegedly for smoking. The dismissed workers set up a picket line, and others joined them. Although the union denied authorizing the strike, it speedily presented itself as the workers' agent to negotiate a settlement.¹⁸⁰ In a Brantford plant, where the union

was not yet strong, a supervisor fired four union members. The remaining workers in the department, where the union had only minority support, refused to work. Despite his official disavowals of playing any role in the strike, the union staff organizer assumed leadership of the strike and spoke to the wildcatters, persuading them to return to work, with the assurance the union would contact the Department of Labour to investigate the dismissals. While workers awaited the department's ruling, union organizing accelerated in the plant.¹⁸¹

Strikes were sometimes used to show an employer how strong the union was¹⁸², and occasionally when one union was vying with another for workers' allegiance. Even company unions took this tack. At De Havilland Aircraft, the company union, in order to prove its mettle with workers, called an illegal strike when it was competing with the UAW. Illegal strikes were even used in conciliation board hearings as proof of a union's strength. The UE called a walkout at the Westinghouse plant Hamilton in early 1941 and later offered, as proof of its strength to a conciliation board, the fact that 80 per cent of workers had heeded the strike call.¹⁸³

As we saw earlier, union recognition often had to be won on the picket line. The nine-week recognition strike at Dominion Glass that caused such debate within the UAW was eventually lost, and the company refused to rehire hundreds of the strikers. Burt nevertheless defended the work stoppage as a necessary organizing strategy: "One cannot just request the company to... recognize the union and then agree not to do anything when the company refuses the request...because once you agree to the refusal of management to recognize the union, you would have all the managements giving you the same answer."¹⁸⁴ Worker's commitment to union recognition could be tenacious. A strike for union recognition at Malleable Metals in Oshawa had been sustained for five

months when the union held a vote whether or not to keep the strike going: 110 workers voted to continue the strike, and only 30 voted to halt it.¹⁸⁵

As the war progressed, union used illegal strikes to by-pass the conciliation stage altogether. With labour shortages now acute, the drive for uninterrupted war production a government obsession, and the CCF rising in the polls, the UAW's illegal recognition strike at Motor Products in Windsor in 1942 had set a precedent. In 1943, for example, 80 per cent of the workforce at Brantford Coach and Body walked out in March "to convince government and management they were determined to have their grievances settled through the UAW." The strike was declared illegal, and the Department of Labour ordered the workers back to work, which workers did this time but only on the condition that the government grant the union a government-supervised strike vote. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the company agreed to a representation vote and also agreed that if the union won the vote, collective bargaining would proceed.¹⁸⁶ The union's strategy was based on its observation that by 1942 when it took workers out on illegal recognition strikes, "we find we get quicker conciliation service and the government is more prepared to co-operate in order to settle disputes."¹⁸⁷

Even after winning recognition, however, unions often faced yet more corporate intransigence and had to strike in order to force employers to the bargaining table. The comments of URW leader Joe McKenzie about a lengthy 1943 URW strike in Galt were echoed time and again by unionists: "The only reason there is a strike," he said, "is that the company has simply refused to negotiate with the union. It has not been asked to sign any agreement but simply sit down and negotiate with a union committee."¹⁸⁸ In 1941, Steel Workers at Acme Screw and Gear won a recognition vote 1,524 to 160 but had to strike twice to force their employer to the bargaining table.¹⁸⁹ In 1942, workers at

Wilson Motor Bodies had to strike for three days to make the company keep its promise to negotiate with the UAW, again after the union had won a recognition vote. And even then, while management was ostensibly in talks with the union, supervisors were taking a petition through the plant, asking workers to sign it and either renounce their membership in the UAW or lose their jobs. The company also fired 100 workers, ejecting some forcibly from the plant.¹⁹⁰ In September 1943, at General Dry Batteries, 60 UE members conducted a sit-down strike protesting the stalling tactics the company was using to avoid meeting the union at the bargaining table. The union had won a recognition vote, but the company fired all 60 sit-downers. The investigating labour department officer persuaded the company to reinstate the 60 and to open talks with the union, but it had taken a three-day strike to win that.¹⁹¹ At Hobbs Glass Company in London, the UAW had been recognized but had to conduct a three-week strike to persuade management to negotiate. When workers reported for duty, however, the company locked them out. The union could not hold the low-paid workers, who were now suffering financially, through their second work stoppage. Some workers returned to work, and others found new jobs. With the picket line depleted, strike breakers could enter the plant, and the strike was for all intents and purposes broken. The dispute was ended through conciliation, with the employer agreeing to another a vote, which the union lost to a company union.¹⁹² As late as 1945, workers were still having to strike for a contract. Union members at Anaconda Brass in Toronto walked out in February over company delays in signing the collective agreement.¹⁹³ The fact the new agreement contained union recognition may have prompted management there to hold out, anticipating an end to the war and the end of PC 1003, the "Canadian Wagner Act," which had been introduced in 1944.

Sometimes unions had to strike in order to force a company to abide by a labour board ruling, whether it was the wage increases authorized by a war labour board or a conciliation board. Union members at the GM plant in Oshawa, for example, conducted a series of sit-down strikes in late 1943 to protest the auto maker's failure to give them the retroactive wage increases the war labour board had authorized. GM finally agreed to pay up.¹⁹⁴ In other cases, it was the government itself that was the target of a strike. In one instance, a CCL organizer threatened a strike if the conciliation board convened to hear its case did not award union security. The organizer had been working the Union of Wood Workers in Wingham and had been successful in getting a conciliation board set up. He asked the board for a union shop clause. If the board did not accede, he told the CCL's Conroy when asking for strike authorization, "there is a possibility of strike action...[I]n my opinion this is justifiable not just because of the obstructionist policies of the Company," but also because of the "effect it would have on organizing throughout this district, as many unorganized plants are watching the outcome of this case." In another instance, the UAW threatened to strike if a conciliation board ignored the majority position of the CIO union and insisted that the company union remain in effect until the expiry of its agreement with the employer. "If the workers are really demanding the union... I am going to recommend the plant go on strike on the assumption that the company permitted the signing of a company union contract without proper ratification by the employer," Burt told a union meeting.¹⁹⁵

Even after a union was well-established in a plant, it would call strikes to defend itself, especially in an era when unions had to guard their representation rights zealously. Workers at Ford in Windsor wildcatted in 1943 and again in 1944 ostensibly over speed-ups but really over the company's insistence that stewards needed

management's permission to talk to workers." It was the only weapon we had," explained one union leader. "There was no other outlet."¹⁹⁶ Care, however, had to be taken when responding to company provocations.

Belying the female stereotype of being averse to conflict, women were unafraid to tackle their employers head on. At Border City Industries in Windsor, women in the newly organized plant, where the workforce was all female, conducted the "first sit down strike of their sex" over the company's refusal to allow their union staff representative into the plant. The company backed down.¹⁹⁷ A St Catharines local union reported in 1942 that an entire line of women workers walked out of the plant over a wage bonus dispute, which was resolved to the women's satisfaction. The following week, the same line of women threatened to walk out again, and several wage increases were put through for them again.¹⁹⁸

Recognition strikes, however, were more often lost than won. In 1942, for example, of the 43 strikes across Canada for union recognition, only six were successful, explaining why a conciliation board-recommended recognition vote was favoured by unions, as they won most votes.¹⁹⁹ The UAW, for example, lost only one out of 14 votes in 1942, the one at Motor Lamp in Windsor.²⁰⁰ The UE lost only three of 18 votes held in 1943,²⁰¹ while an analysis of the 1943 strike wave shows that of the 45 strikes that year for union recognition, less than half were successful.²⁰² By 1944, after the passage of Ontario's labour legislation and introduction of PC 1003, recognition strikes dropped from 139,000 lost days in 1943 to 3,000 in 1944.²⁰³ The creation of the Ontario Labour Relations Board meant, furthermore, that in the last three months of 1944, for example, when the UE made 11 applications for certifications, five were granted without a vote, meaning less opportunity for employers to interfere with a union's drive.²⁰⁴

While disputes over union recognition declined, disputes over other “union questions,” however, such as union security and the dues check off still accounted for two-thirds of disputes.²⁰⁵ At the UAW ‘s first council meeting following V-E Day, Burt reviewed with some satisfaction the union’s wartime accomplishments but warned that post-war unemployment might encourage an employer offensive, which would force, he believed, the union to pursue a more conservative tack of meeting the needs of its current members rather than aggressively organizing new members. With the vast majority of bargaining units having no employment security and no union security, the union might have trim its organizing sails and concentrate on retaining its current membership. “We have consolidated our ranks,” he said, “and we are armed to meet the peace with a strong, united membership... but as a result of the situation we find ourselves in, we may have to curtail to some extent our new organizational activities and use our staff to service our membership”²⁰⁶ He also noted, with typical ambiguity, that the end of the war meant that the UAW in Detroit could change its thinking about strikes, and the Canadians could be less defensive about striking. “The [American] membership adopted the no-strike pledge,” he said to the union’s district council, “but it seems to me that values had changed since V-E Day, and we may have to adjust our thinking in order to meet the on-rushing situation which post-war problems present.”²⁰⁷

Conclusion

The UAW claimed a membership of 3,000 in 1939, but by the end of the war that figure had increased 17-fold, to 50,000. ²⁰⁸ Other CIO unions, too, had seen a similarly explosive growth in their memberships during the war, with the CIO growing from its (inflated) claim of more than 50,000 members in 1939 to a government-reported 244,000

by the end of the war.²⁰⁹ Union membership in cities like Toronto and Montreal had increased 30 per cent. ²¹⁰ In November 1944, Burt could proudly tell his district council that “we are running out of big plants in our jurisdiction, and most of our organizational work is directed towards smaller plants.”²¹¹ Burt was rightly satisfied, but in fact the total number of CIO members fell well below the target of one million members, set in 1939. This target, however, may have never been realistic, given the number the daunting obstacles facing a union’s survival, and close examination of the enormous difficulty in maintaining a union explains, in part at least, not just the failure to reach the one-million-member target – but also the CIO’s concerted wartime campaign for collective bargaining legislation and a dues check-off regime. These reformist innovations may well have carried with them the danger of union bureaucratization, technocratic legalism, membership alienation from the union, and all the other pitfalls described by critics of the “post-war settlement.” But with employers hungrily awaiting the end of the war so that they once again could press their advantage and destroy the new CIO unions, to refuse protective legislation would have been to endanger the gains had been made, gains that provided an organizational base from which to lever CIO growth after the war. CIO activists faced no simple choice between a bad option and a good option: they had to decide between two unsatisfactory options. Having experienced enormous difficulty in organizing unions even under the optimal conditions of wartime, they chose the one they thought would best protect and advance workers’ interests.

¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of the Select Committee Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees*, 1943, 874.

-
- ² Author's interview with UAW wartime organizer Paul Siren, February 2003.
- ³ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with John Eldon by Jack Steele," n.d., but c. 1963, 5.
- ⁴ LAC MG 28, Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 319, File 6: Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 1943-45, "Minutes of TWOC Conference, April 22, 1944," 3.
- ⁵ LAC, MG 28, Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 319, File 6: Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 1943-45, "Textile Report, February 8, 1941."
- ⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10.
- ⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District Five, Box 1385, File 10: District Council, April 1943, "Minutes," 4.
- ⁸ LAC, MG 28 I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 183, File 6: "Our Organizational Program," n.d. but c. 1942.
- ⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File 4: "CIO Conference Report, November 4-5, 1939," 14.
- ¹⁰ LAC, United Steelworkers of America, File 6: CIO, Conference, Minutes and Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Conference Minutes," 13.
- ¹¹ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 183, File 6: "Report on Ontario Organizing, Memo from Arthur Williams to Pat Conroy, March 20, 1942."
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 183, File 6: "Letter from C.S. Jackson to Pat Conroy, March 31, 1942."
- ¹⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, CCL Director of Organizing Elroy Robinson Correspondence, Part IV, "Letter from Elroy Robinson to Pat Conroy, March 7, 1944."
- ¹⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 27, File 1, *Massey-Harris Steelworker*, October 29, 1942, "Toronto War Workers Go CIO," 2. The notion of community was strong during the war, as Serge Durflinger argues in his study of wartime Verdun, Quebec. *Fighting From Home: The Second World War in Verdun, Quebec* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006).
- ¹⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1942, "UAW Speeds Big Union Drive in Toronto," 8.
- ¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 17, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Ford Edition*, November 12, 1941, "On Guard for Freedom," 4.
- ¹⁹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Baptism of a Union: Stelco Strike of 1946* (Hamilton: McMaster University, c. 1980), 14.
- ²⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, November 1942, "Report," 6.
- ²¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District Five, Box 1386, File 139: "Officers' Report, October 1944," 17.

-
- ²² Interview with UPWA organizer Charlie Borsk, by Vanessa Chivallo, July 2003. In author's collection. Charlie Borsk was Adam Borsk's brother.
- ²³ Ian Macmillan, *Making a Difference: 50 Years of Local 343* (Kingston: USWA Local 343, 1995), 11.
- ²⁴ Paul Krmpotich, *A Tribute to the Members of Local 2251 United Steel Workers of America* (Sault Ste Marie: Local 2251 USWA, n.d.) 13.
- ²⁵ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 26, 1943, "Here and There," 3.
- ²⁶ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade* 48.
- ²⁷ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, December 5, 1942, "C.D. Howe Denies Story," 4.
- ²⁸ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 46.
- ²⁹ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with John Eldon by Jack Steele," n.d but c. 1963.
- ³⁰ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 143, File 17: "Letter from CCL Organizer Ernest Evans to Pat Conroy, August 16, 1942."
- ³¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office, Box 5, File: Eldon Correspondence, April-August, 1943, "Affidavit, August 26, 1943."
- ³² City of Toronto Archives, John Inglis Papers, Series 297, Box 22, File: Union, Reports of Meetings Held, H.V. Waterhouse, 1942-43.
- ³³ Ibid., "Report from October 28, 1942 meeting."
- ³⁴ Ibid., "Report from November 9, 1942 meeting."
- ³⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting December 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 4.
- ³⁶ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 19.
- ³⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File District Council Meeting December 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ³⁸ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "Interview with John Eldon by Jack Steele," n.d. but c. 1963, 28.
- ³⁹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 64.
- ⁴⁰ UPA, *UE News*, July 4, 1941, "Small Arms Workers," 1.
- ⁴¹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, 23.
- ⁴² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting December 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 4.
- ⁴³ UPA, United Electrical Workers District Five, Box 1386, File 148, "Organizational Report by Ross Russell, January 28, 1945," 7.
- ⁴⁴ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 1943, 4.
- ⁴⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, May 1942, "Minutes," 6.
- ⁴⁶ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Baptism of a Union: The Stelco Strike of 1946*, 9.
- ⁴⁷ Valerie Endicott, "A woman's place [was] everywhere: a study of women who worked in aircraft production in Toronto during the Second World War," M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1991, 114.

-
- ⁴⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office Collection, Box 64, File 2, "Letter from George Burt to Hans McIntyre, April 13, 1943."
- ⁴⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1387, File: 169, "Secretary's Report, July 24, 1943," 8.
- ⁵⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 148, "Organizational Report by Ross Russell, January 28, 1945," 7.
- ⁵¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *Canadian UE News*, June 12, 1941, "Firm Stand Off by GE Workers," 1.
- ⁵² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, File: "Toronto and District Shop Stewards Council Officers' Reports and Minutes, February 4, 1941," 3.
- ⁵³ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 70, "Letter from C.S. Jackson to James Matles, February 1, 1942."
- ⁵⁴ Smith, Doug. *Cold Warrior: C.S. Jackson and the United Electrical Workers* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1997), 78. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the UE, however, was opposed to work stoppages.
- ⁵⁵ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office, Box 70, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.
- ⁵⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 3, 1943, "Report from Massey-Harris," 3.
- ⁵⁷ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office, Box 70, District Council Meeting January 1940 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ⁵⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 15, 1943, "Win Grievance Procedure at De Havilland," 1.
- ⁵⁹ Charles J. Morris, *Blue Eagle: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 85.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 84. In the United States, 64 per cent of UAW agreements in 1938 were members-only, and 85 per cent of Steel Worker contracts. By 1940, such contracts had become a memory, as these unions made substantial gains at the bargaining table and were able to win majority status under the Wagner Act.
- ⁶¹ *Labour Gazette* 45 (October 1945), "Union status in collective agreements," 1429-1434.
- ⁶² LAC, MG 28 I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 143, File 17, "Letter from CCL organizer Ernest Evans to Pat Conroy, November 27, 1942."
- ⁶³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 1, 1943, "Chrysler Ordered to Hand Out Bonus," 1. A CIO affiliate would also accept non-exclusive recognition, exist side by side with AFL bargaining units, but persuade companies to negotiate grievances. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 13, 1940, "Local 195 Report," 8.
- ⁶⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.

-
- ⁶⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, June 12, 1941, "Firm Stand by GE Workers," 1.
- ⁶⁶ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Collection, "Interview with George Burt," 1. The UAW in Windsor was aided by the pressure from the American parent company on Ford of Canada and Canada's minister of labour, neither of whom wanted work interruptions.
- ⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, October 15, 1943, "Victory at Massey-Harris," 1.
- ⁶⁸ LAC, MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Correspondence of CCL organizer Jack Robinson, "Letter from Pat Conroy to Jack Robinson, April 15, 1944."
- ⁶⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, District Council Meeting June 1942, Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.
- ⁷⁰ Judy and Eric Tucker. *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 243.
- ⁷¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office Collection, Box 64, File 2, "Letter from George Burt to Hans McIntyre, April 13, 1943."
- ⁷² Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 1128.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1129.
- ⁷⁴ As of November 1939 the IDIA's scope had been enlarged to include all workplaces involved in war work.
- ⁷⁵ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 290. The irony was compounded by the fact the UE had taken a no-strike pledge.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1128.
- ⁷⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1941 Minutes and Reports, "Statement on Boards of Investigation Under the IDIA, April 1941," 4.
- ⁷⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, August 2, 1941, "A Job to be Done," 2.
- ⁷⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 64, File 3: "Letter to Hans McIntyre from George Burt, April 16, 1943."
- ⁸⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6.
- ⁸¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office, Box 11 File, District Council Meetings March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6. The UAW was able to fight this off in the case of the Canadian Bridge plant in Windsor, possibly owing to the union's strength in that city and its consequent relative strength in the city's plants. Burt warned that it would take this degree of militancy and strength to prevent the Steel Workers' formula from becoming a board precedent affecting all others cases.
- ⁸² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 8. It was not until the 1960s that unions in Ontario were required to win only a majority of votes cast to win recognition.

-
- ⁸³ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Trade*, 47.
- ⁸⁴ Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law*, 277. Labour spokespersons and CCF MPs both pointed out that the NWLB's rule did not, for example, apply to the elected government officials who had appointed its members.
- ⁸⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting December 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 8; Desmond Morton with Terry Copp, *Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labour Movement* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1980), 184.
- ⁸⁶ ALUA, UAW Oral History Collection, "George Burt Interview by Jack Steele," April 23, 1963, 9-10.
- ⁸⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Office, Box 79, File 1, "Letter from George Burt to UAW locals, March 4, 1942."
- ⁸⁸ ALUA, Canadian Region Office Collection, Box 79, File 1, "George Burt letter to UAW- USA locals, March 6, 1942."
- ⁸⁹ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.
- ⁹⁰ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 315; UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1368, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October, 1943," 6. The UE's no-strike pledge may have limited its success: other unions, such as the UAW, were prepared to strike for recognition, even illegally.
- ⁹¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 290.
- ⁹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 2.
- ⁹³ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, January 23, 1943, "Fink Union Wins," 21.
- ⁹⁴ John Tait Montague, "Trade unionism in the Canadian meatpacking industry." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1950, 106.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 105-108.
- ⁹⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ⁹⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1943, "Victory at Massey-Harris," 3.
- ⁹⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 11.
- ⁹⁹ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6.
- ¹⁰⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *Aircraft Worker* "What Has Happened to the Wage Brief? September 17, 1943, 1.
- ¹⁰¹ LAC, MG 28 I103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 233, File 12, "Letter to C.S. Jackson to James Matles, International UE Director of Organizing," May 6, 1944.

¹⁰² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting August 1940 Minutes and Report, "Report," 1.

¹⁰³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, October 1, 1940, "One Day Strike Wins Increase," 1.

¹⁰⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October 1943," 25.

¹⁰⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1387, File 169, "Secretary's Report, July 25, 1943," 9.

¹⁰⁶ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.

¹⁰⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.

¹⁰⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers, Box 1387, File 169, "Secretary's Report, July 25, 1943," 8.

¹⁰⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 4.

¹¹⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 8.

¹¹¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6.

¹¹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹⁴ A bitter strike at Ford in Windsor in 1945 led to an arbitrated settlement that introduced the "Rand Formula," a dues-check-off arrangement that eventually became a feature of most union contracts. See David Moulton, "Ford 1945," in Irving Abella, ed., *On Strike!* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975). For critics of the post-war settlement, see Bryan Palmer, "The Rise and Fall of British Columbia's Solidarity," in Palmer, ed., *The Character of Class Struggle* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 176-200; Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, *The Assault on Trade Union Freedom: From Wage Controls to Social Contract* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993); Kirby Abbot, "The Coal Miners and the Law in Nova Scotia: From the 1864 Combination of Workmen Act to the 1947 Trade Union Act," in Michael Earle, ed., *Worker and the State* (Fredericton: *Acadiensis*, 1989). Laurel Sefton MacDowell rebuts these critics in her biography of J.L. Cohen, the key lawyer for the CIO during the war. MacDowell, *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), while providing a summary of this debate. American critics of the post-war settlement include: Art Press, *Labor's Giant Step* (New York, Pioneer Press, 1964); Nelson Lichtenstein, "Ambiguous Legacy: The Union Security Problem During World War II," *Labor History* 18 (1977), 214-238; Irving Howe and B.J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, 1949).

¹¹⁵ Dues for most CIO unions varied from about \$1.00 a month to \$1.50. The UAW, with its higher wages, levied \$1.50 a month, for example, the equivalent of about two hours' straight time for a Big Three auto

worker. Some unions also levied an initiation fee: the UAW's was \$2.00. Harold Logan, *Trade Unions in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948), 242.

¹¹⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 7.

¹¹⁷ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 1287.

¹¹⁸ UPA, UE District 5 Box 1386, File 148, "Organizational Report, January 28, 1945," 6.

¹¹⁹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 874.

¹²⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.

¹²¹ MG 28 I 103 Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File 7, "Letter from George Burt to Pat Conroy, January 1944."

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ UPA, UE District 5, Box 1388, File 268, Local 507, "Ward Street Analysis, Feb. 22, 1945," 1.

¹²⁴ Terry Copp, *The IUE in Canada* (Elora: Cumnock Press, 1980), 9.

¹²⁵ MG 28 I 268 United Steel Workers of America, Volume 4, File 4, "Letter from S.H. Dalrymple, President URW, to Allan Haywood, Organizational Director, CIO, Washington, July 8, 1940."

¹²⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Reports, "Report," 5.

¹²⁷ Wayne Roberts, *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, 23.

¹²⁸ *Labour Gazette* 43 (July 1943), "Labour Turnover," 897. An eight per cent monthly turnover meant a 100 per cent turnover every nine months.

¹²⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9; George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting August 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 5.

¹³⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.

¹³¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.

¹³² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.

¹³³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9

¹³⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 5.

¹³⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.

-
- ¹³⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting March 1942, Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 8.
- ¹³⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10.
- ¹³⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting October 1944 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ¹³⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting September 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 5.
- ¹⁴⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes, 7.
- ¹⁴¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 5.
- ¹⁴² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting March 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 5.
- ¹⁴³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 7.
- ¹⁴⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 1, "Letter from Silby Barrett to Harry Hamburgh, September 23, 1938."
- ¹⁴⁵ *Labour Gazette* 45 (November 1945), "Union status in collective agreements," 1612.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Labour Gazette* 45 (October 1945), "Union status in collective agreements," 1426. Eight percent of workers and 16 per cent of establishments were represented by company or independent unions, the remainder by bona fide trade unions.
- ¹⁴⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, Officers' Reports, October 1943, "Contract Provisions," 9b.
- ¹⁴⁸ Harold Logan, *Trade Unions in Canada*, 238.
- ¹⁴⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File, Report of Regional Director, 1939, "George Burt to George Addes, International UAW Secretary-Treasurer, November 30, 1939."
- ¹⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 15, 1953, "Report from District Council," 1.
- ¹⁵¹ In a 1941 public opinion poll, 78 per cent of Canadians polled favoured a ban on wartime strikes. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (Spring 1942), 160.
- ¹⁵² Occasionally, public sympathy was with strikers during the war, Burt claimed, saying that during the Motor Products strike in 1942 in Windsor, because the union had offered to arbitrate the dispute, "public sympathy is entirely in our favour." ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 79, File 1, "Letter from George Burt to all UAW locals, March 4, 1942."
- ¹⁵³ Jeremy Webber, "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada During World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* 15 (Spring 1985) 57-90, 62.

-
- ¹⁵⁴ *Globe and Mail*, October 29, 1940 "Can't Afford Labour Rows," 5.
- ¹⁵⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 1, "Letter from C.H. Millard to Philip Clowes, International USWA, October 8, 1940."
- ¹⁵⁶ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 6.
- ¹⁵⁷ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting August 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 6.
- ¹⁵⁸ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1939* (Ottawa: Department of Labour 1940), 220. In 1939, international unions in Canada paid out slightly more than a half-million dollars in strike benefits to all their members in North America. Little had changed by 1943. That year, all international unions operating in Canada had paid just over \$11,000 in strike assistance to their Canadian members. Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1943* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1944), 65-66.
- ¹⁵⁹ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 1
- ¹⁶⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 3. England, however, did lead a six-day strike over equal pay for women in November 1941 at Ford, months after the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
- ¹⁶¹ ALUA UAW Canadian Regional Collection, Box 83, File, Local 112, 1943-44, "Letter from George Burt to Local 112 Executive, February 26, 1943." England, however, led a six-day strike of more than 13,000 Ford workers in Windsor in late 1942 over the issue of equal pay for women workers (see Chapter 7).
- ¹⁶² ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 8.
- ¹⁶³ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Ontario Select Committee*, 292.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 292.
- ¹⁶⁵ ALUA UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 15, 1944, "Wartime Strike Record," 1.
- ¹⁶⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting December 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 1.
- ¹⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region, Box 83, File 1, Local 112, 1943-44, "Letter from George Burt to Local 112 Executive, February 26, 1943."
- ¹⁶⁸ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ¹⁶⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 4.
- ¹⁷⁰ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 125, File 7, "In the Matter of the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, P.C. 1003," May 7, 1945.

-
- ¹⁷¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1941 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 3.
- ¹⁷² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 12.
- ¹⁷³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1944 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 13.
- ¹⁷⁴ Martin Glaberman, *Wartime Strikes: The Struggle Against the No-Strike Pledge in the UAW During World War II* (Detroit: Bewick Editions, 1980), 18-20.
- ¹⁷⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting May 1940 Minutes and Report, "Report," 1.
- ¹⁷⁶ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 263, Local 507, "Handwritten text by C.S. Jackson, June 1941," 4-5.
- ¹⁷⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File, Report of Regional Director, 1939, "George Burt to George Addes, International Secretary-Treasurer, November 30, 1939."
- ¹⁷⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 2.
- ¹⁷⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 8.
- ¹⁸⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 2.
- ¹⁸¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting August 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ¹⁸² *Labour Gazette*, 42 (October 1942), 1108.
- ¹⁸³ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, February 1, 1942, "Minority Report," 2.
- ¹⁸⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ¹⁸⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 1, "Letter from Dick Steele to Silby Barrett, April 30, 1940."
- ¹⁸⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.
- ¹⁸⁷ ALUA, UAW Research Department Collection, Box 23, File, 23-4, "George Burt report to UAW International Executive Board, March 17, 1941." The UE had had less luck in 1941 when the government refused to send in investigators until workers had returned to work, but by 1942, labour shortages and the goal of uninterrupted production were both more intense than in 1941.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Globe and Mail*, June 16, 1943, "Hope to end labour unrest," 6.
- ¹⁸⁹ *Labour Gazette* 41 (June 1941), "Recent Proceedings Under IDIA," 619; *Labour Gazette* 41 (July 1941), "Other Boards Established," 738; *Labour Gazette* 41 (September 1941), "Recent Proceedings Under

-
- IDIA," 1040; *Labour Gazette* 41 (September 1943), "Strikes After Awards," 1043; *Labour Gazette* 41 (September 1941), "Report of Board in Dispute Between Canadian Acme Screw and Gear and its Employees," 1187; *Labour Gazette* 41 (October 1941), "Other Settlements," 1187.
- ¹⁹⁰ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Box 17, File, Wilson Motor Bodies, 1942-43, "Letter from Paul Siren to Louis Fine, chief conciliation officer, Ontario, December 22, 1942."
- ¹⁹¹ *Labour Gazette* 43 (October 1943), "Electrical Workers, Toronto," 1369.
- ¹⁹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1941 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6-7.
- ¹⁹³ *Labour Gazette* 45 (April 1945), "New Toronto, Ontario," 516.
- ¹⁹⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting December 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.
- ¹⁹⁵ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 11.
- ¹⁹⁶ Archives of Ontario, Irving Abella Oral History Interviews, "Interview with George Burt," 2.
- ¹⁹⁷ UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 5, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition* February 1, 1943 "Women Workers Win Demand by Sit Down," 4.
- ¹⁹⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council May 1942 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9. Martin Glaberman says there is no evidence American women refused strike action except when the strike action was directed against them. Glaberman, *Wartime Strikes*, 24.
- ¹⁹⁹ *Labour Gazette* 43 (July 1943), "Strikes and Lockouts In Canada During 1942," 1949-1985. See Greg Kealey and Douglas Cruickshank for analysis of war time strikes, "Strikes in Canada, 1891-1950," *Labour/Le Travail* 20 (Fall, 1987), 119-119.
- ²⁰⁰ Burt blamed the loss on the company's "working on" the employees, making them "so fearful we lost." Burt had asked the labour department's investigator to take the UAW off the ballot when he heard about all the company's violation of the voting rules, but the official refused. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 6.
- ²⁰¹ UPA, UE District 5, Box 1386, File 136, District Council, October 1943, "Officers Report," 8.
- ²⁰² *Labour Gazette* 44 (March 1944), "Strikes and Lockouts, 1943," 315.
- ²⁰³ *Labour Gazette* 45 (March 1945) "Annual Summary of Strikes and Lockouts," 258.
- ²⁰⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 148, "Organizational Report by Ross Russell, January 28, 1945," 9.
- ²⁰⁵ Canada. *Department of Labour Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ending 1946* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 38.
- ²⁰⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1945 Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.
- ²⁰⁷ ALUA George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting Minutes and Report, "Report," 10.
- ²⁰⁸ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 50.

²⁰⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region, Box 14, File 4: "Report of First Conference of Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, November 4-6, 1939," 26. Canada. *Labour Organization in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 24. The precise numbers are hard to pin down. While CIO unions reported a total of 244,750 members to the labour department in 1945, the officers of the Canadian Congress of Labour told delegates to their 1946 convention that CIO members in Canada totaled 350,000. Canada in 1945. *Labour Organization in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 24.

²¹⁰ Canada. *Labour Organization in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 14.

²¹¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1944 Minutes and Report, "Report," 5.

Chapter Four

Wartime Organizing: Three Case Studies

“It is always hard,” say union organizers today of the challenge of unionizing workers. The case studies examined here serve as evidence that it was ever so. There has been at least a hint, in some histories of labour organizing during the war, that union growth was inevitable and relatively easy.¹ These case studies aim to join with such work as Laurel Sefton MacDowells’s study of the 1942 Kirkland Lake strike in depicting how difficult it was to build and maintain a union, even under promising wartime conditions.² The following case studies are representative in that they feature wartime worker enthusiasm for the CIO matched by a significant commitment of union resources to organizing. But they also show that workers and their unions were up against equally committed and often ruthless managers, strong company unions, and plodding government procedures. In other words, even in the best-possible circumstances of the war — when pro-union sentiment was strong and clear among workers and the general public alike³— companies could use their considerable economic and political power, and their arsenal of anti-union weapons, to prevent unionization and, in most cases, used them vigorously and effectively. In two of the three case studies outlined here, the union campaign surmounted many difficulties and was successful. In the third, it failed.

These case studies, coupled with the composite narrative of union organizing contained in Chapter Three, are intended to bring the actors and the issues of the eras to life and to give some idea of the sacrifice, risks, and uncertainty involved in wartime organizing. They are also thus offered as evidence about how difficult it was to build

and maintain a union in the absence of protective labour legislation and a dues check-off regime. In this way, I argue, they bolster my argument that these difficulties shaped the CIO's vision for unions in the post-war period and, by extension, its vision of post-war Canadian society.

It didn't take long for the CIO in Canada to recognize the organizing potential of the war. Delegates to the Canadian CIO's inaugural conference in Ottawa in November 1939 believed that industrial unionism's ability to make some progress even during the depths of the Great Depression "augurs well for the results to be achieved during the period of more promising economic circumstances which lies directly ahead."⁴ The CIO's optimism was based on new conditions that war brought. War-induced labour shortages and explosive economic growth helped union organizing efforts. But the war also brought new challenges: wage controls, which limited potential gains for workers from unionization; public concern over production interruptions during a hard-fought war against formidable adversaries; and government labour relations machinery so ponderous it sapped the momentum of the most energetic organizing drive, thus helping the aims of a hard-nosed business class determined to limit wartime unions gains lest they become permanent and impede post-war profit-taking.

The CIO and the De Havilland Aircraft Company Limited

Two months after Canada's declaration of war, the UAW's Canadian head, George Burt, described the union's fortunes in Canada to his colleagues on the union's International Executive Board. He told the American UAW leaders, whose country was still at peace, that in the immediate aftermath of Canada's entering the war, organizing

had slowed down noticeably. It was, he said, "a sort of dead period, in which people were probably appalled at the prospect of another major conflict...." But, he said, it did not last long, once workers realized they were exposed to the "same old grind and slavish methods" of Canadian industry. Since then, organizing had picked up within the established locals. In the previous six weeks, Local 222 at General Motors in Oshawa had tripled its membership, as had Local 199 at the company's plants in St Catharines.

Burt said he expected the war would stimulate industry, although, he pointedly told the Americans, their nation's repeal of its arms embargo on Britain meant that many British war contracts would now be placed in the United States, diverting work from Canada. Even so, he predicted a winter season of increased membership within existing locals as well as new organizing initiatives, including in Toronto.⁵

In fact, it would be more than two years before the UAW made its first organizing bid in Toronto. As late as March 1942, Burt was telling UAW leaders in Canada that he wanted to continue to focus the union's organizing efforts on Windsor, already a UAW stronghold.⁶ But by early 1942, Paul Siren, a UAW international representative assigned to service the UAW local in Oshawa, was inundated with calls from Toronto-area workers asking the UAW to send a representative to help them organize a union in respective plants.⁷ In March 1942, Burt, in response to Siren's reports, dispatched international representative Hans McIntyre to the De Havilland Aircraft Co., located in the northwestern outskirts of the city, to start a drive in that burgeoning war plant.

The UAW had had its eye on the aircraft industry for some time. As early as 1938, Charles Millard, while still head of the UAW in Canada, identified the growing importance of the aircraft industry in Canada and was researching the industry,

determined that the unionization of the industry grow right along with it. ⁸ Burt after succeeding Millard, told UAW district council delegates in June 1939 that aircraft was an important industry and “attaining considerable proportions in Canada.”⁹ The International CIO had called for the unionization of the aircraft industry at its 1939 San Francisco convention and had directed the CIO executive to cooperate with the UAW in setting up a national organizing committee to accomplish that. This approach was echoed a month later in Canada by a UAW resolution to the November 1939 Canadian CIO conference proposing that the International CIO give its financial and moral support for an organizing drive in the rapidly developing Canadian industry. ¹⁰ Labour leaders knew of what they spoke: the industry in Canada was taking off. In 1937, the Ontario aircraft industry employed about 600 workers and produced less than two million dollars in product. By 1941, it employed more than 7,000 people and, with \$32 million in gross output, had pulled ahead of such Ontario manufacturing stalwarts as agricultural implements, furniture, and men’s clothing. ¹¹

By the UAW district council meeting in June 1942, with McIntyre organizing at De Havilland and Siren reporting an interest in the CIO by workers in other Toronto industries, Burt was returning to his earlier recognition of the city’s potential, but his pragmatism was very much in evidence though, as he cautioned his colleagues that no CIO contract of any size recognizing a union had been signed in Toronto for several years. ¹²

De Havilland Canada was founded in 1928 and throughout the 1930s never employed more than 60 workers. The war brightened the company’s fortunes. It won its first government contract — building the Tiger Moth trainer — early in the war; by 1941 the plant had grown to 1,200 employees. When the company landed a further contract to

build the Mosquito light bomber, the workforce grew again, to more than 4,000 employees.¹³ De Havilland profits were skyrocketing as well: its assets had doubled between 1941 and 1942, and its net profits in 1942 represented a record rate of return of 26 per cent on net worth.¹⁴

Wages were a pressing issue with workers, who shared a "common knowledge that employees working on comparable occupations within the Toronto area...receive a substantially higher rate of pay."¹⁵ Internal wage inequities, including lower pay for women doing the same work as men, were also a source of discontent. Another key organizing issue for workers was work time: De Havilland workers put in 10-hour days, six days a week. "We can't go at this pace forever," declared one UAW leaflet.¹⁶ "Every employee is yearning for shorter hours."¹⁷ Most workers had two-hour commutes on top of their 10-hour day, and the result, said the union, was "excessive but justifiable absenteeism," owing to illness.¹⁸

The UAW was not the first union to try to organize De Havilland workers; the United Steel Workers of American had approached workers in early 1940.¹⁹ The only result, however, of this effort was the revitalization of the company's dormant Recreation Club, which in response to the CIO's organizing efforts, began sponsoring dances, baseball teams, and other recreational activities in order to build loyalty amongst its workforce. In February 1941, 30 employees, led by Stanley Jones, an anti-union employee who had attended the Steel Workers meetings, petitioned the company for an "Employee Relations Committee," to operate under the aegis of the Recreation Club.²⁰ The club held a meeting in early March 1941, with 800 workers attending. They unanimously approved the creation of an Employee Relations Committee, and elections were conducted for worker representatives on the new committee. In April, the chair of

this new shop committee approached management about negotiating a collective agreement. The resulting contract was signed in May 1941. For almost a year, workers at De Havilland worked under this agreement, which created, in personnel manager E. H. Featherstonehaugh's words, "the most harmonious cooperation between the company and the employees [with] no differences between them about working conditions or pay."²¹ But just as this company union, now called the Employees' Association, was about to hold its second set of annual elections, in March 1942, the UAW's Hans McIntyre began talking to workers about joining the CIO.²²

Vince Coulson, who became one of McIntyre's key in-plant organizers, was hired by De Havilland in September 1941, at which time he had agreed to the 25-cent monthly pay deduction for the Recreation Club/Employees' Association. Coulson's interest and former membership in the UAW while working at Chrysler in Windsor was well known in the plant and, perhaps because of this record, he was nominated by his department co-workers to run in the company union elections in March 1942. The Employees' Association told him, however, that he was ineligible because he was two days short of the required six months membership in the Recreation Club. Coulson's co-workers then elected by a large margin Thomas Spratt, who was also identified with the UAW. Immediately after the election, the Employees' Association, however, ejected Spratt and two other UAW supporters who had been elected to the executive on the grounds they were members of the UAW and therefore could not be members of the company union, thus foiling the CIO tactic of taking over an existing company union executive.²³

In early April, little more than a month after McIntyre started the drive, the UAW, confident it had enough strength in the plant, went public with its organizing campaign. Union supporters were now encouraged to sign union application cards, and

union representatives appeared at the plant gates at shift change, handing out leaflets urging workers to join the UAW.

De Havilland moved to shore up its fledgling company union. The company announced over the plant's loud speakers that a mass meeting of all employees would be held the next morning, on company property, during working hours. Plant police were in attendance, along with several supervisors and foremen. At the meeting, Thomas Caskie, a De Havilland worker who had just been elected chair of the company union executive (a full-time, company-paid job with an office in the plant), soon made the meeting's purpose clear. In addition to making some derogatory remarks about the UAW, he said the Employees' Association would now start actively soliciting members. Caskie challenged UAW members in the crowd to come forward and speak. Not wanting to expose themselves to company reprisal, none did. In fact, there was no discussion at the meeting at all, which silence the company union chose to characterize as the employees' "unanimous expression of confidence" in its existence.²⁴ Employees seemed less than impressed by management's performance. As the end of the shift arrived, workers just left the meeting, "without word or gesture," said one eyewitness.²⁵

The next day, employees who were officials of the company union went around the plant during work hours handing out applications cards and urging workers to sign up with their union. Supervisors instructed lead hands to pressure workers to join.²⁶ The company fired 12 workers, including Vince Coulson, dismissals which the union believed were for union activity. All the UAW could do was to lobby Ottawa to set up an inquiry to investigate the firings.²⁷ By the end of May, the company union claimed 2,481 members, a figure that in no way indicated either support or non-support for the

UAW, since the latter's advice to workers had been to sign up in order "to keep their heads down."²⁸

Almost immediately, De Havilland opened negotiations with the company union for a second collective agreement. The new agreement was reached the same day and contained a wage increase, which the UAW took responsibility for. "Maybe we're conceited but we intend to take full credit if this agreement goes into effect," read a union leaflet. "Never before the UAW came on the scene did the Company Union show any activity on behalf of workers."²⁹ The wage increase, however, in spite of the UAW's claims, may have been an effective counter to the union's organizing effort.

Three months after McIntyre went to De Havilland, the drive was not going well. At the union's district council meeting a month later, Burt reported that while some workers had signed up, enthusiasm had waned, and there were too few members for the UAW to apply for a conciliation board. Burt explained that the company union was "strong" and since it was supported by De Havilland management, could "put on the heat."³⁰ The UAW's efforts, Burt also said, were handicapped by the long distances workers lived from the plant, which left little time for union meetings or even house calls.³¹ He now feared that the shortage of full-time UAW organizers in the city at his disposal meant De Havilland would go the way of Chrysler: years of organizational work done in such a piecemeal manner that the union could not win until the city had "gone CIO," just as Windsor had done.³²

Alarmed at losing the union's foothold in the aircraft industry and in Toronto, the council delegates passed a resolution authorizing a full-scale publicity campaign for the De Havilland drive. Morris Jackson a delegate from the De Havilland local, thanked them for their support, adding that Toronto was a "very Tory city" and since the CIO

had had little success in the city he believed the union needed a "concerted drive specializing in aircraft." The re-energized campaign took on new momentum. The UAW distributed well-written leaflets, professionally designed and printed, some with cartoons and photographs. To keep the union in the minds of workers, the UAW began publishing on behalf of its new local at De Havilland, Local 112, a bi-weekly, tabloid-sized, newspaper called the *Aircraft Worker*.³³ At the same time, news arrived from Montreal and Vancouver about the successes of CIO unions in aircraft plants in those centres, providing further incentive for workers to sign up with the UAW.³⁴ By early August Burt could report to district council that more than 800 workers had joined the UAW.³⁵

The company's reaction to the UAW growing numbers was to organize a show of strength on the part of the company union by colluding with the Employees' Association in a one-hour walk out."³⁶ The pretext for the strike was to protest the delay in the wage increases the company had negotiated with the company union in May, although it was the Regional War Labour Board (RWLB), not De Havilland, which was holding up the pay hikes. The real reason for company union's calling the walk out was likely a desire to raise its prestige as a fighting entity with workers. The UAW was adamantly opposed to the stoppage. A union leaflet called the company union's work stoppage a "show-off" strike. "If we folded up tomorrow, that would be the last you'd hear of Association militancy," the union told workers.³⁷ The company refused a UAW request to post notices in the plant telling its members to stay on the job. When the UAW put the posters up anyway, they were torn down by plant police who left the company union posters calling for a walk out in place. Wrote one commentator: "When...the CIO takes up strike-breaking, confusion was fairly well founded and anything can happen in

Toronto. ³⁸ According to the UAW, only 700 workers struck, ³⁹ while company union spokespersons put the figure at an improbable 3,800. ⁴⁰ An official from the federal Department of Labour, sent to the strike scene by labour minister Humphrey Mitchell, ordered the strike stopped. Only then did De Havilland management speak up, using a new argument to explain the walk out, saying that it was not against the company but rather against RWLB delays in ruling on the June wage agreement. ⁴¹ The strike's failure was the UAW's success, a convincing demonstration that it had the support of many of De Havilland's production workers. The union said later that hundreds of "disgusted" company union members had turned their cards into UAW stewards after the strike. ⁴²

With the company union's weakness among workers so exposed, the UAW held a membership meeting in later August to take the strike vote needed to apply for a board of conciliation, which was done the next day. The issue cited was De Havilland's refusal to bargain collectively with the UAW. ⁴³ In its brief submitted to the labour department, the union also cited the bona fides of the shop committee's collective agreement as a major issue, arguing that there was collusion between De Havilland and the shop committee. As for the strength of its support at De Havilland, the UAW said it was a matter that could easily be resolved by holding a secret-ballot vote, even before a board was established.⁴⁴ Inside the plant, the union continued to urge workers to sign UAW cards: "The more union cards we have, the easier it is going to be to persuade the government to give us a vote in the plant," a leaflet explained.⁴⁵ The union's appeal may have had a touch of desperation. While claiming that the majority of workers supported the UAW, Burt's figure of 800 actual union members was only a fraction of the more than 4,000 workers eligible to vote. ⁴⁶ Since the UAW's usual strategy was to apply for a board only when it had a majority of workers in a plant signed up, it is possible in the

De Havilland case that the union believed the support was there, but that it would take a secret-ballot vote before workers would express it. As a result, the strategy would be to claim majority support and hope the bluff was convincing.

Two days after the UAW applied for a board of conciliation, De Havilland fired four workers, all women. Each had good work records, but all had refused to join the company union walk-out. The UAW advised the women to demand reinstatement. When the company questioned the women about the UAW, two of them, Alice Scott and Anne Hearn, both well-known union activists inside the plant, told the company they were UAW supporters. The other two women denied membership in the union. The company reinstated the latter two, while refusing to budge on Scott and Hearn's discharges.⁴⁷ Women were beginning to join the UAW in large numbers, the UAW told workers in a leaflet issued distributed after the firings, and "management doesn't like that...they want to scare the girls away from the UAW."⁴⁸

In October, more than a month after the UAW's application for a board, the Minister of Labour appointed not a board, but an industrial disputes commissioner, Mr. Justice Ian Macdonnell, thus adding another step to the union's fight for recognition.⁴⁹ Weeks dragged on without a report from Macdonnell; and the company continued to fight the union. Plant police handed out company union leaflets to workers at shift change.⁵⁰ The company union's on-going campaign, combined with the firings and the delays intrinsic to the government's procedures, sapped the UAW's momentum in the plant. Burt reported to the union's district council that while the UAW had a substantial number of members in the plant, it still did not have majority of workers signed up.⁵¹ The union was not giving up, however. De Havilland as a Toronto aircraft plant, was a beach head in a key, new industry for the union and in a city with much potential for the

union. Accordingly, Burt persuaded the International UAW, anxious to establish the union as a presence in the aircraft industry, to set up an UAW aircraft department in Canada and to send one of its top American organizers to lend a hand.⁵²

Macdonnell finally reported in November. He ruled that the company union's contract was to remain in effect until its expiry, in May 1943, at which time the labour department would conduct a representation vote. The union had long opposed such recognition of company union contracts, arguing that management would just sign a sequence of contracts with shop committees for the sole purpose of keeping a bona fide union out. "There is no reason why employers could not use the precedent in this case and sign agreements with company associations for five or ten years ahead, thus keeping the legitimate union out,"⁵³ Burt told a district council meeting that such rulings showed the government's preference for company unions.⁵⁴

The UAW did not call a strike over the issue at De Havilland, perhaps because Macdonnell, in a further recommendation gave the UAW's fortunes an important boost by advising the company to recognize the UAW as the bargaining agent for UAW members in the plant even before the vote was taken.⁵⁵ As a result, the union was able to persuade De Havilland to recognize UAW international representatives as well as the union's entire in-plant structure: the bargaining committee, union stewards in each department, as well as a grievance procedure. Vince Coulson, Local 112's president, was allowed to conduct union work inside the plant on company time. De Havilland now had two fully-recognized bargaining committees in the plant, the Employees Association and the UAW. As a result, an exultant Burt could report to his district council in January 1943 that "The company union structure is crumbling and the UAW is becoming stronger... we have established a real union in the plant, which is showing

remarkable results. ⁵⁶ A Local 112 delegate reported to the same council meeting that the union's bargaining committee was "red hot," winning about 95 per cent of the grievances the UAW took up, most in the initial stages. Local leaders gave credit to an "enthusiastic and militant rank and file," which was helping UAW stewards to "begin to take over complete bargaining rights in the plant. " ⁵⁷ The fact the "red hot" UAW was able to represent only its own members would have been incentive for workers to join the union, and they did, with the local projecting a paid-up membership of more than 1,000 by the end of January. ⁵⁸

Also in January 1943, the union proudly claimed that its campaign for equal pay for women had produced results. The company told the union that it intended to make "no discrimination" between the wages of men and women and that it was instituting a plant-wide minimum wage of 53 cents an hour, meaning some women earning as little as 40 cents an hour would be receiving a 13-cent increase. ⁵⁹ The company may have been motivated to bring in equal pay in order to dampen enthusiasm for the UAW, since equal pay was such an important issue in the plant. ⁶⁰ It also may well have been having trouble attracting women at its remote location without offering more generous wages. At any rate, women's wages now ranged from 53 cents to 70 cents an hour, an increase the UAW was quick to point out to women workers it was organizing in other Toronto plants. ⁶¹

But the UAW was far from out of the woods. The long delay for the vote, lasting from August 1942 to March 1943, allowed for a certain opportunism to develop. Application cards for membership in the International Association of Machinists (IAM) had begun to appear in the plant in December and January. ⁶² The IAM, an affiliate of the AFL, was not built along craft lines, as other AFL affiliates, but along industrial union

lines and, as result, it could compete readily with CIO unions for members within mass industry plants. There is evidence from other CIO drives in this period, that some employers, seeing a possible CIO success in their factories, called in the AFL to thwart the CIO, which was perceived as more dangerous than the AFL. This may well have been the case at De Havilland. Certainly the UAW thought so, and it didn't hesitate to share its suspicions with workers. Burt said that since both AFL and CIO leaders in the United States had agreed to eliminate jurisdictional disputes in the interests of an "all-out war effort," he had been surprised to find the IAM attempting to organize auto plants where the majority of workers had joined the UAW, including a plant in Wallaceburg, where the IAM came into the plant after the UAW had applied for a board of conciliation, similar to the IAM's strategy at De Havilland. Burt charged that, at the Wallaceburg plant, foremen were intimidating workers into joining the IAM. He said that in the De Havilland plant, company union officials were distributing IAM cards, and IAM supporters were offering to accept paid-up UAW cards as initiation into their own organization.⁶³ Coulson was even blunter, telling district council delegates the IAM, a "scab outfit," had simply taken over the company union with the company's approval.⁶⁴ The ostensible reason for objecting to the IAM's entry into De Havilland was because such action was contrary to efforts by the Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada to eliminate jurisdictional disputes.⁶⁵ The union's real concern was that if the IAM were on the ballot, it would split the vote between the two bona fide unions to allow the company union to go up the middle and win. The Local 112 newsletter published an open letter from Coulson to the IAM, protesting the incursion of the IAM into the mix at De Havilland, pointing out that the UAW had negotiated a grievance procedure with De Havilland, that it had settled

numerous grievances for workers, and that there was an agreement among the government, the company, and the union that there would be an representation vote in March, with that election deciding between the UAW and the company union. "We intend to fight to the finish any disruptive group coming in at the last minute and loudly proclaiming – ME TOO!" Coulson vowed in his letter. ⁶⁶

Coulson had little to fear. In March 5, the date for the long-overdue representation election was set: March 22, 1943. The company union announced that it was withdrawing from the contest. The IAM, however, was going to be on the ballot. The parties – De Havilland and the two unions -- agreed that the winner must receive 51 per cent of those eligible to vote and that the loser would drop out of the picture once and for all. Meantime, electioneering could continue until March 19. ⁶⁷ But another significant obstacle was thrown in the UAW's path. The company and the IAM both insisted that office workers be included in the vote; they were no doubt hoping that office workers, stereotyped as being more conservative than production workers, would dilute the UAW's vote. ⁶⁸

The UAW won the vote among the 4,600 workers deemed to be eligible. Although Vince Coulson called it a "smashing victory.... [bringing] to a conclusion a twelve-month campaign to wipe out company unionism in De Havilland,"⁶⁹ the UAW, with 2,424 votes to the IAM's 1,033, had won a bare majority of those eligible to vote. ⁷⁰ The IAM's unexpected strength may have been due to company union and, possibly, company support — and by the promise of the good collective agreement the IAM had gained at the Victory Aircraft facility in Malton.

