Making Ukrainian Canadians: Identity, Politics, and Power in Cold War Canada

by

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Department of History
University of Toronto

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the process by which a singular Ukrainian Canadian identity was constructed and entrenched throughout the twentieth century. It details how one of Canada's largest and best organized diasporic communities, utilizing changing notions of cultural pluralism and the politics of the Cold War, crafted an increasingly nationalist, anti-communist version of identity that eradicated previously popular articulations of what it meant to be a Ukrainian in Canada. The traditional historiography posits that the community defined itself on its own terms, relying on individualized acts of agency and migrant resilience to entrench a version of Ukrainian-ness that was a democratic, bottom-up reflection of the collective. This project offers an alternative perspective by focusing on the battle over community narratives between communists, represented by the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) and then the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), and the nationalists, organized under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC). I show how, with the help of state officials, the nationalists overpowered their ideological enemies on the left, concreting their identity as hegemonic. Through this process of coherence, they further bound specific aspects of their own ideology, perceived as innocuous, apolitical, and simply common sense, into mainstream political consciousness. Beyond a simple community study, this

dissertation is also a case study about the building of anti-communist hegemony in Canada. Chapter One examines the role of state surveillance and political policing to show how state officials collaborated with the UCC to weaken the domestic left. Chapter Two analyzes the rise and fall of a government bureaucracy that acculturated the nationalists so as to embed them in Canada's structures of power and bolster their anti-communism. Chapter Three looks more closely at acts of anti-communist violence, which seriously deterred participation in the AUUC. The state's refusal to condemn the violence also telegraphed its preferences and helped define Canada's social, political, and judicial boundaries. Chapter Four focuses on the nationalists' appropriation of cultural pluralism to further entrench their version of Ukrainian identity. Lastly, Chapter Five explores commemoration, where competing visions for certain cultural figures were articulated and, eventually, nationalist narratives were set.

Acknowledgments

There is rarely a chance for reflection while writing a dissertation. It is only now, as the process is coming to an end, that I am able to properly mull over the experience and fully appreciate the immense encouragement and support I have received over the last several years. I am both humbled and gratified to have worked in such privileged circumstances.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ian Radforth. Writing a dissertation has been the most challenging thing I have ever done. Ian knew when to push me and when to not, and I cannot thank him enough for allowing me to grow confident in my ideas at my own pace. A true master of his craft, I have benefitted immensely from his thoughtful interventions and seemingly never-ending wealth of knowledge. I am beyond grateful for his guidance over the years and feel exceptionally fortunate to have learned how to be a historian from him. Franca Iacovetta has long been an inspiration - not just for me, but for generations of feminist historians whose work would not exist without her paving the way first. Simply put, because of her, I am brave enough to write unapologetically political history. On a more personal note, I thank Franca for the countless times she held space for me when writing about my own community took its toll. Her support on this front made all the difference and encouraged me to forge ahead. Early on in the PhD program, Steve Penfold asked me perhaps the most important question I had been asked about my work to date: “So what?” While overwhelming at the time, I now appreciate how Steve encourages budding historians to make our work count. Having also been his TA on multiple occasions, I would be remiss not to recognize how much I have learned from Steve as a teacher too. I will forever try to replicate his unparalleled sense of humour (and will surely come up short), his compassion for his students, and his unremitting enthusiasm in explaining the aforementioned “so what.” My deepest thanks as well to Dimitry Anastakis,

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As a graduate student, I have benefitted from the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program, and several internal university funds. I also thank the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies for their financial support of my research.

