Your search

The election of neo-conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario in the early 1990s brought dramatic changes to provincial public policy; both the Ralph Klein Revolution and Mike Harris' Common Sense Revolution emphasized fundamental changes in the role of government, balanced budgets, and the elimination of provincial debts. While public sector unions were forced to react, the response of the Alberta and Ontario unions differed significantly. The reasons, outcome, and long-term impact of the difference is the focus of Yonatan Reshef and Sandra Rastin's careful and revealing analysis. The authors' argument concentrates on union responses to the neo-conservative transformation in the two affected provinces, but the scope of the discussion expands to cover such issues as the differences between the two regimes, the damage to the Ontario labour movement dealt by the labour-oriented NDP government, the limits of inter-union cooperation, and the role of modern unions in politics. Lively and timely, Unions in the Time of Revolution places Canada's unions in the full context of the neo-conservative trend in provincial politics, and demonstrates the importance of individual union responses in times of such significant change. --Publisher's description. Contents: Alberta and Ontario: Industrial relations and their contexts -- Revolutions, Canada style -- Collective action conceptual framework -- Revolutionizing the Civil Service: OPSEU and AUPE -- Teachers: Protecting the profession, defending the union organization -- Sins of commission and sins of omissions: The Ontario days of action and missed opportunities in Alberta -- Sleeping with the devil: Strategic voting in the 1999 Ontario Election -- Revisiting the collective action model -- Additional thoughts on collective action.

The 1990s and 2000s were especially difficult decades for government–public sector union relations in Canada. Rising costs and growing debts meant that governments were on the lookout for savings, and public sector unions and employees were easy targets for government actions. Bitter conflicts between unions and governments erupted and each labour dispute involved numerous rounds of public rhetoric in which both sides attempted to justify their actions and stigmatize their opponents.In Bad Time Stories, Yonatan Reshef and Charles Keim analyse the language of both parties in order to identify the legitimation strategies at work during government-union conflict. The authors use evidence drawn from newspapers, speeches, parliamentary transcripts, and legal statements in presenting a new framework for understanding the discursive strategies employed by governments and unions in labour disputes.Using a case study and linguistic approach, Bad Time Stories offers a unique perspective on industrial relations and will be of interest to scholars in the areas of business, public policy, and communications, as well to those directly involved in union-management negotiations. -- Publisher's description

Summary: We use the 2011-12 conflict between the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) and the British Columbia (BC) government to explore how the union president, Susan Lambert, used language to bring the conflict into being and mobilize union members in opposition to the government. We use newspaper articles and archival material from mid-2011 to June 2012 to explore how Lambert identified the core issues and actors, prescribed roles, relationships and actions, and, importantly, inspired a will to act in union members and supporters.To explore how she constructed the conflict, we adopt a mobilization theory developed by scholars of social movement organizations (SMO). Snow and Benford (1988: 200-202) conceptualize three core pillars of conflict: 1- diagnostic framing identifies a problem, attributes blame or causality, and identifies the key actors; 2- prognostic framing offers a solution and identifies strategies, tactics and targets; 3- motivational framing provides a call to arms, or rationale for action while inspiring an urge to act among members and supporters. In exploring how she urged action among members, we use the four archetypal legitimation strategies identified by Van Leeuwen (2008) and Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999): authorization, rationalization, moralization and mythopoesis.McAdam (1982: 48) argues that before collective action can begin people must come to view their situation as unjust and subject to change. We use the above framework to structure our exploration of how the union president used language to frame members’ understanding of the conflict. Through language she ushered the reality of labour conflict into being and constructed a reality in which union members could identify themselves as agents of protest and change. // Dans cet article, nous nous penchons sur le conflit de travail, survenu en 2011-2012, entre la Fédération des enseignants-es de la Colombie-Britannique et le gouvernement de cette province, afin d’examiner de quelle manière la présidente de cette fédération, Susan Lambert, a utilisé le langage pour amener ses membres à réaliser l’ampleur du conflit et les mobiliser contre le gouvernement. À cette fin, nous avons passé en revue des articles de quotidiens et des documents d’archives couvrant la période s’étendant de la mi-2011 à juin 2012, dans le but de cerner comment Mme Lambert est parvenue à identifier les enjeux et les acteurs cruciaux, attribuer les rôles, établir les relations et les actions, et, surtout, comment elle a réussi à inspirer une volonté d’agir chez les membres et leurs partisans.Pour explorer comment elle a « construit » le conflit, nous adoptons une théorie de la mobilisation développée par des universitaires qui ont étudié les mouvements sociaux organisés. Snow et Benford (1988 : 200-202) ont conceptualisé trois piliers-clés du conflit : 1-élaboration du diagnostic, soit identifier un problème, en attribuer le blâme ou la cause, et identifier les acteurs-clés; 2- élaboration du pronostique, soit offrir une solution et en identifier les stratégies, tactiques et cibles; et, enfin, 3- élaboration de la motivation, soit faire un appel aux armes ou offrir un argumentaire qui convaincra les membres et les partisans de l’urgence de passer à l’action. Pour analyser la manière dont la présidente a réussi cela, nous nous référons aux quatre stratégies de légitimation identifiées par Van Leeuwen (2008), et Van Leeuwen et Wodack (1999) : autorisation, rationalisation, moralisation et construction d’un mythe.McAdam (1982 : 48) soutient qu’avant qu’une action collective ne débute, il faut que les personnes concernées considèrent leur situation comme étant injuste et devant être changée. Nous nous servons de ce cadre d’analyse pour explorer la manière dont la présidente a utilisé le langage pour « construire » cette vision. Grâce au langage utilisé, elle est parvenue à faire ressortir les enjeux du conflit et à « construire une réalité » où les membres ont pu s’identifier comme agents de changement et acteurs de la protestation.