Since the parties had agreed that the loser would leave the scene, the UAW as the exclusive bargaining agent for De Havilland workers, opened negotiations with the

company soon after the vote, but then it faced a new hurdle, this time at the bargaining table: what the local union leaders called “a new phenomenon on the Ontario scene,” the Ontario Labour Relations Institute. The head of the institute, J. C. Adams, was the former executive secretary of the Ontario RWLB and was acting as a consultant to the company during negotiations.⁷¹ The International UAW’s most experienced negotiator in the aircraft industry, Fred Andrews, joined the Canadian UAW bargaining team during negotiations. He found Adams such a “insurmountable” problem that he had trouble controlling his temper. The union reported that on several occasions it had the “exasperating experience of management agreeing to certain clauses and then having them turned down by our friend Adams.” Unlike the bargaining in late 1942, before Adams came on the scene, there were frequent deadlocks, ones so grim that the union frequently considered strike action. It seems likely the workforce would have gladly heeded a strike call. Workers were restless, and local union leaders had difficulty keeping the membership from walking out.⁷²

Nonetheless, a contract was ultimately reached in June, and Local 112 leaders proudly called it one of the best UAW contracts in Canada, with strong seniority and grievance procedure language, a chief steward for every supervisor, and company agreement to classify jobs more equitably. A guarantee for equal pay for women was written into the agreement as well. Working conditions were improved, with the company agreeing to locate canteens throughout the plant and, according to the ideal world envisioned by workers in 1943, on-the-job smoking was to be allowed. Once the non-economic contract was in place, the union turned its attention to its economic goals — increased wages, shorter hours, and paid vacations — all of which had to be

approved by the RWLB. Negotiations continued on these issues, and the union began its preparation of a brief for the board. ⁷³

Thanks to the successful vote and the new contract, the UAW members at De Havilland had almost tripled, to 2,300, very close the number who voted for the union in March. Ever pragmatic, workers were taking stock of the union's increasingly impressive record; they were becoming union supporters and ultimately union members. ⁷⁴ It was not to last, however. Workers grew impatient as the union laboured through summer over its brief to the RWLB, when another government-imposed delay arose. This time it was in the form of Minister of Munitions and Supply C. D. Howe's insisting that he be given approval rights over wage increases in plants such as De Havilland. De Havilland was telling the union at the bargaining table that while it agreed with the union's wage proposals, it had no power to agree to them without Howe's approval. ⁷⁵ "Weeks of effort [have been wasted] by the arbitrary and possibly illegal action of the Minister of Munitions and Supply," read a union brief to the RWLB. "Collective bargaining, which has been legalized by the Ontario Parliament has been stultified and negated." ⁷⁶ "There is nothing that disturbs workers more," Burt said, "than the stalling tactics used by Mr. Howe or delays in getting decisions from the Board." ⁷⁷ Matters were made worse by the company's new truculence in dealing with grievances, sending most cases to arbitration, making it difficult for the union "to gain any prestige through [our] grievance procedure." By August, hundreds of workers had stopped paying their dues; the paid-up membership had fallen to 1,500. ⁷⁸ As a result of the loss in revenue, the local was running in the red. ⁷⁹

In late 1943, the RWLB ruled on the union's application for its economic package for production workers and allowed only two minor, non-wage items on the UAW's list

of demands, the only two that had also been supported by the company. The union then adopted a new tactic. It surveyed 65 different industries in the Toronto area and re-applied to the board on the basis of the highest rates in these industries, all of which had been approved by the board.⁸⁰

But by December 1943, only office workers had seen a wage increase, and as a result they made up the bulk of the 1,000 new members the local had signed up since the recognition vote nine months before.⁸¹ By early 1944, stewards had begun to burn out. Local 112 leaders responded by revitalizing the local's steward body and embarking on a range of union activities, including an education committee and a women workers' council, intended to encourage women "to be more active and to intermingle with other members of the local to further extend their aims."⁸² These efforts helped the local with signing up 200 new members.⁸³

In early 1944, the UAW and the IAM signed a no-raiding pact promising they would not launch a drive in the other's jurisdiction where the other had been certified or established by collective bargaining.⁸⁴ The new cooperation between the two unions paid off quickly. In June 1944, the RWLB authorized the UAW's proposed wage increases, ranging from five to 20 cents an hour. Burt credited the "exchange of ideas" between the unions for the victory, which came about when the two organizations found out that De Havilland and Victory Aircraft managements had been working together to defeat the unions at both plants. When the company's objected to the unions' cooperation, union leaders tartly replied that they were only playing management's own game.⁸⁵ The wage increase attracted new members and boosted the local's member to 3,700, including both paid up members and members in arrears.⁸⁶

The UAW's first contract with De Havilland expired in June 1944. Negotiations for a new agreement began in Spring 1944, and a year later no new agreement had been reached. The dispute centered around union security provisions, with the UAW seeking a union shop and a dues check-off clause. The dispute was sent to the labour board for a ruling, which rejected the union's request for a union shop on the basis of the union's own admission that the union majority in the plant was not substantial. As for the check-off, the board recommended a modified check-off, whereby union members could authorize a payroll deduction for dues, which deduction would be in force until the expiry of the agreement.⁸⁷ A month later, in June 1945, a month after V-E Day, Local 112 leaders reported an 85 per cent rate of union membership among De Havilland production workers.

The success of even a modified check off in encouraging workers to pay their union dues was more proof to the union that workers supported a pay roll check off. That September, barely a month after the end of the war, the UAW in Canada was engaged in a fierce struggle with the Ford Motor Co. of Canada over the check-off, a strike that produced the Rand formula, which quickly became an almost universal feature in Canadian union contracts.⁸⁸

The CIO at Metallic Roofing

Metallic Roofing, located on Atlantic Avenue in Toronto, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Western Steel Products Corp. Ltd, a company with factories across Canada employing about 2,500 people. Workers in Metallic's Toronto factory made fabricated steel products, and by 1943, 98 per cent of production was for the war, constructing water tanks for the Canadian Army. The company's 250 production workers in Toronto

toiled for more than 50 hours in a six-day work week.⁸⁹ Wages ranged from 45 cents an hour for labourers to 90 cents an hour for welders. Unlike many war plants, which were often either government run or Crown corporations, Metallic was a private company. The UAW began to organize the factory in the late summer of 1942, just as the union was opening other drives across the city.

Metallic management had found out about the UAW organizing efforts by early September. The war had provided Canadian management with a whole new battery of arguments — patriotism, duty, sacrifice, and national peril — with which to exhort workers to stay away from unions. Metallic distributed to its employees a memo that was an extraordinary example of this kind of management propaganda. It featured dire warnings about the strength of Canada's enemies, saying that the allies were losing the war and "that never in our lives have we been as close to disaster as we are now." It told workers that Japan had never been defeated in its 2,000-year history and that Canada's enemies were not just brave, they were "fanatical." Above all, the memo said in its peroration, this was no time to talk about "rights." Enlisted men had given them up, and (now that corporate output was distributed according to government instruction, profits subject to the excess profits tax, and high income earners forced to pay steep income taxes), so had managers. If we put our rights ahead of our duty, said the memo, "we are asking for — and will probably get — no rights at all."⁹⁰

But more than words comprised the company's response to the UAW incursion. Metallic also launched a company union. By early November, management at Metallic was corresponding with its company union shop committee in open letters distributed to all employees. The letters aimed to persuade workers their newly minted company union was sticking up for them. For example, the company's calculation of the cost-of-

living bonus was a hot issue with Metallic workers, and management moved to blunt its potency as an organizing issue. A fawning company memo to the Metallic Roofing Shop Committee and sent to all employees congratulated the committee fulsomely on its "excellent presentation" about the cost-of-living bonus, which the committee was arguing was less than workers were entitled to. The bonus, the company admitted, "occasioned dissatisfaction in the minds of the employees." Management then blamed both the government and the press for any misunderstandings, refused to change the bonus, but told the shop committee that it would provide only the "heartiest co-operation" if the shop committee appealed the bonus issue to the RWLB. The shop committee, however, did not want to go the RWLB because the bonus "was...better dealt with between the Company and its employees," for "[o]nce we start going outside for redress, the door will be opened for the entry of an outside Union Organization."⁹¹

The CIO's early suspicions about the American Federation of Labour (AFL) being in league with employers to foil the CIO were well-founded. The same day as the memo to all employees about the bonus, management wrote the shop committee about a successful AFL organizing drive in the company's Winnipeg plant, where a contract had recently been negotiated. Since then, the Toronto management learned, an AFL organizer was talking to management at the company's Montreal branch plant about organizing there. Toronto managers asked the shop committee to give the AFL organizer "the courtesy of letting him talk to you for a half an hour." The shop committee agreed, and five days later a Metallic manager wrote the Sheet Metal Workers Union local in Toronto inviting it to meet with the shop committee.⁹² (The AFL organizer must not have made much of an impression because nothing further is heard of the organization.)

A month later, in December 1942, the CIO called a mass meeting of Metallic workers at the Steel Workers' Hall in Toronto. The notice calling the meeting said Metallic employees were demanding a union and that the CIO "stands ready and willing to assist them in forming a strong, militant organization." Those in attendance elected an organizing committee, including one woman, Vanche McDermott. Paul Siren, the UAW organizer, convened meetings the following week to elect an executive and a bargaining committee. Workers also voted on a bargaining agenda for Metallic workers.

The work week was a big issue. The company had had a 44-hour work week until July 1940, when succumbing to the pressure of war contracts, it extended it to 48 hours — with no overtime pay whatsoever.⁹³ As for wages, the starting rate for new male labourers at Metallic was 35 cents an hour, placing them "in the category of sweated labour," in the UAW's words, and below other Toronto-area plants.⁹⁴ The union campaign featured a demand for a 50-cent minimum hiring rate for both men and women, which would establish the principle of equal pay for women.

But the burning issue was the cost-of-living bonus. The company was paying \$2.53 cents a week in bonus, but workers believed they were entitled to far more. When Metallic had increased the work week in 1940, instead of paying workers overtime, it rolled that year's government-mandated seven-and-a-half per cent cost-of-living increase into the 1941 wage rate, with pious words about it being "a tangible expression of appreciation for your loyalty and co-operation" and compensation for overtime worked.⁹⁵ But during the organizing drive, when workers started complaining the company had failed to pay the government-ordered cost-of-living bonuses, the company changed its story, saying the 1941 increase had been a cost-of-living increase after all and

therefore should be included in wage calculations, meaning, the company claimed, it was already paying the bonus. ⁹⁶

The shop committee reacted immediately and the next day wrote the RWLB appealing for full payment of the cost of living bonus. The application, on company letterhead, went through the arguments as to why government should allow an increase. Since the company had not been interested in appealing to the labour board only a month before, when the UAW's strength in the plant was less tangible, the turnout at mass meetings must have convinced Metallic it was facing a serious CIO threat, thus inspiring a sudden conversion on the bonus issue whereby its company union could position itself to deliver the goods to workers. ⁹⁷

The UAW responded that week with the first issue of the *UAW-CIO War Worker, Metallic Roofing Edition*, an impressive-looking, four-page tabloid newspaper, professionally laid out and printed, with photographs, tables, and cartoons. ⁹⁸ To offer reassurance to workers, the major theme of the publication was the size, strength, and success of the UAW, taking up almost half the paper. The union boasted of being the largest industrial union in both Canada and the United States and of its success in winning improved conditions for thousands of workers in several Ontario industrial cities, including Toronto. There was a vow to increase and standardize wage rates, and to rationalize job classifications. Health and safety matters at Metallic were touched on, and workers were told that time-and-a-half after eight hours on a shift was UAW policy.

An explanation about dues was featured. The writer argued that dues should be seen as a good "investment," because while UAW-negotiated wage increases were ranging between 10 and 15 cent an hour on average, dues would cost workers only about a cent an hour. The editor told workers the UAW would fight any discharge for

union activity, so "Don't let your foreman scare you with threats of firing." The article related the story of the De Havilland firings, where all dismissed workers had been reinstated by order of the Department of Labour, with full back pay.

The war provided the union with ammunition as well. Far from hindering the war effort, the editorial asserted, unionization, because of the UAW's commitment to setting up joint union-management production councils, would boost war production. Union membership was thus seen a way of participating even more directly in Canada's war effort: "Production increases of up to 50 per cent and more have been made where they have been established. ...Do your bit by joining the UAW today," said the paper.

Workers responded and by January, Siren reported the union had signed up about half the Metallic workforce. He believed the union was sufficiently strong that he could ask the company for recognition, and when the company refused, he was confident he could get the strike vote needed to have a board of conciliation appointed.⁹⁹ He first approached the company directly about recognizing the UAW, and Metallic rejected his request, notifying employees in a bulletin that as it had "no intimation from any reliable source... that any material number of employees" wanted a vote, it would not agree to a vote unless requested by the government. Since the government's labour relations machinery only started up with the threat of a strike, Siren had to call a membership meeting of all Metallic employees, so union members could vote on whether or not to apply for board of conciliation, which was tantamount to a strike vote. Before taking the vote, union leaders made it clear that if the government did not appoint a board a "yes" vote would authorize the union's executive officer to declare a strike.¹⁰⁰ The union had bought space in newspapers to advertise the meeting, a risky

strategy if it was not confident about the outcome of the vote. Its confidence was well-founded, with workers voting overwhelmingly in favour of proceeding to conciliation.¹⁰¹

The successful vote sparked a spate of virulent union-bashing from the company. One bulletin consisted of quotes from the Conservative Member of Parliament from Parkdale, Dr. H. A. Bruce, attacking the CIO. The company helpfully put the most egregious of the MPs outburst in capital letters. "...[A]nyone who has watched the policies and tactics of the CIO will not confuse this organization with any REALLY HONEST labour movement," Bruce told the Commons. "I do not believe that the cause of the workers will ever be permanently advanced by such DISHONEST PRACTICES AND LOW IDEALS OF FAIRNESS AND DECENCY at those which guide the CIO effort,"¹⁰² the good doctor said.

The company then distributed to all employees a professionally printed pamphlet called a "Statement of Company Position." In the pamphlet, the company told workers that it had "cheerfully" accepted the instructions of the government in all aspects of the war effort, including controls on profits and wages. It said if its wages were not competitive with those of other similar plants in Toronto, then it would have been able to make a successful case before the RWLB for raising them. The company said it did not want to see its employees "misled and misguided into paying good money to people who, we understand, claim they can accomplish objectives, which, in our belief, are absolutely impossible of accomplishment." ¹⁰³

Throughout the winter, as the UAW's application for conciliation wended its way through the bureaucracy, Metallic continued to argue the shop committee represented the workers in its plant, not the UAW. It warned employees that holding a vote would only cause "factionalism" within the plant and that would be detrimental to the war

effort. The union's retort was that the company's refusal was causing more dissension in the plant than ever existed before and that, if a vote were held, workers voting in the minority would accept the decision of the majority, thus ending the tensions. ¹⁰⁴

With the company refusing to back away from its shop committee, the union took the shop committee over. As a result, at a March meeting with the shop committee, Metallic managers said once again they strongly opposed the CIO union and urged workers to stick to their "own union in the shop." But this time the shop committee rejected the suggestion and put forward a motion that the company to consent to a government-supervised vote. The mover and seconder of the motion were members of the UAW's local executive, Frank Frier and Ainslee Burke. At the same meeting, shop committee elections were held, and the UAW slate was elected. Not surprisingly, at the next meeting, the company representatives launched a vociferous barrage against the CIO, including accusations that Ainslee Burke was a communist. ¹⁰⁵

But shortly after this nasty and agitated meeting, persuaded perhaps that further resistance was futile now that their company union was in the hands of the UAW, Metallic managers notified employees that they had met with UAW officials, including George Burt, and had hammered out an agreement whereby Metallic agreed to supply the Department of Labour-appointed investigating commissioner, H. W. Perkins, with a list of union-eligible employees. This management memo explained that Perkins would then check the union's records to see what percentage of employees were UAW members. If he found that the union did have the majority of cards, then the company would agree to a vote. The company was even, in this memo, however, still appealing to its employees to stick with a "good, solid shop committee [which] can do everything for employees an outside union can do." ¹⁰⁶

On April 7, they received bad news, with Perkins notifying them that the majority of employees eligible to vote were UAW members and that he was, therefore, recommending a vote be held between the UAW and the shop committee. Metallic agreed to the vote,¹⁰⁷ without forcing a conciliation board. ¹⁰⁸ Perkins's count was taken not a moment too soon. Just days before, Local 252 had told their district council colleagues that the delays at Metallic had reduced enthusiasm for the union and that membership was beginning to drop off. There had been a large turnover in the union's steward and executive body, on account of military enlistments; secondly and more important, union members had stopped paying dues because they felt the union was not getting anywhere. As a result the local was in a precarious financial position. ¹⁰⁹

But Perkins's announcement of a UAW majority made all the difference, and by April 15, the UAW-dominated shop committee, including Vanche McDermott, was meeting with management in an "atmosphere of negotiations," with the committee demanding action on a range of issues, from sanitation and safety issues to hours of work and paid holidays, and winning concessions from the managers on many.¹¹⁰ On April 26 Perkins wrote the parties, setting forth the voting procedure. A polling booth would be open for three hours during the day shift and one and half hours during the night shift. Electioneering was banned during voting day and the day before. Each party was allowed a scrutineer, who was furnished with a voter's list and given the right to lodge any objections about the proceedings and ask that the objection be recorded. ¹¹¹

The UAW won the vote 255 to 82. Contract negotiations opened a few weeks later, and Burt hailed the agreement, signed July 15, 1943, the first UAW contract within Toronto's city limits, as "first class." ¹¹² The agreement included such improvements as plant-wide seniority that was not to be affected by race, sex, religion, national origin, or

family status; equal pay for women; a grievance procedure; rest periods, call-in pay, and lost time for stewards handling grievances.¹¹³ Metallic union leaders remembering that “management has fought the Union since we first started organizing,” said of the victory that “we did not gain objective without a struggle, so we “feel justly proud of ourselves.” A fountain pen was bought to sign the contract and given to Ainslee Burke, now a gunner in the Canadian Army, who was largely responsible for bringing the UAW to Metallic.¹¹⁴

Local union leaders, however, were having difficulties maintaining membership at Metallic, even though — in keeping with the UAW strategy of signing a contract before an “economic package” had been agreed upon (such matters would be delayed anyway owing to having to gain the approval of the RWLB)— they had a grievance procedure that allowed them to put the contract to work and show workers the union in action. At a district council meeting a few weeks after the contract was signed, union leaders at Metallic said dues collections were falling off and that “our main problem is female workers, who “give us strong support, but for some reason they are very backward in paying their dues.”¹¹⁵ The women’s reluctance is perhaps not hard to understand. Making a fraction what underpaid men were earning at Metallic, women workers were no doubt stretched to the limit financially and were pragmatically waiting to see what the union could actually produce on equal pay beyond the sentiments expressed in the contract.

Meantime, the union had laid its economic demands before the employer, including a 44-hour work week, a minimum hiring rate of 50 cents an hour, a week’s paid vacation, shift premiums, six sick-leave days a year, and payment of the full cost of living bonus. Equalizing wages was a key union demand. For example, the union

argued that all labourers, the lowest paid classification in the plant and earning 45 to 60 cents an hour, should receive a standard rate of 65 cents an hour. Welders were earning between 55 and 91 cents an hour. The union proposed 80 cents to \$1.10 an hour, thus compressing the range while well as raising it. Equal pay for women was introduced by the elimination of male and female job rates. ¹¹⁶

In the talks over the economic package, the company agreed to pay a five-cent shift premium, double time pay for work on Sundays and statutory holidays, a minimum hiring rate for male labourers of 50 cents an hour, and to close the wage gap between men and women to no more 10 cents an hour for "comparable," work, provided that "comparable" would be interpreted by management, subject to the grievance procedure. (It said it did not agree with paid vacations during a war but would be prepared to work something out after the war. ¹¹⁷) Yet the company refused to support the UAW in these demands in any meaningful way by refusing to make a joint submission to the RWLB and forcing the union to go alone to the RWLB, putting the union in a much weaker position ¹¹⁸ In September, the board issued its ruling, denying the union all its economic proposals, save for a five-cent shift premium. It, in fact, capped the wages of "adult male common labour" at 50 cents an hour, a ruling described by the UAW "as beyond comprehension. ¹¹⁹ The board also disallowed double time for Sunday and holidays worked, even though the company had been doing so long before the UAW organized the plant.¹²⁰ The one piece of good news in the board's report, in a ruling praised by the UAW as a breakthrough, the board "authorized" Metallic to pay women the same rate as men if they performed exactly the same work with exactly the same results. ¹²¹ Burt said the ruling established the principle of equal pay and the "UAW would be on guard to ensure its enforcement. "¹²²

The company moved swiftly on the propaganda front, sending a copy of the ruling with a covering letter to all employees saying the board's orders "constitute practically a 100% VINDICATION OF THE COMPANY'S POSITION.... It confirms what we told you to the effect that no Union can get anything that your own Shop Committee and/or Company cannot get for you."¹²³ The UAW appealed the ruling, but the RWLB stuck to its guns, confirming in a November ruling its previous decisions for the most part, except for two issues. It relented slightly on paid vacations, perhaps influenced by Metallic's assurances during the board's October hearings on the appeal that the company was prepared to discuss vacation with the union in January, and told the parties to go back the bargaining table with a view to reaching agreement. The board may also have been sensitive to the fact that it had approved a week's paid vacation in dozens of plants in Ontario. It also allowed changes in overtime pay for night shift workers. Meantime, six months had elapsed since Metallic workers had voted for the UAW, and workers had seen no monetary gains but just a long series of rulings, appeals, and more rulings, followed by more appeals. Local union leaders reported that Metallic management was trying to break the union "by every method it can legally use." They complained the contract appeared to mean nothing to management, who would not "cooperate unless the Company or the Non-Union employees are going to benefit."

Warned UAW representative John Eldon, who now headed up the union's efforts at Metallic, management tactics were creating a serious situation at the company's facilities. "This management is very glib with its promises to the employees," Eldon charged in a November 18, 1943, letter to Louis Fine, Ontario's chief conciliator, "then [it] goes to the Labour Board and fights to the last ditch against any requests made by the employees and finally ends by refusing to put decisions of the Board into effect."

Eldon's charges were not frivolous. The company was refusing to hand over to the union a list of job classifications and their wage rates, even though they had been authorized by the board. And while the company had agreed to re-open the vacation issue starting January 1944, when the union lost its appeal in November, the company announced it was delaying any such discussions until April, leaving little time for the negotiations and subsequent government approval needed before workers could get their vacation that summer. Eldon wrote the RWLB chair, J. B. Metzler, demanding his board "direct, not authorize" the company to pay for vacations for 1944, just as Wilson Motors Bodies, another recently organized UAW plant was doing.¹²⁴ Most seriously, as it turned out, though the board in November had ordered Metallic to pay a five-cent night-shift premium, the company was telling the union it would not, arguing that it was prevented by government wage ceilings. The union applied the RWLB to order the company to pay the shift premium, which the board did. The company then argued that it was in fact paying the premium and posted notices in the plant to that effect. Workers reacted angrily, with both the day and night shifts launching brief work stoppages, and the night shift threatened an all-out strike. Union officials persuaded workers to stay on the job and went to the Department of Labour to persuade Metzler in person to order the company, once again, to pay. Metzler promised that he would talk to the company "in no uncertain terms," but after four days, it was apparent he hadn't. The night shift then struck the plant. The labour department announced it was going to send Perkins in to arbitrate the dispute, which was news to the union. The strikers voted to stay off the job anyway.¹²⁵

Perkins was able to negotiate a return to work, but the company continued its campaign. Pouring gasoline on a kindling fire, the company, when announcing a 35-cent

increase in the cost-of-living allowance in November, took pains to point out to its employees that the increase was owing to a government order and had "nothing to do with bargaining. "¹²⁶ Meantime, reported Metallic's union stewards, their wage grievances all received the same answer: "The man is being paid a fair rate for that class of work, at which he spends 75 per cent of his time. "¹²⁷

Meantime, the UAW had gone the National War Labour Board (NWLB), appealing the Ontario board's rulings. But it was not until March, almost a month after the strike, that the federal board responded, although favorably, allowing a week's paid vacation and overtime pay after 44 hours. The union newspaper noted that the NWLB's ruling was the "culmination of a struggle that started in July 1943. "¹²⁸ Burt reported to the district council that the ruling had helped the union's organizational work at Metallic. ¹²⁹

The company's reaction was to threaten and insult its workforce. G. G. Complin, the general manager, said that workers would have had to work a minimum 300 days to qualify for vacation in 1944, and "from the look of our absenteeism record, it does not seem as though many employees will qualify. "¹³⁰

The local, however, was hard at work trying to create a sense of cohesion and channels through which to communicate with union members. It started publishing a regular newsletter and embarked on an ambitious series of dances, socials, and education workshops. These activities, coupled with the NWLB's more lenient ruling and the introduction of overtime pay and equal pay for women, the union's "permanent organizing drive" was meeting with success, but it was, nevertheless, a full year and a half, before 90 per cent of Metallic workers were signed up for the union. Until then, the delays intrinsic to the government's elaborate labour relations machinery and

management's refusal to recognize the union in any meaningful way or abide by the collective agreement it had signed, had put the fledgling union in a precarious state, in spite of the strong support workers had initially shown it. In June 1945, a month after V-E day, Metallic leaders told the district council that they were negotiating for a union check off and believed they would win it, "because for the past two years we have shown that we promote our business in a peaceful and harmonious way."¹³¹

The UE at Underwood Elliott

The Underwood Elliott Co., located on Madison Avenue in mid-town Toronto, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the famous, United States-based typewriter manufacturer. The Toronto plant employed about 250 workers, who had never been unionized since the company's incorporation in 1932. The resulting wages were so low that the near-universal wage gap of about 30 per cent between male and female rates in industry was almost non-existent at Underwood Elliott. The male hiring wage was 29 cents an hour, while women workers started at 26 cents an hour.¹³²

A group of Underwood workers approached the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers International Union (UE) in January 1943. Within a few weeks, the union claimed more than 90 per cent of the workforce as members. Yet, when a union recognition vote was finally held in April, the union was decisively defeated. What happened?

Within three weeks of opening the unionizing drive at Underwood, UE organizers had enough support to bring the drive out into the open. They held widely-publicized mass meetings, where UE speakers addressed the assembled workers, telling them about the advantages of joining a union and urging them to sign a card. But within

days of the meetings, Underwood Elliot management posted notices on plant bulletin boards summoning all workers to another kind of union meeting, one at which management would inform workers about its plans for a company union. At the two-hour meeting, held during working hours, management speakers attacked the CIO and stressed the benefits of a company union. Workers who wanted to comment or ask a question were invited to step forward.

Charlie Henderson, a 17-year veteran of the company and a key UE in-plant organizer, took up the offer. Henderson expressed surprise that management would be sponsoring a company union in view of the number of workers signed up in the UE and asked the company to delay setting up its shop committee for two weeks, to give everyone a chance to think things over. Management agreed.

They kept their word for all of two days, at which time they posted more notices on the bulletin boards, this time asking workers to nominate representatives to a shop committee. The broken promise threw the shop into chaos. Since, the UE estimated, more than 90 per cent of Underwood employees had joined the union,¹³³ workers were indignant about the broken promise. The UE responded to the threat of a company union by organizing the nomination of its own members to the proposed shop committee. Not surprisingly, given the extent of the union's support, workers elected a shop committee made up almost entirely of UE supporters.¹³⁴ The union, in effect, had pre-empted the proposed shop committee. At its first (and only) meeting with the company, the newly elected committee presented management representatives with a petition signed by a majority of workers that asked for a government-supervised recognition vote.¹³⁵

The next day, the company quashed its rebellious creation, disbanding the shop committee its workers had elected and simply installed a new shop committee, this time made up entirely of supervisors. Lee Trenholm, Underwood's director of public relations, who was leading the company's anti-union campaign, moved to gather support—and evidence of that support—for this new committee. Underwood foremen called workers into their offices and warned them "that things would not be too good for them" if they did not put their names down as supporters of the shop committee. "

¹³⁶ The company also went after the union's strength, firing several union activists in the manufacturing division, where the UE was especially strong. ¹³⁷, ¹³⁸ Leading organizers in the plant said that police had visited their homes and shoved them around, although had laid no charges. ¹³⁹ The UE also began to receive letters from workers resigning their union membership, all written on the same paper, with the same typewriter, using with the same wording. The UE claimed that management offered some younger workers, aged 15 to 17, a one-dollar bribe to withdraw from the union. ¹⁴⁰

The management campaign against the union featured carrots as well as sticks. Supervisors hinted at an increased cost-of-living bonus and reclassification of wages, two important issues the UE was promising action on. The company also promised a new sick-pay plan, a new promotion policy that sought to promote from within, and said it would consider a pension plan. ¹⁴¹ It also gave some 54 workers—almost a quarter of the workforce—wage increases. ¹⁴² In response, the UE distributed a leaflet asking workers if the company had ever talked about dealing with workers collectively, or increasing the bonus, or looking at wage classifications before the UE had started pressing for these matters. "It is only because a bona fide union raised these issues that the company took action," the leaflet told workers. ¹⁴³

The UE turned to the government labour relations machinery for help. After their ouster from office, members of the disbanded UE committee asked Lee Trenholm to agree to a government-supervised recognition vote, but he said the company would countenance "no outside interference, regardless of the wishes of workers." ¹⁴⁴ The union then called in F. J. Ainsborough, a federal Department of Labour investigator stationed in Toronto, to mediate the dispute, but he was unable to persuade the company to allow a vote. Trenholm, probably basing his assertion on names gathered by supervisors, claimed he had evidence that a majority of employees were supporting the company union, so the company would not agree to a vote. ¹⁴⁵ Ross Russell, the UE's director of organizing, now raised the stakes, asking for a disputes inquiry commissioner with a mandate to order a vote. "Provocation and intimidation are rampant," Russell told the department's director of industrial relations, M. M. Maclean. "The employee election has been voided by management and a hand-picked committee established," he said. ¹⁴⁶

By mid-February Trenholm's campaign of having supervisors sign workers up for the company union was paying off. The shop committee was able to tell the company that a majority of Underwood employees — 188 of the 252 eligible — had authorized it to represent them. Furthermore, the shop committee submitted a collective agreement to management "for their consideration." ¹⁴⁷ The proposed contract provided a few minor items (such as company-paid coveralls and a couch in the women's rest room) but, more significantly, granted recognition to the shop committee as sole bargaining agent for its employees. The company made a few minor amendments to the contract and signed it. The shop committee distributed the new agreement, printed on company letterhead, to employees, but the agreement was never submitted to Underwood workers for

ratification. The letter to employees accompanying their copy of their new contract included praise for the company's prompt action in responding to "Winston Churchill's appeal to all patriotic men on both sides of the Atlantic to stamp their feet on mischief makers and sowers of discord wherever they may be found." ¹⁴⁸

On February 15, Maclean, finally responding to Russell's request for a disputes commissioner, turned the UE down. Russell replied, warning him that Ainsborough for his part was prepared to call a conciliation board, although Russell himself did not understand why the government should have to go to the trouble and expense, given the company's "flagrant disrespect for the law." Once again Russell called on Maclean to name a disputes commissioner with the power to order a vote. On March 2, however, when it became clear Ottawa was not going to order a vote, the UE called a strike vote (Jackson's "anomalous position") so that it could apply for a board of conciliation. The vote carried, and the next day the union made its application for a board. ¹⁴⁹

The shop committee, again using company letterhead, responded to the UE's application for a board. It claimed it had "acceptable evidence" that it enjoyed majority support among workers and that since the UE had failed to produce like evidence, the "inevitable conclusion is that the applicant does not have majority support." The brief added that only 23 workers had attended the strike vote meeting, and only 15 supported the strike vote. The shop committee submission also claimed that the various grievances the UE had listed in its board application were issues the company had some sympathy with. By claiming majority support for the shop committee and by claiming company sympathy with the UE's grievances, Lee Trenholm had attempted to change the very protagonists in the dispute. The struggle was no longer between the company and a union. It "between the UE and the shop committee." ¹⁵⁰

Meantime, the shop committee had been working with management to arrange for more wage increases. The company agreed to a joint applications to the RWLB for a \$2.50 a week wage increase, for example, for the inspector job classification, which the RWLB approved.¹⁵¹ The committee had also applied for a reduction in the work week from 50 hours to 44. The shop committee's minutes also record a steadily increasing membership, possibly the result of another wave of firings for the company had dismissed three more workers, including Charlie Henderson, now president of the UE local union, as well as two women workers. Ainsborough intervened, pleading with the company to postpone the firings at least until he had investigated them for evidence of possible discrimination.¹⁵² The union circulated an open letter from Henderson to workers, saying that he had been "hounded like a criminal," even with his 17 years' seniority.¹⁵³ The firings, however, meant the union's campaign for a disputes inquiry commissioner was finally, if belatedly, rewarded. Mr Justice Ian Macdonnell was appointed as a disputes inquiry commissioner to investigate the dismissals. While the company agreed to take two of the employees back, Macdonnell was satisfied Charlie Henderson, had been fired for just cause.¹⁵⁴ Macdonnell was also able to persuade the company, which was no doubt now confident it had broken the union's momentum, to allow a vote and scheduled it for April 7.

The UE agreed to an unprecedented method of campaigning, whereby management, the shop committee, and the union would restrict themselves to one piece of literature each, all bundled together in one envelope and distributed to employees by supervisors. Why the union agreed that management should join the fray, especially in view of the shop committee's contention that the contest was between only itself and the

UE is hard to understand except, possibly, as a necessary condition to the company's agreeing to a vote.

The management leaflet said that it had given the shop committee exclusive bargaining rights because it had produced evidence it had the support of the majority of employees. It reassured workers it would work with the UE if the union won, but at the same time, in a veiled threat, said it was "unable to predict whether or not negotiations [with the UE] will result in further improvements to your present working conditions. " Above all, the company, confident the shop committee had majority support and seeking a good voter turnout, urged its employees to vote, saying it would pay lost time for voting. "Vote either way you wish," advised the company, "but vote. It's your duty."¹⁵⁵

The shop committee leaflet assured workers of trouble-free collective rights: it could win all the benefits for workers without their having to pay dues, or join a trade union, or "without making [their] affairs subject to the ideas, policies, and practices of any outsider. " It explained, in impeccable public relations-speak, that it had had merely organized and made permanent on a collective basis the "many advantages" Underwood employees had enjoyed for decades. The committee said it had received from management "the same friendly and fair treatment management has consistently shown its employees. " Then it listed what it had accomplished for workers: recognition of collective bargaining rights; reclassification of jobs; adjustment of wage inequities; establishment of sick pay; daily rest and clean up periods; a lunch room; and a proposal before the RWLB to reduce the work week to 44 hours from 50, meaning a 13.6 per cent wage increase. The shop committee also said it already had good relations with

management and then promised to give workers the right to vote in shop committee elections in the future."¹⁵⁶

The UE leaflet for its part cited its achievements in other shops, focussing on Toronto, with work hour reductions at the Small Arms plant; hikes in the cost-of-living bonus at Die Castings Ltd. ; and wages increases and paid vacations at Coulter Brass. It also cited the superior contracts in Underwood's American facilities (an argument the shop committee countered by saying that conditions in the United States were radically different from those in Canada).

But, said the UE, its first consideration was winning the war. It told workers it was striving for the "highest degree of cooperation between labour, management, and government." It said it was struggling for collective bargaining rights "in order to improve the conditions for workers so there will be no distraction from the main task of producing for victory. " It reminded workers of its no-strike policy, which it had maintained "despite severe provocations on several occasions. " The UE also took pains to distance itself from any grand notions of worker control, and perhaps responding to possible rumours of Communist Party strength in the union, said, "At no time do we challenge upon the right of the owners of industry to manage the plants in which are members are found. " The closing words of the leaflet asked workers to "join the organized brothers of the Underwood plants in the U. S. and with all organized labour here and in our armies for the defeat of fascism and an improved standard of living. "¹⁵⁷

Of 216 workers eligible to vote, 116 voted for the company union, and 89 for the UE. Following the vote, Macdonnell said with the UE's loss there was no longer a need for a board of conciliation.

Trenholm's carrot-and-stick campaign with workers, management's lies and stalling, and government-imposed delay had combined to defeat the union. Company bribes and promises of future benefits were counterpoised with intimidation and firings. The company's publicity campaign was carefully worded so that it did not attack the UE but, following Trenholm's stratagem, positioned the company as almost above the fray. Its no-strike stance, coupled perhaps with some concern about the level of militancy in the plant, meant the UE had delayed a strike vote to force conciliation, so it faced long delays in obtaining government intervention. It may well have also hurt its cause by putting too much emphasis on winning the war and not enough on winning a good contract for workers. It was one of the UE's few losses during the war, but it was a bitter one.

Conclusion

There is no way of telling, however, how many organizing drives fizzled out before they even got to the stage of entering the public record. Among those that were robust enough to enter the record, labour scored many victories, but it also sustained difficult losses: the Packinghouse Workers at Dumart's in Kitchener; Mine Mill at Kirkland Lake; the UAW at Motor Lamp in Windsor; the Steel Workers at Stelco and National Steel Car in Hamilton; the UE at Westinghouse in Hamilton, to name a few.¹⁵⁸ The losses were well-publicized and would not necessarily engender worker confidence in the CIO. As Burt ruefully noted to his union's district council, little press attention was made to union victories but "a loss is played up from coast to coast."¹⁵⁹

The war taught the CIO that even under the most promising conditions (which the war presented) , it was still a hard struggle to build and maintain union strength in the face of corporations that had a free hand in the workplace and few, if any, laws limiting their behaviour towards workers and unions. CIO unions wanted security for their organizations — in order to bring security to the workers they sought to represent.

As we have seen in these last three chapters, the difficulty in winning that security was the context that framed part of the CIO's vision of what post-war Canadian society should be like. But the war also provided the CIO unions with a popular discourse it could use to present that vision to union members and to the public, a phenomenon that will be examined in the next two chapters.

¹ See, for example, Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, *The Assault on Trade Union Freedom: From Wage Controls to Social Contract* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993), 10. The authors, critics of the post-war settlement, note the war featured a shift in “the balance of forces” and a “sustained and comprehensive working-class mobilization and politicization,” without reference to the difficulties unionists faced in

maintaining union membership levels during the war, the conservatism of many workers, and the implacable hostility of employers.

² Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Remember Kirkland Lake: The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

³ In December 1941, 63 per cent of Canadians polled favoured union, while only 23 per cent did not. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (Spring 1942), 159. Two years later, in December 1943, 49 per cent of those polled said they'd prefer "labour unions" to run the government, versus the 26 per cent who preferred "business." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8 (Spring 1944), 144.

⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 268 United Steel Workers of America, Volume 1, File 6: CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, Nov. 4-5, 1939, "Resolution #1: Organization."

⁵ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Box 70, File: Report of Regional Director, 1939, "Report of Region 7, UAW-CIO of Canada, November 30, 1939," 1-3.

⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, March 7-8, 1942, "George Burt Report," 4. ALUA, Toronto Subregional Collection, Series Nine, Box 11, File: Meeting March 1942, Reports, "George Burt Report," 6.

⁷ Author's interview with UAW organizer Paul Siren, February 2003.

⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: "Report of C. H. Millard, 1939," 5.

⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 70, File: Meeting June 1939, "George Burt Report." "

¹⁰ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of American, Volume 1, File 6. CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Letter from UAW Local 195 to Delegates of CIO Convention," 3.

¹¹ *Industry Canada* Vol. 40 (October 1940), "Aircraft Production in Canada Grows Quickly," 66; Ian Drummond, *Progress Without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario From Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 160.

¹² ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 2.

¹³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of E. H. Featherstonehaugh, October, 1942," 1-2.

¹⁴ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File: De Havilland, 1942-43, "UAW Research Department Memo, De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd., April 26, 1943."

¹⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 7, "Regional War Labour Board for Ontario in the Matter of an Application by the UAW and UAW Local 112...on Behalf of Factory Employees at De Havilland Aircraft Co. Ltd., July 28, 1942," 2.

¹⁶ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File: United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union, Local 112, 1942-43, *Aircraft Worker*, August 28, 1942, "Aside From the Men," 2.

¹⁷ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 4.

-
- ¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 25, File 7: "Brief to Regional War Labour Board of Ontario, July 28, 1943," 2.
- ¹⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 25, File 6. "Affidavit of Stanley Jones, October 1942," 1.
- ²⁰ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Stanley Thomas Jones, October 1942," 1.
- ²¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of E. H. Featherstonehaugh, October, 1942," 3.
- ²² ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 25, File 6. "Affidavit of E. H. Featherstonehaugh," October 31, 1942," 3.
- ²³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Carl Vincent Coulson, October 1942," 1-2.
- ²⁴ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Thomas Caskie," 3.
- ²⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Edward Conroy," 1.
- ²⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Carl Vincent Coulson," 3.
- ²⁷ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, June 1942, Minutes and Reports, "Report," 12. The government inquiry supported the union's claim. Coulson and other were reinstated, with back pay. ALUA, Toronto Subregional Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, August 1942 Minutes and Reports, "Report," 7.
- ²⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Thomas Caskie," 2; Company official E. H. Featherstonehaugh claimed that there were 4,000 De Havilland production workers at this point. ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 25, File 6. "Affidavit of E. H. Featherstonehaugh," October 31, 1942, 4.
- ²⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Join the UAW," n. d. but probably August 1942.
- ³⁰ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: Meeting, June 1942, Reports and Minutes, "George Burt Report," 2.
- ³¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 7, "UAW Application to Ontario Regional War Labour Board," 2.
- ³² ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting June 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 8.
- ³³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 6: *Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1942, "Urge Company Unions Outlawed," 1.
- ³⁴ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, clipping, "Judith Robinson Comments on De Havilland's Famous Strike." Source cited is *News*, August 22, 1942.
- ³⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.

-
- ³⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Some Further Developments," n. d. but probably August 1942.
- ³⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Join the UAW," n. d. , but probably August 1942.
- ³⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, clipping, "Judith Robinson Comments on De Havilland's Famous Strike. " Source cited is *News*, August 22, 1942.
- ³⁹ *Toronto Star*, August 16, 1942, "Stop Work for Hour," 16.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; *Globe and Mail*, August 15, 1942, "Plan Walkout," 6. This figure, however, was given by company union spokespersons not ascertained by reporters at the scene. .
- ⁴¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Some Further Developments," n. d. but probably August 1942.
- ⁴² ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Join the UAW," n. d. , but probably August 1942.
- ⁴³ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File: Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union, Local 112, 1942-43, *Aircraft Worker*, August 28, 1942, "Meeting Decides," 2.
- ⁴⁴ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6: "Memorandum on Behalf of the Applicant for a Board of Conciliation, October 9, 1942."
- ⁴⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Join the UAW," n. d. , but probably August 1942;
LAC, MG 28, Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File: Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union, Local 112, 1942-43.
- ⁴⁶ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File: United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, International Union, Local 112, 1942-43, "The Following Letter Was Sent Today to the Minister Of Labor. " Copy of letter from Hans McIntyre to Humphrey Mitchell, August 18, 1942.
- ⁴⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "Memorandum re Discharge Cases," n. d. The UAW's campaign to reinstate Scott and Hearn was successful. In January 1943, the company was found guilty of unlawfully discharging them for union activity. Both women received \$450 in back pay, the largest back pay cheques ever issued to women workers in Canada. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 15, 1943, 8.
- ⁴⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland Organizing, 1942-43, "De Havilland Discriminates Again! "
- ⁴⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6: "District Council Resolution re De Havilland Aircraft Limited."

⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Affidavit of Joseph Tedder and George Carley, September 28, 1942. "

⁵¹ Vince Coulson swore an affidavit in October 1942 that the UAW had 1,208 members in De Havilland's production facilities, out of what a "reliable source" had told him was a production workforce of 2,376, thus putting the UAW slightly in the majority. ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office Collection, Box 125, File 6, "De Havilland Aircraft Limited. "

⁵² ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 7.

⁵³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office Collection, Box 125, File 6: De Havilland Aircraft, 1942, "George Burt Letter to Heads of Unions," November 12, 1942.

⁵⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 11.

⁵⁵ Such members-only recognition may not have been unusual to union activists at the time, especially those active in international unions. Members-only representation and bargaining, as opposed to exclusive rights, was a feature of labour legislation in the American National Recovery Administration and the National Labour Relations Board in the U.S. until the 1940s. In 1937, 85 per cent of SWOC contracts provided members-only recognition, while the figure for the UAW was 64 per cent. When the union achieved majority status in a workplace, it won exclusive bargaining rights. See Charles J. Morris, *The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 83-84.

⁵⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, January 16-17, 1942, "Report," 5.

⁵⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, January 16-17, "Minutes," 2.

⁵⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, January 16-17, 1942, "Minutes," 1. See also ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker, Canadian Edition*, "Win Grievance Procedure at D-H," January 15, 1943, 1.

⁵⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 5: *United Automobile Worker, Canadian Edition*, "Equal Pay Set for Women at D-H," February 1, 1943, 4.

⁶⁰ Valerie Endicott, "A Women's Place Was Everywhere," M.A. thesis (University of Toronto, 1991), 120-121.

⁶¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 16, File 19: *Massey-Harris Organizing Committee Bulletin*, January 1943, "Minimum for Girls and Men at D-H," 2; *ibid.*, January 22, 1943, "You Can Get Some of the Breaks," 1.

⁶² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 17.

⁶³ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, "A Letter from George Burt," February 26, 1943, 3. Burt later blamed Steve Lyon, Canadian head of the IAM, who Burt said was "a bitter opponent" of the UAW and

CIO for the UAW's entry into the aircraft industry. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File District Council Meetings, February-April, 1944, "Report, February 1944," 9.

⁶⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council January-June 1943, "Minutes," n.d. but circa April/May 1943, 2.

⁶⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 1, 1943, "Union News," 4.

⁶⁶ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 26, 1943, "Our Reply to the IAM," 1, 3. An irony in all of this is that a UAW leaflet writer used the IAM's contract at Victory Aircraft, achieved just as the IAM was beginning to organize inside De Havilland, as an example of what a union could do for aircraft workers. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8: *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 19, 1942. "IAM Win at Malton," 3.

⁶⁷ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "Election Date Set," 1. The parties could not agree on who was eligible and who was not: the issue was settled by Louis Fine, Ontario's chief conciliation officer. One disadvantage of early post-war labour legislation was that until the 1960s it required a majority of all those eligible to vote for the union in order to gain certification, not just a majority of those who voted. See Wayne Roberts, ed. *Where Angels Fear to Tread: Eileen Tallman and the Labour Movement* (Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies Programme, 1982), 31.

⁶⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, January-June 1943, "Minutes, n. d. but circa April/May, 1943. " 3.

⁶⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, January-June 1943, "Minutes, June 1943," 2.

⁷⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker, Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "UAW Chosen at D-H by Two to One," 1.

⁷¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, January-June 1943, "Report, June 1943," 1.

⁷² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting June 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 3-4.

⁷³ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, June 1943, "Minutes," 3.

⁷⁴ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, June 1943, "Minutes," 5.

⁷⁵ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, August 1943, "Report," 8. The union had run into the same meddling from Howe at the Reliance Aircraft Company in Belleville, Ontario. Howe had refused to approve a dues check-off clause in the contract, even though the company had agreed to it. The UAW's protest was carried in newspapers across the country, and it succeeded in having Howe reverse his decision. Ibid.

⁷⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 125, File 7. "Regional War Labour Board, July 28, 1943,"

1. The Ontario government had brought in labor relations legislation that provided machinery for union recognition and mandatory collective bargaining. Howe's veto right over collective agreements was, perhaps, a move to limit the efficacy of the legislation.

⁷⁷ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, August 1943, "Report," 1.

⁷⁸ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, August 1943, "Minutes," 3.

⁷⁹ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 8, File: Paul Siren Correspondence, 1942. "Letter from I. Isaacs," n. d. , but circa August 1943.

⁸⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, August-December 1943, "Minutes, December 1943," 3.

⁸¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, August-December 1943, "Minutes, December 1943," 3.

⁸² ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, February 1944, "Minutes," 2.

⁸³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File District Council Meetings February-April, 1944, "Minutes, February 1944," 2.

⁸⁴ *Labour Gazette* 44 (March 1944), "UAW and IAM Sign No-Raiding Pact," 266.

⁸⁵ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, June 1944, "Minutes," 6.

⁸⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings June-August 1944, "Minutes, June 1944," 6.

⁸⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 125, File 7: "In the Matter of the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, P. C. 1003," May 7, 1945.

⁸⁸ For more about that strike, see David Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945," in Irving Abella, ed., *On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada, 1919-1949*, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1975). By August 1945, there were more layoffs at De Havilland, with the possibility that the plants would close entirely, even though, to prevent layoffs, the union had applied successfully to the RWLB to have the work week cut at De Havilland, from 48 hours to 44 a week. In September 1945, the workforce had declined to 2,000, down from its peak of 6,000. By November the local was in such dire straits, that it asked the union's Canadian headquarters to put it under trusteeship, with Burt acting as its administrator.

⁸⁹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d), "Memo from G.G. Complin to Metallic Employees, May 11, 1943."

⁹⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42. "Memo to All Employees, September 18, 1942. "

-
- ⁹¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42, "To Metallic Shop Committee, November. 9, 1942,"
- ⁹² ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42 , "J. F. Duran and G. G. Complin to Metallic Shop Committee, November 7, 1942"; *ibid.* "G. G. Complin to Geo. B. Latimer, November 12, 1942. "
- ⁹³ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Appeal filed on behalf of Metallic Workers by John Eldon to Mr. Justice C.P. McTague, December 1943."
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*; ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, "Letter from John Eldon to UAW organizer Bruce Lee, November 30, 1944."
- ⁹⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Appeal filed on behalf of Metallic Workers by John Eldon to Mr. Justice C.P. McTague, December 1943."
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁷ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42. "Application to Ontario Regional War Labour Board for Redress in the Matter of the Cost of Living Bonus, December 7, 1942. "
- ⁹⁸ ALUA, UAW Toronto Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d). *UAW-CIO War Worker Metallic Roofing Edition*, December 12, 1942.
- ⁹⁹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d). "International Union Report re: Metallic Roofing, n. d, but probably January 1943." Siren's report indicated the UAW was still short of a majority. It could be that there was enough momentum in the drive to allow him to feel confidence that the usual delays in getting a conciliation board struck would allow enough time to sign enough cards for a majority.
- ¹⁰⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42, "Resolution, Dispute, Summary, January 31, 1943. "
- ¹⁰¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42, "Notice to Members," January 1943.
- ¹⁰² ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d), "Memo to Metallic Employees," February 17, 1943."
- ¹⁰³ ALUA, UAW Toronto Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943(c), "Statement of Company Position, February 26, 1943."
- ¹⁰⁴ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d). "We Will Make Our Own Choice," n. d., probably c. first week in March 1943, 1.
- ¹⁰⁵ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42, "Shop Committee Minutes, March 4 and 18, April 15."
- ¹⁰⁶ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d), "To Metallic Employees, March 19, 1942."
- ¹⁰⁷ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d), "H. Perkins to G. G. Complin, April 7, 1942."

-
- ¹⁰⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting April 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.
- ¹⁰⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, January-June 1943, "Minutes, April 1943," 10.
- ¹¹⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1941-42, "Shop Committee Meeting Minutes, April 15, 1943."
- ¹¹¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (d). "Letter from H. Perkins to John Eldon, April 26, 1943. "
- ¹¹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 3.
- ¹¹³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, August 1, 1943, "Metallic Contract. " 8.
- ¹¹⁴ ALUA, Canadian Regional Office, District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic Roofing 1943 (d), "Metallic Roofing Wage Rates."
- ¹¹⁷ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Appeal filed on behalf of Metallic Workers by John Eldon to Mr. Justice C.P. McTague, December 1943."
- ¹¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic Roofing 1943 (b), "Letter from G.G. Complin to John Eldon, July 19, 1943."
- ¹¹⁹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 125, File 6, "Appeal filed on behalf of Metallic Workers by John Eldon to Mr. Justice C.P. McTague, December 1943."
- ¹²⁰ Ibid.
- ¹²¹ Ibid. Eldon did not give up on broadening equal pay from this very narrow definition, saying that he had received a verbal ruling from the RWLB that women should not have to do exactly the same work as men. There is no record of the board saying this in writing ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 5, File: Eldon Correspondence, November-December 1943, "Letter from John Eldon to Victor Reuther, head of UAW Women's Department November 1, 1943;." Ibid., "Letter from John Eldon to Adele Wispen, Workers Educational Association, November 22, 1943."
- ¹²² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, October 1, 1943, "Labour Board Approves Equal Pay in Toronto Plant," 8.
- ¹²³ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 5, File: Metallic 1943, "Memo from G.G. Complin to All Metallic Employees, September 16, 1943."
- ¹²⁴ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943, "Letter from John Eldon to J.B. Metzler, Chief, Ontario Regional War Labour Board, November 18, 1943."

-
- ¹²⁵ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting February 1944 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 10-11.
- ¹²⁶ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (e), "Memo from G.G. Complin to All Metallic Employees, November 11, 1943."
- ¹²⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, District Council Meeting December 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 12.
- ¹²⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 15, 1944, "Metallic," 1.
- ¹²⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, February-April, 1944, "Report, February 1944," 3.
- ¹³⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943 (e), "Memo to All Metallic Employees from G.G. Complin, August 28, 1944."
- ¹³¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting June 1945 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 14.
- ¹³² LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Lee Trenholm, Underwood Elliott Director of Public Relations, to I.M. MacDonnell, Industrial Disputes Commissioner, April 13, 1943."
- ¹³³ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 355.
- ¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 304; LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Ross Russell, UE Director of Organizing to Louis Fine, Ontario Chief Conciliation Officer, February 8, 1943."
- ¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 355.
- ¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 355.
- ¹³⁷ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Brief re Underwood Elliott Fisher Company," a leaflet from the UE to Underwood workers, n.d. but c. February 1943.
- ¹³⁸ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Ross Russell to National Selective Service, February 8, 1943."
- ¹³⁹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 365.
- ¹⁴⁰ The youngsters happily accepted the dollar and promptly used it towards paying their UE initiation fee. *Ibid.*, 355.
- ¹⁴¹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Minutes of Shop Committee Meeting, February 23, 1943."
- ¹⁴² LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Lee Trenholm, Underwood Elliott Director of Public Relations, to I.M. MacDonnell, Industrial Disputes Commissioner, April 13, 1943."

-
- ¹⁴³ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "To All Underwood Workers," UE leaflet to workers, n.d. but c. February 1943.
- ¹⁴⁴ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott "Brief re Underwood Elliott Fisher Company," a leaflet from the UE to Underwood workers, n.d. but c. February 1943.
- ¹⁴⁵ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Lee Trenholm to Ross Russell, February 8, 1943."
- ¹⁴⁶ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Telegram from Ross Russell to M.M. Maclean, Department of Labour, Ottawa, February 9, 1943."
- ¹⁴⁷ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Shop Committee to Management of Metallic Roofing, February 12, 1943."
- ¹⁴⁸ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Shop Committee to Underwood Employees, February 12, 1943."
- ¹⁴⁹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Department of Labour Application for Conciliation Form," March 3, 1943.
- ¹⁵⁰ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Letter from Shop Committee President Joseph Seitz to Registrar of Board of Conciliation, March 8, 1943." (The letter was written on company letterhead.)
- ¹⁵¹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Meeting of Management and Shop Committee, Minutes, March 1"; Ibid. "Meeting of Management and Shop Committee, Minutes, February 24, 1943."
- ¹⁵² LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott. "Letter from Lee Trenholm to F.J. Ainsborough, Department of Labour conciliator, March 8, 1943."
- ¹⁵³ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "A Statement by Charlie Henderson," leaflet handed out by UE, n.d., but early 1943.
- ¹⁵⁴ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott. "Letter from M.M. Maclean to Charles Henderson, April 16, 1943."
- ¹⁵⁵ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Your Own Shop Committee or UE-CIO Local 518?" (management leaflet), April 7, 1943."
- ¹⁵⁶ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Butter Your Bread on the Shop Committee Side" (shop committee leaflet), April 7, 1943.
- ¹⁵⁷ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: Underwood Elliott, "Winning War Is First Consideration" (UE leaflet) April 7, 1943.
- ¹⁵⁸ For more on union losses, see: Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Remember Kirkland Lake: The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983; Robert Storey, "Workers, Unions, and Steel: The Shaping of the Hamilton Working Class, 1935-1948," Ph. D dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981; *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story*, edited by Wayne Roberts (Hamilton: Labour Studies

Programme, McMaster University, 1979); Terry Copp, ed., *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947* (Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976).