Graduate school is an interesting experience to say the least. I would not have survived it without the comradery of Eriks Bredovskis, Matthieu Caron, Lauren Catterson, Susie Colbourn, Sandra Curley, Katie Davis, Sanchia deSouza, Joel Dickau, Ed Dunsworth, Jennifer Evans, Alex Logue, Shane Lynn, Kimberly Main, Danijel Matijevic, Julia Milovanovic, Jesse Munroe, Sheyfali Saujani, Michael Savage, Nicholas Tošaj, Matthieu Vallieres, Simon Vickers, Spirit Waite, and Kevin Woodger. I have thoroughly enjoyed learning, teaching, organizing, and commiserating alongside them at various points along the way. I thank them for providing shoulders to cry on when things got tough and, more importantly, for the many nights at the pub where we debated the problems of the world. These are some of my fondest memories of graduate school that I hope to never forget.

At Queen's University, where I completed my MA, I met a number of incredible scholars who have since become friends: Mary Chaktsiris, Josh Cole, Scott de Groot, Kyle Franz, David

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Barrington Walker's supervision at Queen's was deeply impactful. His keen ability to situate everything in its larger, and much more significant, context challenged me to push beyond the narrow scope of community studies that I may have otherwise fallen victim to. It is because of him that I approach my work with an analytical eye and try to do my part to advance more equitable historical narratives. Barrington was also the first to give me a chance to do graduate-level history. I cannot thank him enough for taking me on and fostering my abilities at such an important juncture.

Also at Queen's, Ian McKay opened my eyes to the potential of Canadian history to inform the world around me. His particular theoretical approaches to history are not just personally inspiring, but have also bettered the historical profession as a whole. By hiring me as his Research Assistant, Ian encouraged my work at a time when I was not entirely sure where it would take me. This support continued when he awarded me the inaugural Corsini Fellowship at the L.R. Wilson Institute for Canadian History. While he likely did not know it at the time, these opportunities helped me overcome an intense imposter syndrome and encouraged me to stay the course.

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As a collective, the field of Ukrainian Canadian studies does not always do a good enough job incorporating younger scholars into the fold. There are, however, several notable exceptions who have helped me along: Jars Balan, Bohdan Kordan, Myrna Kostash, the late Andrij Makuch, Myron Momryk, and Iroida Wynnycka. As both thought leaders and vanguards of much needed change, I deeply admire them for their tremendous contributions to the field and for always making me feel as though I had an equal seat at the table.

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Speaking of *tovaryshkas*, my heartfelt thanks to Larissa Stavroff. Larissa is an immaculate record keeper, a human encyclopedia of all things Ukrainian, and someone who just *gets it*. I remember the first time we met like it was yesterday. Two women, whose last names preceded them, sat down in Roncesvalles for a nervous coffee to talk all things Ukrainian

Canadian. Seven years later and we are still not out of things to say! The irony of our subsequent friendship was not lost on either of us, but it does speak to the kind of person Larissa is. While she would have been justified in never responding to my request for access to her father's archives, effectively shutting me out of the history of the Ukrainian Canadian left, Larissa was not interested in rehashing the community's unhealthy dynamics of not speaking to "the other side." In Larissa, I see a true leader and the answer to many of our community's lingering problems. Her *tato* would be unbelievably proud – of this, I am sure.

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Thank you to my aunts Marta Chyczij (Andrij), Irene Soltys (Roman), and Nadia Luciuk. Matsiu, I like to think that your "imaginary fun world" is where I first learned to dream big. Teta Richka, your cheerful optimism and ability to always find something to smile about has bettered

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Just over twenty years ago, my father, Lubomyr Luciuk, published his own history of Ukrainians in Canada. The book was dedicated to me with hope that its pages would provide a map for understanding the community and faith that I would one day make my own inscriptions on it. While he had no way of knowing then that I would become a historian, he nevertheless led with this hope and faith as I grew up. While our interpretations of the community differ, and we have certainly butted heads many times along the way, I hope that, with my own map now completed, I have made him proud.

There are not enough words available to properly acknowledge my *mama*, Alexandra Chyczij, who has been there for me in every conceivable way. Perhaps most of all, she nurtured my curiosity and never once questioned my decision to study the Ukrainian Canadian community – even when it perhaps made her uncomfortable. I am very appreciative of the space she gave me to become my own person and her willingness to always grow alongside me. I am so very lucky to be her daughter, and I thank her for everything.

