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The British Columbia Teachers' Federation (bctf), representing all public elementary and secondary school teachers in the province, is one of the largest and most powerful unions in British Columbia. bctf has always sought formal rights to full-scope collective bargaining, and unrestricted access to striking at the school board level. It has employed a sustained, sophisticated series of strategies to achieve these objectives, quickly adapting to changing political and legal environments. The bctf has had significant success in advancing its labour relations agenda, establishing a different trajectory for teachers than for most public sector workers in Canada. This article maps bctf's labour relations strategies and agenda against the backdrop of the political and legal environments, from bctf's inception to present-day. It argues that, as a result of these factors, BC teachers have experienced a different labour relations history than most public sector workers. Drawing on and adapting Rose's (2004) eras of public sector labour relations, this article identifies the following eras of BC teacher labour relations: an era of exclusion (to 1982); resistance and revitalization (1982-86); expansion (1987-93); reform (1994); reprieve (1994-2001); restraint and consolidation (2002-2007); and reaching an era of realignment beginning in 2007.

Widespread adoption of mandatory representation votes and express protection of employer speech invite employer anti-union campaigns during union organizing, including employer-held captive audience meetings. Therefore, the problem of whether and how to restrict employers' captive audience communications during union organizing is of renewed relevance in Canada. Captive meetings are a long-standing feature of American labour relations. This article considers how treatment of captive meetings evolved in the U.S., including the notion of employee choice; the "marketplace of ideas" view of expression dominating the American debate; and the central role of the contest between constitutional and statutory rights. It also considers the concept of "forced listening" and the associated Captive Audience doctrine in U.S. constitutional law and considers its possible application to captive audience meetings and the Charter definition of free expression. Finally, it offers suggestions about how Canadian labour law can benefit from lessons learned from the American experience.

Compelling evidence exists that centralized bargaining structures, including broader-based and sectoral bargaining (bbb), offer significant benefits to workers. Examining the role of bbb in major Canadian labour law reform initiatives between the late 1980s and 2019, this article explores why the labour movement, despite the potential advantages of bbb, has not collectively pursued bbb reforms. It concludes with an analysis of the failure to incorporate bbb proposals into labour legislation and an assessment of the key challenges to adopting significant bbb reforms in the future. Earlier research concluded that bbb proposals in the 1990s failed because of employer opposition and lack of understanding, including by labour. This study departs from earlier conclusions to find that neither of these factors has been prominent regarding bbb in recent decades. Instead, lack of support for bbb arises from some unions’ concerns about preserving existing representation rights, resistance to the prospect of mandatory councils of unions, and anticipation of jurisdictional conflicts. Lack of support for bbb from some peak labour organizations arises from a consensus approach to deciding which labour law reform issues to promote. An additional challenge to its adoption is the politicized nature of labour law reform, and the political cost of innovative and untried proposals deter governments from adopting bbb.

During the pandemic employees in the US have engaged in a wave of strikes, protests, and other collective action over concerns about unsafe working conditions, and many of these involved non-unionized workers in the private sector. Similar employee protests were notably absent in Canada. This article examines the differences in labour legislation between the US and Canada, which may help to explain these diverging experiences, primarily: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 7 protection for concerted activity, and the NLRA section 502 ability for a good faith strike due to abnormally dangerous conditions for work. This article outlines and compares the situation of, and consequences for, three categories of workers engaging in a strike over fears of workplace safety: unionized employees, non-unionized employees, and non-employees, such as independent contractors under the NLRA compared to under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative of Canadian labour legislation. In the final section, this article considers how a statutory provision similar to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision might be incorporated into Canadian labour legislation such as the OLRA. It also considers some more fundamental questions that such changes might prompt policymakers to reconsider, including: the focus of our statutory system on “organizing” collective action to the exclusion of “mobilizing” collective action, and questions about the potential role of minority unionism in our labour legislation system.

Examines labor relations between the state (federal and provincial governments) and public sector workers since the 1960s, including interventions into collective bargaining through wage control legislation, wage control policies, back-to-work legislation, and emergency no-strike legislation. Concludes that while Canadian governments have generally accepted the industrial relations system, they have not accepted the outcomes of bargaining. In addition, the authors conclude that there is little evidence to support the thesis of Wellington and Winters (1969) that public sector labor unions use their power to threaten democracy by settling agreements that are contrary to the mandate and best interests of the electorate.

In this paper the authors provide a review and critique of existing legal standards and methods, at common law and under employment standards legis- lation, for determining the length of notice to which employees are entitled as a result of without-cause termination. They argue that, at common law, the factors relied on to determine the amount of termination notice contribute to systemic bias and power imbalances between employers and employees, while fostering the illusion of individualized assessment. As well, the regime is inaccessible to low- and middle-income employees due to the costs of litigation. Minimum statutory notice in Ontario, which relies solely on the factor of length of service, is heavily discounted in relation to the common law, and suffers from poor enforcement and widespread non-compliance. In light of the shortcomings of the common law and statutory regimes, the authors conclude that there is a clear need for reform. While other proposals for reform have been advanced, the authors contend that they focus too heavily on length of service, are likely to perpetuate the problems associated with the existing systems, and fail to comprehensively take into account the primary purpose of notice - to provide employees with a "cushion" between termination and re-employment. The auth- ors then set out their proposal for a "Middle Course" approach to determining length of notice, which would be based on a series of objective factors related to the estimated time needed by a dismissed employee to obtain re-employment. It would be implemented by replacing the existing formula under employment standards legislation with one that would enable notice entitlements to be deter- mined in a more predictable, rational and equitable fashion.

The nature of work has undergone tremendous change in recent decades, and these changes have been well documented and widely debated. Similarly, the adequacy of regulation and institutions of work to operate in the face of these transformations has been questioned. Much attention has been devoted to the condition of this decline. Work and workplaces have been reorganized (in one memorable phrase, "fissured"),' increased intermediation in the traditional employment relationship has made it more difficult to identify the "real employer," and fewer "employees" exist, as precarious work and contracting-out of work has grown. These workers are more difficult to organize, and labour and employment relations regulatory schemes have failed to respond robustly or effectively to these changed conditions. Equal attention has been paid to the causes of the decline in union density: the "globalization of production" through technological and communications innovations, the offshoring of work (even work previously thought to be impervious to this trend), the expansion of the financial sector and the proliferation of its meth- ods and values into the productive or "real" economy (a process called financialization), the privatization of formerly public goods and services, and the reorganization of firms to (re)focus on "core competencies" and contract out peripheral functions. Even if all of these possible causes were overcome, workers' attitudes toward traditional organizations such as unions and even toward workers' identities as such have also changed profoundly, and organizing worker voice and collective bargaining has become more challenging.

The authors are engaged in a multi-dimensional project that analyzes Canadian private sector experience under provincial and federal labour statutes. The broad objective of the research is to draw nuanced lessons from the Canadian experience that will inform the debate over labour law reform in the U.S. This commentary reflects the authors´ preliminary research results as they relate to the specific proposals included in the Employee Free Choice Act.

American labour law is broken. As many as 60 percent of American workers would like to have a union, yet only 12 percent actually do. This is largely due to systematic employer interference, often in violation of existing laws. The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), currently before Congress, contains provisions to rectify this problem. Canada's experience with similar provisions can be helpful in evaluating the arguments surrounding this act. It suggests that the reforms proposed in EFCA can be expected to safeguard rather than deny employees' free choices. They will not alter the balance of power in collective bargaining, but only help to ensure that workers can exercise their basic right to meaningful representation at work and, potentially, to win gains that could help to reduce inequality and return America to prosperity.