¹⁵⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Minute and Report, "Report," 6.

Chapter 5

“Becoming Unionized as Well as Organized”: Union Sociability, the Transmission of Ideas, and the Creed of Equality

“Organizing workers is only the beginning of the job,” the Steel Workers’ Charlie Millard warned in 1944. “It depends on how many are behind your organization and when they will become unionists as well as organized.”¹ In Millard’s view, union organizing was more than just recruiting workers to a union. It was about developing in workers the skills and the ideas they needed to believe that working collectively to achieve their aims would be more effective than trying to achieve those aims as individuals.

A union organizing drive was a form of the “propaganda of the deed,” with organizers — as we saw in chapters 2, 3, and 4 — persuading co-workers to taking actions that in themselves developed a collective consciousness, actions that ranged from wearing a union button, to electing stewards, filing a grievance, participating in a workplace stunt, or walking a picket line. While these actions could produce a union consciousness, for their unions to survive, workers needed to develop both the skills to work collectively and the self-confidence required not just to stand up to management but also to gain a stronger and more-respected voice in the running of the larger community.

This chapter examines *how* CIO unions tried to develop workers’ voice; that is, how they tried to create among workers a sense of a union community; how they taught the skills and practice of unionism; how they developed institutions to create a self-

governing democracy where workers could discuss, debate, and participate in making decisions about their unions' programs and policies; and how they facilitated the inclusion of minority groups, such as women and ethnic workers, in that community as equals.

This analysis has been inspired in part by Jurgen Habermas and his work on what he calls the "bourgeois public sphere," whose emergence during the Enlightenment he argues, helped supplant a governing system based on hierarchy and social status. ² The development of this sphere depended on developing rules of democratic debate, a vibrant, independent press, and an array of voluntary associations that encouraged citizens to gather — independent of the family, the economy and the state — to debate the common good. ³

The CIO unions were not independent of the economy; their press was not independent; and the democratic public sphere, Habermas laments, had deteriorated by the twentieth century into competing economic interests. The CIO nevertheless can be seen as an example of a subaltern or subsidiary public sphere, which both critics and disciples of Habermas have postulated.⁴ These subsidiary public spheres range from such "establishment" groups as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and the Business Council on National Issues to groups and social movements that contest the powers-that-be, such as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women and the gay rights movement.

Each subsidiary group must have the desire either to bolster or challenge the way their society is run, a goal which places them in a political power struggle — or in coalition — with other subaltern public spheres. In a liberal democracy this means, to a large extent, a contest over who will influence public opinion. This chapter looks at the

institutions and practices the labour movement developed that created — with mixed success — an organizational and ideological coherence, in other words, a union community. The mechanisms the CIO unions used to encourage workers to think of themselves as members of a union community were parallel to Habermas's prescriptions for the bourgeois public sphere; namely, occasions, locales, and institutions that encouraged sociability and debate, coupled with publicity and printed material that sought to inform as well as exhort.⁵ CIO activists, furthermore, viewed themselves as advocates of democratic discussion and practice, and their deliberations looked many times to the common good, as we shall see in Chapter 6. Moreover, also in tune with Habermas's ideal, but expanding it beyond white, privileged men, they believed that all workers should participate in union life and union democracy as equals, and they made some efforts — though far from wholly successful — to make equality for women and minorities a reality.

"The mutual discussion of problems": union sociability

Jeffrey McNairn in applying Habermas's ideas to his study of nineteenth-century democracy argues that "democratic sociability" — people coming together to work for common goals — was a foundation of democratic practice as citizens from different classes, religions, occupations, and national or social backgrounds learned to work together by developing group rules, discussing topics of general not just individual interest, and practising the norms of reasoned discussion and mutual respect.

The war created a hive of sociability across the country. Most everyone was expected to do some kind of war work: from knitting garments for the troops to fundraising for a myriad of war charities; from volunteering at blood donor clinics to

selling Victory Bonds. As citizens of a combatant country, Canadian workers came together with other Canadians in the shared aim of supporting the Allied cause by devoting time and resources to volunteer war work. In addition, the war drew hundreds of thousands of Canadians into the vast human assemblage of war industry, thus creating countless more opportunities for workers to interact: in the lunch room, the parking lot, the tool crib, the assembly line. Long commutes on either public or company transport encouraged yet more conversation among workers. All these occasions of sociability gave Canadian workers many more opportunities to talk over the issues of the day than most would ever have encountered in peacetime.

When a union organizing drive came to a workplace, the opportunities for such sociability further multiplied as workers came together to work for the common goal of building a union. Union organizers well understood the importance of this new union-centered sociability to a new local's resilience. "You have to group together before you can come together," observed Millard when advising workers about how to go about organizing a union. ⁶ Vital to this project, as UE organizer Ross Russell said, was vibrant democracy within a union. For workers to understand the union and therefore give their allegiance to it, he said, they "must be brought into the active channels of the Union, [as] participants in union discussion and decisions."⁷

The first unions meetings were secret, but at a certain point the union would start meeting openly and regularly and would begin to conduct union business. Those who were more active attended union conferences, conventions, and educational workshops. They participated in meetings of local union committees responsible for organizing the local's activities, such as union label, education, publicity, health and safety. A UE local in Toronto, for example, reported having 60 scheduled meetings every month at the

local level, not counting union meetings for plant departments.⁸ These gatherings created a union community, giving workers a chance to socialize and discuss matters of common concern. In fact, as Habermas might have suggested, union leaders saw union gatherings as training sites for a new industrial citizenship. For in its organizing literature, the CIO rarely failed to tout the fact that that union business was carried out democratically according to the requirements of a written constitution. Workers voted on bargaining programs, took strike votes, and ratified or rejected tentative agreements by secret ballot. They elected local union executives, stewards, and delegates to policy-making convention and councils, again by secret ballot.⁹

CIO leaders believed that such union democracy was a training ground for workers to become more active in the larger democratic sphere. The CIO argued that unions taught more than just industrial democracy; they taught “workers to become good citizens. We have taught our people... what democracy means,” said a labour leader to the 1943 Ontario Select Committee Regarding Collective Bargaining.¹⁰ “Labour unions are themselves training schools in democracy,” wrote a contemporary observer. “Union members learn to give way when they cannot persuade; to sacrifice smaller for greater things; to defer without rancour to the opinions of others, qualities which are essential to successful workings of democratic institutions.”¹¹

To aid workers in the acquisition of democratic skills, union educators taught not just parliamentary procedure, but also the informal rules of democratic debate: how to avoid, for example, “errors in thinking,” such as “prejudice, attacking character and not argument, accepting ‘authority’ instead of analysis of evidence and argument.”¹² Locals set up debating clubs to develop members’ skills for “compiling facts, public speaking, presentation and debate.”¹³ The importance of meetings as opportunities for discussion

was emphasized again and again by union writers, and these discussions were seen not just as educational: they were credited with increasing union cohesiveness, too. When workers wrangled, wrote one union writer, "the need is for discussion to prevent us from keeping our minds in a rut of prejudice and narrow-mindedness."¹⁴

Unions organized myriad other occasions for sociability and interaction. Unions, explained a Steel Workers' editor, recognized that companies "used recreations as a bribe and... see that the principle of collective action can apply to recreation as well as to wages and working condition."¹⁵ Dances, concerts, picnics, outings, and sporting events were often sponsored in direct competition with similar activities arranged by an employer as part of a contest about who would win the allegiance of the workforce.¹⁶ It appears, judging by the frequency of references to them in the union files, that the UE was particularly energetic in organizing these occasions of sociability, perhaps a result of its cadre of experienced and dedicated Communist Party organizers.¹⁷ But workers from all unions turned out in vast numbers to hear union speakers. More than 3,000 thronged to open air rallies in Hamilton at lunch break, for example, to listen to union organizers.¹⁸ More than 10,000 war workers a month attended CIO-organized events where they viewed National Film Board productions about labour issues.¹⁹ The unions also made creating a tangible union "space" a priority. CIO organizers initially used the auditoriums of local community groups for their larger meetings, but with time, as revenues increased, larger locals began building union halls to hold meetings, and each hall was expected to be the centre of an enlarged program of union activity.^{20, 21} The CIO unions further encouraged a sense of self-contained community by adopting labour's traditional use of the language of the family, such as "brother" and "sister," as well as ritual and symbol. The meaning of "belonging" to a union, for example, was

heightened by asking prospective new members to sign an application form and pay an initiation fee, in addition to monthly dues. Insignia were important: union activists gave workers who paid their dues a new union lapel pin each month, a device that workers apparently welcomed, as it boosted dues collections noticeably. Meetings were conducted strictly according to parliamentary procedure, which to many workers new to union life would have seemed almost like a group ritual.

In addition to democratic institutions at the local union level, most CIO affiliates in Canada convened district or regional councils, which brought together delegates from the locals. The UAW's district council met at least every four months; the UE and the Steel Workers' councils were held annually. The objective of the district council, wrote a labour editor, was to allow local unions the opportunity of recommending "measures to improve members' welfare" ranging from wages and organizing to political action and legislation. Furthermore, activists argued, democratic discussion strengthened the union. As a union editor argued, "[e]ven if the District Council had no other purpose...it would be worthwhile for the value it has through the mutual discussion of problems facing delegates, [thus] providing a basis for unity of action, which it is imperative for the maintenance of strength."²² These councils featured spirited debates on hundreds of resolutions over the course of the war.²³ At a two-day meeting, in October 1943, delegates to the UE's District 5 Council, for example, debated no fewer than 24 resolutions ranging from the need for better labour laws and Canada's post-war re-conversion needs to social policies such as housing and stronger human rights laws.²⁴ In addition to these national-level gatherings, workers elected delegates to their international union's convention, usually held every three years, and to the CCL's convention and, after 1943, to the annual convention of the new Ontario Federation of

Labour. Elections were also held for municipally-based labour councils, such as the Toronto and District Labour Council, which usually met monthly. All gave local union representatives the chance to discuss, debate, and pass resolutions on a broad range of subjects, from local union finances to wartime strike policy to Canadian foreign affairs. They also constituted the CIO's institutional method of taking local issues to a national level, meaning not only that locals were no longer dealing with problems in an isolated and, therefore, weak fashion but also that union views on many issues, from union security to the treatment of returning veterans, could be injected more readily into the broader public debate.²⁵

Summaries of the proceedings of these councils were published in union papers so that rank and file workers could learn about the programs and policies adopted by their elected representatives. This raises the important matter of union information, especially the labour press, not just for CIO organizing but for creating a union community with common values and goals.

"A clearing house of ideas": the role of labour press

Today, with newspaper circulations falling, it is difficult to imagine a society as print oriented as Canada was only a few decades ago. In 1937, Toronto had about 150,000 households, and every day they bought a total of 519,000 copies, or more than three per household, of the city's three major dailies – the *Toronto Star*, the *Globe and Mail*, and the *Toronto Telegram* – in addition to supporting six other dailies, including a Hebrew-language one with a circulation of 21,000 and a Chinese-language one with a circulation of 6,000.²⁶

The war, if anything, increased reading, perhaps a result of the population's hunger for war news, with the dailies devoting most of their pages to it. Over the course of the war, the Canadian printing and publishing industry grew 25 per cent, even in the face of paper rationing and labour shortages in the industry.²⁷ Unions had to fight for press time in busy print shops because of this wartime explosion of printed materials. The expansion of government was at least partly responsible for this increase, but the labour movement played its part, too, with the CIO, for example, targeting workers with volleys of printed matter during and after organizing drives. The UE estimated that in 1943 its locals in Canada distributed a minimum of 50,000 pieces of literature to workers, in addition to the numerous pamphlets and newspapers issued directly by the union's national office.²⁸ The growth of the labour movement during the war was accompanied by a proliferation of Canadian labour newspapers and periodicals published both by national and international union headquarters and by individual local unions.²⁹ In 1939, there were only 20 Canadian-published union papers, none of which was CIO. By 1944, that figure had grown to 174 (of which 48 were CIO), thanks in part to nationalistic pressure from burgeoning Canadian CIO affiliates, which had persuaded their American headquarters to publish Canadian editions of their international union papers.³⁰ As a result, a Canadian edition of *Steel Labor* appeared in 1938; a Canadian edition of the *United Automobile Worker* began publishing in 1940; the Canadian *UE News* in 1941, and the *Packinghouse Worker* in 1940.³¹ These Canadian editions consisted of a few pages of Canadian material inserted into the American editions, the text and pictures concerning affairs in Canada being supplied by the unions' Canadian headquarters.³²

There was also something of a parallel, though less dramatic, development of a local union press. Newspapers published by individual CIO local unions numbered 19 in 1944, up from none at all in 1939. The Communist Party- influenced UAW and UE accounted for the majority, with nine and three of their local unions producing papers respectively. ³³ Some local union publications were fleeting, produced during organizing drives and then disappearing with either the success or failure of the drive; others went on to publish for decades. ³⁴

Unions spent significant resources on these papers. In most cases, the papers were professionally typeset and printed, with photographs and cartoons, and production quality was reasonably comparable to the mainstream commercial press, giving the CIO an image of professionalism, legitimacy, and permanence. The international papers were mailed to each member's home, in the expectation that family members would see them, too. Local union papers varied more in quality, but most were also professionally typeset and printed. Occasionally, local unions mailed them to members' homes; usually stewards distributed them to all workers, members and non-members alike, as an organizing tool. Often union headquarters would produce and pay for the paper until the new local union was well enough established to publish a paper itself.

The explicit purpose of the papers was to counter the propaganda of the mainstream press about the CIO ("The CIO has been the target for attack for every peregrinating politician, demagogue, newspaper editor, radio commentator," declared one Steel Workers' resolution ³⁵) to tell workers about the programs and policies of the union, and to communicate with non-union workers about the advantages of union membership. Union organizers saw the papers as central to an organizing drive. "A

union organ must always be given primary importance in [organizing],” wrote Harry Rowe, who helped organize the Toronto Newspaper Guild before becoming the UAW’s first full-time publicist, “since it is the paper the membership logically looks to for news, leadership, and stimulation.”³⁶ There was also the sense that a newspaper would create a union “sphere” of news and ideas.³⁷ So important was the function of written materials that the first staff people unions hired from outside a union’s rank-and-file as “technicians,” were not generally economists or health-and-safety experts but public relations practitioners like Rowe.³⁸

Labour papers were as much house organs as any company publication: “balanced” or “objective” journalism was neither their goal nor their task. “[This] paper... will attempt to acquaint thoroughly every employee, member and prospective member with the benefits of union membership,” wrote one union editor.³⁹ Consequently, in addition to fairly straightforward news stories about the developments at the various levels of the labour movement, much of their content was hortatory or self-congratulatory. Dissent from the “party line” of the union was rare,⁴⁰ although union leaders nonetheless saw their papers as part of union democracy because of the role they played in transmitting information and ideas. “The strength of our union is only based on the democratic participation of all members and the knowledge of its activities, and this is largely possible through the *Auto Worker*, and its importance cannot be overemphasized,” Burt said of the UAW’s paper.⁴¹

Union papers, furthermore, carried news that the commercial press ignored, or covered inadequately and, in that sense, they enlarged workers’ literacy about the public issues of the day. *Steel Labor*, for example, published the complete text of the Steel Workers’ brief to the 1943 Ontario Select Committee, while the daily press carried only a

few quotes. The *United Automobile Worker* frequently, for instance, carried in-depth feature stories about challenges facing the industries its members worked in, and *UE News* carried extensive analyses of the benefits of labour-management cooperation in aid of the war effort. Local union papers performed the same functions, offering readers detailed stories about local union or workplace issues that would never have been covered in the commercial press. Union papers also carried articles designed to educate workers in the daily work of a union on the shop floor, such as how their grievance procedure worked, or what they should expect from their steward.⁴²

It is impossible to gauge with any accuracy how workers reacted to the wartime avalanche of union literature, although former UAW organizer Paul Siren recalled seeing few copies of any union material discarded as litter.⁴³ Union papers were considered important enough by the Wartime Information Board to conduct a monthly survey of their content and to produce ready-made stories, cartoons, and photographs about the war effort for union editors to use.⁴⁴ The capacity of a paper to build the union was recognized early. Dick Steele, an organizer with the Steel Workers, reported that the *Thresher*, produced for a drive at Massey-Harris in Toronto, had boosted the union's organizing efforts. Steele reported that the paper was the "centre of discussion at every company union meeting." The paper's campaign against firings had resulted in the reinstatement of workers and its campaigning on behalf of CIO candidates for the company union executive elections had resulted in their winning office.⁴⁵ Union publications were vital for "building, consolidating and strengthening the membership" and for "instill[ing] in our membership an awareness of the vast problems which can only be solved by a strong and ever-vigilant organization," said the UAW's Burt.⁴⁶ The editor of the De Havilland local's *UAW-CIO War Worker* said the paper had helped

organize the plant and in making the membership "union-minded."⁴⁷ During a 1941 protest at Ford in Windsor, workers demonstrated the organizing power of a union newspaper when they attached copies of the union paper and leaflets to assembly-line conveyor belts, sending hundreds of them looping around the enormous plant. "[Work] had come to a complete standstill, the lines were going around but all that was being carried were the leaflets and the *Auto Worker*," recalled UAW organizer John Eldon.⁴⁸ The newspapers distributed by the Packinghouse Workers (and by the company union) during the union's unsuccessful 1941 drive at Canada Packers in Toronto stirred up so much ill will between the parties, the labour board official gave up in despair and abandoned the file.⁴⁹

Papers were a central part of labour's efforts to encourage union mindedness. By educating workers on the issues, organizers believed, labour papers would encourage workers to mobilize: "In informing our membership of the issues and arousing them to action, the shop paper will be a major factor," declared the editor of the *Aircraft Worker* in 1944, as the union prepared to mobilize members around its political action program.⁵⁰ But the paper could also create a union community by regarding union members as whole persons not just workers and injecting the union into workers' homes and private family life. It was the shop paper that dealt with the vital daily issues in a worker's life, which national publications could not,⁵¹ so local union paper tried to provide a forum for members to express their views not just about the workplace, but all their relationships, "with each other, home life, government, etc."⁵² "There are many happenings in the plant which are not just grievances and improvements but members leaving for the armed forces, weddings, births, etc," explained one editor.⁵³ Union editors, furthermore, encouraged workers to see the local's newspaper as "their"

newspaper by encouraging a less-hierarchical, two-way conversation by holding contests to name the paper, for example, or soliciting submissions about how to win a grievance, or examples of a company's poor organization of work, or "humorous incidents."⁵⁴

Metropolitan daily newspapers have been credited with creating "an imagined community," with readers connecting to one another in their minds through their reading of shared, common stories in their newspapers.⁵⁵ Union literature may well have played a similar role for workers. The regularly published national union newspapers would have signified established, stable, and well-organized union entities. Their very existence, let alone their content, spoke to the creation of a new community — "the union" — both in the workplace and in the political and social life of workers that transcended a given organizing drive and indicated a degree of permanence. Most important, they helped create a community of workers, both within and without the workplace by facilitating the exchange of information and opinion. Not only would the union paper bring "authentic news to labour everywhere," wrote one reader of the *United Automobile Worker* in February 1940, it would "be a vital factor in bringing about a common understanding of labour's problems ...and be a clearing house of ideas."⁵⁶

Union education programs also strove to create union mindedness and union community, and classes went beyond teaching basic union skills such as public speaking and grievance handling to inculcating the CIO's philosophy and significance. To counter the argument organizers heard from some workers that the union was a "flash in the pan" that would dissipate once the war was over, educators taught union history, rooting the CIO in medieval guilds. "That way we could steady them" recalled a labour educator, "and I think that fulfilled quite a job at the time." Significantly, classes stressed

the connection between a local and the larger union to create “a deeper sense of belonging and deeper feeling of cohesion ... rather than have them treat themselves as merely an isolated local different from the others.”⁵⁷ Local unions sponsored debates on union subjects, set up their own lending libraries, organized film series and other cultural activities, and sponsored meetings featuring prominent speakers from labour and politics.⁵⁸ “Labour unions carry on a large educational campaign among the employees,” a sympathetic church leader said at the time. “[C]ollective bargaining is an educational process and a training in democracy.”⁵⁹

“We are all workers”: the creed of equality

The sociability of union life – workplace camaraderie, union socials and meetings, education courses, municipal, national, and international level conferences and conventions – when combined with an extensive labour press, had the potential of constructing for CIO members a self-contained union community, with its own values, policies, and opinions and – most important -- a collective voice that had the strength to be heard in the broader society, a prerogative that employers through their industry associations and their own individual political power had enjoyed for years.

Admission, however, to any democratic community should be done, as Jurgen Habermas wrote of the public sphere, on the basis of equality, a requirement the CIO would have agreed with. “We will strive to make each member of the local, new or old, man or woman, feel his membership and active assistance in the affairs of the local are desired and appreciated,” averred one local union editorial, adding that “brotherhood, comradeship and fellowship” should characterize the union, not discrimination or segregation, “regardless of the approval of any portion or all of the members of the

local.”⁶⁰ Since the CIO’s professed philosophy was inclusive equality — as opposed to the exclusive nature it said characterized AFL craft unions — it laboured to live up to its ideals, and to maximize the numbers of its members, with mixed success.

Ethnic and racialized workers

Some CIO activists recalling the war period later claimed there were no ethnic, racial, or religious tensions in the union or the workplace,⁶¹ a statement that no doubt reflected the CIO’s philosophy more than it did the reality of either the workplace or the labour movement. The union leadership was solidly northern European; in fact almost all were of British background. CIO leaders — Burt, Millard, Jackson, Dowling — were British, as were most members of union staffs. Of the 105 delegates to the CIO inaugural conference in November 1939, all but a dozen had British surnames.⁶² The bias towards all things British permeated union discourse, with the war no doubt fuelling the making of distinctions between, for example, “British justice” and German Nazism or Italian fascism. Union editors called for collective bargaining rights, which would create “harmonious” labour management relations: “That is the British way, and ...workers believe it is the best way,” one wrote.⁶³ Britain and not the United States, in spite of the CIO’s American provenance, led the way for Canadian labour. “Labour in Canada can give thanks to our Brothers in Britain for leadership in the evolutionary and orderly change from capitalism to socialism by the parliamentary method,” declared an editorial in the Massey-Harris local union newsletter.⁶⁴ When Ford workers demanded a secret-ballot recognition vote in 1941 between the UAW and a company union, they were asking for no less than a “democratic British choice,” wrote one editor.⁶⁵ When a labour board told a union it would have to prove that its proposed wage increases would not

raise costs, the union retorted that such a demand was a “negation of the fundamental principle of British justice, innocent until proven guilty.”⁶⁶ When UAW Local 112 finally signed its first agreement at De Havilland, the *United Automobile Worker* reported that management and union sat down and enjoyed “the good old English custom of tea.”⁶⁷ The same local later invited King George VI to become a lifetime honorary member of their union.⁶⁸

Despite their deeply British culture, however, Canadian CIO unions participated in the official wartime philosophy of non-discrimination, which was being bolstered by National Selective Service warnings to employers that they would have their access to labour recruits shut off if found guilty of any sort of discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, or creed.⁶⁹ Employers apparently needed such warnings. Unions found that companies combating a union organizing effort would often appeal to native-born workers by calling union organizers “foreign-born.”⁷⁰ If only for survival, CIO unions made common cause with the foreign-born and made at least some effort to bring ethnic, racialized, and immigrant workers into the life of the union.

The UAW’s Eldon recalled that workers came from “all over the world,” and while there were some “smart guys from Europe,” who knew all about unions, many others were “peasants from Europe who were ‘absolutely illiterate,’” he claimed. “They brought with them all the prejudices and weaknesses, which the employer developed in them to keep them separated.” The union’s education program explained, Eldon said, why it was better to fight for equal pay than to have a two-tier wage system based on sex or age.⁷¹

Union rhetoric urged cooperation among racial groups. The De Havilland *Aircraft Worker* told readers, “Black, yellow, or brown, is but a colour of the skin. We are

all workers."⁷² Any kind of disunity, including racism, was an aid to the Axis, as Hitler's only hope against the Allies was disunity, warned another union editorial. "The weapons used by the enemies of unity are common enough. They're easy to recognize. Negro-baiting, Jew-baiting, red-baiting, catholic-baiting. Whenever you hear one of these things being used, ask yourself, 'Who is being served?' It's certainly not the union."⁷³ Another writer appealed to the shared national peril: "If we were occupied by a conqueror nation, we would not worry about our fellow Canadians' race or religion. We would be drawn together to fight the common enemy."⁷⁴ To underline its commitment to the principle of unity among workers and its opposition to fascist racism, the UE passed a resolution in 1943 calling for Ottawa to make racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination a criminal offence.⁷⁵ At the same time, however, the British bias appeared to overwhelm the CIO's good intentions. Tom McClure, the Communist Steel Workers organizer largely responsible to leading the fight to organize Hamilton workers said of one worker who had been fired for alleged sabotage: "He is a man of British-Welsh parentage, an honest sort of fellow, a returned soldier."⁷⁶

There is evidence that ethnic workers especially responded to the CIO appeal. The union gave ethnic workers "a chance to get some dignity," recalled a wartime organizer, adding that in one Hamilton steel plant, ethnic workers were the strongest supporters of the union.⁷⁷ Alf Ready recalled workers with Ukrainian backgrounds being "really solid" for the union.⁷⁸ Eileen Tallman recalled that the ethnic workers in the Toronto packing plants she helped organize in the early 1940s, accepted union literature gladly, even though it was in English. "I'd hand them a leaflet and they'd take it and smile and go into the plant and wave out of the window. They knew it was about the union, even if they didn't know what it said."⁷⁹ The union paper at De Havilland

reported that all the Polish workers in the plant had joined the union, and ran an article welcoming Polish workers, even managing to translate the story's headline into Polish, although the story itself was in English.⁸⁰ War service earned some ethnic workers inclusion. Many of the new union members from Poland, the article said, were veterans of the war and "strangers in our land. To these comrades we extend the warm hand of brotherhood...."⁸¹ The same respect was accorded Chinese workers, in an era when Madame Chiang Kai-shek was still regarded as a hero. The *United Automobile Worker*, for example, ran a half-page profile of Wen Kee, an activist in Local 252 in Toronto, who had been an active trade unionist in China. The story said that "many of Kee's fellow countrymen are keen unionists in other plants, such as Ford in Windsor."⁸² The paper duly reported that Kee was known as "Bill" in the plant, since Wen meant "William" in Chinese, and carried a photograph of Wen's Chinese union card. Union leaders in Windsor described how Chinese workers were being told by small-time employers to "go get a job in laundry or a restaurant," but proudly related that "one of our Chinese brothers has just been elected steward."⁸³

While the Massey-Harris *Local 439 News* at least once carried material translated into Ukrainian,⁸⁴ for the most part local union editors did not accommodate the needs of non-English speakers. Union education programs, however, made some effort to meet the needs of minority workers, if only in the interest of encouraging union solidarity. "We are trying to hold the union together [at Imperial Iron in St Catharines]," Burt told a 1943 district council, "but it is quite a problem among the foreign-born workers in the plant who cannot speak the language."⁸⁵ The solution was to have interpreters at every union meeting. When the company agreed to give every worker a copy of the first contract, however, it was in English only.⁸⁶

French Canada and French Canadians received some attention from the CIO, although the fact that Quebec wages were even lower than Ontario's was as much a part of the expression of solidarity as anti-bigotry was. The UAW fretted aloud about auto makers' moving production to Quebec following the war on account of the low wages there and urged more union organizing in the province.⁸⁷ Millard said that the CIO should "hold out fraternal hands to our brothers in Quebec to help them as fellow Canadians to get decent wages."⁸⁸ Unions did make special efforts to include the many Quebecois who moved to Ontario, attracted by the comparatively high wages, as well franco-Ontarian workers. The UAW, for example, held French-language meetings when organizing Canada Foundry and Forgings in Welland in 1942.⁸⁹ There is evidence employers underpaid Quebecois workers who had moved to Ontario, and the unions were concerned about the divisiveness that could result. Such differentials could create suspicions among other workers that French Canadians were "tools of the manufacturers for decreasing existing wages," read one UAW resolution in 1943. This "may contribute to racial hatred at a time when the closest unity is needed for our war against fascism," the resolution warned, urging fellow unionists to work with French Canadian workers to end the two-tier wage system and "prevent manufacturers from dividing the workers in their common struggle for better working conditions and union recognition."⁹⁰ While the CIO's national paper carried articles in French, there is no evidence, however, that individual affiliates did.

In their battle for public acceptance, CIO unions argued that unionization performed a valuable community function by helping non-English-speaking workers become fully functioning citizens and members of Canadian society. By bringing together "good, bad and broken English speakers for common activities and the

discussion of common problems," as Packinghouse Workers leader R. J. Smith explained to the Ontario Select Committee, the union "not only trains our members in self-expression but creates feelings of unity and fellowship...It can thus be an integrating medium for different racial groups in the community and a training school in the techniques of democracy." ⁹¹

While union newspapers carried editorials and news stories against racial discrimination in Canadian society, they carried few stories about workers of colour in their own workplaces, even though the major media did feature, for example, pictures of African-Canadian women working in a UAW plant in St. Catharines. ⁹² But many union papers, especially those from locals where the Communist Party was strong, did devote space to the issue of racial discrimination arguing that it divided and weakened the union. ⁹³ The *United Automobile Worker* condemned the *Windsor Star* for sympathizing with restaurant owners who barred blacks from entering because these proprietors believed their "white customers would resent being made to associate with coloured folks and would probably withdraw their patronage." The *Star* had said that "education" would gradually eliminate such discrimination. The union editorial argued that to allow such discrimination would be to do "Hitler's bidding," as the German dictator had called for weakening America by increasing racial divisions there. The paper's editor hinted at common cause with racialized workers when he noted that if the *Star's* logic had been followed in labour relations, workers would have had to wait for employers to become educated before gaining any rights. "The best education is achieved by legislation prohibiting discrimination," argued the union editorial. ⁹⁴ *Local 439 News* railed against the incongruity of a United Nations committee being barred

from Ottawa's posh Seignory Club in 1944 because a member of the committee was Jewish.

Such racial prejudice, the paper noted, was not just restricted to the "upper crust," but that it was found "among workers in our factories" and described anti-Semitic incidents among workers in Windsor and Toronto. Union leaders were not above racism either, despite the CIO's official policy. When GM in St. Catharines told UAW Local 199 that the National Selective Service had asked them to hire Canadian-born Japanese and had placed a Japanese-Canadian in its foundry, the local union promised to "take it up" with the government.⁹⁵ National publications could be as offensive, with the UAW paper carrying a cartoon with a racist depiction of a Japanese pilot, "Stop the Jap. Buy Victory Bonds."⁹⁶ There is no evidence in the record of any such prejudice against Canadian-born Germans; such language reflected both Canadian government policy towards Canadian-born Japanese and the often-racist portrayals of the Japanese adversary in the American-content section of union newspapers.⁹⁷

Local 439 News was particularly active in combating racism, perhaps a result of its strong CPC roots. The chair of the local's education committee, in a series of columns, told readers that fighting for minorities was not only a matter of justice but of union "self-preservation," calling it a "life and death struggle for our unions." Pointing to automaker Henry Ford's anti-Semitism, he said Ford's racist sentiments were not accidental because "it is good business for him to have workers fight among themselves. When workers fall into the trap of harboring racial prejudice they are just doing what the anti-union employers want them to do." The local's education committee, he wrote, would combat racism with "the truth that racial superiority is a myth no scientist outside Nazi Germany would support," and would meet with minority community

groups to work on a program of community action to combat prejudice, lobby Ottawa and Queen's Park for stronger anti-discrimination laws, and identify and combat any employer discrimination.⁹⁸ The paper carried articles about the dangers of racism and the achievements of people of African descent. There is evidence that minority workers acknowledged union efforts to combat racism. After several editions of the paper featuring this theme, the paper printed a letter sent by African-Canadian worker James Callendar, who worked in Massey-Harris's cream separator department. "Never did I think for a moment that the white man would give himself the trouble even to think about the Negro and his achievements so much as to publish them," Callendar wrote. "I wish there were more like you, then this would be a world worth living in."⁹⁹

Women workers

A 1939 meeting of the Steel Workers, held before women began entering war industry, cleaved to traditional gender roles: women were aides, not players, in the labour movement. The meeting resolved to determine "how we can interest the wives of our members in ladies auxiliaries" and then resolved to "express its gratitude to women who have worked and struggled" for the union by authorizing the formation of ladies' auxiliaries.¹⁰⁰ In other words, delegates were far more interested in women as male workers' wives than as workers. Thus, it is not surprising that of the 95 local union delegates to the CIO's Canadian inaugural conference November 1939, only 11 were women.¹⁰¹ Within a few years, though, a change in attitude occurred, which union writers attributed to the war. After the surge of women into war industry in 1942, union leaders began to talk of women's right to work and to be full participants in union life. "During this war," wrote a union editor, "many thousands of our women have found a

place in industry and have a right to, and undoubtedly a desire to, maintain their place in industry as a means of obtaining freedom based on the economic security which is their right on equal terms with the men of our nation."¹⁰² Women's wartime entry into the workforce, wrote Margery Ferguson in *Local 439 News*, had made them realize there "is a definite place for them in the social, economic and political life of the country, not only now but in the post-war world as well."¹⁰³ The official position of the CIO unions, furthermore, was that women should play as important a role in the union as they did in war production. Said Ferguson: "In the trade union movement, women have taken their rightful place alongside of men...."¹⁰⁴ "The UAW-CIO welcomes you into industry and into the ranks of the union," echoed another union editor. "Girls, the UAW-CIO has ... a place for you at its meetings and in the conducting of its affairs."¹⁰⁵

Ferguson, an activist at Massey-Harris plant, wrote a union newspaper column for and about women workers. Her feminism stressed women's differences from men while insisting that women had equal rights in the workplace. Women, she wrote, had two kinds of "immediate problems." The first was a desperate need for decent housing, childcare, and provisions for shopping and food preparation – and for attention to be paid to the "big question of the type of work most suitable for women's physical make up." She said that while many women would want only a home and family after the war, "many women will not want to give up their independence...they will want to return to work and that is their privilege." She saw no contradiction between demanding that women's household and family responsibilities, and generally different physique, to be recognized and supported and calling for women's right to fair and equal treatment with men on the job.¹⁰⁶ Ferguson may have failed to recognize this contradiction, or she just may have refused to consider it important. Meantime, she

ruefully acknowledged that many of her male trade union colleagues “did not want to be educated on these issues” and “will be up in arms against me for suggesting that they should study the question.”¹⁰⁷

As a result of this general union failure to acknowledge women’s needs, references to women’s double day of work in an era of 60-hour work weeks, to the lack of childcare, and to women’s responsibility to care for the sick and the elderly, were few and far between in union papers.¹⁰⁸ Although striving to make women feel included in union life, the CIO unions failed for the most part to include the reality of women’s lives in union life.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, the CIO’s record at admitting women to the union community was at best mixed, featuring an amalgam of pure pragmatism and the acknowledgement of women’s right to equality at work and in the union. The pragmatism was founded in the ineluctable mathematics of organizing. In a workplace with substantial numbers of women workers, the union needed their support to win a recognition vote. Women were widely rumoured to be hard to organize, and there is some evidence that was true. The UE’s Ready recalled women being harder to organize than men (although those who did were “were right up there,” he said).¹¹⁰ The same union reported that of the 450 workers at General Electric’s Ward Street plant in Toronto, half were women, but not one woman had joined the union while 100 men had.¹¹¹ There was at least some understanding of women’s apparent hesitation. One reason given was that women saw themselves as only temporary workers and therefore had taken little interest in the union.¹¹² Unions also believed that women in industry were less likely to join the union because they were earning far more than they had in their pre-war, traditionally female

work and didn't see the need for a union. Some unionists recognized that women's pay was, nonetheless, still so low that union dues were far more onerous than for men.

To overcome these obstacles unions needed to persuade women they were a permanent and valued part of the workplace and the union by acknowledging the presence and importance of women. Union papers at both the local and national level, consequently, made space for women in their pages, especially in workplaces where women were a large presence, such as at Massey-Harris and De Havilland. Union papers featured women's columns, stories about gains women were making both in Canada and internationally, as well as pictures of women workers and activists. They ran regular women's columns, often on page one¹¹³ and carried pictures and biographies of women activists.¹¹⁴ The UE newspaper made a point of telling its readers that the union had many women organizers on its staff and that many more were being trained to take the place of organizers who joined the services.¹¹⁵ *Steel Labor* under a large photograph of women workers, noted that women were in the forefront of organizing, large numbers had become stewards, and many had been elected to their local union executives.¹¹⁶

When women were elected to union office, union newspapers headlined the event for its readers, proclaiming that such developments showed that "women were playing an increasingly active part in the union."¹¹⁷ Women, newly elected as delegates to the UAW district council, were praised by union editors for "entering the discussion as actively as any veteran council member."¹¹⁸ The De Havilland local union paper reported with some satisfaction that "at long last" women were taking up a role in the union. Three women had been elected to the local's executive board, and women would not have trouble exerting their influence in the affairs of the local union, wrote the

editor.¹¹⁹ The De Havilland *UAW-CIO War Worker* ran a story in September 1943 about a woman elected as chief steward, who was “reported to be doing a real swell job, having taken up a number of grievances with management and winning her cases.” Added the editor, “This is not a man’s union, it is a worker’s union.”¹²⁰ A UE organizing leaflet assured women workers that “Women get a fair deal in the UE and are eligible for membership, for votes, for officership on exactly the same basis as men.”¹²¹

Unions also looked to sociability as another means of including women in union life and so convincing women the union would benefit them. Recreation programs dedicated to women’s needs were seen by UE leaders as vital to “establishing in [women’s minds] the knowledge that our Union plays an all-important role in looking after the needs of working people.”¹²² Some such occasions of sociability were women-only. The UAW held sessions at its union schools especially for women workers.¹²³ Women-only meetings and groups were organized, sometimes at the recommendation of women activists.¹²⁴ The local at De Havilland, for example, set up a women’s council to encourage women to become active in the union, and the council invited women from neighbouring locals to attend its meetings “to further extend [our] aims.”¹²⁵

Union papers were constantly calling for women to become more active in the union, sometimes for practical reasons: “Work for your union so it can work for you,” implored one issue of the *Inglis Steelworker*. “MORE GIRL STEWARDS! More Girl members in Local 2900! That’s the only way to STOP CHEAP LABOUR AT INGLIS!” is exhorted.¹²⁶ Union organizers came to understand the value of women organizers and stewards for building membership levels: “Girls, girls, girls, that’s our crying need [for the steward body]...We are doing it the hard way if we carry on without girls,” warned one UE 1944 steward’s bulletin at the York Arsenal plant in Toronto.¹²⁷ Local 199

reported with satisfaction that a woman had been elected to the union bargaining committee at McKinnon Industries, saying "we feel this is one of the best ways to build up the union for we have a lot of female workers in the plant."¹²⁸

Labour feminists, in particular, understood the necessity of including women in the life of the union. Ferguson used her women's column, "A Women's Place Is In The Union," to promote women's interests. Comparing the problems of women to the "race problem," she said the issues faced by both groups were class problems as well, and were shared by men in the shop. She asserted that it would require "a combination of men and women, educated and active, to bring about any solutions to these problems."¹²⁹ She anticipated Second Wave affirmative action programs that mandated "room" for women in male-dominated organizations, arguing that the union "should have [women] equally represented on the committees...where they will learn to voice their opinion and gradually take their full place in union meetings."¹³⁰ She called for a women's committee to be set up in every local union to solve some of women's immediate problems, especially the problem of unequal pay.¹³¹

Labour feminists also felt that unions must adjust to women, and they had some success. "The Unions must incorporate more of women's views into the local Unions and executive boards if they hope to have a clear understanding of their problems," wrote one woman Local 112 activist to the *Aircraft Worker*, telling the story of how women stewards had come out of a stewards' meeting deciding "that something just had to be done." They convened a women's group, which received an enthusiastic response.¹³² After a few of its lively meetings, the local union president, a man, praised the groups, saying, "Never let us forget the part that women are playing in our struggle, and that they have their problems."¹³³ One editor cited such issues as childcare,

pregnancy provisions, clean restrooms, and equal pay – issues he claimed were identified not by a paternalistic union hierarchy but by women themselves. “[We] have a program for women in industry,” he wrote. “It is a program which has been made by the women themselves from their experience working in factories.”¹³⁴

Women were conscious of their pioneering role. Ferguson told her fellow delegates how “proud” she was to be the first woman to make a local union report to the UAW district council; and some individual women were remarkably active in their locals. Doris Archer, who was eventually appointed to the UPWA staff, while working at Massey-Harris was elected to the local’s executive and was a member of four union committees, in addition to her CCF activities.¹³⁵ Ferguson was equally active. She was her local’s financial secretary, was elected as a delegate to the UAW’s district council, served on several local union committees, co-chaired the Toronto Labour Day Parade, and wrote regularly for both *Local 439 News* and the UAW’s national paper.¹³⁶

Such consciousness of women’s changing role was not confined to women workers and labour feminists, moreover. Even before the wartime influx of women into Canada’s factories, the CIO’s women’s auxiliaries, made up of the female relatives of union members, were seen by some male unionists as important to the consolidation work of a local through their tireless efforts organizing both fundraising and social events.¹³⁷ The URW in fact sent a delegate from its women’s auxiliaries to the inaugural CIO conference in November 1939.¹³⁸ With the war, union women redefined women’s auxiliaries, giving them a more feminist, more independent bent. While some male unionists still tended to see women’s auxiliaries as a means of educating workers’ families, especially wives (“kitchen scabs”) about unions, claiming that many a member dropped out of the union because his wife was not aware of its value,¹³⁹ the auxiliaries

themselves took a far larger view. Mabel Mayne, for example, the head of the UAW's women's auxiliaries in Canada, believed the war had brought women closer to equality with men and had changed forever the idea that women should be confined to the home. She saw women's auxiliaries as a vehicle for women's new-found independence and supported initiatives by women's auxiliaries' that existed independent of their locals. ¹⁴⁰ Some CIO auxiliaries linked up with the Canadian women's movement. The women's auxiliary at UAW Local 200 participated in the war effort at a fairly senior level by gaining a representative on the Windsor arm of Ottawa's wartime prices and trade board, as did the women's UAW auxiliary in Brantford. The Brantford auxiliary also conducted and publicized their own survey of grocery and other staple prices, as well as mobilizing to build more playgrounds in the city. ¹⁴¹

Women, however, in spite of all the CIO pronouncements of inclusiveness and equality, were not well represented at the CIO's senior levels. Even late in the war, of the UAW's 73 elected local union officials, only seven were women, and of these, five were recording secretaries, the least powerful and most clerical position on the executive. ¹⁴² Only three of the union's 33-strong district council were women in 1944, despite the union's organizing thousands of women workers during the war. ¹⁴³ The UE was little better. While women did better at the shop floor level — two of the UE's eight chief stewards in its Toronto Local 514 were women — the few UE women who were elected to union executive boards also tended to be recording secretaries. ¹⁴⁴

The situation of full-time union staffers was even worse. There is only one mention of the UAW hiring a woman on staff, Local 676 officer Ruth Thompson, who was brought on merely to help collect dues there. ¹⁴⁵ Margaret Sedgewick was the PWOC's secretary-treasurer, and the Steel Workers had hired organizer Eileen Tallman

for the drive at the Inglis plant, but no other women staffers appear in the records consulted for this study. When the *United Automobile Worker* asked locals to submit pictures of women holding union office to encourage women to run, only one responded.¹⁴⁶

While in their news stories and editorials, most union papers treated women respectfully and in a non-sexist manner, in the more informal sections of union papers — especially local union papers — sexist narratives, allusions, jokes, and cartoons abounded. Unions proclaimed a “real partnership” between men and women for the war effort, but would deal with that partnership ironically, as in the cartoon appearing in *UE News* showing a woman striding off to work in her overalls and toting a lunch bucket, while a bemused and be-aproned husband holds a squalling infant in his arms.¹⁴⁷ A similar cartoon in a UAW paper depicts the waiting room outside a delivery room, with a beaming nurse holding up a newborn baby — wearing a welder’s helmet — for the father’s approval. “She can’t get her mind off the job!” reads the caption, referring to the notably “absent” mother.

The boys’ club ethos of the workplace played itself out in other ways. Women did not have the protection offered by male-only societies such as the Masons, for example. UE inside organizer Alf Ready believed the reason he was exempted from the wave of firings at Westinghouse in Hamilton was because, as one manager told him, Ready was “on the square,” meaning he was a member of the Masons.¹⁴⁸ Complaints about women’s alleged passivity were frequent. Eugene Forsey, research director of the Canadian Congress of Labour, believed that unions would fight for women’s rights but that “women workers themselves will have to do their share of the fighting.” He repeated the nostrum that women were hard to organize (while providing no evidence),

saying that it would take a special effort on the part of unions "to see that [women] pull their weight in union activities," with no mention of the special challenges women workers faced in becoming more active in their unions. ¹⁴⁹

Soldiers and veterans

All Canadians were anxious to maintain connections with those serving overseas. In 1943 alone, more than 31.5 million pieces of mail were sent from Canada to the "boys."¹⁵⁰

Unions reached out to soldiers as well. Unlike the United States, where the CIO had been well established before the war, the Canadian CIO locals did not have a "number of solid union people in the armed forces," and so regarded the post-war relationship between warrior and worker as a grave issue and potential weakness. ¹⁵¹ With little experience of the benefits of CIO unionism among Canadian soldiers, unions were concerned, first, about armed forces personnel not understanding labour militancy during the war and then, secondly, joining the anti-union forces post-war, which had happened to some extent after the First World War. ¹⁵² Unions were also concerned about the "enemies of labour who control the press [who] have been active in attempting to poison the minds of servicemen against unions."¹⁵³ A war veteran who had been invalided out of the army told a 1944 UAW's district council that "it is hard for the average soldier to understand that unions are doing everything in their power to prevent stoppage of production....From their point of view they are going to give their lives for democracy while these stoppages continue," he said. "So we should keep in touch with these boys."¹⁵⁴

Employers were not absent from the fray, pursuing the loyalty of overseas workers assiduously. Unions were painfully conscious that employers were sending soldiers packages of cigarettes, and other comforts, while rarely cooperating in providing locals with lists of those union members who had enlisted.¹⁵⁵ A soldier wrote the *Canadian Tribune* as late as 1943 saying that only a few of his buddies had heard from their union, but their employers had sent over cigarettes and various comfort parcels. Such initiatives, wrote the soldier, would mean more to service men "than 20 articles about worker-warrior unity."¹⁵⁶ Unions were also suspicious of government moves that appeared to favour employers in the struggle to win the hearts and minds of soldiers. When the government ruled in late 1943 that soldiers' letters could not be published, unionists were outraged, pointing out that all military mail was censored before it reached anyone. The editors of *Ford Facts*, which had published many letters from soldiers serving overseas commending the union, objected to the "undemocratic edict," which they regarded as a "measure to block good soldier-civilian relations, a factor which some people in high places apparently fear."¹⁵⁷

Unions responded to the challenge by setting up "soldiers' committees" with the aim of aiding "in the promotion of good will and cooperative spirit to the end that we may win the peace as well as the war."¹⁵⁸ Local unions sent their "care packages" to their brothers- and sisters-in arms. That soldiers heard news from their union was vital, the CIO believed. The UE's national office sent 1,500 copies of *Canadian UE News* every month to service personnel overseas,¹⁵⁹ while the UAW's national paper was mailed to every member serving overseas, at first-class mail rates.¹⁶⁰ (These efforts were supplemented by family members, who would tuck a copy of the union paper into their own parcels.) The UE published a booklet for soldiers called "Welcome Home," which

were sent overseas with the explicit aim of bringing them “into active participation in union life.” The booklet told soldiers what the union had been doing on their behalf while they were in the armed forces.¹⁶¹ As for returned soldiers, unions made special efforts to include them in the life of the union. At Inglis, for example, the Steel Workers worked with the Dominion Corps of Legionnaires to organize meetings of returned veterans, using the bitter experience of Great War veterans as a mobilizing call. “Those who recall the conditions which followed the last war and the difficulty which faced soldiers in the period of post-war reconstruction...will understand their need for organization,” explained the *Inglis Steelworker*.¹⁶²

Union newspapers carried extensive stories about the labour movement’s campaign for Canada to treat its veterans generously after the war.¹⁶³ They ran profiles of workers or workers’ relatives who had joined the services.¹⁶⁴ They carried stories of the members’ fortunes at war, union leaders and rank-and-file workers alike. The *Aircraft Worker*, for example, reported the severe wounding of its first local union president, army paratrooper Vince Coulson, in Holland, and asked union members to write him. Many union papers carried the tragic news of Steel Workers’ organizer Dick Steele’s death in France while serving as a tank driver in the Canadian Armoured Corps. The Massey-Harris union paper carried a regular feature, “Thoughts and Feelings from the Homes of Those on Active Service,” invoking the deep bonds of a family dealing with a terrible war, in a union context. The papers proudly ran letters they had received from serving members. Corporal Charlie Burnside, wrote to *Local 439 News* from Italy after the bloody Battle of Ortona, commending the union for its efforts to build an organization to make conditions better for workers. “May you go on building until you realize God’s Kingdom on Earth,” he wrote. “All this has been an inspiration for us to go

forward and prepare us for the sterner task which lies ahead." *Local 439 News* published a letter from army lieutenant John Bell, a union member at Massey-Harris, who on behalf of the union had surveyed his fellow soldiers about their post-war concerns and compiled a list of their most commonly-asked questions for the paper. ¹⁶⁵

Believing they were competing with employers for the allegiance of soldiers and soldiers' friends and families, union editors would describe the gains the union had made for veterans, such as job protection, including accrued seniority while they were in the armed forces and equal pay for women to protect male wages into the post-war period. ¹⁶⁶ Most unions allowed returning veterans to remain members throughout their military service, and many, including the UAW, extended union membership to returning veterans for three months after their discharge. ¹⁶⁷ Unions set up committees at the local union level to work with community groups to help veterans with their "rehabilitation." ¹⁶⁸

The common rhetorical motif of the wartime partnership of worker and warrior (to be discussed more fully in Chapter 6) had a real-life basis in that many armed forces members were manufacturing workers, who planned to return to their factory jobs once the war was over. ¹⁶⁹ Organizers, furthermore, were hearing from some men who had yet to be conscripted that they were holding back from joining the union because, as they told organizers: "I'll be in the army soon, so what good will the Union do me then?"¹⁷⁰ Consequently, unions appealed for workers who might be conscripted, as well as those who had already been called up, by reminding their readers how the union was fighting for decent treatment for returning soldiers on the part of employers and government alike. As the war drew to a close, organizers recognized that their unions would have to develop a program to attract servicemen, or business would use the

existing veterans' organizations "to break unions down by blaming all undesirable post-war conditions on unions."¹⁷¹

The UAW debated whether to set up veterans' committees in the locals to help integrate returning service people, saying that the existing Legion "was dominated by big men in industry."¹⁷² Unions passed resolutions calling for the government to bring in generous resettlement grants and training programs for returning veterans, including accrued seniority for all and special job guarantees for the disabled. They called on government to extend generous benefits to returning veterans, including mustering out pay, a 35-hour work week to create jobs, at a guaranteed annual wage of \$1,800, and they publicized these demands.¹⁷³

Managers were rebuffing union approaches to negotiate provisions for returning servicemen, saying it was their business "to look after them."¹⁷⁴ The most contentious issue was seniority, and the unions found themselves dealing with the competing claims of returning veterans who had less seniority than male and female workers who had been civilians during the war. The CIO accused employers of using the issue to divide returning soldiers from production workers by denying soldiers accrued seniority for their stint in the armed forces.¹⁷⁵ Meantime, established veterans' organizations, such as the Royal Canadian Legion, were demanding that veterans have priority access to all recalled jobs regardless of seniority, even if it meant displacing a higher-seniority man or woman.¹⁷⁶ Union contracts stipulated that soldiers accumulated seniority while serving in the armed forces,¹⁷⁷ but they did not believe war service gave veterans the right to displace workers with more seniority. Unions such as the UAW – whose membership included both men and women with more seniority than many returning veterans -- were arguing that seniority had to rule. Burt pointed out the Legion policies

would pit fathers against sons, as Second World War veterans could replace First World War veterans, and called the issue of returning vets a “social” rather than a union problem. The UAW stuck to its straight seniority position, refusing to allow lower-seniority veterans to “bump” workers with higher seniority, but was very concerned about the public pressure that opposed veterans’ organization could muster.¹⁷⁸ The CIO finessed the seniority issue by calling upon the government to create full employment. One union editor, who deplored the activities of “certain forces” who were trying to divide the soldier from the production worker by using seniority as the issue, wrote: “Seniority never gave anyone a job in the 1930s. We need full employment.”¹⁷⁹

It is impossible to gauge to what extent service personnel felt included by the union, beyond the anecdotes that appear in union papers. There are proxy indicators, however, that demonstrate that soldiers and veterans did feel an allegiance towards the CIO unions and to their notions of what was possible for workers. A large number of servicemen and women overseas voted for the CCF in later wartime elections, but more significant was the tenacity of returning veterans during the post-war strike wave. The determination of these veterans, recalls the UAW’s Siren, was “a marvel.”¹⁸⁰ Veterans often walked these picket lines while wearing their service uniforms, thus conflating war service with union activism, an argument, as we shall see in the next chapter, that was a staple of CIO discourse.¹⁸¹ The CIO, moreover, had joined other elements in the population to press for generous treatment of Canada’s veterans, a record not likely to be ignored by returning service men and women.

Conclusion

The CIO was proud of its democratic practices and believed that union democracy was critical to a union's strength. The editor of the De Havilland *Aircraft Worker*, for example, told his readers that the union stood for "Democracy" because without a union, workers lost all citizenship rights once they entered the workplace and were subject to the arbitrary rule of their employer. But by participating in a union's democratic life, "by attending meetings with his fellow employees, [a worker] increases his knowledge of their common problems, and secure in the ranks of the Union, can meet his employer on even terms."¹⁸² The notion of a union constituting a sort of self-contained democracy, was shared by contemporary observers as well. "As miniature democracies, [unions] reproduce on a smaller scale the self-governing states on whose success the future success of civilization largely depends," wrote a sympathetic cleric.¹⁸³ Sometimes, democratic discussion in the labour movement was characterized by bitter factionalism, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, over such issues as strikes in wartime, while at other times, consensus on goals and methods was reached. The point is that workers did have a democratic forum — a miniature democracy — in which they could participate in union decision-making. Once created, this miniature democracy allowed workers to discuss, debate, and decide labour's definition of an ideal workplace, an ideal country, an ideal world, all of which were framed by labour's own values and sense of its rightful place in the larger society, and which workers could put forward in the general public discussion about shape and direction of Canadian society. These are the subjects of the next chapter.