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List of Abbreviations

ACC – Association of Canadian Clubs
AUUC – Association of United Ukrainian Canadians
AUWA – American Ukrainian Workingmen's Association
BUC – Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics
CBC – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCCC – Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship
CCUC – Central Committee of Ukrainians in Canada
CCF – Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
CIO – Congress of Industrial Organizations
CLAT – Civil Liberties Association of Toronto
CLLU – Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine
CNR – Canadian National Railway
CPC – Communist Party of Canada
CPU – Communist Party of Ukraine
DEA – Department of External Affairs
DNWS – Department of National War Services
DOCR – Defence of Canada Regulations
DOL – Department of Labour
DP – Displaced Person
FUSD – Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats
JIB – Joint National Defence-External Affairs Intelligence Board
LPP – Labor Progressive Party
MFAC – Manitoba Folk Arts Council
NFAC – National Folk Arts Council
NRMA – National Resources Mobilization Act
OUN – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
OUN-b – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera faction
OUN-m – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnyk faction
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCUC – Representative Committee of Ukrainians in Canada
SIS – Secret Intelligence Service
SPC – Socialist Party of Canada
SOS – Secretary of State
SUSK – Ukrainian Canadian Students' Union
TLDC – Timmins Labor Defence Committee
UAAF – Ukrainian Association for Aid to the Fatherland
UCC - Ukrainian Canadian Committee (or Congress)
UCCA – Ukrainian Canadian Committee of America
UCRF – Ukrainian Canadian Refugee Fund
UCWC – Ukrainian Central Welfare Committee
UHO – United Hetman Organization
ULFTA - Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association
UNF – Ukrainian National Federation
UNR – Ukrainian National Republic
UNRRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UPA – Ukrainian Insurgent Army

USDP – Ukrainian Social Democratic Party
USRL – Ukrainian Self Reliance League
UWL – Ukrainian Workers' League
WBA – Workers' Benevolent Association
WIB – Wartime Information Board

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Introduction

When I was fifteen years old, my Ukrainian dance group participated in a tour of Manitoba. We performed at the National Ukrainian Festival in Dauphin before heading to Winnipeg to partake in Folklorama, Canada's longest-running multicultural festival.[1] A product of the push for ethno-cultural pluralism in the postwar period, Folklorama is an extremely popular event and, as a result, runs for two consecutive weeks. This gives larger ethnic groups, like the Ukrainians, a chance to accommodate multiple pavilions.

As we pulled up in front of the Ukrainian hall on the corner of Pritchard Avenue and McGregor Street, ready to dance, a worried look settled on the faces of our chaperones. After a hushed discussion outside of our bus, they returned to give us some bad news. The organizers of the festival had made a mistake: there was no Ukrainian pavilion to perform at. All hope was not lost, though. We would be taking our talents to the Greek hall across town instead.

As our bus pulled away, I was confused. This was clearly a Ukrainian hall. Blue and yellow ribbons lined the stair railings. Most of the people filing in were wearing embroidered blouses. The air lingered with the distinctive smell of garlic, onions, and butter, a combination that formed the coating of all the best perogies. I could hear the pulsating sounds of the basolia playing the familiar chords of the *Hopak* dance through the walls. There did not appear to be a

