Your search

This paper interprets extensive empirical data on the growth and then stagnation of “modes of flexibility” by using labour process theory, specifically with respect to control and resistance. In a “risk cycle,” management initially seizes an opportunity to reduce costs by transferring risk from capital to labour through some mode of flexibility. The chosen mode is used more and more until further expansion is blocked by the need to overcome resistance, to obtain consent and/or to exercise control. Management then seeks a new mode. The risk cycle is consistent with OECD data on “temporary employment,” and Australian data on “casual employment.” Implications for the gig economy and the future of work are discussed.

Cet article interprète les nombreuses données empiriques sur la croissance, puis la stagnation des « modes de flexibilité » à l’aide de la théorie du procès de travail, en particulier en ce qui concerne le contrôle et la résistance. Dans un « cycle de risque », la direction saisit d’abord une occasion de réduire les coûts en transférant le risque du capital au travail par le biais d’un certain mode de flexibilité. Le mode choisi est de plus en plus utilisé jusqu’à ce que l’expansion soit bloquée par la nécessité de vaincre la résistance, d’obtenir le consentement et/ou d’exercer un contrôle. La direction cherche alors un nouveau mode. Le cycle de risque est cohérent avec les données de l’OCDE sur l’« emploi temporaire » et les données australiennes sur l’« emploi occasionnel ». Les implications pour l’économie à la demande et l’avenir du travail sont abordées.

Each action of a decollectivizing employer - be it in the realm of employment practices, information or relational actions - has both real and symbolic dimensions that may be inclusivist, exclusivist or both. While many attempts at decollectivism are crude, Australia has seen the emergence of a coherent model of sophisticated decollectivist behaviour which has policy implications for many countries. Some analogies can be seen between certain sophisticated strategies of decollectivizing employers and state strategies of Oceania in Orwell's 1984, though there are many limits to such analogies and indeed to the success of decollectivist strategies, due to the contradiction between rhetoric and actions, employees' exposure to other discourses and the potential for union response and renewal.

While there is a strong logic favouring co-operation, it faces a central problem: the "free rider" or "cheat." Collectives find ways of promoting norms of solidarity and seek regulation to prevent free riding. Around two-fifths of Australian employees covered by collective agreements are free-riding non-members. Evidence suggests that the recent growth of free riding reflects institutional changes and not the decline of co-operative values and the ascendancy of individualism. The Canadian solution to the cheating problem, which is the Rand formula, inspired Australian unions to introduce (excessive) "agency fees" into collective agreements. These were eventually stopped by the state. Alternative models include "social obligation fees" - provisions for employees covered by the agreement to make a contribution to a voluntary organization of their choice.

One response to the employer’s search for “flexibility” (most evident in the “platform economy”) may be “institutional experimentation,” i.e., changes to institutions and how they relate to organizations and labour standards. Our question: “What form of institutional arrangement can best enable the lessons of policy experimentation to be learned and disseminated?” Under directed devolution, as proposed here, legal entitlements or obligations would be set at a higher level (say, a national jurisdiction). A lower level (“subsidiary bodies”) would be required to work out detailed implementation of those standards, with a view to protecting the affected workers’ interests. The subsidiary bodies might cover specific industries or groups of industries. They may need to be quite innovative. Results would be evaluated and ideas generated. By emphasizing flexibility and learning, directed devolution enables actors to learn from the experiments of other actors. One such example is the regulation of New York’s road passenger transport industry in 2019, a highly innovative attempt to convert a high-level time-based minimum standard into a practical, local solution. Directed devolution is a form of multi-level policy-making, with some similarities to the concept of subsidiarity, but more tightly integrated. Other relevant but distinct forms of multi-level bargaining include the ILO Conventions, the Bangladesh Accord and several forms of regulation adopted in Australia. Actors and policy-makers should have long-term strategies, be careful in their processes of selecting institutional members, and be prepared to deal with powerful opposition. Directed devolution can be useful wherever establishing enforceable general principles is important and can make a real difference, but there are complications with implementation if circumstances vary considerably among organizations or industries. Devolution can be achieved without losing enforceability, and this can be done without shifting power away from those with less power. Directed devolution is a complement to, not a substitute for, specific regulatory interventions.

This paper examines the implementation of a model of systematic individualisation of the employment relationship by a large multinational corporation in Australia, operating with the support of a pro-corporate state, and the nature and effects of resistance. Principally through interviews with affected workers, we show how the symbolic and the real effects of employment practices, relational practices and informational practices were all aimed at removing freedom of association and replacing it with uncontested, union-free managerial control. We consider how workers and their families were affected by these strategies and how they and their union responded. // Cet article examine la mise en place d'un modèle systématique d'individualisation de la relation d'emploi par une grande multinationale australienne, cela avec le support d'un gouvernement partialement favorable au patronat. La nature et l'impact de la résistance des travailleurs syndiqués sont également mis à jour. Nous montrons, principalement à l'appui des témoignages des travailleurs en cause, comment les effets réels ou symboliques des pratiques d'emploi, ceux des pratiques relationnelles et informationnelles ont été utilisés de concert pour dénier la liberté d'association et la remplacer par un contrôle gestionnaire incontestable et exempt de présence syndicale. Nous relatons comment les travailleurs et leurs familles ont souffert de ces stratégies patronales et comment leur syndicat a rétorqué.

We studied 14 universities across Canada and Australia to examine how the COVID-19 crisis, mediated through management strategies and conflict over financial control in higher education, influenced workers’ job security and affective outcomes like stress and happiness. The countries differed in their institutional frameworks, their union density, their embeddedness in neoliberalism and their negotiation patterns. Management strategies also differed between universities. Employee outcomes were influenced by differences in union involvement. Labour cost reductions negotiated with unions could improve financial outcomes, but, even in a crisis, management might not be willing to forego absolute control over finance, and it was not the depth of the crisis that shaped management decisions.