¹ LAC, MG 28, United Steel Workers, Series I 103 Vol. 319, File: Textile Workers Organizing Committee 1943-1945, "Minutes of Textile Workers Organizing Conference, April 22, 1944," 2.

² Harry C. Boyle, "The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 342-343.

³ Jeffrey L. McNairn, *The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854* (University of Toronto Press, 2000), 9.

⁴ See, for example, Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 123.

⁵ Harry C. Boyle, op.cit., 342. For a discussion of early CIO efforts to create a union community in the city of Oshawa following the historic 1937 strike at General Motors, see Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "After the Strike: Labour Relations in Oshawa, 1937-1939," in Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth, eds. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*, 2nd ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2000, 505-522.

⁶ LAC, MG 28, Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 319, File: Textile Workers Organizing Committee 1943-1945, "Minutes of Textile Workers Organizing Conference, April 22, 1944," 2.

⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October 1943," 25.

⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 302 Local 512, "To All Chief Stewards," June 20, 1945.

⁹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46: "Winning War Is First Consideration," UE leaflet, April 7, 1943.

¹⁰ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee Relating to Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees*, 738. Geoffrey Ely quotes Gunther Lottes, *Politische Aufklärung und Publikum: Zur Theorie und Praxis des englischen Radikalismus im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1979) who argues that the nineteenth-century labour movement was a "specific attempt to educate the masses into citizenship," aimed at bringing artisans and small tradesmen from expressing their discontent in pre-political protest rituals to expressing it through a political movement with organization, strategies, and a theoretically grounded platform. Geoffrey Ely, "Nations, Politics and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 329.

¹¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 802.

¹² ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 5, File: Fleishman, Helen, Correspondence, 1943-1944, "Shop Steward Problems," n. d. but c. 1943.

¹³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File District Council Meetings, February-April, 1944, "Report," 9.

¹⁴ LAC, RG 28 Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 22, File: International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 112, 1942-1943, *Aircraft Worker*, August 28, 1942, "Our Columns," 1.

¹⁵ City of Toronto Archives, Series 297, John Inglis Papers, Box 21, *Inglis Steelworker*, June 14, 1943, "Steelworkers Launch Recreation Program," 3.

¹⁶ MacMillan, Ian, *Making the Difference: 50 Years of Local Union 343, Kingston, Ontario* (Kingston: USWA, 1995), 43.

¹⁷ LAC, MG I 190, United Electrical Workers, microfilmed records of *UE News* and various UE leaflets. While these microfilm files are now all-but illegible, the display type that advertised the numerous union-sponsored sports, social, educational, and recreation events can still be made out.

¹⁸ Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story*, (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1979), 13.

¹⁹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 16, 1942, "10,000 War Workers," 3. It is difficult to tell how many attended union meetings. Most local union papers carried editorial copy urging workers to attend union meetings, indicating perhaps low attendance. The John Inglis security detective reported that organizing meetings were not well attended, but security's presence alone would discourage attendance. There are frequent mentions in the union press, on the other hand, that union social, sports, and educational events were well attended. For many workers, especially women workers with household, childcare, and war work duties, attending union meetings on top of their 50- to 60-hour work week would have been a considerable challenge. It is probably safe to say that committed unionists attended regularly scheduled, routine meetings, while less committed workers would turn out for special events, such as strike votes and rallies, in large numbers. These events drew substantial grassroots support and, coupled with the enthusiasm for union socials and the like, indicate a considerable involvement in union life by rank-and-file workers.

²⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "Local Presidents Urge Payment," 1.

²¹ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, September 19, 1944, "General Meeting," 1; LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, June 18, 1943, "Steward Meeting," 4.

²² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 5, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 1, 1944, "Aim of DC Outlined," 1.

²³ See Charlotte Yates for a description of this turbulent and disputatious forum. Yates, Charlotte. *From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 31.

²⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, UE District 5, Box 1385, File 31, Resolutions, District Five Council October 1944."

²⁵ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 70, File: District Council, 1939, "Report on Organizing," 1.

²⁶ Canada. *Canada Yearbook 1940*, (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1941), 759, 771.

²⁷ Statistics Canada. *Historical Statistics of Canada*. F.H. Leacy, ed., Second revised ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983), "Series R490-513 Indices of real domestic product for manufacturing industries by major groups 1919-1976. "

²⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, UE District Council 5, Box 1387, File 169, "Secretary's Report," July 1943, 6.

²⁹ Bryan Palmer made the point in his *Working-Class Experience* that in the economic crisis of the 1930s, there emerged in Canada new literary and cultural vehicles (such as the *Canadian Forum*) and "the written word became a potent weapon in the class struggle." Bryan Palmer, *Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1983), 221.

³⁰ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada, 1939* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1940), 232; Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada, 1944* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1945), 77.

³¹ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 70, File, District Council Meetings, May 1940, "George Burt Report," 4. Initially the Canadian UAW was to have its own paper separate from the American version. That the American section of the union paid for the bulk of the costs may have accounted for the fact that it still originated in the United States as part of the larger American edition. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File : District Council May 1940-41, "Report, Dec. 1, 1940," 1.

³² This meant Canadian members were exposed to American union policies and programs, including, first, their isolationist or anti-war stance prior to Pearl Harbor, followed by a no-strike pledge and strident, almost bellicose, support for the war after that attack, including racist characterizations of the Japanese foe. The banner, page-one, story for the Canadian edition of the *United Automobile Worker* of January 1, 1943, was about Pearl Harbor and written from an American perspective, "Our nation has been attacked. On all sides there is a cry for intensified, uninterrupted production." Canada had been at war for more than two years. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Box 25, File 9, January 1, 1942, "War Has Come to America," 1.

³³ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada, 1939* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1940), 232; Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada, 1944* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1945), 76.

³⁴ The *Oshaworker*, *Ford Facts*, and the *Aircraft Worker* continue to publish (in 2006).

³⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File: CIO, Conference – Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Resolutions," 2.

³⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File: Misc. Material, 1942, "The Future of UAW Publicity in Canada," 2.

³⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 14, 1940, "First Issue," 1.

³⁸ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting, 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 10.

³⁹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "What Can the CIO Do For Me? 4.

-
- ⁴⁰ Although some dissent was allowed. The *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, for example, in October 1944 carried a column objecting to the paper's insulting those who were demanding the union take a more aggressive role with management. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "As I See It," 5.
- ⁴¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, January-June, 1943, "Minutes, June 1943," 22.
- ⁴² UPA, *Canadian UE News*, June 27, 1942, "Union News and Views," 2.
- ⁴³ Author's interview with UAW organizer Paul Siren, February 2003.
- ⁴⁴ *Labour Gazette* 43 (December 1943), "Canadian Labour Papers," 1586. Authorities were so concerned about union publications that in the late 1930s Canadian customs officials tried to block the mailing of the then United States-based *United Automobile Worker* into Canada. See Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Union Town," in Radforth and MacDowell, *op.cit.*, 509-510.
- ⁴⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, SWOC Correspondence File 1: "Letter from Dick Steele to Harry Hamburgh, December 31, 1937."
- ⁴⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Report," 12.
- ⁴⁷ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 9, 1942, "The War Worker," 2.
- ⁴⁸ ALUA, Oral Interview Collection, "Interview with John Eldon, UAW International Representative, by Jack Steele," c. 1963, 29.
- ⁴⁹ John Tait Montague, "Trade Unionism in the Canadian Meatpacking Industry," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1950, 102.
- ⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, June 16, 1944, "Message to Aircraft Workers," 2.
- ⁵¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 1, 1944, "February District Council," 1.
- ⁵² LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 9, 1943, "The War Worker," 9.
- ⁵³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 15, 1943, "Your Autoworker," 1.
- ⁵⁴ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, June 10, 1943, "News Items Invited," 1. There is evidence that locals were not contributing much material to their union's national paper, with leaders such as George Burt pleading with them to send in stories. Locals may have not made the national paper a priority once their own newspaper was launched, or they didn't have the time, or perhaps the confidence, to send in written material. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, May 1940-41, "George Burt Report, November 30-31, 1941," 1.
- ⁵⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso: 1983), 39-40.

-
- ⁵⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 14, 1940, "First Issue," 1.
- ⁵⁷ ALUA, Oral Interview Collection, "Interview with John Eldon, UAW International Representative, by Jack Steele," c. 1963, 19.
- ⁵⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 17, 1944, "Educational Committee," 3.
- ⁵⁹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 8-1
- ⁶⁰ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, November 7, 1945, "Union Policy," 1.
- ⁶¹ Author's interview with UAW organizer Paul Siren, February 2003.
- ⁶² LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File, CIO conference, Minutes, Briefs – November 4-5, 1939, "Report of Conference," 16.
- ⁶³ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 19, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Ford Edition*, n. d. , circa 1941, "The Sleeping Giant Stirs," 2.
- ⁶⁴ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, September 1945, "Labour Day," 2.
- ⁶⁵ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 19, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Ford Edition*, November 8, 1941, "Demand Honest Vote," 1.
- ⁶⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1944, "Minutes, February 1944," 8.
- ⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 15, 1942, "Many Gains at DH," 1.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid. The Massey-Harris local had also communicated with Joseph Stalin, however, asking him to become a lifetime member of the local. ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 95, File, Local 439, 1943-44, "Resolution."
- ⁶⁹ *Labour Gazette* 41 (April 1941), "Statement by Minister of Labour on employment of aliens," 364; City of Toronto Archives, John Inglis papers, Series 297, Box 17, File, Employment, "Memo from M. A. Davison to W. R. MacLachlan," December 7, 1942.
- ⁷⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, January-June 1943, "Minutes," 17.
- ⁷¹ ALUA, Oral Interview Collection, "Interview with John Eldon, UAW International Representative, by Jack Steele," c. 1963, 8.
- ⁷² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, June 16, 1944, "Convention Successful," 1. For discussions about racism in Canada in the 1940s, see Constance Backhouse, *Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999); James Walker, *Race, Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997); Ross Lamberton, "The Dresden Story: Racism, Human Rights and the Jewish Labour Committee of Canada," *Labour/Le Travail* 47 (Spring, 2001); Ruth Frager

and Carmela Patrias, "This Is Our Country, These Are Our Rights": Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaigns," *Canadian Historical Review* 82 (March 2001), 1-35.

⁷³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 1, 1943, "Dangers of Factionalism," 8.

⁷⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, September 1, 1944, "Canadians All," 4.

⁷⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 30, "Resolutions to District Council, October 1943," 8.

⁷⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Regional Office, Box 14, File 4, "Report of First Conference, Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, November 1939," 30.

⁷⁷ Wayne Roberts, *Baptism of a Union* (Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies Programme, 1981), 14.

⁷⁸ Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story* (Hamilton: Labour Studies Programme, McMaster University, 1979), 4.

⁷⁹ Wayne Roberts, ed., *Where Angels Fear to Tread: Eileen Tallman Sufrin and the Labour Movement* (Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies, 1983), 20.

⁸⁰ Such attempts at translation appear to be the exception. In the surviving record, I found no discussion about the need to translate materials, and there is little evidence of union literature being translated, although that there were a few, if faltering, attempts does indicate a sensitivity to the needs of non-English speakers. Union resources, however, were scarce and if unions had no recourse except professional translation, it would have been very expensive.

⁸¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, "Witajcie Bracia Polscy," 3.

⁸² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, "Trade Unionist in China," April 1, 1944, 3.

⁸³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council, 1942, "Minutes, November 1942," 7.

⁸⁴ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, June 5, 1944, 1.

⁸⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1943, "Report, April 1943," 5.

⁸⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting September 1941, "Minutes," 4.

⁸⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "Editorial," 2.

⁸⁸ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, January 9, 1942, "Workers Join Union," 3.

⁸⁹ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, February 13, 1942, "CIO Meets with French Canadians," 4.

⁹⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings December 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 16.

⁹¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 870.

⁹² Sam Gindin, *The CAW: Birth and Transformation of a Union* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1995), 88.

⁹³ The Communist Party paper, the *Canadian Tribune*, was not distributed to workers directly as the union papers were, but its frequent and passionate articles and editorials against racism would have been read by CPC activists and others in CIO locals.

⁹⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "Lies: The Color Line," 2.

⁹⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, June 1944, "Minutes, June 1944," 9.

⁹⁶ It is possible this offensive material -- rare in Canadian papers where Germany rather than Japan was the chief foe -- was put in as a "filler" by the U. S. editors who laid out the Canadian pages, and whose own papers frequently carried anti-Japanese material.

⁹⁷ The local may well have been influenced by the government's own policy of interning Japanese-Canadians on the West Coast and by the racist depictions of Japanese in the United States-based union publications.

⁹⁸ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, June 5, 1944, "Racial Discrimination," 2; ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper collection, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, March 16, 1944, "Conference Delegates Report," 1.

⁹⁹ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, April 5, 1945, 5.

¹⁰⁰ LAC MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, SWOC Ontario Conference of SWOC Lodges, June 11-12, 1939, "Resolutions."

¹⁰¹ LAC, MG 28 I268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 6: CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs --November 4-5, 1939," 17-18.

¹⁰² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October 1944," 30.

¹⁰³ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, June 5, 1944, "A Woman's Job," 4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ LAC microfilm, *Aircraft Worker* July 2, 1943, "Women and War," 2.

¹⁰⁶ In fairness to Ferguson, while her views about women's capacity for industrial work do seem to underestimate women, many if not most industrial jobs in the 1940s involved much heavy physical labour, arguably even too taxing for men in the long run. The subject of working women's demands for equality being either of wanting to be treated the same as men or as workers with special needs has been examined for the 1940s period by Pam Sugiman, *Labour's Dilemma: The Gender Politics of Auto Workers in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Julie Guard, "The 'Woman Question' in Canadian Unionism: Women in the UE, 1930s-1960s," Ph. D. dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1994.

¹⁰⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *Aircraft Worker*, January 15, 1944, "Women's Place in the Union," 3.

¹⁰⁸ A women editor, Mary Haines in the *De Havilland War Worker* praised women for working long hours, not just in the plant but at home. "Your union is proud of you," she wrote. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, December 11, 1943, "Women's View," 3.

¹⁰⁹ One exception was the UAW's International Executive Board's (IEB) adopting unpaid maternity leave as a bargaining goal, whereby women could leave in the seventh month of pregnancy and then return to work with accrued full seniority. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 15, 1944, "Women and the War," 3. Burt as head of the union in Canada was a member of the IEB, but I found no record of this provision being negotiated by the UAW in Canada.

¹¹⁰ Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story* (Hamilton: Labour Studies Programme, McMaster University, 1979), 4.

¹¹¹ LAC, MG 28 I268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee Reports, July 12, 1939, "Report from C.S. Jackson, UE to CIO Committee," 5.

¹¹² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, February 24, 1943, "Urges Girls to Organize," 5.

¹¹³ For example, a regular column called "Aside From the Men" appeared in the *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, the *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, and the *Massey-Harris War Worker*.

¹¹⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *Canadian UE News*, June 23, 1942, Aug 15, 1942,

¹¹⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *Canadian UE News*, July 4, 1942, 2.

¹¹⁶ City of Toronto Archives, John Inglis Papers, Series 397, Box 22, *Inglis Steelworker*, April 16, 1943, 2.

¹¹⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4: *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, May 15, 1944, "Two Women Elected at MH," 3.

¹¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, October 1, 1943, "Women Delegates Present," 1.

¹¹⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, February 26, 1944, "Women's View," 4.

¹²⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, September 3, 1943, "First Girl Chief Steward," 2.

¹²¹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 45: Underwood Elliott. "UE Leaflet to Underwood Elliott Workers, 1943."

¹²² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 11, "Minutes of July 1943 District Council," 8.

¹²³ ALUA, UAW Research Department, Box 1, File: Region 7 Correspondence, 1939-1942, "Letter from Drummond Wren, Workers Educational Association, to Frank Joyce, UAW," March 4, 1941.

¹²⁴ Ian Macmillan, *op.cit.*, 43.

¹²⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting February 1944 Minutes and report, "Minutes," 2.

¹²⁶ City of Toronto Archives, John Inglis Papers, Series 297, Box 22, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 4, 1943, "Fight Cheap Labour Now," 1.

¹²⁷ LAC MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 54, File 9, "Stewards' Bulletin," June 16, 1944.

-
- ¹²⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File 3 District Council Meetings October 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 9.
- ¹²⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, February 3, 1944, "Women's View," 4.
- ¹³⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 5, 1944, "Women's Place in the Union," 3.
- ¹³¹ Ibid.
- ¹³² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10. *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, December 11, 1943, "Women's View," 3.
- ¹³³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, "President's Message," 2.
- ¹³⁴ LAC microfilm, *Aircraft Worker* July 2, 1943, "Women and War," 2.
- ¹³⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, September 19, 1944, "Some Misses Who Will Be Missed," 5.
- ¹³⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 1, 1943, "Massey Local Chartered," 1.
- ¹³⁷ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting January 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 11.
- ¹³⁸ LAC, MG 28 I268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs -November 4-5, 1939," 17-18.
- ¹³⁹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 10.
- ¹⁴⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 15, 1944, "Women's Auxiliary Report," 4.
- ¹⁴¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings "Minutes," 20.
- ¹⁴² ALUA, R. J. Thomas Collection, Box 18, File 19, "Officers of the UAW-CIO Locals in the Canadian Region," c.1944.
- ¹⁴³ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meeting February 1944 Minute and Report, "Minutes," 5.
- ¹⁴⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 330, Local 515, "Vice Presidents and Chief Stewards," March 1944; *ibid.* Box 1388, File 395, Local 525, 1943-1944"; *ibid.* Box 1388, File 321, Local 514, "Application for Local Union Charter," September 1941.
- ¹⁴⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, "Report, November 1944," 1.
- ¹⁴⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting February 1945 Minutes and Report, "Report," 11.
- ¹⁴⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *Canadian UE News*, May 23, 1942, 1.
- ¹⁴⁸ Wayne Roberts, *Alf Ready*, 2.

-
- ¹⁴⁹ *Canadian Unionist*, February 1943, "Post-War Problems of Canadian Labour," 30. Women writers were more sympathetic. See Violet Anderson, *Canadian Forum* 23 (July 1943), "Part-time work for married women," 90.
- ¹⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 3, *Aircraft Worker*, May 12, 1944 "Mail to the Boys," 4.
- ¹⁵¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 138, "Letter from C. S. Jackson to Julius Emspak, UE International Secretary-Treasurer, March 6, 1944."
- ¹⁵² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1944 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 6-7.
- ¹⁵³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Workers Canadian Edition*, June 15, 1944, "Education," 3.
- ¹⁵⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1944, "Minutes, June 1944," 5.
- ¹⁵⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 138, "Letter from C. S. Jackson to Julius Emspak, UE International Secretary Treasurer, March 6, 1944."
- ¹⁵⁶ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, March 27, 1943, "Sharp Contrast," 11.
- ¹⁵⁷ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, January 6 1944, "Soldiers Must Stay Mum," 1.
- ¹⁵⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1944, "Minutes, June 1944," 12.
- ¹⁵⁹ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, March 27, "Soldiers Hear from Home," 3.
- ¹⁶⁰ ALUA, R.J. Thomas Collection, Box 2, File, IEB Minutes, "IEB Minutes, March 10-1943," 90.
- ¹⁶¹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 16, "Minutes of District Council Meeting, October 1943," 5.
- ¹⁶² City of Toronto Archives, John Inglis Papers, Series 297, Box 22, *Inglis Steelworker*, December 30, 1942, "Veterans Are Organizing," 2.
- ¹⁶³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting, September 1941, "Resolutions," 11.
- ¹⁶⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1940, "On Active Service," 8.
- ¹⁶⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, July 10, 1944, "Wounded in Action," 7; *ibid.*, September 19, 1944, "Dick Steele Killed," 3; *ibid.*, September 19, 1944, "Thoughts and Feelings," 4; *ibid.*, July 10, 1944, "A Letter from Burnside," 4; *ibid.*, November 9, 1944, "10 Questions," 3;
- ¹⁶⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 15, 1944, "Seniority and Jobs," 2.
- ¹⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 3, *Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1943, "Military Withdrawal Certificate," 2.
- ¹⁶⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 31, "Resolution, District 5 Council, October 1944," 11.

-
- ¹⁶⁹ ALUA. George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting June 1944 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 6-7.
- ¹⁷⁰ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 24, 1943, "UAW Protects Soldiers," 3.
- ¹⁷¹ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 9, File, Staff Meeting January-February 1944, 4.
- ¹⁷² Ibid.
- ¹⁷³ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 15, 1944, "Seniority and Jobs," 1.
- ¹⁷⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 58, File 7, "The Veterans' Committee of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Windsor and District, January 1944."
- ¹⁷⁷ ALUA, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "First-Rate Agreement Now in Operation," 4; ALUA, UAW Bound Newspapers, Volume 19, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Ford Edition*, November 21, 1941, "Saboteur on the Home Front," 2; UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 4, "Statement of Winning the War and the Post-War," 3.
- ¹⁷⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1 File District Council Meetings, February-April 1945, "Report, February 1945," 11-12.
- ¹⁷⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 15, 1944, "Seniority and Jobs," 2.
- ¹⁸⁰ Author's interview with UAW organizer Paul Siren, February 2003.
- ¹⁸¹ Wayne Roberts, *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story*, (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1979), 5.
- ¹⁸² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 2, 1943, "Your Union," 4.
- ¹⁸³ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 802.

Chapter Six

“The War for the Common Man”: CIO War Stories and its Narrative of a Fulfilled Democracy

The Second World War, as Paul Fussell has written, was a more silent war than the First World War, with fewer poets, fewer memorials, less sentimentality.¹ Yet it produced at least one great myth: the myth of the “people’s war,” a notion created in Britain and taken up in Canada.² The Canadian CIO appropriated that myth, used the strength it had with the general public, and turned it to its own uses — at the very time the CIO was at last gaining real strength in Canada and emerging as political player. “Of all the wars fought in this world, not one has had so great a cause as the present conflict,” said a CIO newspaper. “It is the war for the common man.”³ This chapter will look at how the CIO used the “people’s war” rhetoric in its organizing literature, in effect trying to mould workers’ opinions about the meaning of the war, their place in it, and the kind of “ideal Canada” that should therefore follow it, opinions that were made manifest in the wartime elections that began the country’s halting movement towards social democracy.

The “people’s war” rhetoric, coming as it did from Britain, would have had particular resonance in Toronto because of the city’s British heritage. The population was overwhelmingly British in origin, and a vast wave of British immigration in the first third of the century had only added to Toronto’s “Britishness.” The 1939 Royal Tour, organized to bolster Canada’s loyalty to Britain in the looming war, saw Toronto

“throbbing with imperialist feeling,” reported the *Toronto Star*. The streets were packed with an estimated million people, and from the north end of the city southwards “humanity stretched away, lost in the gray mist of downtown” as the royal motorcade slowly made its way down Yonge Street. The King and Queen’s arrival in Montreal may have been greeted with the “full roar of a great city’s joy,” and in Ottawa crowds may have witnessed “the stately theme of kingship and loyalty,” but it was in Toronto that the “adante of the drama,” took place, the “spectacle of a King among his people.”⁴ The adulation of the Royal Family was felt even by the CIO, not necessarily known for a sentimental attachment to the ruling order. The April 1939 issue of *Steel Labor*, for example, proudly reported that Hamilton alderman Harry Hamburg, a Steel Workers organizer and a Communist, would be introduced to the King and Queen during their visit to that city.⁵

But Torontonians’ adherence to Britain extended beyond the monarchy. The *Inglis Steelworker* pointed to Britain’s labour relations as an exemplar. Not only had Churchill brought Labour Party MPs into his War Cabinet, it told its readers, but his government had also recognized that “Unions have a full part to play... and labour is regarded as full partner in the gigantic task of winning the war.”⁶ When Canadians were polled in 1942, 46 per cent of those contacted said that the United Kingdom should have the most to say about what kind of peace there ought to be, versus 22 per cent who favoured the United States’ playing the lead role (and 10 per cent for Canada).⁷

Another influence on the language of the Canadian CIO was the United States, always a major player in Canadian culture but especially so in an organization such as the CIO, which was an American import to Canada. Not only did Canadians attend union events in the United States, gatherings dominated by Americans and American

issues, the national-level union newspapers remained predominantly American in their content,⁸ with Canadian content amounting to a few pages in these papers, all published and printed in the United States.⁹ (The all-Canadian *UE News* was an exception.) The American sections of these papers were often markedly different in tone and content from the Canadian sections. Before Pearl Harbor, for example, the American pages of the *United Automobile Worker* were isolationist, but afterwards they were often rife with a hyper-patriotic fervour not characteristic of the more staid Canadian section. The September 1939 issue of *Steel Labor's* Canadian edition carried a story, "Labor in America Wants No War," quoting United Mine Workers leader John L. Lewis saying that Americans "had no need to participate in the festering intrigue and ancient political quarrels of Europe." The Canadian section in the same issue of the paper, however, carried a story about a Steel Workers representatives' meeting in Toronto pledging their cooperation with the government "in its measures to protect the nation," a rather tepid endorsement of Canada's war effort (in the period of the "phony war") but an endorsement nonetheless.¹⁰ At the Canadian Congress of Labour's founding convention in 1940, held after the fall of France and during the Battle of Britain, delegates were more resolute in their support for the war, even arguing it in class terms, reasoning that if the "British Commonwealth of nations does not win the war, then the fate of Canadian workers will be same as that of the millions now under the heel of the Nazi conqueror: they will be enslaved and exploited with no means of redress. The first move of Hitler and Mussolini was to ban labour organizations and steal their money and property."¹¹

American labour historian Gary Gerstle has argued that in the United States, on the other hand, the language of the American CIO during the war tended to define American progressivism no longer in the class-based terms of its 1930s rhetoric about

“democracy,” but in terms of cultural and ethnic pluralism (presumably with the exception of the Japanese). There was also a hint of paranoia in the American papers, warning of Nazi agents and sympathizers, not just among the ruling class, as the Canadian pages tended to posit, but also among the ranks of ordinary Americans.¹² When senior UAW officials came to Canada and urged their Canadian counterparts to support a no-strike pledge, their commitment to that pledge led them to use the “people’s war” rhetoric to describe not so much a war *for* the people but a war *by* the people.¹³ How Canadian union members sorted this all out is a mystery, but as cultural historian Paul Rutherford has argued, Canadians have been doing just that for generations when it comes to American cultural influences.¹⁴ Furthermore, the wartime Canadian government — promoting the same kind of racial and ethnic tolerance the American government was urging¹⁵ — refused to assist labour in gaining recognition or collective bargaining rights, unlike Democratic administrations in the United States. This may well have helped Canadian unionists retain more of a class analysis than their American counterparts.

During the war, the CIO told a story in countless leaflets, speeches, newspapers, and union meetings about how working people could at last come into their own by organizing into unions of such strength that labour could shape a peace in which workers would enjoy a secure, prosperous, and happy life. If they unionized, the CIO told workers, they could force change not just from employers at the bargaining table but in the political arena, too, pressuring government to respond, not to Big Business, but to workers’ needs. In telling this story, union speakers, educators, writers, poets, organizers, and publicists alike enlisted the war itself into the CIO cause, creating a

powerful narrative in which workers and warriors, in shared sacrifice, were all soldiers, merely fighting on different “fronts” for the same cause: the triumph of a fulfilled “democracy.” The soldier on the battlefield overseas was fighting to defeat the anti-democratic, racist (and woman-repressing) evil of Nazism, while the soldier on the “production front” was fighting for a new kind democracy in Canada, one that in the post-war era would extend far beyond mere political democracy to embrace economic democracy — through the “industrial democracy” of collective bargaining and the intervention in the economy of a more activist government, working in equal partnership with labour. Thus, the CIO argued, unlike after the Great War, the nation would keep faith with its returning soldiers, by making the country “fit” for them to return to. Canada would be transformed from a country of great natural wealth, but politically and socially backward, to a modern nation with modern laws and modern, democratic, social relations, including cooperation and partnership among labour, business, and government. Thus, the CIO argued, would the promise of democratic equality be fulfilled. The CIO story in wartime Canada had villains and heroes — and a narrative that promised security and order in an insecure and disorderly world.¹⁶

This chapter examines the individual elements in this narrative. It will look at how the CIO depicted the villains in the narrative, often enlisting wartime language to compare its opponents to Hitler and Nazism. The CIO narrative also warned of the “enemies at the gates,” who, it told workers, were determined to restore Canada to the conditions that produced the Great Depression and war. This chapter explores not just how the CIO described itself to workers but also how it leveraged the war effort in an attempt to create an identity in people’s minds between the nation’s heroes fighting overseas and workers fighting, perhaps a less popular battle, for unionization at home.

The chapter will also look at the content of the CIO's ideas about the "new social order" it envisioned; namely, its notions about expanding democracy; modernizing Canada's social relations; rationalizing labour-management relations; and creating a governmental regime more responsive to working-class concerns. Oftentimes here as well, the nation's war effort was recruited to the CIO cause.

This chapter looks at the language the CIO used to represent itself and workers' struggles. How workers and others received this message is a matter of speculation, although it can be argued that in all probability union writers, publicists, and orators would tend to use and re-use words, expressions, and metaphors that resonated positively with readers and audiences. In other words, the CIO could well have deployed the narrative — and the language it used to tell it — not only for ideological reasons but also because they were persuasive.

The sources cited in this chapter were the CIO's public face: its organizing leaflets, newspapers, speeches, and advertising campaigns.¹⁷ The UAW's George Burt and the UE's C.S. Jackson appear most often because UAW and UE records during this period are extensive and well preserved. Furthermore, the minutes and reports from the proceedings of the UAW's district council meetings in particular are an invaluable source.

Courting public opinion: the CIO's publicity strategy

CIO leaders made their appeals not just to workers but to the general public as well. They recognized early their need for public relations — called "publicity" during this period. At a meeting in June 1939, the CIO Coordinating Committee discussed how the CIO had to produce "publicity on the need for industrial organization in our

communities.”¹⁸ Moral and financial support from the public was vital to the CIO’s future organizing, its leaders believed, so publicity efforts had to be directed not just to potential union recruits but to the community at large, as fellow Canadians. “We face the task of informing the public of our aims and through their understanding, enlisting their support, financial and moral, for improving the wages and benefits of our fellow Canadians,” the report read.

As the CIO unions grew in size and resources and thus had more members to organize and service, sentiment grew for a permanent bureaucracy of staff specialists not necessarily drawn from the union’s rank and file. CIO affiliates hired full-time educators, researchers, and even community liaison staff, but very often the first such appointment was a full-time publicity person.¹⁹ One of the first recommendations of the CIO committee, for example, was that it appoint a full-time publicity director to help coordinate CIO organizing publicity.²⁰ In 1940, a Toronto Newspaper Guild resolution noted that, “An efficient publicity apparatus is vital to the growth and development of a progressive labour organization both to keep its own members and the public fully informed of the aims of industrial democracy.”²¹ The CIO hired advertising agencies as early as 1940 to assist with publicity campaigns.²² So important was publicity thought to be that when the UAW was considering laying off its publicity director in 1942, local union leaders, crediting him with a vital role in their organizing successes, advised Burt to let one of the union’s full-time organizers go instead.²³

The Canadian media, during the war, was also more interested in labour than it is today, giving unions a better chance of garnering public attention. In the 1940s, daily newspapers hired staff reporters specializing in labour stories, carried reports on the monthly municipal labour councils meetings, and followed affairs of locals, especially

large locals, closely. When the UAW presented a 27-page brief to a National War Labour Board inquiry into collective bargaining legislation in 1943, the *Windsor Star* devoted an entire page to it.²⁴ As Burt said of the UAW local at Ford in Windsor, “[E]verything done in the local is the property of the public, it being such a large plant and of such importance.”²⁵

The union definition of publicity also included, in addition to the mainstream media, in-house products such as union newspapers, organizing leaflets, and the labour press. This apparatus, as we saw in Chapter 5, was largely developed during the war, and it was the war, furthermore, that gave that apparatus its “messages” and thereby provided the CIO with the lever it needed to advance its public relations efforts. The messages often referred to the war effort, telling readers and audiences that the CIO unions’ were resolutely in support of the war effort, that they were vital to winning the war, and that they had the same aims and objectives as all Canadians.

There was nothing accidental about this. In March 1942, for example, the UAW’s Rowe submitted a report to the union’s district council advising the union to use the country’s war effort in its publicity. He shrewdly noted that while the war may have restricted labour’s militancy (on account of public opinion against strikes) it had, on the other hand, given labour an alternative avenue to gain its objectives: the positive publicity to be gained by showing how the labour movement stood shoulder to shoulder with other Canadians in supporting the war. He urged that the union’s publicity efforts be “largely integrated with the war effort.”²⁶ “We have an opportunity only during wartime to show through group action the value of the labour movement and its contribution to the war effort,” Burt told his district council a year later.²⁷ Union publicists worked hard to ensure the mainstream media carried stories and photographs

showing labour's contribution to the war effort, and throughout the war, union records are filled with references to whether or not such initiatives had received the publicity union leaders felt they deserved.²⁸

The heroes: the CIO

In its wartime narrative, the CIO portrayed itself, not unexpectedly, as one of its story's heroes. What is unexpected, perhaps, is the extent to which the CIO portrayed itself as a war hero. While wages and working conditions and the CIO "advantage" were dealt with very extensively in organizing literature, so was CIO support for — and value to — the nation's war effort.

Organizers needed to address workers' concerns as employees first, and the literature that CIO unions distributed did describe at length how unionization would meet workers' immediate day-to-day needs.²⁹ CIO unions published their bargaining aims in organizing literature to let workers know what negotiators would be seeking at the bargaining table: improved wages, including equal pay for women; overtime pay and shift premiums; safer working conditions; seniority protection, including cumulative seniority for veterans; and a grievance procedure. Union organizers also sought to impress workers with the growing strength of the new CIO unions and their overwhelming popularity with other workers, conveying a sense not just of reassuring robustness, but of a certain inevitability as well. A favourite theme in CIO literature, for example, was the CIO's galvanizing momentum, which was driven by workers' "union organizing fever,"³⁰ as one union editor described it. A tangential theme was that the CIO was no temporary, wartime phenomenon. "The CIO with 250,000 members is the largest trade union organization in Canada," boasted a UAW newspaper in 1944, "and is

here to stay.”³¹ Even when arguing for better wages and working conditions, CIO writers used the war to rationalize union demands. They said low wages, for example, hurt the war effort as they sapped workers’ morale and health. “The Union agrees that War entails the necessity of sacrifice, but we maintain,” said the UE, “that to allow wages which fail to provide a subsistence level of existence, is in fact sacrificing the war effort itself.”³² A UAW editorial arguing for a higher wage said it was “necessary if we are to win this people’s war.”³³

The CIO, by using the war effort as a reason to build a strong union, was appealing to workers not just as employees but as citizens, too, although the organization’s support for the war effort was never a straightforward matter, as close readers of union papers would have observed. Various CIO affiliates had their own stance towards the war, depending in all probability on the strength of the Communist Party in their ranks. The UAW had many Communist Party members among its organizers and activists, and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the *United Automobile Worker* was virtually silent about the war, except in its American section. There, U.S. editors ran anti-war stories in keeping with American isolationism, a stance supported by the strong Communist Party wing of the American section of the union. The February 14, 1940 issue — the inaugural issue — of the Canadian edition of the *United Automobile Worker*, for example, featured pictures of a union-supported anti-war demonstration in New York City, with marchers bearing signs reading “I want work, not war!”³⁴ But by July 1941, after the Germans invaded their former ally, the Canada UAW paper began to talk about the war in positive terms. “Our soldiers on the battlefield cannot win the battle for democracy overseas if it is being lost at home,” it declared.³⁵ Henry Ford’s record on unions could now be safely

described as "fascistic," since the Nazis, like Ford, opposed free trade unions. The UAW paper called for Ottawa to declare Ford a "fifth columnist" and saboteur of Canada's war effort and suggested the federal government seize the Ford plants in Canada and run them for "the duration."³⁶ By January 1, 1942, after Pearl Harbor, the American section of the paper was also on board for the war effort.³⁷ The UE, which was led by Communists, followed much the same route as the UAW, while the Steel Workers, which had conducted a purge of Communists in 1940, supported the war effort before the German incursion into Soviet territory.

After that incursion and throughout the rest of the war, in spite of frustration with Ottawa's non-support of CIO demands, all CIO affiliates stoutly defended the war as "a just war, a war for the working class"³⁸ and argued for its energetic prosecution. "The UAW puts winning the war first," said one union newspaper, "and until that is achieved there must be no let up in effort."³⁹ Labour is prepared to put everything it has into a democratic, all-out, war effort," read one union editorial. "Government and management must be prepared to do likewise. Anything short of that would be playing into Hitler's hands."⁴⁰

The CIO's affiliate unions used their support for the war as an organizing tool. A favourite play on words for an organizing slogan, for example, was "Organize for Victory," meaning that a victory in an organizing drive would speed victory overseas.⁴¹ That unionization would increase war production was an argument organizers used frequently, telling workers that unionization would lead to harmonious labour-management relations, which in turn meant more production. The UAW, for example, credited the building of 500,000 armored vehicles in Canada by 1943 to its being recognized at key automotive plants, which increased cooperation between labour and

management and allowed the “orderly settlement of grievances without loss of production time rather than through speed-up.”⁴² The *United Automobile Worker* claimed that one of Massey-Harris workers’ chief grievances was management’s failure to reach war production goals and that workers were responding to the union’s commitment to remedy that.⁴³ The *UE News* told readers that the main issue in its drive at the Small Arms plant in Toronto was workers’ concerns about lagging production.⁴⁴ The CIO affiliates argued that management opposition to union organization, contrary-wise, caused dissension and, therefore, hurt production. “When the UAW is recognized and collective bargaining established, Massey-Harris workers will be able to put their full energies into production and smashing Hitler. The war effort needs unions,” said a union leaflet.⁴⁵

Employers did not leave this CIO argument uncontested, however. They warned that winning the war, depended not on employers being forced to the bargaining table but, according to the Toronto Board of Trade, on workers and employers working together. “Our task is to unite in common cause for victory,” it said, with employers and employees joining in common cause “on mutual understanding of common problems.”⁴⁶ Making collective bargaining compulsory, argued the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, would have a “disturbing effect on employer-employee relations and hence on the war effort.”⁴⁷ Managers at Metallic Roofing, battling a UAW organizing drive in 1942, distributed a letter written by Stelco’s president warning workers that the Allies were losing the war and that Canadians, including workers, had to put their duty above their rights or they would have no rights at all.⁴⁸ The Steel Workers, though, in a leaflet to Inglis workers responded to such corporate arguments by quoting an American company head who said he had stopped opposing the union when he saw the unity it

produced, which meant he “got better production out of the men” and a 1,500 per cent increase in production.⁴⁹ By this time, Ontario’s Liberal Government, for its part, was softening its hard line against the CIO, with its labour minister noting that strikes were increasing and that, even worse, the unrest created in war plants by on-going recognition battles was “often more disturbing to a plant than an actual strike.”⁵⁰ When Prime Minister Mackenzie King told the nation in a 1943 radio broadcast that his government was planning to introduce compulsory collective bargaining legislation, he conceded that new measures were necessary “to promote industrial harmony,” at least in war plants, given that year’s strike record. (He avoided, however, the issue of whether collective bargaining was a worker’s right.⁵¹)

“Democracy” was another important CIO wartime theme as it leveraged the mainstream wartime discourse of defending democracy. CIO writers took pains to describe the CIO’s own democratic structures and practices.⁵² “The UAW will continue its phenomenal growth because of the confidence of workers in its democratic procedures,” said one 1942 union leaflet. “Contracts are always discussed freely by workers and only signed with their approval.”⁵³ The UE’s Jackson described his union as a democratic organization, “wherein decisions are made through discussion and understanding by the active membership and not by being handed down from above.”⁵⁴

The CIO’s definition of its own democracy included autonomy for its Canadian affiliates, and CIO leaders in Canada were anxious to reassure workers that their unions were autonomous Canadian entities.⁵⁵ “The old cry of ‘American controlled’ is ridiculous,” wrote the editor of the *Aircraft Worker*, in all likelihood responding to criticisms of the union circulating in the plant. “CIO unions in Canada are only asked to do one thing and that is to conform to the industrial form of organization. All other

policies are determined by the unions in Canada...⁵⁶ The UE emphasized that for every dollar in dues paid by Canadians, the International matched it with three dollars, the reverse of the corporations, where Canadian General Electric paid more than 95 per cent of its income to its Canadian parent.⁵⁷ "Our Staff is 100 per cent Canadian," the union said. "Our policies are 100 per cent Canadian."⁵⁸ At the same time, organizers preached the value of the international union connection.⁵⁹ Burt in fact was anxious to preserve the American connection and to "be connected with our brothers in any other country in order to pursue with some strength our purpose and ambition."⁶⁰ One reason, the union explained to workers, was that "companies have become corporations," whose policies were directed from a distant head office in another country.⁶¹

Employers, however, were not prepared to cede to the CIO when it came to claiming "democracy." They argued that the democratic principle of freedom of association meant the union shop and any automatic dues check off were undemocratic. The same principle, they argued, supported recognition of company unions. They cited freedom of speech when they maintained employers had the right to intervene directly with workers about joining a union. They took out advertisements complaining about "CIO tyranny." They claimed secret ballot votes on union recognition were undemocratic because they allowed unions to mount propaganda campaign of "false promises and misrepresentations," meaning majority votes in favour of a union were "illusory." Above all, they wanted, rather than Wagner Act protection, the British model of no compulsion on employers to bargain (while maintaining that employers should be able to sue unions, which Britain did not allow).⁶²

On the other hand, government figures adapted to the growing strength and public sympathy to the CIO and began to use "democracy" when talking about labour,

especially when public support for the pro-labour CCF grew.⁶³ Early in the war, federal deputy labour minister Bryce Stewart, for example, felt free to use a discourse of contempt when talking about labour. He opposed compulsory bargaining legislation and said that "the CIO should be whipped by scorpions."⁶⁴ By 1945, however, Jacob Finkleman, chair of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, gave a nod to democracy when he told employers that wartime pro-labour laws would outlast the conflict. Employers should stop "brooding," about their loss, he said, and "learn to accept the heavy burden of leadership in a democratic society lest you forfeit your claims to leadership."⁶⁵

The heroes: workers and warriors

In the CIO narrative, the working class was democracy's stalwart defender, and in that struggle there were two kinds of fighters: the front-line soldier and the production-line soldier. This worker-warrior partnership was a universal element in union literature, and it was founded on class analysis. Its premise was that since the bulk of Canada's armed forces were drawn from the working class, there was an identity of interest and entitlement between soldiers and workers. The men in the armed forces did not belong to "a different race from industrial workers," the *Inglis Steelworker* told its readers. "As a matter of fact the vast majority of officers and men came out of the factories and mines, they came from the homes of workers...."⁶⁶ "Our fighting men are also our working men," wrote a union editor.⁶⁷ It was "the workers who were paying for the war, the workers who built the ships, the planes, the tanks, the guns, it was the workers who wore the uniforms both khaki and blue, that did the fighting and the dying...." said a union editorial.⁶⁸ Working-class women were explicitly included in the subject of "home-front soldier." "One by one, we have stepped into the shoes of our husbands,

fathers, and sons and no one has accused of not being able to do the job," wrote Local 439 activist Marjory Ferguson, in 1943.⁶⁹ The idea even extended to the unions' women's auxiliaries: "The whole nation needs the assistance of those women, too, for Victory must be won at home as well as in the shop and on the battlefield."⁷⁰

The partnership of worker and warrior was also rooted in the bitter memories of the treatment of the soldiers of the First World War. A world fit for heroes didn't materialize after the First World War, CIO writers emphasized. "Our heroes came back to walk the streets, to sleep on park benches, to live on the dole," *Local 439 News* told readers when calling for a new economic system that would make the current war worth fighting, a system that would "put an end to the stark misery and suffering we see all around us."⁷¹ Another writer described the broken promises made to First World War soldiers and, urging readers to become more active in the union, exhorted them by asking, "How do we know it will be different after this war if we do not take a hand in it ourselves and make sure those conditions will not come back?"⁷²

The CIO, in recalling the nation's betrayal of those veterans, would often use their fate as an organizing argument. "When we returned 20 years ago," wrote one Great War veteran whose son was fighting overseas, "industry did not welcome us gladly.... We are determined to bring about improvements so that the fighting will not be in vain. We owe it to our sons. We owe it to ourselves." He vowed the conditions in his plant would be improved for "my boy" when he returned, "not like when I came back." Added the father: "He'd think I was really letting him down if I didn't continue the struggle we both began to improve working conditions."⁷³

In this vein, the CIO exhorted workers to give the current war a higher purpose than that of defeating the enemy by not allowing what happened to soldiers after the

Great War to be repeated after the current war. Said a UE editorial: "Organized labour has a task to fulfill to the fighting men and women and that is to see that when the heroes return home...employment at wages and under conditions which will enable them and their dependents to maintain a decent livelihood shall be available to them, instead of the fate which awaited the fighting men of the last war..."⁷⁴ "These men are depending on us to change those conditions — change them so that they will never arise again — so that when they come back, they will come to a Canada, where a decent job awaits them, where they can make adequate wages to supply the necessities of life..."

Local 439 News told its readers.⁷⁵ Another editorial urged workers to vote for social security measures so that "all the sacrifices made by the last two generations of Canadians shall at last be honoured by the future security and happiness of those to come."⁷⁶ "We owe it to our loved ones overseas," the president of Local 439 told readers of the local's newsletter in January 1945. "We dare not fail them, we must see to it that those who have sacrificed much shall be rewarded by knowing that we at home are determined that Canada will be a home fit for her heroes to live in."⁷⁷

CIO writers thus sought to create an identity of interest between the worker and the warrior. The home-front soldiers, they said, had a debt of honour to the battlefield soldiers, meaning "production-line fighters" had two home-front battles: one was to help the soldiers overseas defeat Hitlerism and the second was to fight for a better workplace and a better Canada for when they returned home. "We have to organize and fight for the rights of the Labour class so as to give our boys over there and here something to come back to," a Steel Workers speaker told an organizing meeting in 1942.⁷⁸ And, as the UE's Jackson said, such benefits were indivisible within the working class: they had to be reaped by the home-front warriors as well as their comrades

overseas. "We owe a tremendous debt to our gallant comrades," he said. "This debt, however, cannot be paid in any other terms than that of... employment at decent remuneration when they return. This security and job opportunities must, however, be available to all our people, otherwise there will be no guarantee of it for our returning veterans. The struggle for employment and security for the veterans is one and the same with the struggle for employment and security for all."⁷⁹

The elision of the soldiers with industrial workers reached into every aspect of unionism. Reporting on the establishment of a 55-cent-an-hour minimum rate won by the Steel Workers, for example, a UAW paper commented: "Soldiers on the production front must enjoy good health to keep their end up. The former basic rate of 42 cents an hour did not permit the Steel Workers to keep themselves or their families in good health."⁸⁰ "The negative attitude of our government is reflected in the temporary defeat of our soldiers in Hong Kong and our workers in Kirkland Lake," read a UAW article in 1942.⁸¹

CIO unions maintained contact with their enlisted members, and made a point of reminding home-front members of their devotion to the serving men and women. "Hundreds of Canadian UE members are in all branches of the armed forces," said a UE paper in 1942, "and they are kept regularly informed of the activities of the UE through receiving the *UE News* in whatever part of the world they may be stationed."⁸² Union papers reprinted letters from soldiers praising the work the union was doing. Henry Kelly, serving in the Canadian Army overseas, wrote Local 439 thanking them for a comforts package it had sent him: "It also pleases me as I'm sure it does all ex-workers in the company to see the way you people at home are doing such a fine job making a future for us....Many of us are much older now and to work for the wages we once made

is practically an impossibility. I'm sure that will be taken care of now, as you fellow workers have certainly done a wonderful job of organizing. It is certainly a far cry from the old days."⁸³ "The boys in the hospital here with me," wrote Private William Randall, "got great joy on reading the *Aircraft Worker* and find we are fighting for the same thing, whether in uniform or not."⁸⁴ The *Aircraft Worker* carried a front-page story reporting a speech made to the local's steward body by returning veteran, Private James Napier, the first man to sign a UAW card in Canada. "The boys in the armed forces are depending on you back home to build strong unions so that when they come home they may join forces with the workers and build a system [recognizing] their God-given right to work and enjoy the fruits of their labour.... the boys are going to be disappointed if they come back and find that you have let them down."⁸⁵

The CIO unions frequently "spoke for" serving soldiers when arguing for a better world post-war. The men in the armed forces "who were formerly riding the rods....are not coming back to that," said the CCL's Pat Conroy in the *Automobile Worker*. "They say that if Canada can produce billions of dollars for destructive offense it can do the same for constructive offense for everyone."⁸⁶ Both sides of the no-strike issue similarly argued that their respective stance supported the soldiers. Those favouring the pledge argued that there should be no interruption in war production so that the "boys" got what they needed to fight, while those who opposed the pledge said strikes were sometimes needed "to protect our conditions and to insure that our brothers and sisters, the worker-soldiers overseas will not come back to the conditions their fathers faced after the last war."⁸⁷ The CIO assumed soldiers' support in its struggle and reassured workers that the soldiers supported labour's aims. "Those overseas realize only too well there is a battle to be won on the home front against those who would keep down living

standards, and they support every effort which is being made to raise those standards so they may come home to a better Canada than they have known in the past."⁸⁸

The enemy at the gates

The other leading characters in the CIO wartime narrative were big business and its political allies. They were the villains of the piece: the enemy at the gates, whom only unionization could fend off.

The CIO accused big business of causing the Depression, so its power had to be countered during and after the war. "If we leave all the strength and power to those who bungled the job last time, they will bungle it again," warned a Steel Workers paper.⁸⁹ "Industrialists had demonstrated in the 1930 that they were not competent to cope with the problem of unemployment," Steel Workers Canadian head Charlie Millard told workers in 1943. "Yet the same industrialists are today doing everything possible to see that we return to the days of uncontrolled profits for industry and unemployment for large numbers of workers," he said.⁹⁰ "Hitler was not the fundamental cause of the war," Conroy was quoted in the *Automobile Worker* as saying. He was just a "boil on the surface." The real cause of the war was the "economic insecurity and injustices in capitalist countries. Furthermore, he said, "Business has not changed its ways...If 'free enterprise' means the national paralysis produced in this country for 10 years before the war, then the proper term [for it] is a 'scandal,' to the people at large."⁹¹ CIO writers also accused business of using the war effort to roll back workers' gains. "Canadian industrialists would very much like to use the present war emergency to destroy gains made by workers over the past few years," a Steel Workers leaflet told workers at the John Inglis Co. Companies, it said, were resisting unions in order to protect their war

profits and their post-war returns as well. "Now is the time to stand steadfast in your union to protect yourself and your fellow workers,"⁹² the leaflet exhorted.

Suspensions of business's post-war plans ran high, and labour papers warned their readers about business's post-war agenda. "[I]ndustrialists hope to... enter the post-war period in a condition of open shops and a surplus of labour to throw against established wage scales, and unbridled competition for super profits," warned *Local 439 News*.⁹³ Big business's post-war intentions were to "put us back to pre-war conditions, which means controlled depression, wherein two-thirds of labour works for starvation wages while the other third stagnates on relief," said an *Aircraft Worker* article, written by steward Martin Carey, who added that capital was well prepared for a post-war battle with the labour movement. Its "coffers swollen from war profits, [it] can afford to force a recession on labour," Carey wrote.⁹⁴ As the *Automobile Worker* said, "This reactionary group is trying to bring back the pre-war years of misery and suffering after this war."⁹⁵ Furthermore, pro-business politicians would assist business with realizing its reactionary plans in the post-war, warned the CIO. These politicians were determined, wrote a union editor, "that Canadian democracy...shall not win the war, but that Big Business and its agents will triumph."⁹⁶

Business, moreover, said the CIO, was not patriotic; it was only loyal to its own interests. The Ford Motor Company's refusal to pay women equally, said a union publication, "did not answer the needs of the war but rather made the war a means of putting over reactionary labour policies."⁹⁷ Business was identified with the upper classes, who were not to be trusted. The *United Automobile Worker* in 1940 said there was growing recognition among the public of the "shameful betrayal of democracy which had been so common among the upper classes both at home and in Europe."⁹⁸ UE

leader, C.S. Jackson, warned fellow unionists that “certain elements in high positions” — “quislings” and “enemies of freedom” — who would delay the opening of a second European front in order to sap the fighting spirit of the Canadian people, thus paving the way for “a negotiated peace with our enemies.”⁹⁹ The UE warned of “interests” in Canada who feared “the broadening of democracy after the war” and who “would allow war criminal fascists to continue to work for another gigantic war as the one we are presently engaged in.”¹⁰⁰

Such linking of business and its political sympathizers with the nation’s fearsome enemy was a common motif in CIO wartime discourse. Conroy, when arguing before the 1943 Ontario Select Committee, said the war was being fought to extend democracy to those who had had it “stamped out” by Hitler and Nazism. “We are the people who are supposed to be doing the stamping out, but here we are today discussing whether or not we shall have the freedom ourselves which we are supposed to hand on to the people in conquered Europe.”¹⁰¹ Conroy’s remarks were not the first or last time the CIO put its struggle for recognition in juxtaposition with the fight against fascism. Some CIO materials went so far as to conflate the enemies of labour with the nation’s enemies.

“Hitler and fascism stand opposed to every progressive ideal on which our unions are based,” read a union editorial, which then turned to “Hitlerism” in Canada.