We analyze four calls to action issued by the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) president, Jim Iker. These appeals sought to mobilize members during the 2013-2014 collective bargaining that pitted the BCTF against the British Columbia government and the direct employer, the British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association. We apply a “theory of rhetoric” developed by Chaim Perelman to locate and analyze the topics the BCTF president used to persuade his members to adhere to his arguments about the merit of collective action. We argue that the president constructed his rhetoric by visiting five topics—urgency, fairness, futility, agency, and integrity. The first three promoted a utilitarian logic for collective action. Iker used them to persuade teachers, and other stakeholders, that collective action was necessary for addressing the problem—the futility of the bargaining process to produce a negotiated fair agreement due to the government’s reluctance to bargain in good faith. The last two topics—agency and integrity—comprised a rhetoric of comfort and reassurance offering an affective logic for acting collectively. At least some union members, as well as other stakeholders, might have felt that teachers are expected to care for their charges in the classroom rather than on the picket line, by withdrawing services they monopolize. Iker used the topics of agency and integrity to remind everyone that defending students, young teachers, the teaching profession, and the education system was commendable, and reassured them that collectively they would not be ignored and nor would they fail. In short, we have pointed out five topics that the president visited to mobilize his members to collective action. They highlight a unique rhetoric that aimed to persuade teachers to become agents of protest. Our case study methodology did not allow us to generalize our findings, which more research is, thus, needed to corroborate.

The 1990s in Canada will probably go down as the most stressful decade for public-sector industrial relations since the inception, 25 years earlier, of collective bargaining in the public service. Government debt and defecits became the rationale for downsizing, outsourcing, privatization, layoffs, buyouts, and early retirement packages at both the federal and provincial levels. When workers' bargaining units did not bend to government demands at the negotating table, and when leaders did not blink at the threat of restrictive legislation, then governments of both the right and the left at times found it convenient to legislate rule changes to suit their fiscal or ideological purposes. The contributors to Public-Sector Labour Relations examine in depth the events of recent years in the public service of six jurisdictions―Nova Scotia, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia, and the federal government. Trends in the other five Canadian provinces are also considered. Only in BC has there been an essentially co-operative labour relations environment, although even in this province, public service employment has dropped considerably. Overall, from 1991 to 1997, provincial civil service employment fell by 15 per cent, while the federal employment reduction was 14 per cent. (From the employment peak in 1993-4, the overall provincial reduction was over 22 per cent.) Although collective bargaining is still alive, a major conclusion of this study is that collective bargaining in the Canadian public sector is not well. The cases reported here demonstrate that governments have adopted the attitude and policy that they may engage in bargaining or suspend it whenever they find that course of action to be convenient. Viewed from a broader international context, as discussed in the concluding chapter, the casual suspension of bargaining by Canadian governments cannot be justified by the norms and agreements that Canada has shared with the international community. -- Publisher's description. Contents: Public-sector labour relations in an era of restraint and restructuring: an overview / Gene Swimmer -- Provincial government restructuring in Nova Scotia: the freezing and thawing of labour relations / Terry H. Wagar -- From softball to hardball: the transition in labour-management relations in the Ontario public service / Joseph B. Rose -- Fiscal restraint, legislated concessions, and labour relations in the Manitoba civil service, 1988-1997 / Paul Phillips and Carolina Stecher -- The logic of union quiescence: the Alberta case / Yonatan Reshef -- Labour relations in the BC public service: blowing in the political wind / Mark Thompson -- Restructuring federal public-sector human resources / Gene Swimmer and Sandra Bach -- Public-employee relations: Canadian developments in perspective / Roy J. Adams.