Co-operative Values, Institutions and Free Riding in Australia: Can It Learn from Canada?

Resource type
Author/contributor
Title
Co-operative Values, Institutions and Free Riding in Australia: Can It Learn from Canada?
Abstract
While there is a strong logic favouring co-operation, it faces a central problem: the "free rider" or "cheat." Collectives find ways of promoting norms of solidarity and seek regulation to prevent free riding. Around two-fifths of Australian employees covered by collective agreements are free-riding non-members. Evidence suggests that the recent growth of free riding reflects institutional changes and not the decline of co-operative values and the ascendancy of individualism. The Canadian solution to the cheating problem, which is the Rand formula, inspired Australian unions to introduce (excessive) "agency fees" into collective agreements. These were eventually stopped by the state. Alternative models include "social obligation fees" - provisions for employees covered by the agreement to make a contribution to a voluntary organization of their choice.
Publication
Relations Industrielles
Volume
60
Issue
4
Pages
709-733
Date
Fall 2005
Language
English
ISSN
0034379X
Short Title
Co-operative Values, Institutions and Free Riding in Australia
Accessed
3/10/15, 2:36 AM
Library Catalog
ProQuest
Rights
Copyright Universite Laval - Departement des Relations Industrielles Autumn 2005
Citation
Peetz, D. (2005). Co-operative Values, Institutions and Free Riding in Australia: Can It Learn from Canada? Relations Industrielles, 60(4), 709–733. http://www.erudit.org/revue/ri/2005/v60/n4/index.html