“Canada...[has] an important part to play if we are to prevent a Hitler victory in the war or a victory of people with Hitler ideas in Canada.”¹⁰² Another union editorial warned of the true nature of anti-CIO forces in Canada: “Victory must mean a higher standard of living, decent working conditions, wider democracy both political and social, the right to organize, the right to strike if necessary, and wages more commensurate with labour’s contribution to the wealth of society. These are the first things denied by Hitler in the

countries which he conquers and these are the things which are opposed here by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association," railed a *UE News* editorial.¹⁰³ A letter to the *Inglis Steelworker* told readers that the 1943 publicity campaign against the CCF was a sign that the "bosses' hold on the masses is weakening. They know full well that just like Hitler, they are beaten and must eventually admit defeat."¹⁰⁴

The CIO also argued that to deny Canadian workers union rights was tantamount to undermining the war effort and abetting the enemy. "Any act or policy which denies the right of labour ... is subversive of the war effort. We brand it as subterfuge akin to treason," was the UAW editorial reaction to the failure of the Kirkland Lake strikers to win union recognition in 1942, which the editorial imputed to Ottawa's failure to support union recognition and collective bargaining.¹⁰⁵ When arguing for stronger collective bargaining legislation in 1943, a CIO editorial accused both business and politicians of concentrating on defeating labour "instead of concentrating their energies on smashing Hitler....We need to let Queen's Park know," wrote the editor, "that a good labour bill and defeating Hitler are indivisible."¹⁰⁶ "Repressive laws and measures that hamstring labour and curtail the rights of labour can only have an adverse effect upon our ability to fight against fascism to a successful conclusion. It is obvious that those who are responsible for interfering with the democratic rights of labour are at the same time responsible for reducing the effectiveness of the war effort," said the *UE News*.¹⁰⁷

When a Toronto local union pledged \$4,000 in support for strikers at Kirkland Lake, their union paper described them as workers who "maintained solidarity in face of propaganda blitzkrieg by the Canadian Hitlers."¹⁰⁸ When Massey-Harris laid off 76 union supporters in two days during a 1942 organizing drive, the UAW accused the

company of "Nazi-like methods" and likened the company's shock-and-awe methods to a "blitzkrieg," not the least because "goon tactics" were used, with one worker being forcibly ejected from the plant by company police.¹⁰⁹ When De Havilland fired four women UAW organizers, a union leaflet said the company's actions gave "aid and comfort to the enemy....They hurt war production and destroy morale. This sabotage has got to stop. These girls are going back to work. The UAW is going to win the plant. The war effort demands it."¹¹⁰

Company unions were favourite targets of CIO wartime rhetoric. CIO leader Silby Barrett declared in 1940 that company unions "are the same in principle as the fascist unions in Germany."¹¹¹ Another editor described them as "Hitler unions."¹¹² When Ford proposed a union vote featuring only the company union on the ballot, the UAW fired back that the proposal was no better than "a Hitler plebiscite and the company was engaging in typical Nazi tactics. "We are determined to fight Hitlerism wherever it may take hold," the union paper vowed.¹¹³ Company unions were tantamount to denying employees the right of freedom of association, argued the UE, and created "suspicion and distrust in the minds of the workers – suspicion and distrust are the weapons of Hitler and it ill-behooves anyone in our country to provide him with those weapons."¹¹⁴

The narrative hook: "After the war, what?"

With big business portrayed as the "enemy at the gates," the CIO unions appealed to workers' concerns about post-war conditions in their organizing literature; such appeals appeared early, owing to the memories of the Great War. At the CIO's inaugural conference in November 1939, CIO leaders, haunted by memories of the aftermath of the

First World War, looked to the post-war period of the latest conflict and pledged themselves to “organize ... to meet the difficulties which beset labour following the last war.”

“When a war boom ends... it is the ordinary man of the street who suffers worse hardships than before such a boom began. That we know from bitter experience,” read the conference paper.¹¹⁵

Workers remembered, too, and the question uppermost in their minds, according to labour activists, was whether there would be a job for them after the war. ¹¹⁶ “Those employees who remember the last war ... realize that the men overseas will be demobilized. What happens then?”¹¹⁷ “The fear of unemployment is so great that it dominates everything else,” Conroy wrote in a 1944 edition of the *Automobile Worker*. ¹¹⁸ Union leaders in their warning about unemployment used the strongest terms. Jackson, for example, warned the UE district council in 1944 that anything less than full employment would “result in chaos and conflict in our country and...set in motion forces which breed war and which will lead to another world conflict.”¹¹⁹ After the hardships of the Great Depression, union writers and editors told their readers, post-war unemployment was tantamount to military defeat. “Our armies are going to win this war on the battlefields,” wrote UAW activist Margery Ferguson, “[but] if there is not jobs for all after the fighting stops, then I would say that we have lost the war.”¹²⁰

Many unionists also believed industry would turn on labour once the war was over. “Unions were violently attacked after the last war and we can expect a similar situation this time,” said a UAW editor.¹²¹ The same industrialists that had failed to meet the challenge of the Great Depression, Millard said, “were doing everything in their power to see that we returned to the days of uncontrolled profits for industry and

unemployment for workers.”¹²² Some editors predicted a post-war Armageddon.

“There is only one issue,” wrote union steward Carey in a 1944 issue of his local’s paper.

“The fight between Labour and Big Business will come when the war ends and Industry converts to peacetime production. On the outcome of this battle depends your future and the future of your children.”¹²³

The plot: “A union will give workers a voice”

The CIO narrative was that workers and warriors were partners, a partnership best expressed by their organizing into unions, which would give worker-warriors the collective clout they needed to deal with the “enemy at the gates” — and influence, for the first time, how and for whom Canada was to be run. That clout was usually expressed by CIO writers as workers acquiring a “voice.” The CIO told workers that voice was their right and that it would give them some control over their fate both in the private sphere of the shop floor and the public arena of politics. When a CIO agreement was finally reached at Inglis, for example, the union newspaper reported that “for the first time we are now able to have some collective voice about the wages we are paid and the conditions under which we labour.”¹²⁴ Millard told workers at an organizing meeting that, “Workers can only assure themselves of a voice through organization...”¹²⁵ The Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, on the other hand, a Steel Workers leaflet told Inglis workers, “plans to throttle the voice of labour and stop the activities of legitimate trade unions.”

Having a voice gave workers their dignity in the workplace, the CIO said, rendering them visible and “human.” A 1943 UAW resolution, lamenting the way that

employers treated workers under the “competitive” economic system said, “The worker... was regarded for all practical purposes as just another piece of equipment which could and should be thrown into high gear or thrown out of employment without regard to his economic welfare.”¹²⁶ “The first thing we seek is recognition,” went one poem in a union newsletter. “This has been labour’s main ambition/To get management to plainly see/There’s a place in this world for you and me.”¹²⁷ A UAW leaflet recounted how a few workers had grown tired of being “kicked around” by abusive foremen and big corporations. These workers, said the leaflet, unionized when “they woke up to the fact that they, too, were human beings entitled to decent wages and decent homes.”¹²⁸ The CIO also used the notion of “citizenship” to claim rights and privileges for workers, arguing that union recognition would give workers the respect in the workplace their civic citizenship merited. As a Steel Workers organizing leaflet told Massey-Harris workers in 1941, a union would mean management would “treat us as real people, as citizens of Canada, and this is only possible by our union.”¹²⁹

Furthermore, a union meant management would have to treat workers as adults. “You are not children that have to be coaxed and persuaded. You are intelligent men and women workers capable of making decisions and carrying them out,” the *War Worker* told De Havilland employees.¹³⁰ In fact, union membership and activism in themselves would lead to adult independence, albeit it would be gendered masculine: “The union will make a man out of you,” explained the *War Worker*. “It will teach you to speak up for yourself, it will teach how to handle your own funds. It will show you that you DO count and that you CAN do things....”¹³¹ CIO writers even called upon the North American credo of individual self-reliance. Far from taking away their ability to stand up for themselves, went its argument, a union would allow workers to be more

self-sufficient, more independent. "A union is a cooperative association of men and women ... [who] work together today to help themselves."¹³² Union people didn't wait for the company or the government to do them any favours, said CIO writers. "They aren't going to wait for some distant legislator to help them. They are working together, today, to help themselves. Union people know that the only people who are happy are people who help themselves."¹³³

Having "voice" was more than just a fortunate benefit of unionization, the CIO said, it was a fundamental right in a democracy. The CCL's Conroy was incensed that a worker, who was "like a farmer or any producer," should have to beg government for the "right in a Political democracy" to bargain for the worth of his or her labour.¹³⁴ "All that workers ask," said Jackson, "is that their fundamental rights as Canadian workers be recognized, and in this instance it merely amounts to the commencement of direct negotiations between the legitimate Trade Union of the workers' choice and the Management of the employing company."¹³⁵ When the *Inglis Steelworker* appealed to workers to support a union recognition strike in Galt, Ontario, it urged them to give a day's pay "to win this fight for the democratic rights of workers on the home front."¹³⁶

The right to a voice was seen as an essential element of "freedom." For example, deploying the language of the "people's war," with its talk of freedom, democracy, and equality, Millard told workers: "Collective bargaining is where labour meets management on equal terms, as free men.... Workers join unions not just for economic gains but to gain that freedom so dear to freedom-loving men, the freedom to call our souls our own."¹³⁷ "We ask, as free men, the right to join the union of our choice," read a Petroleum Workers' brief to government in 1943.¹³⁸

A voice in the affairs of the nation was also workers' right, the CIO said. Initially, the CIO demand was for labour representation on the various agencies, boards, and commissions that Ottawa set to run the national war effort. The 1939 CIO conference argued that such representation would "eliminate the injustices and dangers which confront our people."¹³⁹ In 1939, however, there was no reference to such a "voice" being labour's right, one grounded in the citizenship of the country's working class. By 1943, however, as the CIO grew in numbers, its language had changed to incorporate such notions. "As there are millions of us," said a UAW paper, "it is only natural that we should demand to have a rightful place in the seats of the mighty."¹⁴⁰

As it argued for labour to have voice in the political arena, the CIO used the war as a rhetorical lever to persuade workers of the wisdom of joining a union by emphasizing in its organizing literature, especially later in the war, when post-war reconstruction became a preoccupation, that a strong labour voice would mean a better Canada for working people. The collective voice of labour, the CIO said, would ensure that post-war Canada would be more sympathetic to the needs of working-class Canadians than had been the case before the war. "Workers will need unions more than ever in the post-war period," a UAW paper told employees at Massey-Harris. "Only through their unions can workers gain a voice in determining that all the many difficult problems to be faced in the post-war period will be solved with full consideration for the wage earner."¹⁴¹ "These [post-war] problems can be met if we in the labour movement can close our ranks, organize the unorganized, develop our political rights and make our voice heard in the Governments throughout this country," Jackson told UE activists.¹⁴² "The Common People of this and other lands have yet to come into their own," Millard told workers. "Securing [a better world] depends on our strength, and our strength

depends on our organization. Organize industrially! Organize politically! Organize to make our wish come true!"¹⁴³ Millard made a special appeal to women workers at a "jam-packed" mass organizing meeting, saying they, too, had a role to play in the making of the post-war world. Whether or not they decided to stay in the workforce after the war, he told them, their "willingness to organize into unions to improve wages and working conditions would be a determining factor in the kind of post-war world we live in."¹⁴⁴

The notion that workers were the Canadians fighting the war and producing the weapons of war suffused this discourse. "Because it's our war, yours and mine, we are the ones that are going to fight it, make the machines of war, buy Victory Bonds, buy war savings stamps. And pay for it and die for it — and that is why we should have some say in how it is going to be won," wrote Local 439 activist Fred Brookes in the local's paper.¹⁴⁵ Declared a leaflet distributed to Metallic workers in their 1942 organizing drive: "This is our war, and the peace that follows it must be our peace.... Workers, who are the largest section of the community, should have the largest say in what is done. We have not had this say in the past because we were not organized to make our voice heard."¹⁴⁶

CIO leaflets portrayed the CIO as workers' best chance for securing a better life for all Canadians after the war. "Only through their union can workers gain a voice in determining that all the many difficult problems to be faced in the post-war world will be solved with full consideration for the wage earner," asserted a UAW organizing leaflet in late 1942. "You, by joining the UAW can become part of organized labour and help make certain that both the front-line and the production-line soldiers will get a real break after this war."¹⁴⁷ CIO writers portrayed their organization as key to working-

class success: "The labour movement is going to be the greatest single factor in bringing you the kind of country you hope for," said the *Aircraft Worker*.¹⁴⁸ If workers rallied to their union, argued *Ford Facts*, they could "build a mighty force which both Government and Industry will recognize as our guardian in the present and post-war period and guarantee that all the sorrowful sacrifices have not been made in vain."¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, labour's voice was the true voice of the nation, said the CIO. "Labour's voice should and must be heard clearly," Burt said. "The interests of labour and the basic effectiveness of the nation are intertwined and are alike in danger and in peril."¹⁵⁰ By late in the war, labour frequently claimed it was advocating for all Canadians, not just its members. When labour demanded laws mandating union security and collective bargaining, it was acting on "items of concern to the entire trade union movement and the Canadian people." Union proposals for post-war full employment and a guaranteed annual income were described as "a mission" that was "for the benefit of Canada and all Canadians."¹⁵¹ Said Mosher in his 1944 Labour Day message: "Labour wants nothing for itself it does not desire for every other element in the nation; labour is opposed to nothing that is beneficial to the general welfare."¹⁵² The corollary argument was that the CIO spoke for other Canadians. As the UE's Jackson said, his union's post-war program was shared by all Canadians: "These are our objectives," he said, "and they coincide with the full interest of our Nation and its people"¹⁵³ In March 1944, the editor of the *War Worker* said the union's demands for post-war jobs and security were "only a few of the things we must demand for all Canadians."¹⁵⁴

Parliamentary politics was one method for labour to use its voice to effect labour-friendly laws, said CIO writers — who exhibited great faith in the liberal democratic

system — as long as workers voted their interests. “We the people, by means of our ballot, can determine the destiny of Canada in the Post-War era. Government to be truly democratic, must be authorized and directed from the bottom, not from the top,” *Local 439 News* told its readers, urging workers to vote for labour candidates in an upcoming election.¹⁵⁵ Arguing that governments had to respond to the ballot box, a Steel Workers leaflet told worker at Inglis: “There are thousands in Canada who face the same ‘after war’ prospect that you do. It would be a foolish government that will not do something about it.”¹⁵⁶ As a result of this sense of the potential of working-class power at the ballot box, CIO writers regarded the vote almost as a religion, especially in view of the war. “To retain this privilege,” wrote Local 439 President George Goodwin, “we are now fighting the most costly and terrible War in history; to retain this privilege our sons, brothers and others dear to us are dying on foreign soil. You have a duty to perform TO VOTE! Let it not be said that one member of Local 439 shirked his plain duty in this regard.”¹⁵⁷ Noting that both mainstream political parties were talking about collective bargaining legislation, the editor of *Steel Labor* said in 1943 that “the cowing [sic] on Liberals and Tories by these matters speaks to the wisdom of the USWA going into direct political action to elect its own supporters and members.”¹⁵⁸

“When workers have a voice, democracy will be fulfilled”

Workers’ having voice was essential to a robust democracy, the CIO argued, and linked its goal of winning greater workplace democracy to the nation’s defence of political democracy. “In the struggle of Canadian workers to maintain and extend our democracy, side by side with those in active service, it is only fit a proper that they shall share democracy’s dividends,” read the November 1939 conference paper.¹⁵⁹ The CIO’s

democratic "crusade," as described in the paper, was ambitious. It included changing the very mentality of workers about their status by bringing "real [meaning economic and workplace] democracy into the very homes and souls of our people."¹⁶⁰ Yet in 1939 the CIO's actual claim on government to respond to workers' interests was not yet rooted in the language of rights but only in contracts, with the CIO merely asking that Ottawa stipulate in all war contracts that employers bargain collectively with their employees and their unions.¹⁶¹ During the war, however, the CIO's definition of democracy would increasingly include talk about workers' rights, as the nation's war effort against a dictatorial and racist enemy became all-consuming. Conroy turned the government's characterization of the war as a "people's war" to advantage: "Without labour, the war could not be won...We are told it's a people's war. You can't tell labour it's a people's war and deny them participation,"¹⁶² said Conroy.

The war supplied CIO writers with ample ammunition in its battle for "democracy." The CIO at times linked its own fight for industrial democracy directly with the war aim of defending political democracy. "We may have political freedom, but we have industrial dictatorship," objected Burt after being jailed for walking a Chrysler picket line in 1940.¹⁶³ "Our members have shown by joining the services that they are willing to fight Hitlerism abroad. We feel we have a responsibility of keeping Hitler doctrines from gaining a foothold in Canada through powerful corporations who use their strength against the democratic institutions of this country," he said.¹⁶⁴ Citing American President Franklin Roosevelt's famous "Four Freedoms" speech encapsulating Allied war aims, a union editorial noted that, "A union brings the four freedoms to industry. It provides an avenue of free expression of worker opinion. A union protects the workers in the exercise of his religious freedom, and prevents

discrimination because of race or colour. ...it is a bulwark against freedom from want and provides workers with organization, whereby they no longer fear the economic strength and domination of their employer."¹⁶⁵

In the midst of a war being fought for democracy, the CIO used "democracy" as an argument for union recognition. "What does the union stand for?" a local union editor asked rhetorically. "It stands for 'Industrial Democracy.' The democratic rights which [a worker] enjoys as a free citizen, vanishes [sic] when he enters the factory gates. Unless he has [union] protection he is subject to the arbitrary whims and rules of his employer, over who he has no control whatever."¹⁶⁶ Defending the closed shop, the editor of *Ford Facts* similarly linked political democracy with "industrial democracy," declaring that far from restricting workers' freedom, the closed shop was the "highest form of industrial democracy since it extends the basic principle of majority rule to the field of unionism."¹⁶⁷

There was a striking corollary to this argument; namely, that unions educated workers in democracy. It appeared in the testimony of Packinghouse Workers spokesperson R.J. Smith before the Ontario Select Committee in 1943. One of the weaknesses of company unions, he argued, was their undemocratic nature. "Paternalism, even the benevolent form, is not good for any group, man or woman. ...Workers must take an active and intelligent interest in the affairs of their community, if democracy is to be maintained, and interest in the problems of their industry and fellow workers is a good place for them to begin," he said.¹⁶⁸ Jackson regarded union education directed towards UE members as "developing our membership to full citizenship, understanding and responsibility."¹⁶⁹

As the war progressed, talk about rights entered the union discourse more explicitly and more frequently. In its 1939 conference paper, the CIO, with Canada still mired in depression, talked about the right to work as a fundamental democratic right but its human rights demands were limited to CIO objections to employers' dismissing immigrant workers because of their foreign births.¹⁷⁰ As the war went on, however, references to worker rights and human rights appeared increasingly in union literature, perhaps because the racist nature of the enemy had become clearer, perhaps because Communists in the labour movement, usually better-versed on issues of race and gender, became fully committed to the war effort. The *War Worker*, for example, in 1942 reported proudly that the UAW convention that year had called for "an end to discrimination against negro workers in the plant, in addition to equal pay for women workers." The union's objective, a page-one sidebar to the story told workers, was "to unite in one organization regardless of religion, race, creed, color, political affiliation or nationality all employees under the jurisdiction of the International union."¹⁷¹ Imploring readers to remember that "first of all and above all, we are all Canadians," a UAW editorial told its readers that as union members "we all want the same things for our country whether we are Canadians of English, Irish, French, Polish, or any other descent."¹⁷²

Increasingly the CIO defined workplace rights as fundamental human rights. As Conroy argued before the Ontario Select Committee, workers had a human right to organize and a right to sit across the bargaining table with their employers on an equal basis. "Man must be recognized as a definite entity in the industry itself on the basis of equality.... The company feeling they are entitled to run an enterprise from the top down is morally wrong...." Using the war as his moral lever, Conroy warned the

committee that human rights could not be denied forever, that just as human beings were resisting Hitler's classification of some people as inferior, so would workers. "[An employer] cannot grind individuals into a mechanism of his own choosing because human beings will rebel," he said.¹⁷³ In fact, Canadian union activists used arguments similar to those made by African-American leaders during the war when African-American soldiers were denied the democracy at home they were fighting for overseas. Army private and former UAW organizer Jimmy Napier, for example, told De Havilland workers at a meeting just before he shipped overseas that he was "going over to fight for the democracy that was denied to [him] at home." Napier told workers that, after defeating fascism abroad, "We will have to defeat it at home...the interests of workers and soldiers, regardless of race, color or creed, must be united to defeat industrial dictatorship."¹⁷⁴

"When democracy is fulfilled Canada will be modernized"

The CIO's depiction of the nature of Canada was complex. On the one hand, said the CIO, Canada as a political democracy, was "one of the free nations of the world,"¹⁷⁵ and there were frequent references in CIO literature to the "democratic traditions of the Canadian people."¹⁷⁶ As a stout advocate of the United Nations, Canada, the CIO said, was a progressive force internationally.¹⁷⁷ It was, furthermore, rich – a country of "illimitable wealth" in Burt's words.¹⁷⁸ Since the country was "one of the most lavishly endowed nations on earth, with a small population in a huge country well-equipped with natural resources... We can be a people with the best standard of living in the world, if we wake up and assert our rights as citizens," wrote a Massey-Harris local

union member.¹⁷⁹ "Canada should be the land of milk and honey," wrote a UE activist.

180

It was a country worthy of loyalty: "I love the land of my birth," wrote one worker to the De Havilland local union paper. "I consider her one of the greatest, cleanest, most humane nations on God's green earth."¹⁸¹ "We Canadians want a big future for a big country," wrote one union columnist in 1945.¹⁸² There was particular pride in the country's war effort. Isabel Warren, a UAW editor at De Havilland, wrote about the "almost unbelievable development in Canadian industry... The eyes of the world have been on Canada's war effort."¹⁸³

The portrait that CIO writers painted of Canada had its shadows, however, and they often portrayed Canada as backward and behind the times, especially with respect to labour relations. Governments everywhere were addressing the inequities created by modern industry, a UAW editor wrote in 1940, everywhere but in Canada. Pointing out that the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and France had all brought in labour relations legislation recognizing the right to organize, the writer emphasized that even "Germany, before the Nazis, had labour courts."¹⁸⁴ A UAW delegation told Ontario Premier Connant in 1943 that "Ontario is a backward province concerning labour legislation."¹⁸⁵ A UAW editorial pointed out the lamentable results of Canada's backwardness: a unionization rate of 12 per cent, compared to 100 per cent in New Zealand and 80 per cent in Britain.¹⁸⁶ The UE's editor told readers that while the Canadian labour movement was struggling to give its all for victory, it found itself "stymied by a government policy which fails to guarantee even a remote semblance of the rights accorded and guaranteed the workers of Britain and the United States."¹⁸⁷ Equal pay for women was similarly argued, with union editors pointing out that

jurisdictions in both the United States and Britain had recognized equal pay for women, some as early as the First World War.¹⁸⁸

The CIO also told its readers that working conditions were backward in Canada. The UE paper, for example, ran an editorial condemning Canada for failing to keep up with the United States and Britain in recommending shorter hours of work: workers in Canada were routinely working 12-hour shifts even in government-owned war plants, a situation exacerbated by wages so low that workers had to work long hours to make up for them.¹⁸⁹ "These are problems for government," wrote one UAW editor, "and it seems every government is thinking of them but ours here in Canada."¹⁹⁰ Canada's low unionization rate led to another symptom of backwardness: wages so low that Canada was "a back door for any kind of American employer who wants to exploit cheap labour," in the words of one UAW activist.¹⁹¹ Unlike in the United States, a UAW Canadian delegate told a largely-American convention, in Canada, "It is illegal to strike, we have concentration camps for labour leaders... and labour has no say in government boards."¹⁹² A UE editor told readers the wage difference between Canada and the United States was "so startling, it led an American commentator to describe Canada as a 'well-ordered game preserve' for industry."¹⁹³ The war had offered an opportunity to bring Canada up to date, argued Local 439 executive member George Goodwin. "It is up to us, the working people to see that working conditions here in Canada are brought up to the United States' standard now, while the war is on. If we don't do it now, it can never be done."¹⁹⁴ A Packinghouse Workers spokesperson from Lever Brothers told the 1943 Ontario Select Committee how around the world the company had recognized unions, yet not in Canada. "The fear of unionization here was fear by Canadian management. They did not understand labour in every other part of the world and they

were afraid of it."¹⁹⁵ When the Ontario government suggested that school-leaving age be lowered from 16 years to 14 to increase child labour, a letter-to-the-editor in a union newspaper said, "Labour must protest this backward step."¹⁹⁶

The CIO put itself on the side of modernity. As a modern labour movement, the CIO said of itself, it matched the modern developments in industry. A 1939 resolution read: "The self-organization of Canadian workers into modern labour unions capable of dealing with vast combines of industry and capital is the fundamental and unalterable purpose of the CIO."¹⁹⁷ "Inglis is a modern, industrial, mass-production plant [and] needs a united industrial union," said one Steel Workers leaflet.¹⁹⁸ Unlike the craft unions, CIO unions were better suited to the "modern, mass production plant which takes in all workers regardless of craft," a Steel Workers organizer told workers in 1942.¹⁹⁹ Workers were becoming modern too: "And who is the common man?" asked a writer in the *Aircraft Worker*. "[He was] a slave rowing a galley, or he carried stones to build the pyramids, a serf... and now he has progressed to the point where he builds these magnificent machines, the Mosquito..."²⁰⁰

Not surprisingly the CIO described its demands on government and employers as demands for modernity. "Time to Modernize Collective Bargaining" was the headline on a story in the UAW newspaper, pointing out that the 1907 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act was 34 years old.²⁰¹ The recognition of unions was described as "a modern conception of labour relations."²⁰² When labour supporters urged Ontario to enact collective bargaining legislation, they called for a "modern bill," one in line with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.²⁰³ In a front-page story entitled "Modern Labour Policy Proposed in Ottawa Brief," the UAW's newspaper reported on the union's submission to National War Labour Board hearings in 1943. In its brief the union

attributed wartime industrial unrest to “unwise attempts to freeze the development of trade unions in the midst of tremendous industrial expansion.” The CIO, it implied, was part of a dynamic future. “It is only due to the extreme patience of workers...that attempts to hold their organizations static in a dynamic area of industrial society has not produced more work stoppages,” the brief said.²⁰⁴

The CIO linked itself to the nation by describing both itself and its objectives as nation-builders. The social and economic programs the CIO was advocating were not just part of workers’ future, said one union editorial, they were “essential to the national growth of Canada.”²⁰⁵ Workers joined the CIO, said one union leaflet, so they could “take a more active part in building and developing this great country of ours.”²⁰⁶ “It is squarely up to all of you to join [the union] and each do what you can to help make a better, more just, and tolerant Canada,” Local 439 president George Goodwin told workers in 1944.²⁰⁷

“A modern Canada will mean modern labour relations”

Modernity meant modern labour relations, and as the war progressed the CIO tended to define modernity as “cooperation” with employers. As unions were the “culminating growth of a great industry,” they meant labour and management could now cooperate,” read a union editorial.²⁰⁸ No doubt the CIO’s emphasis on cooperation reflected the desire of Canadian workers to maintain war production during a hard-fought conflict and the consequent need for CIO organizers to be sensitive to that when making their appeals. No doubt that was reinforced by the CIO’s need to incorporate the views of Communist activists, who gave priority to uninterrupted war production.

At least until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, however, militancy was the name of the game. In its 1939 conference document, the Canadian CIO pointed out that "in most instances collective bargaining has been established only after a strike. Labour has no recourse but to strike after exhausting all other avenues of peaceful negotiations."²⁰⁹ At that conference, a Steel Workers delegate from Toronto cut right to the chase with his colleagues. "There is no foundation for the idea that you can't strike in wartime," he said.²¹⁰ "Militancy of any trade union is its greatest assurance of success," read one organizing leaflet in 1941, reporting on a Steel Workers conference that had committed the union to demonstrating "the maximum of militancy commensurate with the degree of organization existing in the situation."²¹¹

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, however, when Communists in the labour movement began to argue for labour-management cooperation in aid of an all-out war effort in defense of the Soviet Union, Canadian CIO affiliates played a delicate game of balancing the American CIO's no-strike pledge with the actualities of Canadian labour law and worker militancy. CIO unions tread a fine line between arguing for harmonious relations with management while also arguing the need for militancy and non-cooperation when employers proved obdurate. The UAW, in which both Communists and social democrats were strong, had to be particularly nimble. "The Congress of Industrial Organizations is not merely the name of an industrial union, or International Union, but it is a symbol of militant rank-and-file unionism," declared a UAW Canadian Council resolution of May 1941 boasting of the union's fighting heritage. But, on the other hand, said the resolution, "Your union will not take a belligerent, antagonistic, smug, dictatorial, inflexible position on any issue...The UAW-CIO at all times means to be fair to members of the organization in getting for them the things they want and at

the same time be fair to management.”²¹²After a contract was signed, said the *Automobile Worker*, the job of the union was to “police the contract and make the union function effectively and efficiently....Rabble rousing becomes a thing of the past. Good relations have to be established. In so doing we do not become weak nor compromising, we become strong and independent.”²¹³ In spite of the strong language used in many organizing leaflets comparing business and managers to Hitler and Nazism, cooperation was the dominant theme in the CIO’s wartime literature about its vision of labour relations.²¹⁴ In the UAW’s 1944 “Win the Peace Plan,” the words “cooperation,” “partnership,” and “unity” appear 18 times in the three-and-a-half-page document.²¹⁵

The crusade, shared by Communist activists in all unions, for an “all-out war effort” and their almost incessant calls for an Allied Second Front in Europe may well have moderated labour’s views about both corporations and capitalism. The Communist-led UE told workers in all its organizing literature that it would adhere strictly to the no-strike pledge no matter what management provocation might be.”²¹⁶ At times, UE literature reads as though the reason to join a union was to help the war effort. “Will it help us win the war if I join the union?” asked UE organizer Dick Steele in a letter written from overseas to the *UE News*; his letter made no reference to wages or working conditions. “Will the union help to give our fighters more guns, planes, tanks, small arms, etc.? Will it help to cut down waste?...Undoubtedly in helping to build such a union, you are helping to win the war.”²¹⁷ The pledge on the reverse side of the UE application card asked prospective members to dedicate themselves to 10 actions, such as devoting all their energies “to the military defeat of Fascism”; developing “maximum war production”; and supporting “all necessary war measures and war services.” Only one of the 10 pledges spoke to workplace issues and then in a tangential way: “To

maintain standards and wages and conditions which guarantee a democratic total war, under conditions of peace of mind and high morale. ²¹⁸ In 1942, UE district council delegates voted to boost production voluntarily by 10 to 15 per cent "even if management opposed it."²¹⁹

The UE was not alone in making pro-production appeals, however. When Conroy, for example, who was professedly non-partisan, argued against suggestions that a general strike be called to support striking Stelco workers in the summer of 1943, he, too, invoked the war: "We are fighting a war for survival. Shall we let Hitler go...and concentrate our fight against the employers? If we do, what then will be result? There will be no more fight to be fought. Above all else, we must see to it that this war is won."²²⁰

In fact, with war production being their priority, some organizers' pro-production war rhetoric appeared designed to dampen worker militancy. A UAW leaflet to Metallic Roofing workers, distributed just after the 1943 Casablanca conference but before the UAW had won union recognition there, exhorted workers to exercise "production discipline" and not use any "wildcat tactics" because a grievance procedure "recognized by the Company and the Union will make possible the peaceful settlement of every dispute." Quoting the Conservative premier of Ontario the leaflet told workers that "we may work and plan for the production in Canada of the last tanks, the last aeroplane, the last gun, the last and utmost piece of munitions of which our resources, the ability of our industrialists and the skill of our working men and women are capable."²²¹

Labour cooperation, however, did have a catch in that it was premised on business and government entering into "partnership" with labor. That was the "deal"

the UE was offering. The UE said it would adhere to its no-strike pledge in the interests of "total war," but was explicit in its demand that in return business and government grant full "partnership" and recognition of labour rights.²²² As Jackson put it, the only guarantee of cooperation was for labour to be given "an important functional part to play in all the policy making bodies of the nation." CCL President Aaron Mosher, a CCF'er, also spoke to a "deal" that traded off militancy for a place at the table. He said the majority of Canadian workers agreed with the CCL that winning the war was the first priority, and by striking only as a last resort, the CIO unions would "win public support, which is essential to the attainment of our objectives."

"If we show that we are willing to sacrifice even our legitimate rights for the cause of democracy and freedom, we shall be in a position to insist upon receiving after victory has been won, everything we may reasonably demand and having full opportunity to play our part in the reconstruction of the social order along lines which will provide security and happiness for everyone," he said.²²³

While the CIO in Canada did not adopt the American no-strike pledge, support for Labour-Management Production Committees (LMPCs) was official CIO policy in Canada. Organizers told workers that total war required total production, which could only be brought about by labour-management cooperation. But, as Burt noted in 1942, few locals had set LMPCs up in spite of UAW headquarter pressure, possibly because workers weren't interested. Burt himself was ambivalent about the committees. "We may as well realize the fact that workers are more interested in protecting what they have and extending those benefits than in something which so far is only a popular theory," he told the union's Canadian district council in 1942, wondering out loud how many resources to divert to the project, "which in my opinion has doubtful

organizational value."²²⁴ (Burt also worried that organizing workers into these committee as a means of eventually organizing them into a union would border on "company unionism."²²⁵)

Significantly, the CIO believed the ethos of "cooperation" should survive the war. Long before such bureaucratizing measures as union security and government recognition laws had, as has been argued by other scholars, reduced the militancy of the labour movement, the CIO's proposals for the post-war social contract were already less than radical. Urging cooperation among management, government, and labour, the UAW in 1944 called for the expansion of export and domestic markets for its members' products. "Our peace-slogan," said the union, is "a car for every family! A car and a tractor for every farm!"²²⁶ Furthermore, the union said, "At no time do we challenge the right of the owners of industry to manage the plants in which our members are found."²²⁷ The UE shared the UAW's comparatively conservative view of the post-war economic system. There was an element of pragmatism in the UE's offer, the recognition perhaps of the moderate views of Canadians because, as Jackson explained, "the majority of people in Canada from all walks of life and from all classes have the same general goal in mind, namely, security and a rising standard of living."²²⁸ "We must as realists accept the fact that we are going to continue to live under the profit system known as capitalism, for many years to come," Jackson told UE activists in 1945. "This is the thinking of the bulk of the people of Canada and the United States, and as such, it will of necessity be the prevailing mode of our economy," he said. The goal was to change the way that system worked, he said, so that it provided "greater guarantees of security to the people."²²⁹

A Massey-Harris writer also seemed to acquiesce to capitalism's permanence, telling workers the union could not win all the grievances workers filed against management because the company still owned and managed the plant and "certainly had something to say in the running of same."²³⁰ Union writers also assured workers that the idea was not to infringe on employer profits: "They will still make big profits, but it does mean that profits are more equally divided with the workers."²³¹ Nor were workers asking for a voice in actually running the company. "The worker does not seek to usurp management's function or ask for a place on the Board of Directors of concerns where organized," said the *Aircraft Worker*. "The worker through his union merely asks for his rights," defined by the writer as the right to negotiate wages and working conditions.²³² Partnership, rather than an adversarial industrial philosophy where relative bargaining power decided labor and management's essentially irreconcilable differences over the distribution of wealth and control, was the ethic of the day. "It is our job to help the worker," read the *War Worker* in 1943, "and in so doing we help production by bringing the worker and the employer closer together and showing them the great need they have for one another."²³³ The paper went on to complain that management's failure to keep its promises was endangering "harmony" in the face of union efforts to create a "friendly and cooperative relationship that would accomplish more than continuous friction and table pounding." In fact, underlying the language of harmony and cooperation was the notion of "order," a commodity that CIO leaders appeared to value highly. In its submission to the NWLB hearings in 1943, the UAW called for labour relations legislation that would "permit the orderly growth of the labour movement..."²³⁴ The CCL's Conroy argued that such legislation "would calm the excesses of both sides."²³⁵

Other forms of pragmatism were factored in the CIO's support for cooperation. The UE, for example, vowed to continue its wartime no-strike pledge after the war, reminding workers that unions had been "smashed" after the post-war strike wave in 1919. Cooperation would be the better path for workers to follow in the aftermath of the Second World War. "In the war period we have all gained through cooperation; in the post-war it is equally possible for all to continue that cooperation to our mutual benefit," the UE's director of organizing, Ross Russell, told union activists.²³⁶ In late 1944, Jackson explained his confidence in such cooperation taking place: "Many of the social and class relations that existed prior to this war have been changed so completely during this war period that we must of necessity re-evaluate our relationships to employers in terms of the peace that lies ahead."²³⁷ The labour movement should be prepared to make common cause with any group in society who wanted the same things labour wanted including employers, Jackson said.²³⁸

In its moderate demands the CIO revealed that it believed the aim of Canadian workers, who had suffered through a decade of severe economic depression and were fighting a second global conflict within the space of a generation, was nothing more ambitious than security. "Security" appeared countless times in CIO wartime records. Predominant "in the thoughts of the people of the world," said Jackson, "is the question of security, which is so desperately needed if we are to put our house in order and move forward to the broadest freedom for the common man."²³⁹ "After the war, we must inaugurate an economic order which will permit all Canadians to live in health and security," wrote Steel Workers organizer Eileen Tallman in a leaflet directed to Inglis workers.²⁴⁰ Indeed, said Millard, "security of employment after the war years was one of the most important long-term aims of the union."²⁴¹ "Security is the key to happiness,"

wrote a contributor to a UE local union paper, *On the Beam*. "On this basis lies the future of our generation..."²⁴² The Steel Workers urged workers at Inglis to join the union because the union as a vehicle that that allowed for "democratic planning for a secure post-war world."²⁴³ One worker explained what security meant to him in a letter-to-the-editor of his local's newspaper. "The first thing I want is security for my wife and kids. To have that security, I've got to have a job....I want my kids to have a decent break, decent education, a decent home, no more 'pogie', the right to call a doctor if they get sick without worrying about the bill. I'd like to see the old folks get a decent break and a pension they can live on."²⁴⁴ Union writers tied workers' personal security to the call for union security. "The first thing [a worker's dues] certainly does give us is SECURITY, and what does this do? It gives us something to lean on, [such as the grievance system]," wrote one union editor.²⁴⁵

But there were hints that some activists were impatient with the cooperation line. Murray Dowson, a union activist at De Havilland Aircraft, complained in a letter to the editor that the publication was too critical of workers who wanted the union to take a more aggressive policy vis-à-vis management. "The critical and militant tendencies in our union must be encouraged," he wrote. "Remember, the union movement was built on the dissatisfaction of the workers with rotten conditions. Our own CIO grew up on the criticisms of the inadequate methods and lack of militancy of the AF of L leadership."²⁴⁶ In the same issue, a local union poet spoke for Dowson's side when he wrote about the post-war period and the need for the labour movement to force business and government to keep their promises to workers and returning soldiers: "We'll make them keep those vows, make them do their stuff/If we can't move them gently, we can treat them rough."²⁴⁷ Only a minority of union writers, however, called for the abolition

of capitalism. Jack Burnside in the Massey-Harris newspaper said that ordinary people had to take up destructive arms against fascism, but “what about the greedy, mad men who drive us into war? Why not destroy the profit-hunting, man-slaying, unemployment and war breeding system...?”²⁴⁸

But such a radical change in the nation’s social contract did not have the support of the majority of union organizers, writers, and editors. Conroy may have asserted that the fundamental causes of the war were economic insecurity and injustices in capitalist countries, but he called for “partnership” to correct them.²⁴⁹ His demand was not for worker control of industry but public ownership—and only if industry refused to cooperate. “If industry is an obstacle to full employment,” he wrote, “then private ownership will have to be replaced with public ownership.”²⁵⁰

Most of the CIO’s vision for the post-war social contract rested not on transformed power relations among the classes but on the emerging notion that if government money could be found for war, it could be found for people. One union editorial said that if governments in Canada found the same finances “for peacetime necessities as is being found for the war” it would constitute “victory at home.”²⁵¹ As the *Inglis Steelworker* told recruits: “If we can spend money on war, similar planning and social expenditures on the needed necessities of peace can keep unemployment and low wages away from our land when the war is over.”²⁵² This theme was perhaps best expressed by a local union poet: “But had the war lasted ten more years/And you all know this to be so/That our government then would have found/A way to rustle up the dough./So the only deduction to take from this/And this really is a honey/To get us killed, a million dollars a day/To keep us employed, no money.”²⁵³

“A modern Canada will bring beneficent government”

Thus, the CIO attitude towards government was ambivalent. On the one hand government was seen as being captive of business and pro-business politicians as reactionaries, advocating a world where “pot-bellied millionaires control everything and whose slogan is ‘Billions for War but not a damn thing for Peace’.”²⁵⁴ Government, furthermore, had been unsympathetic and unresponsive during the Great Depression. The *Aircraft Worker* printed a letter from a former member serving overseas recalling how government had not taken action during the Depression. “Our government did nothing to protect us in those years,” he reminded his readers. “To them we were a problem they did not care to solve.”²⁵⁵

But while the CIO believed that big business controlled government, it did not believe, however, that government was inherently hostile to labour. As one union editorial pointed out, referring to the New Deal and Wagner Act in the United States: "Our American cousins were much less harshly dealt with. They happen to have a government with a heart."²⁵⁶ Examples of what government could and should do came, came not just from the pre-war New Deal, but at least as importantly, they also came from the wartime United Kingdom. Union newspapers carried frequent stories and references to government developments in the United Kingdom that were favourable to labour, including the 1942 Beveridge Report, considered to the founding document of the British welfare state. Union papers often described the success of Britain's industrial war effort, which the CIO attributed to the Churchill government's "partnership" with labour, illustrated by the presence of Labour Party titan, Ernest Bevan, in its War Cabinet.

The CIO told workers that through liberal democracy, it was possible for Canadians to elect a government more responsive to their needs. The Canadian people could vote for a government, "which will administer Canadian affairs in the interests of the majority, not in the interests of the minority as is the case at present," averred a UAW editorial.²⁵⁷ Wrote a contributor to *Local 439 News*: "Canada belongs to the people, so let us have a government in power who will see that we workers get a fair share of the things that are rightfully ours."²⁵⁸

The CIO's faith in government had grown with the nation's war effort. In 1939, the CIO's legislative program was minimal; it did not even include a demand for Wagner Act-type legislation but merely that Ottawa require government war contractors to recognize worker-chosen unions at their workplace. By the end of the war, however,

the CIO's vision of government had expanded considerably. Using the Beveridge Report as a model,²⁵⁹ it included, in addition to comprehensive labour legislation, a wide range of social security measures, state-run and financed full-employment programs and national programs for health insurance, childcare, housing, fuel, transport, and food. The CIO wanted to nationalize the banking and finance sectors and bring private radio broadcasting under public ownership. The CIO looked at the material changes the sheer scale of war had wrought and noted that the war had transformed Canada from "primarily an agricultural nation to one of the greatest industrial nations in the world," as Mosher told a 1944 CCL convention. "To convert this enormous national economy from wartime to peacetime basis," he said, "it will be necessary to place the financing and operation and control of the entire economic system under the control of the State."²⁶⁰ The productive capacity that the nation had developed during the war should be utilized for the "common good" after the war, said the *Inglis Steelworker*, through public ownership and control of monopoly industry.²⁶¹ That ordinary workers were responding to this argument could be indicated in a letter-to-the-editor to the *Inglis Steelworker*, which said there was in Canada "enough wealth to go around, provided the Machinery of Government is used to organize and guide us to that end, not as now, in the manipulated interests of some few greedy individuals."²⁶² Nor did the CIO demands shrink from intrusive levels of government: the wartime VD panic produced CIO calls for mandatory medical exams prior to marriage and compulsory VD exams for all adults.²⁶³

The CIO argued that human rights were government's responsibility, calling for laws counteracting racial and religious discrimination; making anti-Semitism a "punishable crime"; extending full citizenship to native people; and guaranteeing equal

pay for women. In fact, the wartime language of "rights" infused the CIO's ideas about the proper role of government. Conroy in 1945 was saying that government should legislate vacations with pay because they were workers' "moral right."²⁶⁴ Similarly, the CCL's Political Action Committee used the language of rights in its 1944 legislative program. Canadians had "a fundamental right" to a job; they also had the right to an adequate income, decent housing, good health and adequate health care, as well as the right to "complete social security" and education.²⁶⁵

The CIO deployed wartime rhetoric in much of its advocacy for larger government. "Organized workers will not be satisfied with any less vigorous effort to defeat our greatest peacetime enemy, involuntary poverty, than is now being made to defeat the Nazi-Fascist gangsters in Europe and Asia...the fight against poverty and all its trains of evils will require the same spirit of cooperation, the same large-scale planning and the same determination to win through to victory," Mosher told a CCL convention in 1943.²⁶⁶ The war had shown the sheer scope of what government could accomplish. "The realm of the possible has been widely extended by the experience and the lessons of the war [and] ancient barriers to progress have been proven to be illusions," Mosher said in 1944, calling for "a social order which will be worthy of the sacrifices which this war has demanded and the hopes of those who paid the price of freedom...."²⁶⁷ Furthermore, the war had proven that improvements in social conditions were affordable, for the government had found money to fight the war. "It should be obvious to every thinking person that the favourite excuse of the politicians during the last depression, that there was no money to provide work and wages, was utterly without foundation....," he said.²⁶⁸

The war had also, to some extent, trained the CIO in looking to government for support for its objectives. The IDIA, however irksome, had in fact allowed for the de facto and eventually the actual recognition of unions, especially in workplaces where, before the war, the IDIA had not been in place.²⁶⁹ In 1941, for example, Burt was telling the UAW's International Executive Board that the union in Canada was calling strikes in order to wrest not just conciliation services (and therefore the possibility of union recognition) from government but "more cooperation" from labour department officials.²⁷⁰ In fact, as the war went on, many provisions in collective agreements — such as seniority clauses, union shop status, and dues check-off arrangements — were the result of the intervention of wartime labour boards and officials.²⁷¹ The CIO unions over the course of the war had needed to learn and did learn how to use government mechanisms to reach key workplace objectives. As Burt pointed out in 1943, "before the war it was possible to settle most problems locally, but with the maze of procedure that is necessary to follow at the present time, it is all the more necessary for our membership to be conversant with the procedures of War Labour Boards and other Government agencies."²⁷² Government regulations during the war had in some cases found strong support with the CIO; and resolutions to CCL conventions in the war's later years called for continuation of many war-created programs, such as technical and training programs developed during the war, public ownership of some industries, and controls over the economy.²⁷³

As the CCL's Political Action Committee told workers in 1944, ensuring a secure post-war world was the reason for the CIO to enter politics. "It has become increasingly clear that if workers are to enjoy freedom from want and freedom from fear, organized labour must once and for all definitely adopt a positive political attitude. It must take

part in the political struggles of the day," the committee's report said.²⁷⁴ "It is because the labour movement realizes the importance of prompt and energetic action to prevent a return to the pre-war economic system that they have shown such a deep interest in the development of political power," Mosher told a 1944 CCL convention. The "primary purpose of a labour organization is to protect and promote the economic interests of workers." While this work would be done chiefly at the bargaining table, he said, "the development of political machinery is nothing more than an extension of the general purpose of labour."²⁷⁵ In other words, labour needed an expanded government regime in the public sector to bolster and insure its successes in the private sector. As well, the CIO's wartime failure to persuade government through lobbying efforts to bring in permanent labour legislation moved the CIO to urge its locals and members to become involved in politics. Like it or not the CIO believed, such legislation was needed if labour were to retain its wartime strength post-war. The ferocity of employer resistance to unionization and plans to move on the CIO once PC 1003 had expired with the conclusion of the war was evidence of such a need.²⁷⁶ Furthermore, there was evidence that even the promise of such legislation made a difference in organizing. The UE's Canadian secretary-treasurer, George Harris, said that Ontario's proposed collective bargaining bill, for example, was proving a vital organizing tool in plants where the union had failed to attain a majority because it "removed one of the main obstacles to organizing: workers' fear of joining a union."²⁷⁷ Above all, the entry of the CIO into politics had made a difference, asserted the Steel Workers, noting that both mainstream political parties were taking a leftward turn by 1943 in response to CCF successes in Ontario and in public opinion polls. "This...speaks to the wisdom of the USWA going to direct political action to elect its own supporters and members," said the *Inglis*

Steelworker.²⁷⁸ There was some truth to this claim. By 1943, the Ontario Liberal government was planning to introduce a labour bill providing machinery for union recognition and employer obligation to enter into collective bargaining with recognized unions. Significantly, Ontario Labour Minister Peter Heenan announced that such a law would endure past the war, indicating that politicians had taken note of the CCF's growing strength and voters willingness to elect CIO activists to the Legislature.²⁷⁹ "We will face the same problems after the war," he told the 1943 Ontario Select Committee. "If [such a law] is helpful in wartime, it will be helpful in peacetime" to prevent strikes, he said.

Labour was acutely aware that capital was entering the political fray, with corporate executives, such as John Inglis Co. vice-president Bert Trestrail, forming a committee to persuade Canadians of the value of private enterprise, "now cleverly referred to as 'free enterprise,'" a Steel Workers writer noted waspishly. "Canadian employer and THEIR union, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association are getting pretty scared," he wrote, referring to the growth of the CIO and swelling support for the CCF.²⁸⁰ In its leaflets to workers, the Steel Workers said, management at Inglis was describing as a "fifth columnist" anyone who wanted to win the war for a workers' republic. "If this is NOT a workers' war, who is doing the fighting?" the union response read. "And if they don't organize NOW for a new social order – what you call a workers' republic if you will – in order to make that shining goal of 'peace, freedom, and bread' a reality, they would be a lot more stupid than we suspect management thinks they are."²⁸¹

As the labour movement turned to political action later in the war, publicity became even more important as public opinion became seen as a critical factor in the

labour's movement's success in winning what it considered to be life-or-death legislative gains. Noting that the Canadian Manufacturer's Association had opposed Ontario's proposed collective bargaining legislation a UAW editor said it was "the weight of public opinion" that had led the government to bring in a genuine labour bill in 1943 and urged union members to become even more active in the public realm.²⁸² As for the CIO's broader social goals, Mosher told CIO leaders, "The transformation of the economic system from a competitive to a cooperative basis is too big an undertaking for the labour movement alone. It is necessary to have the goodwill and support of all forward-looking citizens."²⁸³

Either out of patriotism or from a desire to earn favour with the public (or both), unions followed Harry Rowe's advice and participated energetically in war work, with union leaders taking on high-profile roles in Victory Bond drives, to help "the trade union movement get some sound publicity."²⁸⁴ Burt urged every UAW local to set up a publicity committee to publicize union gains, programs, and decisions that affected their community.²⁸⁵ Unions asked members to help labour-short farmers with their 1943 harvest and publicized the request.²⁸⁶ As organizations, CIO affiliates bought Victory Bonds and urged their members to buy them as individuals,²⁸⁷ and union leaders such as Burt spoke over the radio urging Canadians to buy bonds, while managing "to put in a plug for the union."²⁸⁸ The union paper at Massey-Harris noted proudly that 92.4 per cent of workers had bought bonds in the spring 1945 drive, averaging \$114 a person. "That's Our Way of Talking to Hitler" was the paper's sign-off.²⁸⁹ Local unions were energetic supporters of community war work efforts. UAW Local 222, in addition to buying bonds, contributed to the Red Cross, the Soldiers' Fund, the War Relief Committee, the British War Victims' Fund, and the Community Win the War Appeal. Its

women's auxiliary was considered the most active group in Oshawa's war effort.²⁹⁰ Union women's auxiliaries affiliated with local councils of women to help with their war work; sometimes they served as representatives on local wartime prices and trade boards.²⁹¹ UAW Local 200, with about 14,000 members, persuaded 10,680 of them to donate blood and then publicized the results.²⁹² Locals held membership meetings to talk about "Labour and the War."²⁹³ And while the labour movement in the First World War had been opposed to the military draft, unions stumped hard for members to vote in favour of conscription in 1942, and the UAW urged its locals to set up plebiscite committees, called "Win the War" committees.²⁹⁴

Unions often cited the number of their members who had enlisted as proof of their contribution to the war effort.²⁹⁵ Sergeant Gordon Fountain, who was a former member of UAW Local 89, the *Automobile Worker* related proudly, had recruited an entire platoon for the Essex Scottish regiment.²⁹⁶ When union members, especially local labour leaders or well-known labour activists, joined the services, their enlistment was often front-page news for union papers.²⁹⁷ Local 112 participated in the largest recruiting parades in Toronto's history in April 1942, working with the company on a float.²⁹⁸ New enlistees in the armed forces from plants were sent off with hearty congratulations from the local union papers.

At the national level, the UAW took out large advertisements in mainstream dailies extolling the war production records of organized plants, its record in avoiding work stoppages, and its cooperation with management.²⁹⁹

In addition to gaining public support through publicity measures, the CIO unions also sought community support directly by enlisting community groups to buttress their case in the public arena. "What are the channels through which a union may direct its influence in the field of political action?" asked Drummond Wren, the UAW's education director in 1944. His advice was for the union to become active in community groups in order to "stay in touch with the discussions taking place and convey to committee members labour's views."³⁰⁰ The UAW was not alone in its campaign to publicize the union's policies and programs through community involvement. As Jackson told his district council in late 1943, "Our Union must begin to play a basic community role... bringing to the general public a full program of the meaning of the trade union struggles [by] the development of broad educational forums for the membership and the general public...and the integration of our Locals into the general stream of public activity in the community."³⁰¹

Consequently, when Thomas Robb of Niagara Falls presented a brief arguing to the 1943 Ontario Select Committee on Collective Bargaining, he took pains to explain that while he was a union member, the brief came from "a committee of citizens of the Niagara Falls area," and the committee had elected him, an ex-serviceman to boot, to present the brief. Leaders from the United Church presented briefs on behalf of collective bargaining, arguing that it was a fundamental right based on the church's "affirmation of the worth and dignity of the individual man."³⁰² Unions approached local government to win support for labour legislation, and city councils passed resolutions endorsing collective bargaining because unions were proving themselves assets in "stabilizing industrial relations to the advantage of the community."³⁰³ The YWCA and YMCA were valuable allies, not just supporting labour's demands for

collective bargaining rights but dedicating “Y” facilities and staff time to the labour movement.³⁰⁴ Union locals made sure that individual members served on such community groups as the Brantford Wartime Recreational Council, partly because it did not want such committees “to become union busting organizations.”³⁰⁵ A few months after winning recognition, Local 200 reported that two of its leaders had been named to Windsor’s war effort committee, the first time that Ford workers had ever been asked to participate. “We are becoming as broad as possible in our activities to spread the gospel of trade unionism,” wrote the editor.³⁰⁶

Union papers provide a glimpse of how revolutionary it was to include unions in such community endeavours. It was a “celebrated occasion,” chuckled the *Automobile Worker*, when a prominent citizen asked who the stranger was at the meeting of Brantford’s Victory Bond committee and was told he was from the CIO. The stranger was put in charge of factory collections, and Brantford raised 45 per cent more money than before, the paper reported.³⁰⁷

Conclusion

The CIO’s narrative of the nation’s workers and warriors fighting common enemies in order to win a modern, more compassionate country was “present at the creation” and, as an organizing strategy, was integral to the young organization’s early growth in Canada. It was a narrative that combined union militancy with subservience to national duty; it was a story rooted in the Great Depression and two terrible global conflicts that had put – at least as far as CIO leaders observed – security at the top of workers’ list of needs. It was a tale that had to reconcile unionists’ bitter experience of government as a hostile force with the wartime revelation of government’s potential to

help advance the CIO's agenda. As a result, this was not a story of revolution, or radicalism but of reform; of parliamentarianism not syndicalism. It was a story told by union activists who were trying against fearsome opposition to organize workers in the middle of a massive national effort to prevail in a popularly supported and often desperately fought war. The CIO's narrative strategy, based on its pragmatic assessment of workers' own, and articulated, needs, aims, and experiences, helped produce the pragmatic labour movement of the post-war era. It was nonetheless a narrative that won workers' allegiance to their unions and raised the ante for politicians in meeting their own rhetoric of the "people's war."