[1] Little has been written on Folklorama by historians, save for a brief discussion in Royden Lowen and Gerald Friesen, *Immigrants in Prairie Cities: Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth Century Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). Pauline Greenhill, a scholar of women and gender, has done important work detailing Folklorama's somewhat problematic approach to multiculturalism, especially when compared to other festivals that create space for diverging interpretations of it. Pauline Greenhill, "Backyard World/Canadian Culture: Looking at Festival Agendas," *Canadian University Music Review* 19, no. 2 (1999): 37-46; Pauline Greenhill, "Festival, anti festival, counter festival, non-festival," *Ethnologies* 23, no. 1 (2001): 5-12; Cynthia Thoroski and Pauline Greenhill, "Putting a Price on Culture: Ethnic Organizations, Volunteers, and the Marketing of Multicultural Festivals," *Ethnologies* 23, no. 1 (2001): 189-209. Paul Bramadat, a professor of religion, has similarly written about Folkorama as cultural spectacle. Paul Bramadat, *Shows, Selves, and Solidarity: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Spectacles in Canada* (Halifax: Department of Canadian Heritage for the Ethnocultural, Racial, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity and Identity Seminar, 2001).

mistake. After pressing our chaperones for more information, I learned that this was, in fact, a Ukrainian hall. But it was the Labour Temple, home of the *communists*! We, as "Good Ukrainians," would not patronize their hall.

* * * * *

I grew up fully ensconced in what is sometimes referred to as the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community. In reality, this is simply a more neutral stand-in term for nationalist. Through the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) and its various constituent groups, nationalist Ukrainians formally represent the community on Canada's social, political, and cultural stage.[2] It is also a nod to Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community, a "deep, horizontal comradeship" amongst members who, despite not necessarily knowing each other, "live the image of their communion."[3]

My upbringing was fairly typical for a second-generation Ukrainian Canadian. I learned English begrudgingly and only when it was required by law to enroll in school; we rarely, if ever, spoke it at home. I attended Ukrainian-language elementary school where I learned about Ukraine's supposed primordialism and, by the age of six, had already memorized the canonical works of our great thinkers and poets. My evenings and weekends were consumed by Ukrainian language school, dance lessons, and scouting. At home, my *baba* (grandmother) cooked me all the best Ukrainian food. On Saturdays, over *rosil* (chicken soup) and *kotlety* (meat cutlets), we would gather around her television to watch *Kontakt,* a Ukrainian-language news program on Omni Television, the outgrowth of Canada's first multicultural television station.

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[2] The Ukrainian Canadian Congress was originally known as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. This dissertation relies on the latter name because it is historically accurate for the period under review.

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.

There was, however, a subtle undertone that continuously informed this Ukrainian Canadian identity. It was important that I spoke Ukrainian, for example, because communism had tried to eradicate its use. The same notion guided my commitment to dancing. Tradition was under attack by Marxist ideology, and preserving it was the diaspora's unique mission. I participated in scouting not because I particularly liked camping, but because the organization had been outlawed by the Soviets and it was vital that I attended to ensure the survival of organizational life. Ukrainian language school, dreaded by teenagers because it dragged us out of bed on Saturday mornings, was necessary to learn our history – the single best defense against communist indoctrination. While it was rarely articulated in these terms, normal cultural practices were imbued with messianic and existential importance that were subconsciously shaping both the possibilities and parameters of my identity as I grew up.

* * * * *

The loose roots of the nationalist community in Canada can be traced to the period between 1891 and 1914 when the first wave of Ukrainian migrants began arriving in Canada. Most came from western Ukraine, then under Austro-Hungarian rule, which kept its ethnically Ukrainian population as a deeply exploited peasantry. A smaller group arrived from the Russian Empire, which had imposed strict policies of Russification that banned the use or study of Ukrainian. Regardless of where they migrated from, many were supporters of the Ukrainian National Revival movement, a by-product of nationalism's broader sweep of Europe in the nineteenth century.[4] They defined their nationalism accordingly, seeing a singular nation state as the answer

[4] On the spread of nationalism in Europe see Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (New York: Howard Fertig, 2001); Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso: New York, 2002); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006); Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Vintage, 2007); Robert

to Ukrainian emancipation. Once in Canada they continued advocating for territorial independence, but also fervently protected language, literature, and culture.[5]

It was not until the interwar period, in the aftermath of Ukraine's various unsuccessful battles for independence, that a defined political program became extant. Now visibly conspiratorial, anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and ultra-reactionary, the organized movement usurped the rhetoric and ideology of the tsarist autocracy and the authoritarian despotisms common to the Russian and Polish empires. It endorsed a culture of martial worship, Völkisch-ness, strict religious adherence, corporatism, common language, race, class, and gender hierarchy, totalitarianism, and a generalized conservatism. But above all else, perhaps, it prioritized the liberation of Ukraine from the grip of Judeo-Bolshevism and the violent institution of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state.