¹ Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford, 1989), 116-128.

² A 1943 Office of Public Information Office Bulletin, for example, quotes the popular British war movie, *Mrs Miniver*, when invoking the call of the "People's War." See *Canada and the People's War* (Ottawa: Office of Public Information, 1943), 2. British historian Angus Calder says those who created the slogan believed the war would create a social revolution, not the least reason for which was the unprecedented demands on the whole population to help with the war effort. The war he, wrote, "exaggerated a tendency already noticed in World War One...and called for a participation that was wider, deeper, and longer, even embracing veterans and children." He argued that "the people... set off a ferment of participatory democracy...working towards a transformed post-war world." Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-1945* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), 17. For further discussion of the use of the "people's war" trope in Britain during the war, see Sonya Rose, *What People's war?: National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Ian MacLaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information* (London: George Allen University, 1979). William Young discusses how government officials quarreled over the application of the rhetorical device in Canadian propaganda efforts in his "Academics and Social Scientists versus the Press: The Politics of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, 1939-1945," *Canadian Historical Association Papers* 1978, 217-240, with those in favour of assuring Canadians the war effort would lead to a better life winning out, thanks to the social democratic leanings of the WIB's head, John Grierson. In the United States, on the other hand, those in government propaganda circles saying Americans would respond more patriotically to appeals to defend the American way of life won the argument over those who argued for

positioning the war effort as not just a question of defeating the enemy but of building a better life for all. Theodore S. Hamerow, "Women, Propaganda and Total War," *Reviews in American History* 7 (March 1979), 122-127, 125. For the full discussion of the American experience, see Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978) and Frank W. Fox, *Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-1945* (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 1975). The Australian government, on the other hand, followed the British and Canadian model. See Robert Crawford, "Nothing to Sell?: Australia's Advertising Industry at War, 1939-1945," *War and Society* 20 (May 2002), 99-124.

³ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, "Open House Day Address," 1.

⁴*Toronto Star*, May 22, 1929, "Yonge Street Becomes a Canyon of Cheering for Their Majesties," 1.

⁵LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, April 1939, "Hamburgh to Meet King and Queen," 1.

⁶CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 19, 1943, "Industrialists Striving to Stop Labour Growth," 4.

⁷*Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (Fall 1942), 492.

⁸In the minutes of the UAW's International Executive Board meetings, George Burt's voice almost never appears, and in the minutes of the International Union convention, rarely does one see speeches by Canadians, save for (the very infrequent) occasion when Canadian issues are being discussed – or when a Canadian delegate was demanding the Canadian flag share the platform with the American flag, a complaint that was repeated countless times, right up to the point when the Canadian UAW split from the American section of the union in 1984.

⁹The UAW in Canada asked for its own newspaper in 1943, but did not receive the go-ahead for an independent Canadian paper until 1974, the result of a surge of Canadian nationalism in the 1970s, which also required American-based international unions to allow Canadian sections of international unions to belong to global union organizations, such those sponsored by the International Metal Workers Federation, as Canadian entities, not as part of an American one. Another requirement was that the heads of Canadian affiliates be elected by Canadian union members, not by union-wide electorates. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting, April-December 1943, "Resolutions, December 1943," 3.

¹⁰LAC microfilm, *Steel Labor*, September 29, 1939, "Labor in America Wants No War," 7; *ibid.*, "Canadian CIO Unions Will Support Government," 1.

¹¹LAC, MG 28 I103, Canadian Congress of Labour, Volume 233, File 12, "Proceedings of Annual Convention, 1940." 11.

¹²Gary Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 278, 296-298. For more about American government propaganda see John M. Blum, *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II* (New York, 1976), who argues the war allowed white ethnic Americans to feel fully American; Richard Polenberg, *One Nation Divisible: Class, Race and Ethnicity in the United States Since 1938*

(Harmondsworth, 1980); and Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-45* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). For the overall impact of the American war effort on the CIO, see Nelson Lichtenstein, *Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War Two* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting, April-December 1943, "Minutes, June 1943," 12. Canadians who supported the strike pledge also used the argument of not striking so as not to betray the soldiers, but in Canada, CIO leaders and union publications, with the exception of the *UE News*, made the argument that strikes were needed as a last resort to protect working-class interests.

¹⁴ Paul Rutherford, "Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada," in David Flaherty and Frank Manning, eds., *The Beaver Bites Back?: American Popular Culture in Canada* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1993), 257-280.

¹⁵ **For Ottawa's propaganda efforts vis-a-vis ethnic and racial minorities, see William Young, "xxxxx**

¹⁶ For the notion of a propaganda "narrative," I am indebted to Fred Block, "A Moral Economy," *The Nation*, March 20, 2006.

¹⁷ Quotes from the UAW's George Burt and the UE's C.S. Jackson predominate in this section because the UAW and UE records are the most extensive and best preserved. The microfilm of the Canadian edition of *Steel Labor*, for example, has faded to the point of illegibility.

¹⁸ LAC, MG 28 Series I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Volume 1, File 3: CIO Coordinating Committee, "Minutes, June 27, 1939," 1.

¹⁹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meetings 1942, "Report, June 1942," 7. The UAW hired publicity people a full year before taking on Workers Educational Association leader Drummond Wren as its education director. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, August-December 1943, "Report," 12. AFL affiliates published union papers, based mostly in the United States, and presumably edited by specialist staff. The lack of AFL organizing in the 1930s may point, however, to its affiliates not concentrating on other kinds of publicity materials; the CIO's focus on public relations during the war could well have been a new initiative for unions.

²⁰ LAC, MG 28, I 268, United Steel Workers of American Volume 1, File 4: CIO Coordinating Committee – Reports, "Report CIO in Canada, July 12, 1939," 6.

²¹ LAC microfilm reel, Canadian Labour Congress, M-2338, "Proceedings of 1940 CCL Annual Convention," 34.

²² LAC, MG 28, I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 4, File 1: SWOC Correspondence, "Letter from Charles Millard to McDonald, December 23, 1940."

²³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, March 1942, "Minutes," 11.

²⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings June 1943, "Report," 5.

²⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943, "Report," 7.

²⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council January-June 1943, "Report, June 1943," 13.

-
- ²⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meetings, January-June, 1943, "Report, June 1943," 9.
- ²⁸ LAC, MG 28, I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 85, Scrapbook, 1940-41, "Clipping from *Toronto Telegram*, October 17, 1940."
- ²⁹ At times, however, UE literature seemed almost wholly preoccupied with the war effort, especially emphasizing the need for "all-out production" and a "Second Front" in Europe.
- ³⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1940, "Wage Increases for Canadians," 1.
- ³¹ LAC, microfilm, *War Worker*, March 9, 1944, "Opening of Ontario Legislature," 2.
- ³² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 241, Local 504, "Preliminary Brief to the Board of Conciliation and Investigation," c. Summer 1941, 2.
- ³³ LAC, MG 28 I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 4, File 9, UAW Local 112, (Part II), 1942-1943, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1942, "More Production," 2.
- ³⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 14, 1940, 3.
- ³⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, July 1, 1940, "Henry Ford Doesn't Care," 1.
- ³⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, July 1, 1940, "Henry Ford Doesn't Care," 1. Union papers also made much of the fact that Ford had accepted a medal from the Nazis.
- ³⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 1, 1942, "War Declared," 1.
- ³⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, August 5, 1942, "UAW Convention," 1.
- ³⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "First-rate Agreement Now in Operation," 4.
- ⁴⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 10, 1942, "Strengthen the Union for Greater War Production," 4.
- ⁴¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1942, "UAW Speeds Big Union Drive in Toronto," 1.
- ⁴² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, January 29, 1943, "Canada's Best War Production in UAW Organized Plants," 3.
- ⁴³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1942, "UAW Speeds Big Union Drive in Toronto," 1.
- ⁴⁴ LAC microfilm, *UE News*, July 4, 1942, "Answer Union Call," 1.
- ⁴⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 20, 1943, "UAW Program for Massey-Harris," 1.

-
- ⁴⁶ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employer and Employees*, 1943, 1450.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 464.
- ⁴⁸ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File, Metallic, 1941-42, "Letter from G.G. Complin, Manager, to all Employees," September 18, 1942.
- ⁴⁹ City of Toronto Archives (CTA), John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, February 19, 1943, "Unions Boost War Production," 4.
- ⁵⁰ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of the 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 26. In 1937 Ontario Liberal Premier Mitch Hepburn had fought a successful election on a platform that included a pledge to keep the CIO out of Ontario.
- ⁵¹ *Labour Gazette* 43 (December 1943), "Wage Controls," 1601.
- ⁵² CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, SWOC leaflet, April 16, 1943, "Ten Reason to Vote CIO."
- ⁵³ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, File, Metallic Roofing 1943 (d), *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 12, 1942, "10 New Contracts Signed," 2.
- ⁵⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Report, October 30-31, 1943," 4.
- ⁵⁵ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 4, 1943, "Steel Workers Executive Statement," 3.
- ⁵⁶ LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, August 17, 1942, "The Bogey Man," 2.
- ⁵⁷ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 296.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 296.
- ⁵⁹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942, "International Union," 1.
- ⁶⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office, Box 70, File, Report of Regional Director, 1939, "George Burt to George Addes, UAW Secretary-Treasurer, Nov. 13, 1939," 2.
- ⁶¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 10, 1940, 3.
- ⁶² Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of Select Committee*, 1008, 1017; and 406, 467. For "CIO Tyranny," see CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, *Steel Labor Canadian Edition*, February 26, 1943, "Editorial," 10.
- ⁶³ Support for the CCF, at eight per cent nationally in early 1941 had peaked at 29 per cent by Fall, 1943. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (Summer 1942), 308; *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1944), 290.
- ⁶⁴ *Labour Gazette* 41 (January 1941), "Bryce Stewart," 16.
- ⁶⁵ *Labour Gazette* 45 (July 1945), "Ontario Labour Relations Board," 1070.

-
- ⁶⁶ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 18, 1943, "Dorothy Thompson Answers Smear," 4.
- ⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, June 16, 1944, "About Women," 4.
- ⁶⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 2, 1943, "Bond Drive Goes Over the Top," 1.
- ⁶⁹ LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 20, 1943, "Women's View," 6.
- ⁷⁰ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 24, 1943, "Union Wives Unite for Victory," 2.
- ⁷¹ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, July 10, 1944, "Thoughts and Feelings From the Homes of Those on Active Service," 5.
- ⁷² LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, October 6, 1944, "For a Better Canada in the Post-War Years," 3.
- ⁷³ ALUA, UAW Bound Collection, Volume 17, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 1, 1941, "Why Veteran Wants Union in Ford Shop," 1.
- ⁷⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, June 6, 1942, "Union News and Views," 2.
- ⁷⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, December 6, 1944, "For a Better Canada in the Post-War Years," 3.
- ⁷⁶ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, February 7, 1945, "Forward to Social Security," 7.
- ⁷⁷ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, January 11, 1945, "Square Deal for Returned Men and Women," 1.
- ⁷⁸ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Reports of Meetings Held, 1942-43, "H.V. Waterhouse memo to Ainsworth, April 12, 1942."
- ⁷⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 139, "Officers' Report to District Council, October 27-28, 1944," 22.
- ⁸⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, January 29, 1943, "Vital Steel Production Will Gain from CIO Steel Workers Victory," 4.
- ⁸¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 15, 1942, "Equality of Sacrifice," 1.
- ⁸² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, August 8, 1942, "Things You Should Know," 2.
- ⁸³ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, May 7, 1945, "Letters from Overseas," 6.
- ⁸⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, August 1944, "Letter to Editor," 2.
- ⁸⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1943, "Ist UAW Member Addresses Steward Body," 1.
- ⁸⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1943, "Conroy Calls for Labour Partnership for War Effort," 3.
- ⁸⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 17, 1944, "As I See It," 5.
- ⁸⁸ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 18, 1943, "Dorothy Thompson Answers Smear," 4.

-
- ⁸⁹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942, "International Union," 1.
- ⁹⁰ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, Box 21, File: Clippings, Leaflets Distributed, 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 30, 1943, "Millard Speaks to Inglis Workers," 2.
- ⁹¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1943, "Conroy Calls for Partnership for War Effort," 3.
- ⁹² CTA, John Inglis Papers SC 297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, May 191943, "To Victory," 4.
- ⁹³ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, July 16, 1945, "Statement of Present Labour Relations," 7.
- ⁹⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "What Is the Union Doing?" 8.
- ⁹⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 15, 1944, "Local 195," 3.
- ⁹⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 15, 1944, "Local 195," 3.
- ⁹⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 10, 1942, "Strengthen the Union for Greater War Production," 4.
- ⁹⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 1, 1940, 8.
- ⁹⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 10, District Council, April 17-18, 1943, "Minutes," 3.
- ¹⁰⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Report, October 30-31, 1943," 14.
- ¹⁰¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 206.
- ¹⁰² LAC microfilm, *UE News*, August 2, 1941, "V for Real Victory," 2.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, November 24, 1943, "Just a Worker," 2.
- ¹⁰⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 24, 1941, "Labour Supports Kirkland Lake Miners," 1.
- ¹⁰⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 1, 1943, "Canadian Workers Must Fight Hard," 1.
- ¹⁰⁷ LAC microfilm, *UE News*, July 19, 1941, "Democracy Must be Won at Home," 2.
- ¹⁰⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 1, 1942, "War Declared," 1.

-
- ¹⁰⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Dec 2, 1942, "Selective Service to Investigate." 1.
- ¹¹⁰ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Box 16, File, De Havilland 1942-1944, "DH Discriminates Again!" n.d. but c. Summer 1942.
- ¹¹¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, August 1, 1940, "Ask Bargaining Clause in All British Orders," 1.
- ¹¹² ALUA, ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, July 1, 1940, "Canadian Labour promised CIO Aid," 1.
- ¹¹³ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 17, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 8, 1941, "Demand Honest Vote," 1.
- ¹¹⁴ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 241 Local 504, "Preliminary Brief to the Board of Conciliation and Investigation," c. Summer 1941, 5.
- ¹¹⁵ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 8.
- ¹¹⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council, February-April, 1944, "Minutes, April 1944," 21.
- ¹¹⁷ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942, "International Union," 1.
- ¹¹⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 15, 1944 "Wanted: Two Million Jobs," 3.
- ¹¹⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 14, "Statement of the District Executive Board on Winning the War and the Post War," Summer, 1944, 1.
- ¹²⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "Labour and War," 2.
- ¹²¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, May 15, 1943, "Pay Assessment Before Dues," 8.
- ¹²² CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, March 30, 1942, "Millard Speaks to Workers," 4.
- ¹²³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "What is the Union Doing?" 8.
- ¹²⁴ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, March 18, 1943, "CIO Agreement," 4.
- ¹²⁵ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, March 30, 1943, "Millard Speaks to Workers," 4.
- ¹²⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council, August-December 1943, "Minutes, December 1943," 18.
- ¹²⁷ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, July 2, 1943, "Back Up the Boys," 8.

-
- ¹²⁸ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "Our Union," 2.
- ¹²⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Volume 4, File 7, SWOC, "Massey-Harris Employees Union Organizational Bulletin."
- ¹³⁰ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 29, 1943, "DH Breaks Off Negotiations," 1.
- ¹³¹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 9, 1943, "It's Your Union, Brother," 2.
- ¹³² Ibid..
- ¹³³ Ibid.
- ¹³⁴ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 206.
- ¹³⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1388, File 241, Local 504, "Preliminary Brief to the Board of Conciliation Appointed in Westinghouse Case," 1941, 7.
- ¹³⁶ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc. 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, June 24, 1943, "Labour Conference," 3.
- ¹³⁷ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, January 9, 1943, "Workers Join Unions," 3.
- ¹³⁸ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 1076.
- ¹³⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 8.
- ¹⁴⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 1, 1944, "A Fateful Hour in History," 1.
- ¹⁴¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 10, 1942, "Unions in the Post-War Period," 3.
- ¹⁴² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Report to October 30-31, 1943 District Council," 28.
- ¹⁴³ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC 297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, December 10, 1943, "Union Leader Sends Greetings," 2.
- ¹⁴⁴ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 30, 1943, "Millard Speaks to Workers," 2.
- ¹⁴⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8 *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 2, 1942, "Open Letter," 4.
- ¹⁴⁶ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic 1943(c), *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 12, 1942, "This Is Our War," 3.
- ¹⁴⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, December 10, 1942, "Unions in the Post-War Period," 2.
- ¹⁴⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, September 27, 1945, "Editorial," 1.
- ¹⁴⁹ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, December 23, 1943, "Ford Workers Seek Evidence of New Post-War Canada," 4.
- ¹⁵⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Councils June-August 1944, "Report," 3.

-
- ¹⁵¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 2, File, District Council Meetings February-April 1945, "Minutes of Reconversion Committee Meeting, March 20, 1945," 3.
- ¹⁵² *Labour Gazette* 44 (August 1944), "Labour Day Messages," 1080.
- ¹⁵³ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, October 30-21, 1943," 29.
- ¹⁵⁴ LAC microfilm, *War Worker*, March 9, 1944, "Political Action Report," 1.
- ¹⁵⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, July 10, 1944, "Political Action," 6.
- ¹⁵⁶ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, Etc. *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942 "International Union," 1.
- ¹⁵⁷ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, December 6, 1944, "It's Your Duty," 1.
- ¹⁵⁸ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC 297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc, 1943, *Steel Labor Canadian Edition*, February 26, 1943, "Editorial," 10. The Liberal Ontario Government had indicated plans to introduce such legislation, and Ontario Conservatives had, too, in their 1943 platform. For the 1943 Ontario Conservative Party platform, see, Keith Brownsey, "Opposition Blues: Leadership, Policy, and Organization in the Ontario Conservative Party, 1934-43," *Ontario History* 4 (December 1996), 273-295.
- ¹⁵⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 5.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ¹⁶² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1943, "Conroy Calls for Labour Partnership in War Effort," 3.
- ¹⁶³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1940, "We Spend a Night in Jail," 1.
- ¹⁶⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, November 15, 1940, "Intimidation Occurs," 1.
- ¹⁶⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, June 5, 1944, "Unionism is Democracy in Action," 2. The four freedoms were freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom for fear.
- ¹⁶⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, November 2, 1943, "Your Union," 3.
- ¹⁶⁷ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, December 16, 1943, "Industrial Democracy Does Not Exist Under Open Shop," 2.
- ¹⁶⁸ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 871-872.
- ¹⁶⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Reports, District Council, October 30-31, 1943," 27.
- ¹⁷⁰ LAC, MG 28 I 268, Volume 1, File, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 23.

-
- ¹⁷¹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, February 26, 1943, "Our Objective," 1. Gender, however, was not included.
- ¹⁷² LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, September 1, 1944, "Canadians All," 4.
- ¹⁷³ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 196-197.
- ¹⁷⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1943, "Ist UAW Member in Canada Addresses Steward Body," 1.
- ¹⁷⁵ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 10, District Five Council, "Minutes," 3.
- ¹⁷⁶ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Report to District Council," October 30-31, 1943, 27.
- ¹⁷⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 31, District Council October 27-28, 1944, "Resolutions," 3.
- ¹⁷⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 29, 1943, "UAW Production Record," 2.
- ¹⁷⁹ LAC microfilm, *War Worker*, March 9, 1944, "Political Action Report," 1.
- ¹⁸⁰ LAC, MG I 190, United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 39, *On the Beam*, August 1944, "Post-War," 2.
- ¹⁸¹ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1942, "Man to Man," 4.
- ¹⁸² LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "Labour and War," 2.
- ¹⁸³ LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, December 21, 1944, "This Is the Post War," 3.
- ¹⁸⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 10, 1940, "Labor Laws," 3.
- ¹⁸⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, March 15, 1943, "Danger Imminent as Phony Company Union Wins Official Blessing," 1.
- ¹⁸⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 1, 1940, "2 Canadian Labour Bodies Ready to Merge," 2.
- ¹⁸⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, August 15, 1942, "The Missing Link," 2.
- ¹⁸⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File 7, District Council Brief to National War Labor Board, c. 1943-44, "Equal Pay," 3.
- ¹⁸⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, June 13, 1942, "Excessive Hours Lowers Production," 2. The paper reported in its August 8, 1942 issue that the American government was recommending an eight-hour day for war workers. ("Urge 48-Hour Week for Health," 1).
- ¹⁹⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 11, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 10, 1940, "Does Tariff Hurt Auto Industry," 2.
- ¹⁹¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition* August 15, 1942, "UAW Convention Orders Full Canadian Organizing Drive," 1.
- ¹⁹² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 9, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, August 15, 1942, "UAW Convention Orders Full Canadian Organizing Campaign," 1.

-
- ¹⁹³ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, June 12, 1941, "Canadians Face Higher Living Costs, Lower Wages," 2.
- ¹⁹⁴ *Toronto Star*, December 11, 1942, "Labour and the Future," 6.
- ¹⁹⁵ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 879
- ¹⁹⁶ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, "Letter to the Editor," February 28, 1940, 4.
- ¹⁹⁷ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 17.
- ¹⁹⁸ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, "International Union," 1.
- ¹⁹⁹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File, Union Agreement, Reports of Meetings, 1942-43, *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942, 2.
- ²⁰⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, "Open House Day Address," 1.
- ²⁰¹ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 16, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1941, "Time to Modernize Collective Bargaining," 1.
- ²⁰² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 29, 1943, "UAW Production Record," 2.
- ²⁰³ TPL, *Canadian Tribune*, February 27, 1943, "Ontario Mobilizes," 1.
- ²⁰⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 1, 1943, "Modern Labour Policy Proposed in Ottawa Brief," 1.
- ²⁰⁵ LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "Labour and War," 2.
- ²⁰⁶ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 3, 1943, "Our Union," 2.
- ²⁰⁷ MAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, November 9, 1944, "A Message to All Non-Union Workers," 3.
- ²⁰⁸ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "What Can the CIO Do For Me?" 2.
- ²⁰⁹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6, CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 7.
- ²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ²¹¹ LAC, MG 28, I 268, United Steel Workers of America, Volume 4, File 2, "What a Steel Union Means to You Now!," 2.
- ²¹² LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, May 7, 1943, "Negotiations Resumed," 1.
- ²¹³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 1, 1944, "Signing a Contract Only the Beginning," 4a.
- ²¹⁴ Cooperation, according to Jonathan Vance, was also a theme in Canadian discussions about the First World War, but, as he points out, it was promoted by elites and thus defined in paternalistic terms, with everyone cooperating but left "in their place." Jonathan Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 261.

-
- ²¹⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection Box 11, File, "Win the Peace Plan," October 28-29, 1944.
- ²¹⁶ LAC, MG I 190, United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46, Underwood Elliott, "UE Leaflet," 2.
- ²¹⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, July 18, 1942, "Union News and Views," 2.
- ²¹⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, April 11, 1942, "Pledge on UE Card," 2.
- ²¹⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, April 4, 1942, "Boost Production, UE Pledges," 1.
- ²²⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, July 1, 1943, "General Strike," 1.
- ²²¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File, Metallic 1943, "Casablanca and the Offensive," February 12, 1943.
- ²²² UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, April 11, 1942, "Why a Yes Vote," 2.
- ²²³ *Labour Gazette* 41 (October 1941), "CCL Convention," 1246.
- ²²⁴ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File, Meetings, Reports, March 1942, "Report," 10.
- ²²⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meeting November 1942 Minutes and Report, "Report," 9.
- ²²⁶ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection Box 11, File, "Win the Peace Plan," October 28-29, 1944.
- ²²⁷ LAC, MG I 190, United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46, Underwood Elliott, "UE Leaflet," 2.
- ²²⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 15, "Minutes of District Five Council, October 27-28, 1944," 3. The partnership paradigm was also used by such "enlightened" business leaders as Canada Packers' head J.S McLean, who called for greater cooperation between labour and management. Desmond Morton with Terry Copp, *Working People* (Ottawa, Deneau, 1980), 179.
- ²²⁹ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 140, "Officers Reports, May 27, 1945," 5.
- ²³⁰ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, February 7, 1944, "A Good Record," 2.
- ²³¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 10, 1942, "M-H Workers in U.S. Make Big Money Organized Into UAW," 3.
- ²³² LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "What Can the CIO Do For Me?" 2.
- ²³³ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 29, 1943, "DH Breaks Off Negotiations," 1; *ibid*, "Working Together," 3.
- ²³⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 1, 1943, "Modern Labour Policy Proposed in Ottawa Brief," 1.
- ²³⁵ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 196.
- ²³⁶ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 148, "Organization Report, February-April, 1945," 5.
- ²³⁷ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1385, File 15, "Minutes of District Five Council, October 27-28, 1944," 3.
- ²³⁸ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 140, "Officer's Report to District Council Meeting, May 27, 1945," 5.

-
- ²³⁹ CTA, John Inglis Paper, SC 297, Series A, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, "Post-War Security Must Be Won Now," n.d. but c. Summer, 1943.
- ²⁴⁰ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, March 30, 1943, "Millard Speaks to Workers," 4.
- ²⁴¹ LAC, MG I 190 United Electrical Workers, Volume 51, File 46, Underwood Elliott, *On the Beam*, August 1944, 2.
- ²⁴² CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, USWA leaflet, April 16, 1943, "Ten Reasons to Vote Steel Workers CIO."
- ²⁴³ LAC microfilm, *UAW-War Worker*, March 9, 1944, "To the Editor," 4. The local union paper changed its name to *Local 439 News* in June 1944.
- ²⁴⁴ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 5, 1944, "Your Dues Collection," 3.
- ²⁴⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "As I See It," 5.
- ²⁴⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "O Promise Me," 6.
- ²⁴⁷ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, July 10, 1944, "Thoughts and Feelings from the Homes of Those on Active Service," 5.
- ²⁴⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 1, 1943, "Conroy Calls for Labour Partnership," 3.
- ²⁴⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, February 15, 1944, "Wanted: Two Million Jobs," 3.
- ²⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 14, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, January 15, 1944, "You Can Say That Again," 1.
- ²⁵¹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 22, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., *Inglis Steelworker*, November 6, 1942, "International Union," 1.
- ²⁵² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, September 27, 1945, "Poets' Corner," 8.
- ²⁵³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, December 24, 1943, "The Blitz Is On," 2.
- ²⁵⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, *Aircraft Worker*, October 13, 1944, "We Won't Forget!" 3.
- ²⁵⁵ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, March 14, 1946, "Purchasing Power for Prosperity," 4.
- ²⁵⁶ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, December 16, 1943, "Canadians Prefer Control by Labour, Not Big Business," 3.
- ²⁵⁷ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, May 7, 1945, "It's Up to You," 3.
- ²⁵⁸ *Labour Gazette* 43 (October 1943), "Post-War Planning," 1443.
- ²⁵⁹ *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944) "Canadian Congress of Labour," 1433.
- ²⁶⁰ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, July 22, 1943, "Editorial," 2.
- ²⁶¹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC297, Series A, Box 21, File: Union Agreement, Leaflets Distributed, Clippings, etc., 1943, *Inglis Steelworker*, November 24, 1943, "Commercial Worker," 2.
- ²⁶² *Labour Gazette* 42 (October 1942), "Other Resolutions," 1152; *Labour Gazette* 43 (October 1943), "Other Resolutions," 1447; *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944), "Political Action on Post-War Plans," 1437-40; *Labour Gazette* 45 (May 1945), "Labour Code," 641-642.
- ²⁶³ *Labour Gazette* 45 (May 1945), "Mr. Pat Conroy," 642.
- ²⁶⁴ *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944), "Post-War Plans," 1437.

- ²⁶⁵ *Labour Gazette* 43 (October 1943), "CCL Convention," 1441.
- ²⁶⁶ *Labour Gazette* 44 (August 1944), "Mr Aaron Mosher," 1080.
- ²⁶⁷ *Labour Gazette* 43 (October 1943), "CCL Convention," 1441.
- ²⁶⁸ ALUA, UAW Research Collection, Part II, Box 1, File 27, "Burt Report to District Council, May 18, 1940," 31.
- ²⁶⁹ ALUA, UAW Research Collection, Box 23, File 23-4, "George Burt Report to IEB, March 17, 1941," 1.
- ²⁷⁰ John Tait Montague, "Trade unionism in the Canadian meatpacking industry," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1950, 1. See ALUA, UAW Canadian Subregional Office, Box 125, File 7: "Report of War Labour Board in the Matter of De Havilland," May 7, 1945.
- ²⁷¹ ALUA, Canadian Subregional Office Collection, Box 11, File, District Council Meetings, August, 1943, "Report," 10.
- ²⁷² *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944), "Post-War Plans," 1438.
- ²⁷³ *Labour Gazette* 44 (September 1944), "Notes of Current Interest," 1087.
- ²⁷⁴ *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944), "Canadian Congress of Labour," 1433-34.
- ²⁷⁵ Logan, H.A. *Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1948).
- ²⁷⁶ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 136, File 10, "Secretary-Treasurer's Report, District Council, April 1943," 1.
- ²⁷⁷ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC 297, Series A, Box 21, File: Clippings and Leaflets Distributed, *Inglis Steelworker*, February 26, 1943, "Editorial," 10.
- ²⁷⁸ Ontario voters elected CCF candidate Joseph Noseworthy in a 1942 by-election in Toronto, marking the startling growth of CCF popularity in the polls.
- ²⁷⁹ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC 297, Series A, Box 21, File: Clippings and Leaflets Distributed, *Inglis Steelworker*, October 14, 1943, "Trestail Carries the Torch," 2. See Gerald Caplan, *The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973) for a description of this campaign.
- ²⁸⁰ CTA, John Inglis Papers, SC 297, Series A, Box 21, File: Clippings and Leaflets Distributed, *Inglis Steelworker*, November 3, 1943, "Pin on the Label," 2.
- ²⁸¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1943, "Let's Finish the Job," 8.
- ²⁸² *Labour Gazette* 44 (November 1944), "Canadian Congress of Labour," 1433-34.
- ²⁸³ LAC, MG 28, Series I 103, Canadian Labour Congress, Volume 162, File, Elroy Robinson Correspondence, Part 1, 1943-44, "Robinson to Pat Conroy, November 28, 1944."
- ²⁸⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council, May 1940-41, "Report, May 1941," 9.
- ²⁸⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 8, 1943, "Editorial," 2.
- ²⁸⁶ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 724.
- ²⁸⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, "Report, March 1942," 10.
- ²⁸⁸ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, May 7, 1945, "Over the Top We Go," 6. Almost 100 per cent of workers subscribed to bond purchases, investing in most cases, almost 20 per cent of their pre-tax income.
- ²⁸⁹ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 24, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1942, "Local 222," 4.
- ²⁹⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1944, "Minutes, February 1944," 5.
- ²⁹¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1943, "Minutes, June 1943," 12.
- ²⁹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1942, "Minutes, May 1942," 6.
- ²⁹³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1942, "Minutes, May 1942," 10.
- ²⁹⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings February-April 1945, "Win the Peace Plan," March 231, 1945, 2.
- ²⁹⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, May 1, 1943, "UAW Champion Recruiter Praised," 8.

²⁹⁶ See UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, *UE News*, May 16, 1942, "Labor Men in Hamilton Join Armed Forces," 1.

²⁹⁷ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, April 16, 1942, "Meeting Postponed," 1.

²⁹⁸ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1943, "Labour Helps Production," 3.

²⁹⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 4, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, May 1, 1944, "Education," 3.

³⁰⁰ UPA, United Electrical Workers District 5, Box 1386, File 136, "Officers' Report to District Council, October 30-31, 1943," 26.

³⁰¹ Legislature of Ontario, *Proceedings of 1943 Ontario Select Committee*, 801.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 730.

³⁰³ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, March 9, 1944, "Union Day at the 'Y'," 4.

³⁰⁴ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, 1943, "Minutes, April 1943," 8.

³⁰⁵ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Meetings, "Minutes, March 1942," 11.

³⁰⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, September 15, 1943, "Victory Bonds," 8.

Chapter Seven

“Equal Partners in this World Crusade”: Women, Equal Pay, and the CIO

The Second World War, with its bottomless demands for human labour, proved the fluidity of gender relations, as female domesticity was put on the back burner and women were urged to leave their home-centered private life and take up the more masculine, public duty of aiding the war effort. Hundreds of thousands of Canadian women streamed into the nation's industrial workplaces, putting to the test the CIO's professed philosophy of representing all workers equally, regardless of skill, race, or sex. For most of the war, the most visible issue for women workers was equal pay and, as we shall see, women unionists organized to ensure the issue stayed on labour's priority list.

As early as the 1880s, male unionists were strong supporters of equal pay for equal work for women. Unless women were given wages equal to a man performing the same job, they argued, employers would inevitably lower men's wages to match women's, or simply replace men with women altogether.¹ Feminist historians examining the experience of working women during the Second World War have said that male unionists' equal pay demands seldom strayed from this path of enlightened self-interest, rarely confronting the issue of sexual inequality. “Working men rarely tried to present

themselves as defenders of sexual justice,” says Pam Sugiman, for example, in her study of women auto workers in Canada, arguing that union men fought for equal pay as a pure and simple wage demand and failed to challenge the social meaning of gender.² Nancy Gabin, an historian of union women in the United States, agrees, contending that male unionists seldom recognized management’s treatment of women as unfair or discriminatory.³ There is evidence, however, that during the Second World War, key male-dominated unions in Ontario publicly embraced equal pay as a woman’s right.

The most public test of the CIO’s commitment to equal pay for women workers was a widely publicized wildcat strike in 1942 at the Ford Motor Company’s huge complex in Windsor, Ontario. This strike occurred just as some key Toronto CIO organizing drives, aimed not just at men but the thousands of women now working in the city’s industrial plants, were at critical stages. In its myriad pieces of organizing literature, the UAW portrayed the strike — even though it had a dismal result for women workers at Ford — as proof of the union’s commitment to women’s equality, its seriousness about the issue, and its ability deliver results. The sheer size and significance of the Ford strike ensured its prominence in the mainstream news media in Toronto for its duration. Toronto newspaper readers were treated to front-page stories about the strike for days, and even more people no doubt heard news reports about the walkout on the radio. The strike gave the Toronto drives an added momentum and introduced into organizing appeals an explicit discourse about women’s equality.

In their publicity about equal pay, as with other issues they advocated during the war, CIO unions such as the UAW often linked equal pay directly to the prosecution of the country’s war effort and its war aims of protecting equality and democracy. They went so far as to equate employer opposition to equal pay explicitly with the Nazi

ideology Canadian soldiers were dying to eradicate. Moreover, union calls for mandatory, or legislated, equal pay were often cast in terms of a war-inspired vision of an enlarged public realm, one that could and should intervene in a formerly private matter, such as wage-setting and, by extension, the relationship of men and women in the workplace.⁴ This chapter will examine this discourse about equal pay, the reasons for its appearance, and how promoting equal pay to the status of a human right affected women, unions, and post-war human rights legislation.⁵

Two hours into their shift the morning of November 24, 1942, the 13,500 workers at Ford of Canada's sprawling works in Windsor, Ontario, wildcatted, bringing to a standstill the British Empire's largest producer of military vehicles. In the midst of a war the union strongly supported, a vital operation 100 per cent dedicated to war production was stilled. "The big buildings, usually vibrant with noise and activity," reported the *Windsor Star*, "were sepulchrally quiet."⁶ What made the completeness of the work stoppage remarkable was that the local union involved, Local 200 of the United Auto Workers, was still in its infancy, having won a recognition vote against a company-sponsored union just twelve months before. It signed its first contract with Ford on January 15, 1942, which unlike the General Motors contract with UAW Local 222 in Oshawa, formally recognized the UAW as the workers' bargaining agent. The fledgling local union, however, had little more than half of Ford's workforce in Windsor signed up and was still far short of its objective of 100 per cent union membership.⁷

Nonetheless, non-union Ford workers, right along with union members, joined the walk out, which lasted six days, a long strike by war-plant standards.⁸ And while the union's

national leaders denied any responsibility for calling the strike, they quickly embraced it, assuring the strikers financial support in spite of the strike's wildcat beginnings and backed the strikers until their return to work, not a foregone conclusion given the UAW's hesitancy to use the strike weapon during the war.⁹

At the centre of this storm? Thirty-seven women, who made up less than one-third of one per cent of Ford's Windsor workforce, and who were probably as astonished by their power to bring the corporation to a standstill as they were stunned by their national notoriety. They had been hired in April of that year, when Ford, claiming it could not find men to do the work, began to bring women into its Canadian plants for the first time in its history.

The dispute was about the nature of the work the women were doing. Ford had expanded its manufacturing output so much during the war that it was forced to enlarge the clerical operations in its plants and had begun to hire women into "Stock 7," a department where vehicle parts were warehoused and then shipped. The UAW claimed the clerical work the women were doing had been covered by the contract, had been previously performed only by men, and was still being done by some men. It also argued since both men and women in the department were on the same seniority list (in an era of sex-segregated seniority lists), they were therefore entitled to the contract's starting rate for that job, 75 cents an hour. The company countered that since the women were doing none of the physical work previously required in these jobs, as purely clerical workers they were only entitled to an office-worker starting rate of 50 cents, the same starting rate as women in its Windsor office, which was not yet unionized.¹⁰

The surviving records give no detailed account of job content, so they do not help establish the validity of either party's position. The arbitrator who ultimately ruled

on the issue, however, did say that the work had become for all practical purposes entirely clerical, thus even the men in Stock 7 were doing principally clerical work. The union, moreover, regarded the job as a "white collar" promotion for male workers, indicating the physical work would have been light and only incidental to the job.¹¹

In its first contract with Ford, presumably nervous about the impact the potential wartime recruitment of women would have, Local 200 had won Ford's agreement that it would not hire women into the plant without prior discussion with the union. The company, however, only four months later began to hire women without any consultation with Local 200.¹² At the time of the strike, Ford was in fact unilaterally seeking approval from the Ontario Regional War Labour Board (RWLB) for the 50-cent start rate for the women.¹³ Local 200 raised equal pay at the UAW's district council in August 1942, reporting that women were "infiltrating" the plant and accusing Ford of ignoring the collective agreement. After a spirited discussion, council delegates duly passed a resolution calling for equal pay for equal work.¹⁴ One union editor of the time observed that professed commitment to equal pay may have been around a long time, but it had remained a "pious platitude... a slogan that's been bandied about for... years."¹⁵ Now, with the entry of women into the wartime workforce, the union was taking steps to enforce it.

A month later, the National War Labour Board (NWLB), noting that some employers wanted to hire "women, youth and less capable men to do more skilled work formerly done by men," issued a memorandum to its regional boards saying that boards could allow temporary beginners' rates for these groups of workers as they upgraded their skills. The result, said the board, would be that these groups of workers would be entitled, once they were up to speed, to the higher wages earned by skilled employees.

This would, in effect, said the board, recognize the principle of equal pay for equal work without upsetting employers' prevailing wage structures, which labour boards had already approved under wartime wage control orders. The federal government was preoccupied with dampening inflationary pressures. The NWLB in this ruling, by allowing employers this easily exploited latitude on equal pay, was doing its part to ensure wages remained strictly confined to cost-of-living increases. Equal pay would be tantamount to a real wage increase, and hence inflationary.¹⁶

Meantime, the situation at Ford was considered so serious that representatives from the RWLB spent a September weekend in Windsor trying to mediate a settlement between the parties. Facing Ford's intransigence on the one side and the NWLB's endorsement of equal pay on the other, the Ontario board tried to argue the ill effects of equal pay on the economy, telling unionists that if the principle of equal pay were established, it would cause "the disruption of the whole economic system in Canada."¹⁷ The union held out. On its return to Toronto, the board issued a temporary order saying, in a star turn at bureaucratic hot-potato handling, that no employer paying men more than 65 cents an hour would be allowed to hire women. Since Ford's wages started at 70 cents an hour, the ruling meant the company could no longer hire women, thus allowing the board to sidestep the the equal pay issue. Ford then promptly asked the board again to let it hire women at 50 cents an hour, promising any increase would be retroactive if the board ruled for equal pay. On Monday, November 23, the Local 200 bargaining committee took up the issue of the 37 women now working in the plant directly with management. Ford took the position that it "would hire as many [women] as they saw fit....To us this meant the possibility of hundreds of our union brothers being likewise replaced by low salaried female help," said Local 200 president Roy England. At a union

meeting that night, the hall filled up with hundreds of men, and “when the membership learned of the attitude of the company coupled with the fear that this condition might spread, they took it upon themselves to settle this question.” The next morning workers walked out. Picket lines were established immediately and union kitchens set up. Community support for the strikers was strong, the union claimed. Women relatives and friends of the strikers joined the picket line, emphasized one union leader, an observation likely made to underscore the union’s contention that its dispute with Ford over equal pay was not anti-woman.¹⁸

The first afternoon of the walkout, union officials, including the UAW’s Canadian head, George Burt, met with company officials in a “parley” convened by Windsor mayor, Arthur Reaume. Ford’s personnel manager in Windsor, Wallace Clark, told the meeting that Ford had argued before the labour board that paying women the same rate as men would “mean chaos in the industry.” Burt replied there had been no chaos in Detroit, where Ford of Canada’s parent company was paying women working the same rates as men and that Ford of Canada should likewise give women equal pay. “I don’t know why we should,” Clark retorted, saying the Michigan law mandating equal pay didn’t apply in Canada. Burt then argued that there plenty of “idle men in Windsor, and the company should hire them first.” Clark parried, in an equally sexist manner, that the women were performing clerical work “any man would be ashamed of.” He then said the company had not been given authority by the labour board to pay the women more than 50 cents an hour and that it was not prepared to take any initiative on the issue, but “if the board ruled that women should be paid equal pay, we’d pay it.” The meeting ended in deadlock.¹⁹

The union called a mass meeting a few hours later, with more than 5,000 people attending. Speaker after speaker called for a 75-cent starting rate for the 37 women, although, the *Toronto Star* reported, "several speakers expressed opposition to women being permitted to work in the plants at all."²⁰ Union leaders told the audience about an NWLB proposal that the women be laid off until a ruling had been made about their pay. The proposal was turned down noisily and unanimously.²¹ Workers then voted to refuse to return to work if any of the women were laid off temporarily pending the completion of negotiations, a proposal from Ontario labour department officials.²²

Meantime, both federal and provincial labour officials tried to pass the buck to each other. Ontario labour minister Peter Heenan, who also chaired the RWLB, said his board had no jurisdiction over the dispute: it was properly a matter for the NWLB. Meantime, federal labour minister Norman McClarty disagreed, saying that the dispute was the property of the RWLB. With several Windsor feeder plants threatened because of the disruption at Ford, Reaume urged Ottawa to assign responsibility for mediating the strike to the RWLB.²³

Accordingly, Ottawa did, and Heenan dispatched the RWLB's executive director, J.C. Adams, to Windsor (and later joined the talks himself). Adams told the parties that the dispute would be settled on the basis of the national board's September ruling in favour of equal pay.²⁴ Ford then asked for a conciliation board under the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. The union retorted that this proposal was "not an answer" to Adams's direction on equal pay. The talks stretched on for three days. Halfway through the talks, the United States National War Labor Board ruled in favour of equal pay for comparable work, raising hopes that since Ford operated in both countries, it might concede on the equal pay issue in its Canadian plants.²⁵ Ominously, however, Heenan

warned the UAW that should the strike last into the following week, raw materials for war production would be diverted from Ford to other companies, meaning the shutdown could last at least another two weeks. Pressure to end the strike was now bearing down on the union.²⁶

An agreement was reached November 29 that strikers would return to work, without penalty, while an impartial referee determined the status of the 37 women. The company also agreed to lay off any of the 37 women (from their current jobs) whom the referee considered to be working on operations covered by the collective agreement and thus previously performed by men. The company acknowledged, that while government wage regulations did not prohibit any employer from paying equal pay for equal work, it would only hire men into its manufacturing operations "unless and until the whole question of equal pay for equal work has been discussed with Local 200."²⁷ The next day Local 200 members ratified the agreement and returned to work, having won what they told themselves was a major victory for the union and for the principle of equal pay.²⁸

Heenan appointed Mr. Justice C.P. McTague to arbitrate the dispute over the work being done by the 37 women. His decision, brought down December 29, said the union's evidence did establish that the women were doing clerical work previously done by men covered by the UAW's contract and did validate the union's argument that since the women were on the same seniority list as the men, they were covered by the contract. He did not think, however, that argument was the "answer to that question which I have to decide." He then went on to concede Ford's contention the women were doing purely clerical work but added that he didn't think "that concludes the question

in itself." He then ruled in Ford's favour, as arbitrarily as any arbitrator to whom parties had given the final word ever has.²⁹

Later, in June 1943, Ford once again applied to the RWLB to bring women into the plant at a lower wage than men, alleging that women increased the cost of production and therefore should be paid less. The UAW refused to be drawn into the trap, saying that it would only discuss equal pay and not a variety of red herrings the company was raising. "We welcome women into our plant," declared England, "but insist they have equality." The union's protest was swift and sufficiently strong that, no doubt mindful of the previous November's walkout, Ford withdrew its application to the labour board.³⁰ A relieved Burt reported at the union's district council that the equal pay issue "has been solved."³¹

The editor of the *Labour Gazette*, on the other hand, was less convinced about the extent of the union's victory. "It would appear that the workers won the principle of equal pay for equal work which is the [strike] cause we have been given," he wrote a staff writer, "but the girls who caused the strike... got nothing out of it."³² When confronted by reporters about the fact that Ford had settled the thorny issue of equal pay —and the strike — by simply eliminating women from its plants, England defended the union's actions by saying that the strike had never been about the 37 individuals involved but about the "principle" of equal pay.³³ His callous abstraction was way off the mark: The principle of women's right to equal pay had hardly been won if the price of victory was women's right to employment. Equal pay was of little concrete value to women if they faced discrimination in hiring.

But if women at Ford got nothing out of the strike, Local 200 certainly did, signing up 1,835 new members that November and December, raising the local's membership from 7,000 to 9,000 of the 13,500 workers in Ford's Windsor plants. The strike had motivated hundreds of non-union Ford workers to take out union cards and pay dues for the first time. "...[N]ew members were rolling in," said England, "primarily because we had definitely established the principle of equal pay for equal work."³⁴ In the days before the automatic check off, Local 200 was effectively on a permanent organizing drive, and its pugnacity over the issue of equal pay for women had proven to be one of the most effective organizing strategies it had – inadvertently or not – devised, at least with the men it was seeking to represent.

Furthermore, though the union's success at Ford in Windsor was hollow for the women, the UAW nonetheless used the rallying cry of "Equal pay for equal work!" to appeal to workers in its organizing campaigns in other industrial centres, especially in those plants where women were already present in significant numbers, a phenomenon that was becoming almost commonplace. During the war, the number of Canadian women working in industry almost tripled, to more than 400,000. About 250,000 of them agreed to work in war industry, but a constant shortage of women workers prevailed throughout the war.³⁵

The reason women weren't joining industry, said one well-placed observer, was the nature of the work combined with "not especially tempting wages."³⁶ Indeed, surveys showed that while Canadian women were patriotic and eager to help with the war effort, their wages were abysmal. The Toronto Welfare Council calculated that a family of five needed an income of at least \$36 a week to stay in good health. The average male wage in Canada was about \$30 a week, so fell almost 20 per cent short, but

women fared even worse, partly because of the tradition of paying women a fraction of a man's wage for the same job. At Toronto's Goodyear Rubber plant, for example, male labourers were paid \$25 a week, while women labourers received \$19, little more than half what they needed to stay out of poverty. Many war industries were paying men a dollar an hour and women only 50 cents.³⁷

The contemporary belief that men deserved higher wages because they were their families' breadwinners was not in synch with the reality of women's lives. A 1943 survey of women war workers in Toronto showed that 59 per cent of women were working not out of patriotic reasons but for the money.³⁸ Another Toronto study of mothers using the wartime government-run child care centres found that 50 per cent were working full-time out of economic need, and 30 per cent were working full-time to help supplement their husbands' income.³⁹ Women married to servicemen were often their family's sole parent, and while they received some remittances from their husbands' pay, these were based on a soldier's meagre salary, often less than half his peacetime pay.⁴⁰ With hundreds of thousands of largely unorganized women workers making inequitable wages in spite of pressing financial need, equal pay must have seemed to men, women, and union organizers an idea whose time had come.

In fact, the UAW's position on equal pay did not emerge — and evolve — until after women began working in industrial plants. Only at the last minute and at the urging of women delegates, for example, did the newly fledged Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization, at its inaugural conference held two months after war's outbreak, insert a call for equal pay, saying that "women should not be taken advantage of under the pretext of a national emergency."⁴¹ Even so, in April 1940, well before women were recruited for war industry, the UAW unveiled its "UAW-CIO Program."

Although the program included a call for “social security for those making less than \$1,200 a year,” there was no mention of equal pay, in spite of the social security demand’s call for direct government intervention in workers’ income. At the UAW’s district council meeting two years later, however, in June 1942, reflecting the influx of women into its plants, St. Catharines UAW Local 199 delegates reported that more than 1,000 women were working at the McKinnon works in the city, and that the local was finding it difficult to sign them up. “The issue is wages for them, and unless the union can give leadership on equal pay for equal work we will remain weak among the women,” reported the local’s president.⁴² At the council’s next meeting in August 1942, in response to Local 199’s call, which had been echoed by Local 200, delegates passed a resolution, cast not in terms of women’s equality but in terms of boosting the war effort: equal pay would attract more women into war industry.⁴³ By the time of the Ford strike a few months later, however, the union had expanded its arguments for equal pay to include the human rights argument that women were entitled to full equality, calling Ford’s proposal an affront to democracy. A year later, in August 1943, the council passed a further resolution reaffirming its position on equal pay, this time basing its call for equal pay principally on human rights, asserting that the “justice of the principle of equal pay for equal work is now universally recognized” and then deploying the other arguments used in the case for equal pay: the need to recruit women for the war effort while protecting established male wage standards. The resolution’s demand was also phrased in the language of human rights, asking the RWLB to issue a directive that “unequivocally recognize[s] the right of female workers to equal pay for equal work throughout industry.⁴⁴ By this time equal pay was a constant presence in most of the

UAW's policy statements. And by December 1944, when the union launched its "Win the Peace" plan, equal pay was high on the list of the union's demands of government.⁴⁵

Yet as late as 1944, the union was encountering stiff opposition to equal pay from employers, including threats to women's jobs. Phoebe Blair, chair of the union bargaining committee in Local 192 in Tilbury, Ontario, reported to the union's district council that the company was refusing to pay equal pay and warning Local 192 there was "lots of male help available if women weren't willing."⁴⁶ National and provincial war labour boards were little help. A full year after the Windsor strike, in September 1943, delegates to the Canadian Congress of Labour convention noted that in spite of the NWLB's order of September 1942 endorsing equal pay, many companies "were still pursuing a policy of discrimination in establishing rates of pay for women workers." The congress asked the NWLB to direct its regional boards to grant equal pay, in effect asking Ottawa to go beyond endorsing equal pay to mandating it, because without equal pay directives from government, employers could refuse union demands for equal pay knowing there would be little or no redress when the parties submitted proposals to the labour boards. In a brief to the NWLB, the UAW said that while there was nothing in government wage orders prohibiting employers from paying equal pay, "a large number of companies are hiring women at less than men, and women have turned out equal production. This has been done mainly because of the uncertain attitude on the part of the....National War Labour Board on the matter."⁴⁷ Burt described how the union had been successful in numerous instances in winning equal pay but only by taking individual cases on their own merits and then pursuing them through the grievance procedure under the collective agreement in order to get all the necessary information to prove its case: "Many weeks elapse, and usually the companies refer this to the regional

labour board and the board is very hesitant to take a position."⁴⁸ Ottawa's approach to equal pay mirrored its overall labour policy: delay, avoidance, obfuscation.⁴⁹ Finally, in April 1944, the *United Automobile Worker* reported a NWLB ruling on a United Electrical Workers appeal of an RWLB decision. The story said the NWLB ordered the principle of equal pay, adopting the principle unanimously for the first time and noted that the board's decision outlining a policy of equal pay covered the notion of comparability.⁵⁰

In spite of the obvious reluctance of the war labour boards to allow equal pay, equal pay was —judging by the content of union organizing literature — a crucial organizing issue in the plants, and the Ford strike was a windfall opportunity for the union's Toronto organizers. The importance of equal pay in persuading women workers to join up was demonstrated at organizing drives underway at the time of the Ford strike in Toronto: at De Havilland Aircraft in northwest Toronto; at the city's two large Massey-Harris plants, one downtown, converted to making military vehicles and artillery and a second, in the city's Weston suburb, which manufactured large parts for the Mosquito; and at Metallic Roofing a smaller operation making military supplies in Toronto's west end. The De Havilland, Massey-Harris and Metallic Roofing drives all produced a blizzard of union literature. The UAW distributed leaflets at plant gates daily; it produced a weekly tabloid newspaper, the *War Worker*, also distributed at plant gates; it bought radio time; and took out full-page newspaper ads. And in virtually every piece of union publicity, the UAW pledged that equal pay was a key union collective bargaining goal.

Throughout all its campaigns for equal pay, the UAW used four main lines of argument to appeal to women workers and reassure men workers. The least-used was the argument of women's need for equal pay, as opposed to their right to equal pay,

although it may have been the least-used because, given the low wages of Canadian workers, particularly women, it was in the least need of arguing. But this “need” argument does appear in union literature occasionally.⁵¹ A member of the Ford negotiating committee was quoted in the *Windsor Star* saying that after the war “a lot of women will have to be the breadwinners for their incapacitated husbands. Then it would be a question of seeing to it that the woman is paid enough to maintain a home for her family.”⁵² In a similar vein, in a story in the December 30, 1943 *War Worker* described equal pay as a measure to insure the post-war income security of women, not just men. Predicting that women would stay in industry after the war, the story asserted that women “must have security in the future and wages that will be equal to that of male workers. We can only get this and other security through the Trade Union Movement.” The De Havilland *Aircraft Worker’s* women’s column, “Woman’s View,” said that women wanted security above everything, which meant “a living wage.” “We are very fortunate to be working in a Union shop like De Havilland where the union has succeeded in getting equal pay for equal work for women; many of our sisters are not so fortunate. It may interest you to know that the weekly rate for females as laid down by the Ontario Minimum Wage Board is \$12.50 per week.”⁵³

A second, more frequently used, argument was that women were needed for the war effort and that the best way of attracting desperately needed female labour to heavy, dirty, noisy, monotonous, sometimes dangerous and not completely “respectable” factory work was to offer good wages. “Apart from its obvious fairness,” said one union newsletter editorial, “equal pay will mean that many more girls will be attracted into industry. Thousands more girls are needed in the factories with constantly growing manpower shortage—so any move which will bring more girls into industry is

a victory for production and the war effort."⁵⁴ In its first issue following the strike, distributed in Toronto-area plants two days after the Ford settlement, the *War Worker* said the settlement could only be "temporary since it provides that women will not at present be hired by the Ford Motor Company for jobs." The union was not opposed to Ford's hiring women, explained the *War Worker*. "Rather it has been urging for some time that they should be hired to relieve the manpower shortage."⁵⁵ A UAW newspaper ad run during the strike said equal pay "will bring women into war industry and solve the manpower problem."⁵⁶

A corollary argument was that equal pay would improve morale: "Lower wages for women doing the same work as men creates resentment and antagonism between men and women. Equal pay for equal work means more weapons to beat Hitler," said the *War Worker*.⁵⁷ In portraying the outcome of the equal pay strike at Ford, a union editor, describing the strike as a victory for equal pay, wrote that Ford workers "with grievances adjusted and their heart's at rest over labour's rights....can multiply the production they could have done before...."⁵⁸ A letter to the editor reprinted from the *Toronto Star* expanded this notion to include housewives like the writer herself. "We women have enough worries trying to run a home in war-time without having the dread of that some day our husbands are going to come home and say: I was replaced by a girl, at half the wages today."⁵⁹

The third argument used by the union in support of equal pay was the notion that women should join with the union to fight for equal pay, not as a matter of equal rights, but rather in order to ensure that cheaper female labour did not undercut male wages. In a newspaper ad during the strike, the UAW said that equal pay "will protect wages and living standards for our war heroes – our sons and brothers – when they

come home.”⁶⁰ Equal pay, said the writer of a *War Worker* women’s column, would allow women to acquit the responsibility “we owe our men. “ If women work for lower wages than men on the same jobs, employers will “force soldiers who have fought for freedom” to accept lower wages, or hire women and leave them unemployed.⁶¹ The editor of the *Aircraft Worker*, urged women to support the union’s fight for equal pay “not only for yourselves but to protect the wages of your menfolk now in the armed forces.”⁶²

The fourth argument used in support of equal pay—and the most frequently used — was the straight human rights argument of equality for women. Often the union linked this call for women’s equality to the country’s war aim of defending democracy. Specifically, the war was against Nazism, which stood, among other undemocratic practices, for the subordination of women. “Women have as much right to work as men. They have the same right to earn as much, provided they do the same work,” said Local 200’s newsletter, *Ford Facts*. “The Ford proposal to continually keep women down to an 80% rate in proportion to men is an insult to women’s intelligence and capacities to work. The Ford proposal, like the Nazi theory, places women as inferior to men.”⁶³ Said the *Automobile Worker*, “...[E]stablishment of lower rates perpetuates the same inequality of sexes which men are fighting overseas.”⁶⁴ An *Aircraft Worker* editorial pointed to women having a particular abhorrence of fascism, “which degrades women to a beast of burden.”⁶⁵

Union propagandists repeatedly portrayed equal pay as a principle fundamental to democracy, with *Ford Facts* urging “the Company to keep its eye on the ball: Recognize the equality of women in a democracy” and “to recognize their workers — male and female — as equal partners with an equal stake in this world crusade.”⁶⁶ “Equal

pay is part of the democratic fabric which insures women the right to work at whatever they choose and to hold public office," said one union ad. "Women must enter the work force as equals." ⁶⁷ In another ad, the union again used "democracy" to bolster its case, confronting readers with the question: "Are you prepared to accept this democratic principle?"⁶⁸ In a press statement, reprinted in the *War Worker* about the Ford strike, the UAW's Toronto organizer Paul Siren said the primary cause of the strike was the "undemocratic discrimination against women workers by the refusal to apply the principle of equal pay for equal work." "Aside From Men," a women's column that appeared in UAW organizing literature said the union's determination to prevail meant that "[o]nce and for all, we will learn whether democracy is to win the war for freedom of the sexes, of the religions, of the races. For each of these things is surely linked with the other and inseparable."⁶⁹ The column's author cautioned that the title of the column is "a mild attempt at flippancy rather than an actual idea," because "[t]he root, the core, the very ideal upon which our union is founded is the equality of all persons, black or white, rich or poor, man or woman." Comparing the union's call for equal pay "faintly reminiscent of the Shrieking Sisterhood of years ago when women in full skirts and bustles spent days in jail because they thought they had the right to vote," the author seemed to be falling into flippancy again, but there is no flippancy about the rhetorical question concluding this passage: "Who today would deny us the right to vote?" The author put equal pay into the tradition of the suffragists, who fought for women's political equality, suggesting that contemporary opposition to that principle now seemed hopelessly outmoded, as would opposition one day be for equal pay for women.

An important corollary to the "democracy" argument the union used in advocating equal pay efforts was its proposal that the public realm had to be expanded

if equal pay were to be achieved. The union defined equal pay as a public issue to be addressed by government and laws, not solely a private one to be negotiated between workers and management. Only legislation could bring about equal pay, the union argued. Using the "support the war effort" argument, one editorial said "[a]nything that hinders production is not the private concern of Ford alone. It is the concern of every soldier, every civilian, every Ford worker and particularly the concern and responsibility of government."⁷⁰ Another editorial used the human rights approach. "We all know that all women receive lower wages than men in all industries," wrote one editor. "The catchword of 'equality before the law' must be enforced by the lawmakers."⁷¹ In a similar spirit, another warned that since workers were more aware of their rights and responsibilities, "equal pay for equal work must not be a mere recommendation of the Government to employees. It must be enacted as a law of the land."⁷² In its frequent calls that equal pay be defined and dealt with as a public matter the union was, in spite of vexatious wartime controls, repeatedly asking for an enlarged public role, that is, government role, in labour relations.

In some cases the union argued for equality simply as a matter of "fairness." The *War Worker* tells a familiar tale of a woman teaching a man how to do a job, and "THE MAN WAS BEING PAID 15 CENTS MORE THAN THE GIRL WHO WAS TEACHING HIM"[capitals in original]. "The most hide-bound opponent of equal pay would have to admit the unfairness of that."⁷³ In other instances, the union suggested that women's war work had "proved" their equality, and there was no longer any doubt that women were men's equals in the workplace. An author signing herself "Union Maid" wrote in the *Aircraft Worker's* column "Women's View": "One by one we stepped into the shoes of our brother, our sweetheart, or our husband. We have found that the shoes fit. None

as yet has accused us of not doing as good a job as the men did.”⁷⁴ In a letter to the editor of the *War Worker*, a woman worker told female co-workers: “We have proven in this war that we can work side by side with the men and in the majority of cases do a man’s work and do it equally well....”⁷⁵

The most common appeal for equal pay, however, was grounded in women’s inherent equality as citizens of a democracy. The seven surviving editions of the *War Worker* contained 18 passages about equal pay; some were in general stories about collective bargaining, but eight were in stories solely devoted to equal pay. In these 18 items, the equality argument appeared 10 times, the war-effort argument five times, and support for male wages four times. As well, there were eight “neutral” mentions of equal pay, where it simply appeared as a demand, with no editorializing attached. Occasionally a story cited only one argument; sometimes arguments were tightly woven together, creating a patchwork of Second World War-style egalitarianism and traditional sex-role stereotyping. A leaflet distributed to Metallic Roofing workers during their organizing drive is an example. “[Women] are taking up where [a soldier] left off and are making just as much money for the employer at a lesser rate of pay for themselves. Only a strong union such as the UAW will change this discrimination,” the leaflet begins, in a fairly egalitarian spirit. Then switching gears in the next sentence, it references equal pay’s role in protecting male wages: “Without a strong union do you think an employer will want to reduce his profits after the war by rehiring our fighting men at a higher rate of pay?”⁷⁶ Similarly the author of “Aside From Men” combined the language of justice with the language of morale when talking about the settlement of the Ford strike: “Back to work they go, with justice for all and a lot of wallop waiting to be

unleashed on Hitler. The workers of Windsor are back at work and the workers of Toronto are glad that... fair pay and fair play.... have been established..." 77

Do these frequent and emphatic presentations of the issue as one of equal rights and democratic freedoms disprove the notion that the male-dominated UAW was motivated mainly by a cynical desire to prevent the undercutting of men's wages when it supported equal pay for women? Do they indicate perhaps a more complex reality, where interwoven themes in public debate reflect overlapping goals and a medley of motives? Perhaps so. The union's appeal had to be made to men as well as to women. A collage approach, where many appeals and arguments are used at the same time in publicity or propaganda, broadens its potential audience. Men in all likelihood might have been more interested in safeguarding their wages than women's equality, while women might have needed to hear that their right to equal pay was not purely "selfish" but would help the war effort and maintain wages levels for men and women alike. For its part, the union would have wanted to be seen in the best light possible. By framing its arguments for equal pay in terms of human rights and democracy, the union linked its fight for equal pay — and thus itself — to the righteousness of the nation's war effort. (It also quite possible that some union leaders and editors believed in women's equality, and in a union with a strong Communist presence such as the UAW, that could well have been the case.)

The sexism of many male workers, however, as described by contemporary UAW staff representatives, would have encouraged the union to balance women's human rights with a more sexist, counterweight argument that equal pay would help the war effort and protect male wages. "When women got promoted," recalled UAW staffer John Eldon, "I thought there was going to be revolution. I often feel that a

woman was often lucky to escape with her life." Eldon remembered that "[the men] brought with them into the union all the racial and national and sex prejudices and weaknesses which employers developed in them to keep them separated," adding that the union had to explain why it was better to fight for equal pay than a two-tier wage system based on age or sex.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the various arguments favouring equal pay were not mutually exclusive. An argument for women's equality did not need to cancel the argument for equal pay as means of maintaining male wage levels, and vice versa. It is possible that union propagandists saw the various arguments for equal pay as reinforcing one another: that equal pay meant justice (and money) for women workers *and* prevented employers from undermining male wage levels *and* encouraged women to enlist in the army of production workers on the home front. It is certainly possible that the men and women reading the union appeals could agree with all of them, and at the same time.⁷⁹

The union's publicity strategy was to link all its programs, policies and activities to the war effort, which itself produced an extensive discourse about "democracy."⁸⁰ This was a strategic decision, designed to align the union's struggle for worker rights with the public's support for what was overwhelmingly regarded as a "just war." The union deliberately chose to represent itself and the workers it was appealing to as champions of equality, fighters for human rights, and soldiers of democracy. The fact the union used these arguments so often in organizing drives suggests that union organizers found they resonated well with workers, both male and female. If the arguments had not appealed to workers, union writers would have stopped using them, as George Burt's idea about hiring men to resolve the dispute at Ford had been dropped

within a day of its first utterance. Workers were also members of the public, and there is evidence the union had read the public mind accurately. A 1942 Gallup poll, for example, tested the popularity of equal pay with the public and found that 79 per cent of the general public agreed with equal pay, a figure that rose to 86 per cent among women, a figure so high it might persuade even those who are doubtful of the infallibility of wartime polls.⁸¹

Buttressing the union's appeal for women's equality was the propaganda put out by government — and the country's major media. Workers encountered messages and images about women additional to those they read in union publications.⁸² Female and male workers alike learned about equal pay, the Ford strike, and the issues involved, for example, within a media context saturated with other, sometimes conflicting, sometimes confirming, messages from radio, newspapers, advertising, and government propaganda — a whole range of outlets clamouring for attention, each with their own angle about women's role in society. An examination of the Toronto daily press during the days of the November 1942 Ford strike provides a glimpse of the media context in which the union was talking to potential members about what the union stood for and what it could help workers, including women, accomplish.

The news coverage of the strike was carefully neutral, even praised by union lawyer J.L. Cohen, who said "the moderation and objectivity of the press has helped greatly in bringing about a settlement."⁸³ The *Globe and Mail*, the only daily to run an editorial about the strike, was sympathetic to the issue if not to the strike, saying there was a "good deal of reason in the claim of the employees that there be equal pay for equal work...but it doesn't warrant a strike. If the output of the female worker is as great as that of the male workers, why should she not be given the same rate of pay?"⁸⁴

In material unrelated to the strike, editors ran stereotypical material that confirmed women's traditional role in society right alongside stories describing how women were shattering those stereotypes. The *Toronto Star's* November 24 edition, which ran the newspaper's first story about the Ford strike, is a case in point. In the women's section, many stories dealt with traditional fare: the effect of rationing on fashions, how exercise could keep you trim, how to stretch rationed coffee the way President Roosevelt did, and so on. But even in the women's section, with its brides and debutantes and club-meeting reports, women's lives were portrayed in a larger way than before the war, with the *Star* devoting a column to women's war work and running a myriad of stories about women's wartime volunteer efforts, women's clubs buying Victory Bonds, and farm women going into the fields and producing bumper crops. Advertising conveyed a similar set of mixed messages. Among the many ads for cosmetics appeared an ad for deodorant, for example, featuring an illustration of a women war worker, bandana'ed, tired, unglamorous, and sweaty, in an era when horses sweated, men perspired, and women glowed.

The news section also challenged stereotypical views of women, often with significant intensity. Sharing the edition with the Ford strike were features about women working in Toronto's shipyards, building corvettes and minesweepers. The "overall brigade" of women, management is quoted as saying, "can do anything a man can, short of heavy lifting and are doing so well, they are here to stay." A story about Russian women records the feats of two women Red Army snipers who shot 309 and 500 German soldiers respectively. Another story interviewed women building the new reconnaissance aircraft, the Canso. "They have worked alongside the men and done a good job of a completing their ships, their pride and joy, the Canso." Another story

reports that women recruited from western Canada for war work were protesting that they were not receiving the wages promised them. Kitchener women trade unionists were backing the westerners' demands to start at \$20 a week, reported the *Star*, quoting Edith Calcutte, secretary of the United Rubbers Workers union local in Kitchener. "Our union will back you up," she told the protesting women, adding that "[a]nyone who doesn't, deserves to get less than these girls are."⁸⁵

This media context, one very positive to women workers, was one in which a campaign for equal pay could be well played out, and union organizers were quick to seize on equal pay as an organizing issue, using the Ford strike as their proof of the UAW's dedication to the issue and its strength in the face of employers. Paul Siren, a veteran of relief camp organizing and former activist at the McKinnon plant in St. Catharines, was quick off the mark sending a telegram of support to the Ford strikers and distributing a copy of the telegram to plant gates in Toronto. The union had launched its organizing drive at Massey-Harris a week before the strike, and the inaugural November 19 issue of the *UAW-CIO War Worker, Massey-Harris Edition*, laid out as its lead story, the four-point "UAW Program," which included — in addition to shift premiums, overtime pay and improved working and safety conditions — "fair and reasonable wages," including, uniquely in all-caps, "EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK." Declaring that equal pay was now government policy under an NWLB memorandum, the UAW program simply said that "Girls employed on the same or similar jobs as men should receive the same rates."⁸⁶

The UAW had begun organizing De Havilland earlier, in June 1942, aiming its appeal at the company's 2,400 workers, 400 of whom were women. (By 1944, the company grown, and an estimated one worker in three was a women.)⁸⁷ The union

distributed the *War Worker – De Havilland Edition*, virtually identical to the *Massey-Harris War Worker*, which made the same appeals for equal pay. At Metallic Roofing, where a UAW drive had been launched several weeks before, another clone of the *War Worker* carried stories and pictures of the Ford strike, which the paper said, “brought into the open the issue of EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK [capitals in original] and settled it unmistakably in favour of equity and fairness.”⁸⁸ Organizers also produced leaflets expressly for each plant. One leaflet, for example, distributed to the female-dominated fabric shop at De Havilland asked why only women were being assigned to the shop: “Do you think it is cheaper to hire girls? Do you believe in equal pay?”⁸⁹ Another De Havilland leaflet reported that the UAW’s international convention in Chicago had passed a resolution calling for equal pay for equal work” and “no differential taking advantage of women workers.”⁹⁰ A Metallic Roofing leaflet posed the rhetorical question: “Why should women be paid less than men? They should not be paid less...they are taking up where [men] left off and are making money for the employer at less rate of pay for themselves. Only a strong union like the UAW will change this discrimination.”⁹¹

Organizers found that workers responded favourably to the union’s equal pay appeals. UAW organizers in Brantford reported that “winning the principle of equal pay for equal work was provoking keen interest “ in the organizing drives in that city.”⁹² At Hayes Steel in near Welland, Ontario, union activists said that equal pay was providing women workers “considerable stimulation” to join the union and was in “the forefront of all discussions.”⁹³ A Toronto union worker wrote at the time that women who were having trouble finding childcare and were barely making ends meets were strong union

supporters. "Their pay never equals that of the male factory workers even when they do the same job," she wrote.⁹⁴

In oral history testimony, De Havilland women war workers confirm that the union fought for the principle of equal pay and also recall that it was a successful organizing strategy, being "one of the reasons the union started." One woman organizer remembers that when the company argued that men deserved more money because they were breadwinners, the union women would respond: "Well, maybe they are [the breadwinners], but we're doing the same work, we're working for the same company."⁹⁵ The union's promise to fight for equal pay must have struck De Havilland as having potent appeal to workers because the company conceded on equal pay during the organizing drive, thus taking it off the table as an issue. (The union made sure that equal pay was part of its first collective agreement with De Havilland, however, an astute move encouraged perhaps by the presence of a woman on the union's bargaining committee.)⁹⁶ Some women at De Havilland had been earning as little as 40 cents an hour; with equal pay they received the plant's new minimum wage of 53 cents an hour.⁹⁷ The UAW would still go on to win a representation vote in the plant in March 1943.

The union could now trumpet its success with equal pay at De Havilland in literature distributed to workers in other organizing drives, pointing out that it meant De Havilland women, earning 70 cents an hour and even more in some specialized areas, were now the best paid women in industrial Canada.⁹⁸

At Metallic Roofing, Local 252 achieved a first collective agreement in August 1943, and the RWLB decided in favour of the union's demand for equal pay, a ruling the UAW hailed as "precedent-shattering," as the board went beyond simply approving the principle of equal pay to actually authorizing it. Equal pay for women under the ruling

was strictly confined to jobs where women performed exactly the same work as men with exactly the same results, but George Burt said the ruling established the principle and now the UAW would be on guard to enforce it."⁹⁹

The union's support for equal pay, however, did not help the women at Hayes Steel, a war plant in Merritton, Ontario, a small town in the Niagara Peninsula. Initially organized in 1939, by 1942 the UAW membership at Hayes, with the plant's rapid labour turnover, was dropping among the plant's 1,500 workers. Local union leaders were hoping the company's addition of a woman's division would help bolster their membership, but the union was having particular difficulty persuading the 250 women there to join.¹⁰⁰ In early 1943, just after the Ford equal pay strike, the UAW sent an energetic, left-wing organizer into the Hayes drive and, seeing that women were earning 70 per cent of the male rate for the same work, he immediately began mobilizing around equal pay, with particular success among the women workers.¹⁰¹ The company argued that women were producing less than the men and therefore should be paid less. In response, the UAW persuaded the Department of Labour to supervise a joint union-management survey to test that premise, but when it became apparent the women were in fact more productive than the men, the company bowed out and changed its argument, asserting that women had pushed up the company's indirect labour costs.¹⁰² Significantly, one of the union appointees on the survey was a woman, union bargaining committee member Betty Novak, whose presence would have made sure the union kept pursuing equal pay.¹⁰³

The length of the simmering dispute had weakened union support among the women, but union publicity about equal pay, especially after the Ford strike "[kept] the union before the [women] all the time." The local, with the help of the union's national

staff, set up a committee to lobby town councils in the Niagara area and had taken out full-page advertisements in the region's newspapers. Hopes were raised when the RWLB ruled in favour of equal pay at Metallic Roofing.¹⁰⁴

The campaign for equal pay at Hayes Steel was nonetheless stymied. The RWLB told the company, in a November 1943 ruling, that it "may" apply equal pay, but the board did not require it.¹⁰⁵ Even though the UAW offered up the survey as evidence to the RWLB, the board never mandated equal pay at Hayes Steel for the simple reason that in 1942, before women were hired, the local union had agreed that women coming into the plant would be paid 70 per cent of the male rate. The company produced this document at every hearing of the labour board as proof of a joint request by union and management – and undoubtedly showed it to Local 676 members as well. The union's three-year-long campaign for equal pay at Hayes Steel was ultimately unsuccessful. This failure, one union officer reported, "had a bad effect on the support to the Union by the girls themselves," who continued after three years of the UAW's efforts before the labour board to make 73 per cent of the male rate.¹⁰⁶ They had been hoist by their union's history.

Why did the UAW succeed at De Havilland, Massey-Harris, and Metallic Roofing while failing at Ford and Hayes Steel?

A wartime American study showed that women were far more likely to earn a fair wage if they worked in a factory in a large urban centre like Toronto, as compared to a small town or rural area like Merritton.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, at the Toronto locations, substantial numbers of women were already in the workplace when the union began its organizing drive. The union was compelled to defend and advance the interests of

women who had already joined the UAW. As for the women who hadn't yet joined the union, the UAW saw them as an important source of new members, especially given that women made up a sizeable proportion of the workforces. When the UAW's campaign for equal pay gained energy in 1942 and 1943, the local union at Hayes Steel was trapped by its earlier, sexist policies. As for Ford, the hiring of women there had amounted to 37 workers out of less than 14,000. Since Ford of Canada was determined to hire women only if they were paid sub-par wages, a potential membership pool of women never materialized for the UAW at Ford, leaving it more or less satisfied with a no-hire solution.

Conclusion

Despite union pleas and popular acceptance of equal pay, in spite of some companies being prepared to pay equal pay, neither the Ontario or Ottawa war labour boards ever went beyond recommending equal pay and never mandated it during the war.¹⁰⁸ Their refusal to accede to the clear justice of the demand was in all likelihood fueled partly by Ottawa's fear of a repetition of the steep inflation that was the context of national labour unrest in the wake of the First World War and partly by its complacency about the assumed impermanence of women's wartime participation in the industrial workforce.

The result of their recommendation-only approach to equal pay meant the wage gap narrowed only slightly. Women's average pay was \$594 a year before the war and rose to \$1,051 by the end of the war, while men's average pay went from \$1,055 to \$1,761. At the end of the war, women were earning an average 59.7 per cent of men's pay, up from the pre-war 56.3 per cent.¹⁰⁹

But that doesn't mean the campaign for equal pay was a failure. Many thousands of unionized women did receive equal pay increases; and their higher wages, furthermore, may have encouraged non-union firms to pay women more in order to compete for new workers in the tight labour market created by the war. Moreover, as we have seen, the fight for equal pay encouraged union activism among women and allowed some women, such as Local 676 bargaining committee member Betty Novak, to come to the fore. Women saw labour, perhaps for the first time, as means of ensuring that women's equal abilities would be respected and recognized: "If we do not want the industrialists to use us as 'Scab Labour,' wrote one woman in her union paper, "then it is certainly up to us to help strengthen our Unions so that we shall receive equal pay for equal work." ¹¹⁰ As we have seen, women refused to sign union cards unless the union demonstrated it was serious about addressing equal pay. They discussed equal pay at union meetings and conferences, and publicized its importance in union literature. Women organizers talked to female co-workers about how a union could reduce pay inequities, and women in key positions on bargaining committees kept the issue on the table. Even women who were not in the paid workforce also joined the equal pay fight, for example, during the 1942 wildcat strike at Ford Windsor. It is impossible to know with any certainty what impact union support for equal pay as a human right had on women workers' ideas about their place in society, but it is probably safe to speculate that it reinforced the wartime propaganda that trumpeted women's equality.

The campaign to win improved wages may well have had important long-term effects. As the war drew to a close, for example, union leaders wrestled with the issue of post-war seniority for women, and the wartime struggle with equal pay shaped their thinking. They were mindful that what's past might have to be prologue. Since gender

equality had been the basis of much of their equal pay fight, the logic of equality meant it had to be applied with consistency to the seniority issue, they believed. A 1944 meeting of Canadian UAW staff representatives agreed that “we should stick to strict seniority regardless of sex, as that is the basis on which we approached management and government to gain equal pay for equal work.” The union, however, put its hopes in governments’ responding to its calls for programs guaranteeing post-war full-employment, which would make moot the issue of seniority.¹¹¹ In 1944, the union surveyed women about their post-war ambitions, to “counteract the propaganda” of conservative groups opposed to such notions as government-supported full employment.¹¹² The cards used in the survey were a propaganda vehicle themselves, warning about conservative commentary that claimed “women workers are anxious to run back to their homes and kitchens as soon as the war is over, and as a result the unemployment problem will be solved.” The survey cards went on to assure women there was no valid reason why there wouldn’t be “plenty of jobs for everyone” after the war if an adequate post-war program was in place.¹¹³ This is not to say that unions saved women’s jobs in the post-war period, although there is evidence of some successes.¹¹⁴ It is to say that wartime equal pay rhetoric and action had influenced the way union leaders regarded women’s equality.

Through its high-profile pursuit of equal pay during the war, labour furthered its contribution to the growing wartime discourse about “democracy,” “equality” and “human rights.” Unions enjoyed broad public support in this era, so when they contributed to public discussion about equal pay as a human right, the public would have listened.¹¹⁵ By linking equal pay with the country’s war aim of protecting and advancing democracy and equality, labour would have helped build public support for

Ontario's post-war human rights legislation, such as the province's 1951 equal pay act.¹¹⁶ Moreover, in its frequent calls for equal pay to be defined and dealt with as a public matter, the union contributed, as it did in many other public discussions about labour matters; to the increasing pressure on government to take a more interventionist role in industrial relations.¹¹⁷ Lastly, the linking of equal pay with democracy and human rights raised the issue of economic citizenship for women. Feminists have long argued that political independence for women comes only after they have achieved economic independence. Citing these earlier feminists, historian Alice Kessler-Harris has written that economic independence, or self-support, gives women the autonomy they need to have access to the "full play of power and influence that marks participation in a democratic society....the concept of economic citizenship demarcates women's efforts to participate in public life and achieve respect as women."¹¹⁸ Since, presumably, equal pay would give working women a chance at achieving the economic autonomy enjoyed, at least theoretically, by working men, the discourse that equal pay was a basic human right would have contributed to the larger wartime discourse about workers' rights as citizens (a discourse examined in the previous chapter).

Regrettably, though labour's campaign for equal pay may have added to the post-war consensus about the need to enlarge equality rights, within its own domain equality was still qualified, at least as far as women were concerned. The November 1945 issue of *Local 439 News*, for example, carried a story "Union Policy," which vowed that the union would welcome everyone whether man or women and would "not tolerate segregation, whether social or in the affairs of the union on account of race creed, colour, etc." No qualification was placed on running for union office for reasons of "race, creed, colour, national origin, political affiliation, sex or marital status," but,

significantly, "sex" was omitted from that list of qualifications when it came to seniority rights: "Any special seniority lists when based on race, creed, colour or national origin violate international union policy and may not be agreed to by any local union," meaning separate seniority lists for men and women were acceptable.¹¹⁹

This is a carefully parsed definition of equality that in some provisions includes women and in other excludes them. As we have seen, the union's most frequently used argument for equal pay was women's right to equality; but it also argued the merits of equal pay in terms of boosting the war effort and supporting male wages, meaning, perhaps, the issue could fade for many unionists once the war was over. When war production ceased, women left the workplace and few more were hired, so male wages were no longer so threatened by low-wage female labour. Moreover, with the closed shop effectively created by the 1945 Rand formula, unions did not have to woo the women that remained with promises of equality.

The epilogue of the Ford strike is a case in point. In 1943, a Local 200 member who had enlisted in the air force wrote *Ford Facts*. "It was very good to know that women are being given equal rights in the factory," he said, but asked, "Are they going to be relieved of service at the return of the men of senior service from the Forces?" The editor replied, "You have seemed to have gained the wrong impression about the winning of equality of women in the factory.... A queer situation exists in which we have won equality for women, but there are no women in the plant."¹²⁰ The Ford Motor Company of Canada did not hire another woman into its plants until 1977, a full 34 years later.

¹ To some extent female competition was a myth, because extreme gender-based job segregation meant there was little competition between men and women for the same job. See Janice Newton, *The Feminist Challenge to the Canadian Left, 1900-1918* (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 81. The International Typographical Union raised the equal pay issue at the 1883 founding convention of the Trades and Labour Congress. Charles Lipton, *The Trade Union Movement in Canada, 1827-1959* (Toronto: NC Press, 1978), 72. It later told the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital in 1887 that it had no objection to women entering the printing trade as long as they came in on "equal terms" with men and received the union scale. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital in Canada*, 1889, Ontario Evidence, 109. Cited in Christina Burr, "'That Coming Curse — The Incompetent Compositress,'" *Canadian Historical Review* 74 (September 1993), 344-366, 3545. Burr argues this equal terms strategy functioned to protect the wages of male printers and keep women out of the industry. Similarly in the cigar industry in 19th century Toronto, union insistence on equal pay for women effectively deterred employers from hiring women at all because, they said, men would stay in the workforce longer. Ruth Frager, "No Proper Deal: Women Workers and the Canadian Labour Movement, 1870-1940," in Linda Briskin and Lynda Yantz, eds., *Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement* (Toronto: Women's Press, 1983), 2. During the First World War, women munitions workers earned as little as 50 per cent of the male rate. Women's organizations, however, advocated for equal pay. A priority issue in the 1918 founding of the Federation of Women's Teachers Associations of Ontario, equal pay was included in the National Council of Women's 1920 Canadian Women's Platform. Alison Prentice, et. al., eds., *Canadian Women: A History* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1996), 144, 143, 318. Ontario's legislated minimum wage for women up to and during the Second World War was \$12.50 a week. The minimum rate for men was \$16.00 a week. *Labour Gazette* 38 (August 1938), "Labour and Industry in Ontario," 808.

² Pam Sugiman, *Labour's Dilemma: The Gender Politics of Auto Workers in Canada, 1937-1979* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 49. See also Joan Sangster, *Earning Respect: The Lives of Working Women in Small-Town Ontario, 1920-1960*; Josie Bannerman, Kathy Chopik and Ann Zurbigg, "Cheap at Half the Price: The History of the Fight for Equal Pay in BC," in Barbara K. Latham and Roberta J. Pazdro, *Not Just Pin Money: Selected Essay on the History of Women's Work in British Columbia* (Victoria: Camosun College, 1984), 305.

³ Nancy Gabin, "Women and the United Automobile Workers' Union in the 1950s," in Ruth Milkman, ed., *Women Work and Protest: A Century of U.S. Women's Labor History* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 262.

⁴ For other discussions about the union and equal pay in the Second World War, Nancy Gabin, *Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers, 1935-75* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 61-70; Peter S. McInnis, *Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 109-110; Ruth Milkman, *Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregations by Sex During the World War II* (Champaign-Urbana, 1987);

Ellen Scheinberg, "The Tale of Tessie the Textile Worker: Female Textile Workers in Cornwall During World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* 33 (Fall 1994), 153-86; Julie Guard, "Fair Play or Fair Pay?: Gender Relations, Class Consciousness and Union Solidarity in the Canadian UE," *Labour/Le Travail*, 37 (Spring 1997), 149-77; Shirley Tillotson, "Human Rights Law as Prism: Women's Organizations and Ontario's Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 1951," *Canadian Historical Review*, 72 (Winter 1991), 532-557; Jeffrey Keshen, *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 160-163; David Sobel and Susan Maurer, *Working at Inglis: The Life and Death of a Canadian Factory* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1994); Dean Beeby, "Women in the Ontario C.C.F., 1940-1950," *Ontario History*, 74 (December 1982), 258-283.

⁵ The chapter does not deal with the (poor) record of male-dominated unions and male unionists in advancing women's equality within their own organizations but rather deals only with union discourse of equality concerning the equal pay issue. For the First World War's impact on women, see Ceta Ramkhlalawansingh, "Women During the Great War," in Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepard, *Women at Work in Ontario, 1850-1930* (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974), 261-287; Janice Newton, *The Feminist Challenge to the Canadian Left, 1900-1918* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill University Press, 1995), 150-168. Ramkhlalawansingh argues that the First World War cemented women's right to work in the public mind. Newton argues the pressures of war overtook socialist feminist concerns and shattered the links between and socialism.

⁶ *Windsor Star*, Nov. 24, 1942, "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6.

⁷ David Moulton, "Ford Windsor, 1945," in Irving Abella, ed., *On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada, 1919-1949*, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1975) 131. Local 200 had 7,000 signed-up members. ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council March 7-8, 1942, "Minutes," 11.

⁸ The *Labour Gazette* reported that together the Ford strike in Windsor and the Mine Mill strike in Kirkland Lake accounted for 30 per cent of lost time due to strikes in 1942. *Labour Gazette* 43 (July 1943), "Strikes and Lockouts In Canada During 1942," 949-985.

⁹ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Volume 424, "Strikes and Lockouts," No. 412, Memo from F.J. Mead, Assistant Commissioner and Director of Criminal Investigations, to Deputy Minister of Labour, Ottawa, Nov. 25, 1942.

¹⁰ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Vol. 424, Strike 412, Ruling of C.P. McTague, submitted to Peter Heenan, Ontario Minister of Labour, December 1942; *Windsor Star*, Nov. 25, 1942, "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6; *Globe and Mail*, November 25, 1942, "Heenan to Seek Peace In Ford Strike Today," 13.

¹¹ *Windsor Star*, Nov. 25, 1942, "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6. Equal work, however, was usually at the time defined as women performing *exactly* the same work as men.

¹² ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Jan. 1943, "Minutes," 14.

¹³ *Toronto Star*, November 25, 1942, "20,000 Men Affected in Biggest Walkout Ever Staged in Canada," 3. The Ontario Regional War Labour Board was one of nine such boards, one for each province, set up in August 1941 by the federal government as part of its wartime wage and price control program. The rulings

of regional boards could be appealed to the new National War Labour Board, set up under the same program. The NWLB was also mandated to develop new wage and labour policies. Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *"Remember Kirkland Lake": The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 29.

¹⁴ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: Minutes, District Council, August 29-30 1942. The council reaffirmed its support for equal pay several times over the course of the war.

¹⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, December 15, 1942, "Ford Men Win Equal Pay," 8.

¹⁶ *Labour Gazette* 42 (September 1942), "Equal Pay for Equal Work," 996.

¹⁷ *Windsor Star*, November 24, 1942 "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6.

¹⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting January 1943 Reports and Minutes, "Minutes," 9.

¹⁹ *Toronto Star*, November 25, 1942, 3, "20,000 Men Affected;" *Windsor Star*, November 24, 1942, "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6. Burt's sexist argument that Ford hire unemployed men instead of introducing women into the plant was (wisely) dropped after the first day of the walk out and, as far as I have been able to discover, never repeated. The starting rate for men and women in the Ford plants in Detroit was 95 cents an hour. LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, June 10, 1943, "Ford Seeks Female Help," 1. Michigan law did not apply to the national scene, but the United States National War Labour Board reported in 1944 that though 2,250 companies had followed its recommendation of equal pay, women's pay was still smaller in these workplaces than men's because of the type of work they were assigned to and because women received fewer promotions. *Labour Gazette* 44 (May 1944), "Equal pay principle makes progress," 553.

²⁰ *Toronto Star*, November 25, 1942, "20,000 Men Affected in Biggest Walkout Ever Staged in Canada," 3.

²¹ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Vol. 424, "Strikes and Lockouts," No. 412, Memo from F.J. Mead, Assistant Commissioner and Director of Criminal Investigation to Deputy Minister of Labour, Ottawa, Nov. 25, 1942. One report said some of the women were UAW members, which may have influenced this stout rejection of the proposal. *Globe and Mail*, November 25, 1942, 2.

²² *Windsor Star*, November 25, 1942, "Ford Strike Is Stalemated," 1.

²³ *Toronto Star*, November 25, "20,000 Men Affected in Biggest Walkout Ever Staged in Canada," 3; *Toronto Star*, November 26, 1942, "Windsor Walkout Illegal," 2. The union criticized McClarty for this delegation of responsibility to the Ontario Department of Labour and the Ontario RWLB, including it as one of the reasons it was calling for his resignation. *Canadian Unionist*, December 1942, "Windsor Locals Send Resolution to Prime Minister," 178.

²⁴ The UAW was pleased the board had been forced make a stand on the issue but interested to find out that in its first application to the board Ford had offered to pay the women a 60-cent starting rate, and it was the board that had advised the company to lower it to 50 cents. ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: Reports and Minutes, Jan-June, 1943, "Minutes," 9.

-
- ²⁵ *Globe and Mail*, November 28, "Prospects for Settlement of Strike at Windsor Hopeful, Says Heenan," 16; *Labour Gazette* 44 (May 1944), "Equal Pay Principle Makes Progress," 553.
- ²⁶ *Globe and Mail*, November 30, 1942, "Heenan Gets Agreement in Strike," 1.
- ²⁷ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Vol. 424, "Strike and Lockouts," No. 412, "Text of Agreement."
- ²⁸ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, Jan.-June 1943, "Minutes, January 1943," 4.
- ²⁹ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Vol. 424, "Strikes and Lockouts," No. 412, "McTague Report," December, 29, 1942, 1-3.
- ³⁰ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting August 1943 Minutes and Report, "Minutes," 14.
- ³¹ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: Reports and Minutes, August 1943, "Report," 9. Ford solved its labour shortage problem by subcontracting work to smaller plants that paid lower wages. LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, July 8, 1943, "Is This How the Manpower Shortage Is Being Solved?" 4.
- ³² OA, RG 27 Vol. 424, "Strikes and Lockouts," No. 412, "Memo, June 9 1943."
- ³³ *Windsor Star*, December 1, 1942.
- ³⁴ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Reports and Minutes, Jan.-June 1943, "Minutes," Jan. 1943, 11.
- ³⁵ More than 1,00,000 women were in the workforce by early 1945, up from a pre-war peak of 600,000. In the manufacture of durable goods, women's participation peaked at 25 per cent of the workforce in early 1944, with the iron and steel sector coming second to the textile industry in its proportion of women workers. Toronto's workforce in 1943 was 40.4 per cent female. *Labour Gazette* 45 (May 1945), "Recruitment of Women Workers," 632; *Labour Gazette* 45 (January 1945), "Sex Distribution of Workers in Recorded Employment," 86. For an examination of government initiatives to encourage women to enter the workforce, see Ruth Roach Pierson, "Women's Emancipation and the Recruitment of Women into the Labour Force in World War II," in Susan Mann Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice, eds., *The Neglected Majority* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 125-145.
- ³⁶ *Labour Gazette* 44 (March 1944), "Report on Employment Conditions," 395.
- ³⁷ Archives of Ontario, RG 27, Records of Department of Labour, Vol. 1518, File No. R-3: "Memorandum from Textile Institute to Donald Gordon, Chairman of the National Textile and Leather Equipment Committee, 21 January 1943, 5. Quoted in Ellen Scheinberg, "The Tale of Tessie the Textile Worker: Female Textile Workers in Cornwall During World War II," *Labour/Le Travail*, 33 (Spring 1994), 170.
- ³⁸ Jeffrey Keshen, *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 157.
- ³⁹ Letter from Mary Eadie, Supervisor Women's Division, Unemployment Commission, Toronto, to Miss Margaret Greir, Assistant Associate Director, National Selective Service, Ottawa, Dec. 17, 1945. LAC, RG 27, Vol. 611, No. 6-52-6-1. Vol. 3. Cited in Ruth Roach Pierson, "Women's Emancipation and the

Recruitment of Women Into the Canadian Labour Force in World War II, *Canadian Historical Association Papers*, 1976, 161.

⁴⁰ Ellen Scheinberg, op. cit., 163.

⁴¹ LAC, MG 28 I 268, Vol. 1 USWA Canadian National Office, National Director's Office, National Policy Conferences, File 6: CIO Conference Minutes, Briefs, Nov. 4-5, 1939. "Brief by Canadian Committee for Industrial Organization," 1.

⁴² ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, Reports and Minutes, June 1942, "Minutes," 10.

⁴³ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, Reports and Minutes, August 1942, "Minutes," 26.

⁴⁴ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting Reports and Minutes, August 1943, "Report," 13.

⁴⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, *Canadian Autoworker*, December 1, 1944, "Victory and Jobs," 1.

⁴⁶ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Feb-April 1944, "Minutes," 14.

⁴⁷ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 11, File: District Council Feb.-April, 1944, "Brief to National War Labour Board," n.d., but probably Spring, 1944.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Jeremy Webber, "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada During World War II, *Labour/Le Travail*, 15 (Spring, 1985), 59.

⁵⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1, 1944, "National Board Orders Equal Pay," 1.

⁵¹ Margaret Hobbes, in her study of feminism during the depression, makes the point that arguments about such feminist goals as women's right to work that were based on women's needs (as opposed to women's rights) didn't extinguish the rights argument. Rather, the two often overlapped, as they did in union wartime discourse. Margaret Hobbes, "Equality and Difference: Feminism and the Defence of Women Workers During the Great Depression, *Labour/Le Travail* 31 (Spring 1993), 202-203.

⁵² *Windsor Star*, Nov. 24, 1942, "Negotiations Deadlocked," 6.

⁵³ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, "Woman's View," *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, Dec. 11, 1943, 4.

⁵⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 16, File: 19, *UAW Massey-Harris Organizer* " n.d. but probably Jan. 1942, 2.

⁵⁵ ALUA, UAW UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8: *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Dec. 2, 1942, "Women Workers Win by Ford Strike," 2. The use of the word "girl" was pervasive and was used by both female and male unionists, who also used the words "woman" and "boy" (when referring to adult men). I have tried to discern a pattern in the materials I have examined and have failed except to note the obvious: that "girl" is used more frequently than "boy" and "woman" far less frequently than "man."

-
- ⁵⁶ *Windsor Star*, Nov. 28, 9.
- ⁵⁷ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Dec. 2, 1942, "Equal Pay for Equal Work," 3.
- ⁵⁸ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Dec. 10, 1942, "Aside From the Men," 2.
- ⁵⁹ ALUA UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker Massey-Harris Edition*, Dec. 19, 1942, "Urges Equal Pay," 2.
- ⁶⁰ *Windsor Star*, Nov. 28, 9.
- ⁶¹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Nov. 19, 1942, "Aside From Men," 4.
- ⁶² LAC microfilm, *Aircraft Worker* July 2, 1943, "Women and War," 2.
- ⁶³ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, June 10, 1943, "Ford Seeks Female Help."
- ⁶⁴ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, Jan.-May, 1943, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 15, 1943, "Equal Pay Again Ford Issue," 1.
- ⁶⁵ LAC microfilm, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, July 2, 1943, "Women and War," 2.
- ⁶⁶ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, June 24, 1943, "Recall 60 Cent Application," 1.
- ⁶⁷ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, June-Dec, 1942. *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Nov. 15 1942, "Equal Pay for Women Awaits Board's Order," 4.
- ⁶⁸ *Windsor Star*, Nov. 28, 9.
- ⁶⁹ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, Dec. 2, 1942, "Aside From the Men," 2. There was no by-line for this regular column. It could have been written by a man, Malcolm Young, a publicist in the UAW's Toronto office during the 1942-1943 organizing drives; or by feminist Marjery Ferguson, a UAW activist at Massey-Harris and a prolific contributor to union publications.
- ⁷⁰ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, June 24, 1943, "Unequal Pay Application Recalled; What Is the Next Step?" 4.
- ⁷¹ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts* Sept. 23 1943, "UAW Welcomes Political Action by Organized Labour," 3.
- ⁷² LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, Dec. 3 1942, "UAW Victory Beginning of Nation-Wide Campaign," 3.
- ⁷³ ALUA UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, file 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker Massey-Harris Edition*, January 7, 1943, "Girls' Grievances," 2.
- ⁷⁴ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 74, File 10, "Women's View," *Aircraft Worker*, Nov. 210, 1943, 3.
- ⁷⁵ LAC microfilm, *UAW-CIO War Worker Massey-Harris Edition*, April 5, 1944, "To the Women of Massey-Harris," 3. Two women served on the *War Worker*'s editorial committee when this edition was published, Doris Archer and Agnes Jensen, both activists in Local 439.
- ⁷⁶ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 19, File: Metallic Roofing. Leaflet "Company Statements Misled," n.d., but circa March, 1943.

⁷⁷ ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File: 8 *De Havilland War Worker*, Dec. 10, 1942, "Aside From Men," 2.

⁷⁸ ALUA, UAW Oral Interview Collection, Interview with John Eldon, 8, 10.

⁷⁹ Hobbes, Margaret, "Equality of Difference," 202-203.

⁸⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File 3: District Council Reports and Minutes, Jan 16-17 1943, "Report," 12.

⁸¹ Forestell, Diane G., "The Necessity of Sacrifice for the Nation at War: Women's Labour Force Participation, 1939-1945," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 22 (Nov. 1989), 333-348, 342. It is impossible to prove definitively whether people were swayed by the images and words they encountered of any subject, although polls are helpful in at least in indicating what contemporary opinions were.

⁸² There are many international studies analyzing images of women during the Second World War. See Ruth Roach Pierson's review of just some of them: "Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War," *Gender and History* 1(Spring 1989), 77-86. See also, Maureen Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda During World War II* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), and Alice Kessler's review article, "War, Work and the Culture of Gender," *Labour/Le Travail* 19 (Spring 1987), 163-167. Canadian studies include: Susanne Klausen, "The Plywood Girls: Women and Gender Ideology at the Port Alberni Plywood Plant, 1942-1991," *Labour/Le Travail* 41 (Spring 1998), 199-235; M. Susan Bland, "Henrietta the Homemaker, and Rosie the Riveter in Advertising in Maclean's Magazine," in Laura Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth, eds., *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1992.); Helen Smith and Pamela Wakewich, "Beauty and the Helldivers': Representing Women's Work and Identities in a Warplant Newspaper," *Labour/Le Travail* 44 (Fall 1999), 71-107; Ruth Pierson, *They're Still Women After All: The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986). The majority of these studies argue that the wartime images of women were often based on traditional notions of women's essential femininity (e.g., "self-sacrificing"). Alice Kessler-Harris argues, however, that women would have juxtaposed these images with their real-life experiences of greater income, job choice, and a sense of accomplishment. Alice Kessler-Harris, op.cit, 165.

⁸³ *Toronto Star*, Nov. 30, 1943, "Ford Strike Settled," 2.

⁸⁴ *Globe and Mail*, Nov. 26, 1942, "The Windsor Walkout," 6.

⁸⁵ *Toronto Star*, Nov. 24, 1942, "Lauds War Efforts of Businesswomen," 23; "18-Hour Deodorant," 27; "Tells Part Women Playing in Russia," 4; "Doing Real Man's Job: Girls Speed Shipbuilding," 2; "Women Play Big Part in Building Huge Plane," 19; "Women in War Jobs Back Western Girls," 19.

⁸⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker*, November 19, 1942, 1 and 3.

⁸⁷ Valerie Endicott, "A Woman's Place (Was) Everywhere: A Study of Women Who Worked in Aircraft Production in Toronto During the Second World War," MA Thesis, University of Toronto, 1991, 2.

-
- ⁸⁸ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic Roofing, 1943 (d), *UAW-CIO War Worker Metallic Roofing Edition* Dec. 12, 1942, 4.
- ⁸⁹ Valerie Endicott, op.cit., 63.
- ⁹⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 16, File: De Havilland, 1942-44, *Aircraft Worker*, August 21, 1942, "Great UAW Convention," 2.
- ⁹¹ ALUA, UAW Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Box 49, File: Metallic Roofing 1943 (d). Leaflet, circa March 1943.
- ⁹² ALUA, UAW Bound Newspaper Collection, Volume 25, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, January 1, 1943, "Brantford Union Drive Meets Growing Success," 1.
- ⁹³ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File 3: District Council Minutes and Reports, Jan.-June, 1943. "Burt Report," April 1943, 7.
- ⁹⁴ Gunda Lambton, *Sun in Winter: A Toronto Wartime Journal, 1942-1945* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 2003), 54.
- ⁹⁵ Valerie Endicott, op.cit., 119-120.
- ⁹⁶ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 5, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Feb. 1, 1943, "Equal Pay for Women at De Havilland," 4; UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 15, 1943, "Many Gains in De Havilland Agreement," 1; George Burt Collection, Box 1, File, District Council Minutes, Jan. 11-12, 1943, "Local 112 Report.
- ⁹⁷ Office workers, mostly women, also received equal pay in September 1943 after becoming the first office workers to be organized by the UAW. ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Sept. 15, 1943, "UAW Wins De Havilland Pay Boost," 1.
- ⁹⁸ ALUA, Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 16, File 9, *Massey-Harris Organizing Bulletin*, Jan. 22, 1943, "Minimum for Girls Made at De Havilland," *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, October 1, 1943, "Labour Board Approves Equal Pay in Toronto Plant," 8.
- ⁹⁹ ALUA UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File: 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Oct. 1, 1943, "Labour Board Approves Equal Pay in Toronto Plant," 8.
- ¹⁰⁰ ALUA, George Burt Collection. Box 1, File : District Council Meetings, Jan-June 1942, "Minutes, March 1942," 9.
- ¹⁰¹ ALUA, George Burt Collection, Box 1, File: District Council Meeting, April, 1943, "Report," 7.
- ¹⁰² ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, Aug., 1943, "Report," 6. A 1944 survey by the New York State Department of Labor reported that some companies were claiming they were not paying women equally because of the costs involved in making the changes necessary to accommodate women workers. The labour department's analysis of these claims, however, revealed that few of the changes could be attributed to the entry of women. Most, in fact, were made well before women were hired and were designed, not to accommodate women, but to speed production and reduce training time for new hires. The same report also confirmed the findings of the

Hayes Steel joint survey: women's production equaled or exceeded male production in the majority of the plants surveyed. The report concluded that there was not a "consistent relationship between employers' evaluation of comparative production by men and women doing similar work and the start rates paid to women." *Labor Gazette* 44 (May 1944), "Wages of women replacing men in New York industries," 554.

¹⁰³ ALUA UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File: 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, June 1, 1943, 1, "Hayes Steel Women Prove Equal Work Issue."

¹⁰⁴ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office, Series 9, Box 11, File: Minutes and Reports, Aug. 1943, "Minutes," 14.

¹⁰⁵ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 8, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, Dec. 1, 1943, "Equal Pay Fight Won," 3A.

¹⁰⁶ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Office Collection, Series 9, Box 11, File: District Council Meeting, June, 1945, "Minutes," 21.

¹⁰⁷ *Labour Gazette* 44 (May 1944), "Wages of women replacing men in New York State," 554.

¹⁰⁸ Two weeks before the Ford strike, for instance, the UAW joined with several Windsor-area companies in a lobbying effort directed at the Ontario RWLB. The companies testified they would pay equal pay if the board allowed it. *Windsor Star*, Nov. 25, 1942, "Negotiators Deadlocked," 6.

¹⁰⁹ Jeffrey Keshen, op.cit., 160. Results in the US were little better. In 1944 the US National War Labor Board reported that about 60,00 women had received equal pay under its voluntary approach, out of a female workforce in excess of 10 million. *Labour Gazette* 44 (May 1944), "Equal pay principle make progress," 553.

¹¹⁰ ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 117, File 8, *UAW-CIO War Worker, Massey Harris Edition*, January 7, 1943, "Girls Grievances," 2.

¹¹¹ ALUA, Toronto Subregional Collection, Box 9, File: Staff Meetings, Jan.-Feb. 1944, Minutes, "Minutes, Jan. 22-23, 1944," 2. The union's district council endorsed the principle at its Jan. 1944 meeting. Ibid., "Feb. 21, 1944 Meeting," 1. For an examination of UAW's record on the seniority issue, see Pamela Sugiman, op. cit.

¹¹² ALUA, UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection, Box 25, File 7, *United Automobile Worker Canadian Edition*, April 1944, "Do Women Want Post-War Jobs?" 1.

¹¹³ ALUA, UAW Research Department, Box 32, File: Women's Post-War Survey- Local 112, August 1944. This file contains 149 completed by women at De Havilland. Almost three-quarters of respondents said they planned to work after the war. Interestingly, only a handful wanted to change jobs to office or sales work. The bulk of these women – 74 per cent – wanted to stay in factory work, especially aircraft production, which had been a virtual male bastion before the war.

¹¹⁴ Kay Neal, a wartime local 112 member, recalled in an interview that without the union giving women seniority ratings, the company "would have done what they wanted with us." Valerie Endicott, op cit.,147.

¹¹⁵ When asked to choose between business or labour's having the most influence with government, 40 per cent of respondents chose "labour," 26 per cent chose "business and 25 per cent were "undecided." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8 (Spring 1944), "December 1943 CIPO Polls," 44.

¹¹⁶ For discussion about the war's impact on post-war human rights developments, including equal pay, see Shirley Tillotson, op.cit.; George Egerton, "Entering the Age of Human Rights: Religion, Politics, and Canadian Liberalism," *Canadian Historical Review* 85 (September 2004), 453-481.

¹¹⁷ Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two." *Labour/Le Travail* 3 (Autumn, 1978). 175-196; Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada* (Don Mills: Oxford, 2001); Peter Warrian, "Labour Is not a Commodity: A Study of the Rights of Labour in the Canadian Postwar Economy." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1984.

¹¹⁸ Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equality: Women, Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 8, 12.

¹¹⁹ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, Nov. 7, 1945, "Union Policy," 1.

¹²⁰ LAC microfilm, *Ford Facts*, Aug. 12, 1943, "Ford Airman Wants More Information," 2.

Conclusion

Labour Day in Toronto in 1945 was a far different affair than in 1939. More than 12,000 unionists streamed down city streets in the largest labour parade in the city's history, thanks mostly to a far larger CIO contingent than in 1939. The Packinghouse Workers, resplendent in starched white smocks and caps and marching "in perfect step," took first prize for the "smartest looking" delegation. The UPWA had not even had a Labour Day delegation in 1939.¹

Unlike the overcast event of 1939, Toronto celebrated Labour Day in 1945 under a brilliant-blue sky. Canadian Congress of Labour president Aaron Mosher was on hand to address the marchers after they had made their way from Queen's Park to Riverside Park. "This should be called V-W Day, Victory for Workers Day," he told his audience, as labour "celebrates the winning of the Second World War."²

The CIO in Canada, in the words of the era, had had a good war. Its numbers had grown from a few thousand workers to more than 244,000.³ CIO affiliates had been able to organize workers in most of the large corporations in their respective industries and had been able to negotiate collective agreements with them. Those contracts had given thousands such workplace rights as seniority and a grievance procedure, as well as economic gains in the form of higher wages, paid vacations, overtime pay, pensions, and equal pay for women. The CIO's political power had also grown. From being an upstart troublemaker of the 1930s despised by government, it had become a force to be reckoned with at the ballot box, so much so that both the Liberal and Conservative

parties moved their policies leftwards in response to the CIO-supported CCF's electoral successes during the war.

What accounts for such success? On the material side, the labour shortages of the war empowered workers to challenge their employers about their terms and conditions of work, and those shortages alone could well have assured the CIO success. But it would have been a far more limited success, perhaps restricted to collective bargaining gains. Even that gain would have occurred only if the CIO had been able to maintain its strength in the workplace in the face of corporate resistance to unionization, government foot-dragging, and the unpopularity of wartime strikes even among workers. The government's anxiety to maintain war production and avoid strikes encouraged it to intervene in labour relations, often to the unions' benefit, and thus it also gave the CIO more power. But, again, government assistance would never have been offered if unions had not been strong in members and those members strong in their support for their unions.

In our own time, scholars Mercedes Steedman and Julie Guard worked with the Steel Workers during a recent, successful organizing drive in a Sudbury, Ontario, call centre. What they argue, when accounting for the drive's success, was that the union's creation of a culture of dignity and justice was key, as well as workers' sense of a new "we" that was embodied in the union. ⁴ American scholars studying a successful drive in Reno, Nevada, also note the importance of such cultural factors as workers' sense of collective power and recognition that they, too, have rights. ⁵ Also strong in the Nevada drive was workers' sense of their place in history – the conviction that they were carrying on battles fought by their forbears and were continuing the fight for the next generation.

British historian Sonya Rose notes in her history of the “People’s War” in Britain the importance of cultural factors during the war. ⁶ If the CIO had approached workers as though workers’ only motivation was material, without appealing to them on the bases of workplace democracy, citizenship rights, human rights, and a fairer, more distributive social contract, it would have failed to leverage the idealism generated by the nation’s popular, worker-supported war effort. It also would have failed to engender workers’ sense of being part of history.⁷ To be sure the war created contradictory impulses, with workers responding both to the call of the nation and to the call of their class. Their support for the nation’s war effort was, on the one hand, a conservative influence. Workers were, on the whole, reluctant to strike during the war, as evidenced, for example, when Canadian UAW members supported the American parent union’s no-strike pledge in 1944 against their leaders’ advice. On the other hand, the war encouraged militancy. Wartime labour shortages increased workers’ material power, and the class-based meaning the CIO gave the war increased workers’ sense of class entitlement, both by valorizing their service as “soldiers of production” and by layering on to the “People’s War” rhetoric notions of workplace democracy and worker-citizen-soldier rights. There may not have been a detailed worked-out plan about the way that post-war Canada should reward its worker-citizen-soldiers, but there was a change, in Raymond Williams’ phrase, in the “structure of feeling.”⁸

Crucial to this was the sense of “we-ness” the CIO worked so hard to develop among workers. The taking of action together – organizing together, confronting the employer together, striking together – was critical to building the solidarity so necessary for union strength. But the CIO also fostered a cultural “we-ness” that both bolstered and gave direction to action. Through countless meetings, parades, dances, picnics,

concerts, sports events, publications, workshops, lobbying sessions, and war work initiatives, CIO activists talked to their members about class issues. The CIO also gave workers the opportunity to talk back to their leaders and to talk amongst themselves. Thus it created a union “world,” a mini-public sphere whose discourse and conversation was independent of the larger world while at the same time being linked to it, often through shared the national effort and sacrifice of the war.

Furthermore, successful CIO efforts to make formerly private workplace concerns arbitrarily decided by employers — such as union recognition, mandatory collective bargaining, union security, and equal pay for women — into public issues to be decided by the people through their government changed the very definition of what was debatable within the larger public sphere, thus transforming it. The war, said the *Canadian Tribune* in 1943, was “a mentally exciting time, with new ideas, new concepts, new people, and new culture.”⁹ “We’re talking about things we might never have thought about had it not been for the war,” read a letter to a local union newspaper. “We’re ... planning all the things we must do as citizens to win the peace.”¹⁰

The fact that the permanent establishment of the CIO in Canada occurred during the war influenced the organization’s long-term character. The contradictory impulses of militancy and conservatism were an inescapable part of the war. This led CIO leaders in Canada to make decisions about what its relationship with employers and government should be, decisions that in hindsight critics say lacked ambition for the working class or were even a betrayal of that class. But these critics tend to treat the war only as an economic driver, or merely as a backdrop and not a player, ignoring its cultural power and its appeal to workers’ loyalties to country and the friends, family members, and co-workers serving in the armed forces.

The war also gave the institution of government new life and encouraged CIO leaders to regard the state more expansively than in 1939. Before the war the Canadian CIO had no reason to believe that government would support working people, but CIO ambitions — in the form of its calls on the state — expanded during the war. Its 1939 proposals to government were comparatively underdeveloped, but by the end of the war, CIO appeals were redolent with the potential of a beneficent state that would ensure jobs and security. Without the Canadian government's relatively skilful handling of the domestic front, without the wartime example of government deficit financing, without the cumbersome but nonetheless much-needed intervention of government in wartime labour relations, the CIO may never have found itself arguing so vociferously for a larger state apparatus.

In our own day, many observers, noting the contemporary shift to the right, first in Britain with the Thatcher revolution, followed by the ascendancy of the conservative wing of the Republican Party in the United States, have speculated about how conservatives gained such popular support. While the United States has arguably tilted most to the right, Canada has witnessed a less extreme version, but a version nonetheless. All political parties, including the NDP, have found themselves shifting their spectrum rightward in order to attract votes because ideas thought too conservative by most people as recently as the early 1970s, had found popular resonance by the 1980s. What happened?

The answer, according to these observers, is two-fold. The first is that the right wing, especially in the United States, has for several decades funded communications channels for conservative ideas that have colonized much of the mainstream media. Lewis Lapham, for example, has written about the billions of dollars that right-wing

Americans and American foundations have funnelled into a myriad of conservative communications vehicles: from sophisticated right-wing think tanks with their numerous publications and rosters of articulate and energetic speakers; to conservative magazines and newspapers; to entire universities run by the Christian evangelical right.¹¹ In Canada we have likewise witnessed the rise of the influence of the Fraser Institute, the Canada West Foundation, as well as the appearance of the *Western Report* and the *National Post*.

The other element in the answer is the persuasive power of the language that these conservative media use. As Stuart Hall notes, writing about the ascendancy of Thatcherism in Britain, that while 1940s' ideologies were about collectivism and citizenship, Thatcherism is about competitive individualism and anti-statism. "Thatcherism did a neat trick of translating ideology into popular idiom," says Hall. Hard-faced materialism became a new morality ("A nation living within its means"), he explains, and "Britishness" came to mean "self-reliance," and "personal responsibility," not coddling by the state. "Thatcherism stitched up old Tory tropes: the nation, duty, authority, standards, tradition with neo-liberal aggressiveness and self-interest," writes Hall.¹² As for the United States, Robert Reich describes how conservative writers and publicists there have "hijacked" the classic story line of American politics, changing it from its New Deal variation to a conservative narrative, where conservatives would free the individual, not from the harshness and greed of capitalism, but from government interference imposed by liberal elites.¹³ In Canada, we have seen a right-wing Ontario government adopt similar anti-government, market-oriented language, instructing the province's venerable, publicly-owned electricity company, for instance, to "compete" in the electricity market so that it would gain private sector "discipline."

A communications phenomenon similar to what has occurred in the last two decades took place in Canada during the Second World War. In 1939 the CIO recognized the need to win over the public: "We must see to it that workers and members of the community understand the dependence on one another and the benefits that have come to that community from the improved wages and working conditions won by our union," it asserted in its founding document, *The CIO Is Organizing*. The CIO's publicity message in 1939 and early 1940 was that unionization brought economic benefits to workers and their communities.¹⁴

The war, however, transformed the CIO's message. The UAW's 1942 publicity strategy, prepared by its public relations head, veteran newspaper reporter Harry Rowe, warned that if labour was to grow during the war and survive post-war, it had to "educate the public to its logical place in the scheme of things." To do this, Rowe said, union publicity "should emphasize that unionization is an imperative factor in the war effort."¹⁵

In this manner the CIO devised a narrative about the meaning of the war and workers' part in it that helped galvanize the country's industrial workers. It related this narrative to working-class Canadians through the new channels of communications it had created and through the myriad social interactions that unions offered their members. Thus workers did not merely join the CIO unions; they created a CIO world, a union public sphere in Habermas's terms. In that world they learned that, as unionized workers, they could confront their employers. As unionized citizens they learned about worker rights and demanded more responsive, more respectful, government.

No reading of the CIO's wartime history can be considered complete without the understanding that the war was more than just an economic force. It was a cultural

event as well. The CIO recruited the war effort into its ranks and used it strategically to give workers a vision of a collective enterprise that ennobled the struggle to defeat fascism: the creation of a new social order. It was out of the meaning the CIO gave the war as well as out of the conflict's labour and hardship that came the permanently established CIO in Canada and the beginnings of the country's move towards more social democratic government policies and programs.

¹ *Toronto Star*, September 4, 1945, "Labour Marks Its Day," 2. For more about Labour Day celebrations over time, see Craig Heron and Steve Penfold, *The Workers' Festival: A History of Labour Day in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

² *Toronto Star*, September 4, 1945, "Labour Marks Its Day," 2.

³ Canada. *Labour Organizations in Canada 1945* (Ottawa: Department of Labour, 1946), 50.

⁴ Jorge Garcia-Orgales, Julie Guard, D'Arcy Martin and Mercedes Steedman, "Organizing the Electronic Sweatshop." Conference paper presented to "Labouring Feminism and Feminist Working-Class History in North America and Beyond," University of Toronto, September 20-October 2, 2005.

⁵ Jill Jones and Susan Chandler, "Union Organizing and the Transformation of Immigrant Women Workers." Conference paper presented to "Labouring Feminism and Feminist Working-Class History in North America and Beyond," University of Toronto, September 20-October 2, 2005.

⁶ Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29. Rose says that "the 'people's war' rhetoric amplified the language of class."

⁷ Jill Jones and Susan Chandler, op. cit.

⁸ Cited in Sonya Rose, op.cit., 25.

⁹ Toronto Public Library, *Canadian Tribune*, "What Canadians in UK Talk About," January 16, 1943, 13.

¹⁰ LAC microfilm, *Local 439 News*, November 20, 1944, "A Soldier Writes," 6.

¹¹ Lewis Lapham, "Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda Mill, a Brief History," *Harper's Magazine*, March 2004, 31-41.

¹² Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left* (London: Verso, 1988), 46, 121, 157.

¹³ Robert Reich, "The Lost Art of the Democratic Narrative," *New Republic*, March 2005; Fred Block, "A Moral Economy," *Nation*, March 20, 2006.

¹⁴ LAC, MG 28 I 286, United Steelworkers of America, Volume 1, File 6: CIO Conference, Minutes, Briefs, November 4-5, 1939, "Report," 14.

¹⁵ ALUA, UAW Canadian Region Collection, Box 14, File: Misc. Material, 1942, "The Future of UAW Publicity in Canada," 14. Rowe said CIO efforts to counter the "inherently anti-labour press" had played a "major role in the development and meteoric growth of the CIO in recent years."

Bibliography

Abbreviations

ALUA	Archives of Labour and Urban History, Wayne State University, Walter Reuther Library, Detroit, Michigan
AO	Archives of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario
CTA	City of Toronto Archives, Toronto, Ontario
LAC	Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
TPL	Toronto Public Library, Toronto, Ontario
UPA	University of Pittsburgh Archives, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Primary sources consulted

Archives of Labour and Urban History, Wayne State University, Walter Reuther Library

United Auto Workers Union papers, including:
Canadian Regional Office Collection
George Burt Collection
R.J. Thomas Collection
Toronto Subregional Office Collection
UAW Bound Newspaper Collection
UAW Unbound Newspaper Collection
UAW Oral History Collection
UAW Research Department Collection

Archives of Ontario

Canada Packer Papers
Irving Abella Oral History Collection
"Strikes and Lockouts" Collection
UAW Local 439 Papers
Ontario Ministry of Labour Papers
Workers Educational Association Papers

City of Toronto Archives

John Inglis Papers

Library and Archives Canada

Canadian Labour Congress Papers

Canadian Food and Allied Workers Union Papers
Communist Party of Canada Papers
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation Papers
Cooperative Press Association Papers
M.J. Coldwell Papers
Department of Labour Papers
Department of Munitions and Supply Papers
International Association of Machinists Papers
Joseph Noseworthy Papers
Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto Papers
Microfilms of *Steel Labor (Canadian Edition)*, *Ford Facts*, *De Havilland Aircraft Worker*, *Local 439 News*, *UE News (Canadian Edition)*
National War Labour Board Papers
United Automobile Workers Papers
United Electrical Workers Union Papers
United Rubber Workers Papers
United Steel Workers of America Papers
Wartime Information Board Papers

John Robarts Library, University of Toronto

Canadian Unionist
Canadian Congress Journal
Canada and the People's War. (Ottawa: Office of Public Information, 1943)
Canada. Labour Organizations in Canada. (Ottawa: Department of Labour)
Canada. Labour Gazette. (Ottawa: Department of Labour)
Canada. Department of Labour Annual Report. (Ottawa: Department of Labour)
Canada. Canada Yearbook. (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics)
Industry Canada
Legislature of Ontario. *Proceedings of Select Committee Regarding the Relationship Between Employer and Employees*. Toronto: Legislature of Ontario, 1943.
Public Opinion Quarterly
The Kenney Collection

Toronto Public Library

Canadian Tribune

University of Pittsburgh Archives

United Electrical Workers District 5 (Canada) Papers
UE News (Canadian Edition)

Interviews by author

Charles Bonnello, UPWA wartime organizer
Paul Siren, UAW wartime organizer

Interviews by others

Charles Borsk, UPWA wartime organizer (by Vanessa Chivallo, United Food and Commercial Workers Union)

Secondary sources consulted

Abella, Irving. *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

_____. *The Canadian Labour Movement, 1902-1960*. Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 28. Ottawa, 1975.

_____. ed., *On Strike!* Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975.

Abbot, Kirby. "The Coal Miners and the Law in Nova Scotia: From the 1864 Combination of Workmen Act to the 1947 Trade Union Act," in Michael Earle, ed., *Workers and the State*. Fredericton: Acadiensis, 1989.

_____ and David Millar, eds. *The Canadian Worker in the Twentieth Century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

Adair, Kim. "The URWA and the Struggle for Union Recognition, 1937-1939," in Terry Copp, ed., *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947*. Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976, 1-29.

Allen, Richard. *The Social Passion: Religion and Reform in Canada, 1914-1928*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso: 1983.

Angus, Ian. *Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada*. Montreal: Vanguard Press, 1981.

Arthur, Eric. *Toronto: No Mean City*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964.

Aster, Sidney, ed. *The Second World War as a National Experience*. Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1981.

Avakumovic, Ivan. *The Communist Party in Canada: A History*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.

_____. *Socialism in Canada: A Study of the CCF-NDP in Federal and Provincial Politics*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

Avery, Donald. "Dangerous Foreigners": *European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in English Canada, 1896-1932*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.

_____. "Ethnic Loyalties and the Proletarian Revolution: A Case Study of Communist Political Activity in Winnipeg, 1923-1936." In Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando, eds. *Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada*, 68-93. Toronto: Methuen, 1981.

_____. *Reluctant Hosts: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896-1994*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.

Angus, Ian. *Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada*. Montreal: Vanguard Publications, 1981.

_____. "Last Hired, First Fired: Black Women During World War II." *Journal of American History* 69 (June 1982), 82-97.

Backhouse, Constance. *Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

Bannerman, Josie, Kathy Chopik and Ann Zurbigg. "Cheap at Half the Price: The History of the Fight for Equal Pay in BC," in Barbara K. Latham and Roberta J. Pazdro. *Not Just Pin Money: Selected Essay on the History of Women's Work in British Columbia*. Victoria: Camosun College, 1984.

Barris, Alex. *Days of Victory: Canadians Remember, 1939-1945*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1996.

Bartlett, Eleanor. "Real Wages and the Standard of Living in Vancouver, 1901-1929." *BC Studies* 51 (Autumn 1981), 3-62.

Bausenhart, Werner A. "The Ontario German Language Press and Its Suppression by Order-in-Council in 1918." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 4 (1972), 35-48.

Beck, Karen. "The Job He Left Behind: American Women in Shipyards During World War II," in Carol Berkin and Clara Lovett, eds. *Women, War and Revolution*. New York, 1980.

Beeby, Dean. "Women in the Ontario C.C.F., 1940-1950." *Ontario History* 74 (December 1982), 258-283.

Belisle, Donica. "Exploring Post-War Consumerism: The Campaign to Unionize Eaton's in Toronto, 1948-1952." *Canadian Historical Review* 86 (December 2005), 641-672.

Bemrose, John. *The Island Walkers*. Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 2003.

Benjamin, Amanda. "The Workers' Educational Association: A Study in Social Change and Resistance in Canadian Working-Class Culture." MA thesis, Concordia University, 1999.

Bercusson, David. "Organized Labour and the Imperial Munitions Board." *Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations* 28 (1973), 602-16.

Berton, Pierre. *Marching as to War: Canada's Turbulent Years, 1899-1953*. Toronto: Doubleday, 2001.

Black, Errol and Tom Black. "Labour in Brandon City Politics: A Long View." *Manitoba History* 23 (Spring 1992), 2-16.

Bland, Susan. "Henrietta the Homemaker, and Rosie the Riveter in Advertising in Maclean's Magazine," in Laura Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth, eds. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1992.

Bliss, Michael. *A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Times of Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart., 1858-1939*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1978.

Block, Fred. "A Moral Economy." *The Nation* (March 20, 2006).

Blum, John Morton. *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*. 1976. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Blythe, Ronald. *Private Words: Letters and Diaries from the Second World War*. London: Viking, 1991.

Boyle, Harry C. "The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics," in Craig Calhoun, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, 342-43.

Bray, Matthew. "'Fighting as an Ally': The English-Canadian Response to the Great War." *Canadian Historical Review* 61, no.2 (June 1980), 141-68.

Broadfoot, Barry. *The Veterans' Years: Coming Home From the War*. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1985.

_____. *Six War Years; Memories of Canadians at Home and Abroad*. Don Mills: General Publishing, 1976.

Brody, David. *Steelworkers in America: The Non-union Era*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Brownsey, Keith. "Opposition Blues: Leadership, Policy, and Organization in the Ontario Conservative Party, 1943-43." *Ontario History* 88 (December 1996), 273-296.

Buck, Tim. *Thirty Years: The Story of the Communist Movement in Canada, 1922-1952*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1952.

_____. *Yours in the Struggle: The Reminiscences of Tim Buck*. Edited by William Beeching and Phyllis Clark. Toronto: NC Press, 1977.

Burr, Christina. "'That Coming Curse — The Incompetent Compositress'." *Canadian Historical Review* 74 (September 1993), 344-366.

_____. "The Other Side: The Rhetoric of Labour Reform in Toronto During the 1870s," in Montigny, Edgar-Andre and Lori Chambers, eds. *Ontario Since Confederation: A Reader*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, 55-73.

Cahan, Jacqueline. "A Survey of the Political Activities of the Ontario Labour Movement, 1850-1935." MA thesis, University of Toronto, 1945.

Calder, Angus. *The People's War: Britain 1939-1945*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1969.

Calhoun, Craig. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MIT Press: 1999.

Calliste, Agnes. "Sleeping Car Porters in Canada: An Ethnically Submerged Split Labour Market." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 19 (Spring 1987), 1-20.

Campbell, Lara. "Respectable citizens of Canada: gender, family, and unemployment in Great Depression Ontario," Ph.D. dissertation. Queen's University, 2002.

Campbell, Marie. "Sexism in British Columbia Trade Unions,, 1900-1920," in Barbara Latham and Cathy Kress, eds. *In Her Own Right: Selected Essays on Women's History in B.C.*, 167-86. Victoria: Camosun College, 1980.

Caplan, Gerald. *The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Chafe, William. *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Role, 1920-1970*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Clive, Alan. *State of War: Michigan in World War II*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979.

Cohen, Lizabeth. *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Colling, Herb. *Ninety-Nine Days: The Ford Strike in Windsor, 1945*. Toronto: NC Press, 1995.

Collins, Robert. *You Had To Be There: An Intimate Portrait of the Generation that Survived the Depression, Won the War and Re-Invented Canada*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997.

- Cook, Peter. *Massey at the Brink: The Story of Canada's Greatest Multinational and Its Struggle To Survive*. Toronto: Collins, 1981.
- Cooper, Patricia. *Once a Cigar Maker: Men, Women and Work Culture in American Cigar Factories*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Copp, Terry. *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-47*. Elora: Cummock Press, 1976.
- _____. *The I.U.E. in Canada*. Elora: Cummock Press, 1980.
- _____. "The Rise of Industrial Unionism in Montreal, 1935-1945." *Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations* 37 (1982), 843-875.
- Cornish, Mary and Lynn Spink. *Organizing Unions*. Toronto: Second Story Press, 1994.
- Cotter, Charles. *Toronto Between the Wars: Life in the City, 1919-1939*. Toronto: Firefly Books, 2004.
- Cox, Mark. "The Limits of Reform: Industrial Regulation and Management Rights in Ontario." *Canadian Historical Review* 68 (1987), 552-75.
- Crawford, Robert. "Nothing to Sell?: Australia's Advertising Industry at War, 1939-1945." *War and Society* 20 (May 2002), 99-124.
- Crawley, Ron. "What Kind of Unionism: Struggles Among Sydney Steelworkers in the SWOC Years, 1936-1942." *Labour/ le Travail* 39 (Spring, 1997), 99-123.
- Cuthbert Brandt, Gail. "'Pigeon-Holed and Forgotten: The Work of the Subcommittee on the Post-War Problems of Women, 1943.'" *Histoire sociale/Social History* 15 (May 1982), 239-260.
- Dawley, Alan. "Total War and Class Conflict: American Labor in the 1940s." *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labor History* 49 (Autumn, 1984), 77-80.
- Dawson, Michael. *The Mountie: From Dime Novel to Disney*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1998.
- Dawson, R. McGregor, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
- Dellheimn, Charles. "The Creation of a Company Culture: Cadbury's, 1861-1931." *American Historical Review* 92 (February 1987).
- Denning, Michael. *The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*. London and New York: Verso, 1996.

DesRochers, Ben. *The Union That Changed My Life Forever: Local 1005 United Steelworkers of America*. Hamilton: Self-published, n.d.

Denning, Michael. *The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*. London and New York: Verso, 1996.

Drummond, Ian. *Progress Without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario From Confederation to the Second World War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

Dunmore, Spencer. *Wings for Victory: The Remarkable Story of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994.

Durflinger, Serge. *Fighting From Home: The Second World War in Verdun, Quebec*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006.

Earle, Michael. "The Building of Steel Union Local 1064, Sydney, 1935-1937," in James Cadow, ed. *Industry and Society in Nova Scotia: An Illustrated History*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001.

Egerton, George. "Entering the Age of Human Rights: Religion, Politics, and Canadian Liberalism." *Canadian Historical Review* 85 (September 2004), 453-481.

Endicott, Valerie. "A woman's place (was) everywhere: a study of women who worked in aircraft production in Toronto during the Second World War." M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1991.

Ely, Geoffrey. "Nations, Politics and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," in Craig Calhoun, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, 289-349.

Evans, Gary. *John Grierson and the National Film Board: The Politics of Wartime Propaganda, 1939-1945*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.

Fahrni, Magda. "Counting the Costs of Living: Gender, Citizenship, and a Politics of Prices in 1940s Montreal." *Canadian Historical Review* 83 (December 2002), 483-504.

Filey, Mike. *A Toronto Album 2: More Glimpses of the City That Was*. Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2002.

Foner, Eric. *Free Soil, Free Labour, and Free men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth. "Industrial Recreation, the Second World War and the Revival of Welfare Capitalism, 1934-1960." *Business History Review*, 69 (Summer 1986).

Fonow, Mary Margaret. *Union Women: Forging Feminism in the United Steelworkers of America*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002.

Forestell, Diane. "The Necessity of Sacrifice for the Nation at War: Women's Labour Force Participation, 1939-1945." *Histoire sociale/Social History* 22 (1989), 323-343.

Forrest, Anne. "Securing the Male Breadwinner: A Feminist Interpretation of PC 1003." *Industrial relations/ Relations industrielles* 52 (1997), 91-113.

Fox, Frank W. *Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-1945*. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 1975.

Fragar, Ruth. "No Proper Deal: Women Workers and the Canadian Labour Movement, 1870-1940," in Linda Briskin and Lynda Yantz, eds. *Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement*. (Toronto: Women's Press, 1983.

_____. "Class, Ethnicity and Gender in the Eaton's Strikes, 1912 and 1934," in Franca Iacovetta and Mariana Valverde, eds. *Gender Conflicts: New Essays in Women's History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, 189-228.

Fragar, Ruth and Carmela Patrias. "This Is Our Country, These Are Our Rights": Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaigns." *Canadian Historical Review* 82 (March 2001), 1-35.

_____. *Discounted Labour: Women Workers in Canada, 1870-1939*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

Fraser, Nancy. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Craig Calhoun, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, 109-142.

Freeman, Bill. *1005: Political Life in a Local Union*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1982.

Freeman, Joshua. "Delivering the Goods: Industrial Unions During World War Two." *Labor History* 19 (Winter 1978), 570-593.

Friedlander, Peter. *The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939: A Study in Class and Culture*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973.

Fudge, Judy and Eric Tucker. *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Fussell, Paul. *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

_____. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975

_____. *Uniforms*. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 2002.

Gabin, Nancy. "Women and the United Automobile Workers' Union in the 1950s," in Ruth Milkman, ed. *Women, Work, and Protest: A Century of American Women's Labor History*. Boston: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, 259-279.

_____. *Feminism in the Labor Movement: Women and the United Auto Workers, 1935-1975*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Gairy, Harry. *A Black Man's Toronto, 1914-1980: The Reminiscences of Harry Gairey*. Toronto: Multicultural Society of Ontario, 1981.

Gathercole, George. "The City of Toronto in depression and recovery, 1929-1939: a study of public finance." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, 1945.

Grescoe, Audrey and Paul. *The Book of War Letter: 100 Years of Private Canadian Correspondence*. Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 2003.

Guard, Julie. "The 'woman question' in Canadian unionism: women in the UE, 1930s-1960s." Ph. D. dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1994.

Galloway, Priscilla, ed. *Too Young to Fight: Memories From Our Youth During World War II*. Toronto: Stoddart, 1999.

Gellhorn, Martha. *The Face of War*. London: Granta Books, 1959.

Gerstle, Gary. *Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Gindin, Sam. *The CAW: Birth and Transformation of a Union*. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1995.

Glaberman, Martin. *Wartime Strikes: The Struggle Against the No-Strike Pledge in the UAW During World War II*. Detroit: Bewick Editions, 1980.

Gluck, Sherna Berger. *Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the War and Social Change*. New York: Meridien, 1988.

Glucksman, Miriam. *Women Assemble: Women Workers and the New Industries in Inter-War Britain*. London, 1990.

Gonick, Cy. *A Very Red Life: The Story of Bill Walsh*. Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 2001.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. *No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Granatstein, J.L. *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975.

_____. *Mackenzie King: His Life and World*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977.

_____. *A Nation Forged in Fire: Canadians and the Second World War, 1939-1945*. Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989.

_____ and Peter Neary, eds. *The Good Fight Canadians and World War II*. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995.

_____ *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.

Grant, Hugh. "Solving the Labour Problem at Imperial Oil: Welfare Capitalism in the Canadian Petroleum Industry." *Labour/Le Travail* 41 (1998), 69-95.

Green, James. "Fighting on Two Fronts: Working Class Militancy in the 1940s." *Radical America* 94 (July-August, 1975), 7-48.

Green, Harvey. *The Uncertainties of Everyday Life: 1915-1945*. New York: HarperPerennial, 1992.

Grenke, Art. "From Dreams of the Worker State to Fighting Hitler: The German-Canadian Left from the Depression to the End of World War II." *Labour/Le Travail* 35 (1995), 65-105.

Grizzle, Stanley. *My Name's Not George: The Story of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in Canada*. Toronto: Umbrella Press, 1998.

Guard, Julie and Mercedes Steedman. "Organizing the Electronic Sweatshop." Paper delivered to the "Labouring Feminism and Feminist Working-Class History in North America and Beyond Conference," Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, September 30, 2005.

Guest, Dennis. *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979.

Habermas, Jurgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by Thomas Burger. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.

Hall, Stewart. *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*. London: Verso: 1988.

Hall, J. Dowd. "Disorderly Women: Gender and Labour Militancy in the Appalachian South." *Journal of American History* 73 (Summer 1986).

- Halpern, Rick. *Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-1954*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997.
- Hamerow, Theodore S. "Women, Propaganda and Total War." *Reviews in American History* 7 (March 1979), 122-127.
- Harms, Richard and Robert Viol. *Grand Rapids Goes to War: The 1940s Homefront*. Grand Rapids: Grand Rapids Historical Society, 1993.
- Harris, Richard. *The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.
- Hart, Scott. *Washington at War, 1941-1945*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Hartmann, Susan. *The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982.
- Heild, Melissa. "'Union Minded': Women in the Texas ILGWU, 1933-50." *Frontiers* 4 (Summer 1979), 59-70.
- Heron, Craig. *Working in Steel: The Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935*. Toronto, 1988.
- _____. "Work and Struggle in the Canadian Steel Industry, 1900-1950," in Craig Heron, Robert Storey, eds. *On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986, 210-244.
- _____ ed. *The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.
- _____ *The Canadian Labour Movement: A Brief History*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1996.
- _____ and Steve Penfold. *The Workers' Festival: A History of the Labour Day in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.
- Hobbs, Margaret. "Gendering work and welfare: women's relationship to wage-work and social policy in Canada during the Great Depression," Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, 1995.
- _____. "Equality and Difference: Feminism and the Defence of Women Workers During the Great Depression." *Labour/Le Travail* 31 (Spring 1993), 202-203.
- Hollander, Taylor. "Making Reform Happen: The Passage of Canada's Collective Bargaining Policy, 1943-1944." *Journal of Policy History* 13 (2001), 299-328.

Honey, Maureen. *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda During World War II*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984.

Horn, Michiel, ed. *The Dirty Thirties: Canadians in the Great Depression*. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972.

_____. *The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.

_____. *The Great Depression of the 1930s in Canada*. Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 29. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1984.

_____. "The Great Depression: Past and Present," in his *The Depression in Canada: Responses to Economic Crisis*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1988, 274-289.

Horowitz, Gad. *Canadian Labour in Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

Howe, Irving and B.J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther*. New York: Random House, 1949.

Hunter, Peter. *Which Side Are You On, Boys?* Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1988.

Iacovetta, Franca. "Defending Honour, Demanding Respect: Manly Discourse and Gendered Practice in Two Construction Strikes, Toronto, 1960-1961," in Kathryn McPherson, et al, eds. *Gendered Pasts: Historical Essays in Femininity and Masculinity in Canada*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1999, 199-222.

Jamieson, Stuart. *Time of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-1960*. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1968.

Johansen, Peter. "For Better, Higher, Nobler Things": Massey's Pioneering Employee Publication." *Journalism History* 27 (Fall 2001), 94-104.

Johnson, Marilyn. *The Second God Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Johnston, Charles M. "The Children's War: The Mobilization of Ontario's Youth During the Second World War," in Roger Hall, William Westfall, and Laurel Sefton MacDowell, eds. *Patterns of the Past: Interpreting Ontario's History*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1988, 356-380.

Jones, Jill and Susan Chandler. "Union Organizing and the Transformation of Immigrant Women." Paper delivered to the "Labouring Feminism and Feminist Working-Class History in North America and Beyond Conference," Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, September 30, 2005.

Kealey, Linda and Joan Sangster. *Beyond the Vote: Canadian Women and Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.

Kealey, Gregory. *Workers and Canadian History*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.

Kealey, Greg and Douglas Cruickshank. "Strikes in Canada, 1891-1950." *Labour/Le Travail* 20 (Fall, 1987), 119-119.

Keegan, John. *The Second World War*. New York: Penguin, 1989.

Kennedy, David. *The American People in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Jeffrey Keshen. "Revisiting Canada's Civilian Women During World War II." *Histoire sociale/Social History* 30 (November 1997).

Jeffrey Keshen. *Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004.

Kessleman, Amy. "Hidden Resistance: Women Shipyard Workers After World War II," in Christine Bose, Roslyn Feldberg and Natalie Sokoloff, eds. *Hidden Aspects of Women's Work*. New York, 1987.

Kessler-Harris, Alice. *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

_____. *In Pursuit of Equality: Women, Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th Century America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

_____. "War, Work and the Culture of Gender." *Labour/Le Travail* 19 (Spring 1987), 163-167.

Ketter, David. "Unionization and Labour Regimes in Canada and the United States: Considerations for Comparative Research." *Labour/Le Travail* 25 (1990), 161-187.

Kimber, Stephen. *Sailors, Slackers, and Blind Pigs: Halifax at War*. Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2002.

Klausen, Susanne. "The Plywood Girls: Women and Gender Ideology at the Port Alberni Plywood Plant, 1942-1991." *Labour/Le Travail* 41 (Spring 1998), 199-235.

Klees, Marcus. "Between the Scylla and Charybdis of anarchy and despotism: the state, capital, and the working class in Great Depression Toronto, 1929-1939." Ph.D. dissertation. Queen's University, 1998.

_____. "Fighting the Sweatshop in Depression Ontario: Capital, Labour, and the Industrial Standards Act." *Labour/Le Travail* 45 (Spring 2000), 13-51.

Korineck, Valeria. *Roughing It in the Suburbs: Reading Chatelaine Magazine in the Fifties and Sixties*. Toronto: University of Toronto press, 2000.

Krmpotich, Paul. *A Tribute to the Members of Local 2251 United Steel Workers of America*. Sault Ste Marie: Local 2251 USWA, n.d.

Lamberton, Ross. "The Dresden Story: Racism, Human Rights and the Jewish Labour Committee of Canada." *Labour/Le Travail* 47 (Spring, 2001).

Lambton, Gunda. *Sun in Winter: A Toronto Wartime Journal, 1942-45*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003.

Lamphere, Louis. "Bringing the Family to Work: Women's Culture on the Shop Floor." *Feminist Studies* 11 (Fall 1985).

Lapham, Lewis. "Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda Mill, a Brief History." *Harper's Magazine* (March 2004), 31-41.

Lasky, Marjorie Penn. "'Where I Was a Person': The Ladies' Auxiliary in the 1934 Minneapolis Teamsters' Strikes," in Ruth Milkman, ed. *Women, Work and Protest*. Boston, 1985.

Latta, Ruth. *The Memory of All That: Canadian Women Remember World War II*. Burnstown, Ontario: General Store Publishing House, 1993.

Lazarus, Morden. *Years of Hard Labour*. Toronto: Ontario Federation of Labour, 1974.

Leach, James. "The Workers' Unity League and the Stratford Furniture Workers: The Anatomy of a Strike." *Ontario History* 5 (June 1967), 39-48.

Leacy, F.H., ed. *Historical Statistics of Canada*. Second revised ed., Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983.

Lemon, James. *Toronto Since 1918*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1985.

Lewis, David. *The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1981.

Lichtenstein, Nelson. *Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Lindert, Peter H. *Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 1*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Lipton, Charles. *The Trade Union Movement in Canada, 1827-1959*. Toronto: NC Press, 1978.

Logan, H.A. *Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1948.

_____. *State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining: The Canadian Experience, 1943-1954*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956.

Lowe, Graham. "The Rise of Modern Management in Canada." *Canadian Dimension* 14 (March 1976), 32-38.

MacDowell, Laurel Sefton. "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two." *Labour/Le Travail* 3 (Autumn, 1978). 175-196.

_____. "The 1943 Steel Strike Against Wartime Wage Controls." *Labour/Le Travail*, 10 (Autumn 1982), 65-85.

_____. "The Career of a Trade Union Leader: C.H. Millard, 1937-1946." *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 43 (Fall, 1988), 609-631.

_____. *"Remember Kirkland Lake": The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

_____. "After the Strike: Labour Relations in Oshawa, 1937-1939," in Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth, eds. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*, 2nd ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2000, 505-522.

_____. "Company Unionism in Canada, 1915-1948," in Bruce Kaufman and Daphne Taras, eds. *Non-Union Employee Representation: History, Contemporary Practice and Policy*. M.E. Sharpe, 2000, 96-120.

_____. *Renegade: The Life of J.L. Cohen, Lawyer*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

MacEachern, George. "Organizing Sydney Steelworkers in the Thirties." *New Maritimes*, 2 (1983), 10-12.

Mackay, Ian. *Building a Union: Organizing the Bakery, Confectionery Workers of Nova Scotia*. Halifax: Local 446, Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union, 1986.

MacLaine, Ian. *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information*. London: George Allen University, 1979.

MacMillan, Ian. *Making the Difference: 50 Years of Local Union 343, Kingston, Ontario*. Kingston: USWA, 1995.

- MacPherson, Ian. "The 1945 Collapse of the CCF in Windsor," *Ontario History* 61 (December 1969).
- Mahn, Bryan. "The Packinghouse Workers in Kitchener, 1934-47," in Terry Copp, ed. *Industrial Unionism in Kitchener, 1937-1947*. Elora: Cumnock Press, 1976, 30-52.
- Marshall, T.H. *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.
- May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: HarperCollins, 1988
- May, Martha. "The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor Company and the Five-Dollar Day." *Feminist Studies* 8 (Summer 1982).
- McCallum, Margaret. "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-1939." *Canadian Historical Review* 71 (March 1990), 46-79.
- McEwan, Tom. *The Forge Glows Red: From Blacksmith to Revolutionary*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1974.
- McInnis, Peter. *Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.
- McNairn, Jeffrey L.. *The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- McNeill, Bill. *Voices of a War Remembered: An Oral History of Canadians in World War II*. Toronto: Doubleday, 1991.
- Manley, John. "Communists and Auto Workers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936." *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (1986), 105-133.
- _____. "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism and the 'Third Period': the Workers Unity League, 1929-1936." *Journal of the Canadian Historical Society* 1994, 167-194.
- _____. "'Audacity, audacity and still more audacity': Tim Buck, the Party, and the People, 1932-1939." *Labour/Le Travail* 49 (Spring 2002), 9-41.
- Marks, Lynne. *Revivals and Roller Rinks: Religion, Leisure and Identity in Late-Nineteenth-Century Small-Town Ontario*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- Marwick, Arthur. *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*. London: Macmillan, 1965.

_____. *The Home Front: The British and the Second World War*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1976.

May, Martha. "Bread Before Roses" American Workingmen, Labor Unions and the Family Wage," in Ruth Milkman, ed. *Women Work and Protest*. Boston, 1985.

Menzies, Robert, Robert Adamoski, and Dorothy E. Chunn, "Rethinking the Citizen in Canadian Social History," in Robert Adamoski, Dorothy E. Chunn, and Robert Menzies, eds., *Contesting Canadian Citizenship* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2002), 11-42.

Merrill, Dennison. *Harvest Triumphant: The Hundred-Year Story of Massey-Harris*. Toronto: Collins, 1949.

Meyerowitz, Ruth. "Organizing the United Automobile Workers: Women Workers at the Ternstedt General Motors Plant," in Ruth Milkman, ed. *Women, Work and Protest*. Boston, 1985.

Milkman, Ruth. "Women's Work and Economic Crisis: Some Lessons from the Great Depression." *Review of Radical Political Economics* 8 (Spring 1976).

_____. "American Women and Industrial Unionism During World War II," in Margaret Randolph Higgonet, et al., eds. *Behind the Lines*. New Haven, 1987.

_____. *Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation during World War II*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.

Miller, Ian. "Toronto's Response to the Outbreak of War, 1939." *Canadian Military History* 11(Winter 2002), 5-23.

_____. *Our Glory and Our Grief: Torontonians and the Great War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

Miller, Marc. "Working Women and World War II." *New England Quarterly* 53 (March 1980), 42-61.

Mills, C. Wright. "The Trade Union Leader: A Collective Portrait." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 9 (Spring 1945), 158-176.

Millward, Alan S. *War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Miner, Bob. *Miner's Life: Bob Miner and Union Organizing in Timmins, Kirkland Lake and Sudbury*, ed., Wayne Roberts. Hamilton: Labour Studies Program, McMaster University, 1979.

- Montague, John Tait. "Trade unionism in the Canadian meatpacking industry," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1950.
- Morgan, Carol. *Women Workers and Gender Identities, 1835-1930*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Morgan Cecilia. *Public Men and Virtuous Women: the Gendered Language of Religion and Politics in Upper Canada, 1791-1850*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- _____ and Colin Coates. *Heroines and History: Representations of Madeleine de Verchères and Laura Secord*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.
- Morris, Charles. *The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Morton, Desmond with Terry Copp. *Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labour Movement*. Ottawa: Deneau, 1980.
- _____. *Social Democracy in Canada: NDP*. Toronto: Samuel Stevens, Hakkert and Co., 1977.
- _____. *Canada and War: A Military and Political History*. Toronto: Butterworth, 1981..
- _____. *1945: When Canada Won the War*. Canadian Historical Association Historical Booklet No. 54. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1995.
- _____ and J.L. Granatstein. *Victory 1945: Canadians from War to Peace*. Toronto: Harper Collins, 1995.
- _____ and Morton Weinfeld. *Who Speaks for Canada? Words That Shape a Country*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998.
- Moulton, David. "Ford Windsor, 1945," in Irving Abella, ed., *On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada, 1919-1949*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1975.
- Muszynski, Alicja. "The Organization of Women and Ethnic Minorities in a Resource Industry: A Case Study of the Unionization of Shore Workers in the B.C. Fishing Industry, 1937-1949." *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes* 19 (1984), 89-107.
- Naylor, James. "Ontario Workers and the Decline of Labourism," in Roger Hall, William Westfall, and Laurel Sefton MacDowell, eds. *Patterns of the Past: Interpreting Ontario's History*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1988, 278-300.
- _____. *The New Democracy: Challenging the Social Order in Industrial Ontario, 1914-1925*. Toronto, 1991.

_____. "Southern Ontario: Striking at the Ballot Box," in Craig Heron, ed. *The Workers' Revolt in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, 144-170.

Nelles, H.V. *The Art of Nation-Building: Pageantry and Spectacle at Quebec's Tercentenary*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

Newton, Janice, "'The Alchemy of Politicization': Socialist Women and the Early Canadian Left," in Franca Iacovetta and Mariana Valverde, eds. *Gender Conflicts: New Essays in Women's History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, 189-228.

_____. *The Feminist Challenge to the Canadian Left 1900-1918*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.

Owram, Doug, ed. *Canadian History: A Reader's Guide, Vol. 2, Confederation to the Present*. University of Toronto Press, 1994.

_____. *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

Palmer, Bryan, *Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980*. Toronto: Butterworth, 1983.

_____. "The Rise and Fall of British Columbia's Solidarity," in Bryan Palmer, ed. *The Character of Class Struggle*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986, 176-200.

_____. "Response to Joan Scott." *International Labor and Working Class History* 31 (Spring 1987).

_____. *A Communist Life: Jack Scott and the Canadian Workers Movement*. Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1988.

_____. *Descent into Discourse*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.

Panitch, Leo and Donald Swartz. *The Assault on Trade Union Freedom*. Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988.

Patterson, James T. "Federalism in Crisis: A Comparative Study of the U.S. and Canada in the Depression of the 1930s," in Victor Hoar. *The Great Depression: Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States*, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969.

Parr, Joy. *The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Peate, Mary. *The Girl in the Sloppy Joe Sweater: Life on the Canadian Home Front During World War II*. Toronto: Optimum Publishing, 1988.

- Pendergest, James. "The Attempt at Unionization in the Automobile Industry in Canada." *Ontario History* 70 (1978), 245-263.
- Pentland, Clare. "The Canadian Industrial Relations System: Some Formative Factors." *Labour/Le Travail* 4 (1979), 9-23.
- Perry, Adele. *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
- Petryshyn, J. "Class Conflict and Civil Liberties: The Origins and Activities of the Canadian Labour Defence League, 1925-1940." *Labour/Le Travail* 19 (Autumn 1982), 39-63.
- Phillips, Paul and Erin Phillips. *Women & Work: Inequality in the Canadian Labour Market*. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993.
- Pierson, Ruth Roach. "Women's Emancipation and the Recruitment of Women Into the Canadian Labour Force in World War II." *Canadian Historical Association Papers*, 1976.
- _____. "They're Still Women After All": *The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.
- _____. "Women's Emancipation and the Recruitment of Women into the Labour Force in World War II," in Susan Mann Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice, eds. *The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women's History*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977, 125-145.
- _____. "'Home Aid': A Solution to Women's Unemployment After World War II." *Atlantis* 2 (Spring 1977), 85-97.
- _____. "Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War." *Gender and History* 1 (Spring 1989), 77-86.
- Piva, Michael. *The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900-1921*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979.
- Polenberg, Richard. *America at War: The Home Front, 1941-1945*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- Prentice, Alison, Paul Bourne, Gail Cuthbert Grant, Beth Light, Wendy Mitchinson, Naomi Black. *Canadian Women: A History*. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada, 1996.
- Ramkhlalawansingh, Ceta. "Women During the Great War," in Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepard, eds. *Women at Work in Ontario, 1850-1930*. Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974.

Radforth, Ian. *Bushworkers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario, 1900-1980*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

_____ and Alan Greer. *Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.

_____ and Laurel Sefton MacDowell. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1992.

_____ and Laurel Sefton MacDowell. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*. 2nd Ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2000.

_____ and Laurel Sefton MacDowell. *Canadian Working Class History: Selected Readings*. 3rd Ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2006.

_____. *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.

Rea, K.J. *The Prosperous Years: The Economic History of Ontario, 1939-1965*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

Reich, Robert. "The Lost Art of the Democratic Narrative." *New Republic* (March 2005).

Richler, Mordechai, ed. *Writers on World War II*. Toronto: Penguin, 1991.

Ritchie, Charlies. *The Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad. 1937-1945*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.

Roberts, Wayne. *Organizing Westinghouse: Alf Ready's Story*. Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies Programme, 1979.

_____. *Baptism of a Union*. (Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies Programme, 1981.

_____ ed. , *Where Angels Fear to Tread: Eileen Tallman Sufrin and the Labour Movement*. Hamilton: McMaster University Labour Studies Programme, 1983.

Rodney, William. *Soldiers of the International: A History of the Communist Party in Canada, 1919-1928*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

Rose, Sonya, *What People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Rupp, Leila. *Mobilizing Women for War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Russell, Bob. *Back to Work: Labour, State, and Industrial Relations in Canada*. Toronto: Nelson, 1990.

Rutherford, Paul. "Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada," in David Flaherty and Frank Manning, eds. *The Beaver Bites Back?: American Popular Culture in Canada*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1993, 257-280.

_____. *Endless Propaganda: The Advertising of Public Goods*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

Safarian, A.E. *The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression*. 2nd rev. ed. Toronto: The Carleton Library, 1970.

Salutin, Rick. *The Organizer: A Canadian Union Life*. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980.

Sangster, Joan. *Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989.

_____. "The Softball Solution: Female Workers, Male Managers, and the Operation of Paternalism at Westclox, 1923-1960." *Labour/Le Travail* 32 (Fall 1993), 167-199.

_____. *Earning Respect: The Lives of Working Women in Small-Town Ontario, 1920-1960*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.

Schatz, Ronald. "Union Pioneers: The Founders of Local Unions at General Electric and Westinghouse." *Journal of American History* 66 (December 1979).

Scheinberg, Ellen. "The Tale of Tessie the Textile Worker: Female Textile Workers in Cornwall During World War II." *Labour/Le Travail* 33 (1994), 153-186.

Schulz, Patricia. *The East York Workers' Association: A Response to the Great Depression*. Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1975.

Scott, Bruce. "A Place in the Sun: The Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-29." *Labour/Le Travail* 1 (1976), 158-192.

Scott, Jack. *Canadian Workers, American Unions*. Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978.

Sexton, Patricia. "A Feminist Union Perspective," in B.J. Widdick, ed. *Auto Work and Its Discontents*. Baltimore, 1976.

Smith, Doug. *Cold Warrior: C.S. Jackson and the United Electrical Workers* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1997).

Smith, Helen and Pamela Wakewich. "'Beauty and the Helldivers': Representing Women's Work and Identities in a Warplant Newspaper." *Labour/Le Travail* 44 (Fall 1999), 71-107.

Sobel, David and Susan Meurer. *Working at Inglis: The Life and Death of a Canadian Factory*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1994.

Srigley, Katrina. "Working lives and simple pleasures: single, employed women in a depression-era city: 1929-1939." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Toronto, 2006.

Steedman, Mercedes. "The Promise: Communist Organizing in the Needle Trades, the Dressmakers' Campaign, 1928-37." *Labour/Le Travail* 34 (February, 1994), 37-73.

Stewart, Walter. *The Life and Political Times of Tommy Douglas*. Toronto: McArthur and Co., 2003.

Storey, Robert. "Workers, unions and steel: the shaping of the Hamilton working class, 1935-1948." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981.

_____. "The Struggle to Organize Stelco and Dofasco." *Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations* 42 (1987), 366-385.

Strom, Sharon Hartman. "Challenging 'Women's Place': Feminism, the Left and Industrial Unionism in the 1930s." *Feminist Studies* 9 (Summer 1983).

_____. "'We're No Kitty Foyles': Organizing Office Workers for the CIO, 1937-50," in Ruth Milkman, ed. *Women Work and Protest*, Boston, 1985.

Strong-Boag, Veronica. *The New Day Recalled: Lives of Girls and Women in English Canada, 1919-1939*. Toronto, 1988.

Struthers, James. *No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

Sufrin, Eileen. *The Eaton Drive: The Campaign to Organize Canada's Largest Department Store, 1948-1952*. Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1982.

Sugiman, Pamela. *Labour's Dilemma: The Gender Politics of Auto Workers in Canada, 1937-1979*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Sutherland, Neil. "'We Always Had Things to Do': The Paid and Unpaid Work of Anglophone Children Between the 1930s and the 1960s." *Labour/Le Travail* 25 (Spring 1990), 105-141.

Taylor, Don and Bradley Dow. *The Rise of Industrial Unionism in Canada: A History of the CIO*. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1988.

Taylor, John. "'Relief From Relief': The Cities' Answer to Depression Dependency." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 14, (Spring 1979), 16-23.

Tillotson, Shirley. "Human Rights Law as Prism: Women's Organizations and Ontario's Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 1951." *Canadian Historical Review*, 72 (Winter 1991), 532-557.

Tremblay, Yves, ed., *Canadian Military History since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa 5-9, 2000*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001.

Trofimenkoff, Susan Mann and Alison Prentice, eds. *The Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women's History*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

Tudiver, Neil. "Forestalling the Welfare State: The Establishment of Programmes of Corporate Welfare," in A. Moscovitch and Jim Alberts, eds. *The Benevolent State*. Toronto, 1987.

Turkel, Studs. *"The Good War": An Oral History of World War Two*. New York: Ballantyne, 1984.

Ursel, Jane. *Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family*. Toronto: Women's Press, 1993.

Vance, Catharine. *Not by Gods but by People: The Story of Bella Hall Gould*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1969.

Vance, Jonathan. *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997.

Vipond, Mary. *The Mass Media in Canada*. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1989.

Vokey, Scott. "Inspiration for Insurrection or Harmless Humour? Class and Politics in the Editorial Cartoons of Three Toronto Newspapers During the Early 1930s." *Labour/Le Travail* 45 (2000), 141-170.

Walden, Keith. *Becoming Modern in Toronto: the Industrial Exhibition and the Shaping of a Late Victorian Culture*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

Walker, James. *Race Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997.

Warrian, Peter. "Labour is not a commodity: a study of the rights of labour in the Canadian postwar economy." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 1984.

Watson, Louise. *She Never Was Afraid: The Biography of Annie Buller*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1976.

Webber, Jeremy. "The Malaise of Compulsory Conciliation: Strike Prevention in Canada During World War II." *Labour/Le Travail* 15 (Spring 1985), 57-90.

Wells, Don. "From Fordist Worker Resistance to Post-Fordist Capitalist Hegemony." *Labour/Le Travail*, 39 (Spring 1997), 241-60.

_____. "The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The Formation of an Auto Workers Local in the 1950s." *Labour/Le Travail* 36 (Fall 1995), 147-173.

_____. "Origins of Canada's Wagner Model of Industrial Relations: The United Auto Workers in Canada and the Suppression of 'Rank and File' Unionism." 1936-1953," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 20 (1995), 193-225.

Whitaker, Reginald. "The Liberal Corporatist Ideas of Mackenzie King." *Labour/Le Travail* 2 (1977) 137-169.

_____. *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada. 1930-58*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

_____. "Official Repression of Communism During World War II." *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (Spring 1986).

White, Howard. *A Hard Man to Beat: The Story of Bill White*. Vancouver: Pulp Press Books, 1983.

Williams, Brian. "Notes on the Evolution of Compulsory Conciliation in Canada." *Industrial Relations/Relations industrielles* 19 (July 1964), 298-323.

Williams, Jack. *The Story of Unions in Canada*. Toronto: J.M. Dent, 1975.

Willis, James. *The Ontario Labour Court*. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1979,

Wine, Jeri and Janice Rostock, eds. *Women and Social Change*. Toronto, 1991.

Winkler, Allan M. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978.

Yates, Charlotte. *From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993.

Young, Walter. *The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

Young, William. "Academics and Social Scientists *versus* the Press: The Politics of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, 1939-1945." *Canadian Historical Association Papers* 1978, 217-240,

_____. "Building Citizenship: English Canada and Propaganda During the Second World War." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 16 (Autumn-Winter, 1981-82).

Zieger, Robert H. *The CIO: 1935-1955*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.