In Canada, this new strain partially manifested itself in the United Hetman Organization (UHO).[6] The UHO was a conservative monarchist outfit that sought the restoration of the

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Brenner, *Property and Progress: The Historical Origins and Social Foundations of Self-Sustaining Growth* (New York: Verso, 2009); Tara Zahra, "Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* 69 (2010): 93-119; Slavko Goldstein, *1941: The Year that Keeps Returning* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2013). On *korenizatsiya* (indigenization) in Soviet Ukraine see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (1994): 414-452; Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

[5] For a thorough overview of Ukraine's territorial history and the ideological currents within it see Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Ralph Lindheim and George Luckyj, eds., *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Serhy Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Myroslav Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

[6] Bàrbara Molas investigates the history of the UHO in more detail through the eyes of its main ideologue, Walter Bossy. Chapter 1 is particularly instructive for understanding the influence of the transnational nationalist movement on Bossy. Bàrbara Molas, "Defining Supremacy: Walter J. Bossy and the Conceptual Origins of the Canadian 'Third Force' (1931-1972)," Ph.D. dissertation (York University, 2021).

Hetmanate (Ukrainian Cossack state), which had existed in central Ukraine from 1648 to 1782. The UHO pledged its allegiance to Pavlo Skoropadsky, a Ukrainian nobleman and major general in the Imperial Russian Army. Skoropadsky was a strong opponent of both the Bolsheviks and Ukraine's Central Rada, the socialist and revolutionary parliament of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). With the support of the German Imperial Army, he staged a coup on 28 April 1918, dissolving the UNR and the Central Rada and declaring himself the hetman of the Ukrainian State. In November, however, he was removed from power by Symon Petliura, the Chief of Military Forces for the Directorate of Ukraine, and fled to Germany. A weakened UNR was reinstated, this time with a much more nationalistic creed, until the Soviet's ultimate triumph.[7] In Canada, Skoropadsky's supporters established a liberation army and air corps should he ever call on them to fight for the Hetmanite. But the call never came – Skoropadsky was killed in Bavaria in 1946 – and by the postwar period the organization had lost most of its steam.[8]

The largest influence on organizational life came from the Ukrainian Military Organization and its successor, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Initially a fringe movement in western Ukraine that emerged to fight in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-

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[7] Basil Dmytryshyn, *German Intervention in the Ukraine: A Study of German Policy Toward the Ukrainian Government and the Soropadsky Regime, February-July 1918* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 1951); V. Woropay, *The Hetmanite of P. Skoropadsky in the Ukraine in 1918* (London: University of London, 1959); Taras Hunczak, *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 61-81; Hans Joachim Torke and John Paul Himka, eds., *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994), 76-80; Mark von Hagen, "I Love Russia, and/but I Want Ukraine, or How a Russian Imperial General Became Hetman Pavlo Soropadsky of the Ukrainian State," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, no. 1-2 (2004): 115-148; Christopher Gilley, "Beyond Petliura: The Ukrainian National Movement and the 1919 Pogroms," *East European Jewish Affairs* 47, no. 1 (2017): 45–61; Christopher Gilley, "Untangling the Ukrainian Revolution," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 17, no. 3 (2017): 326-338.

[8] "The UHO Continues its Existence Under False Pretenses," Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); "Re: the Opposition Movement in the UHO," RCMP, RG146, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Fascist Association," 28 July 1938, RCMP, RG146, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

1919, the OUN quickly became a popular landing spot for far-right, ultranationalist Ukrainians.[9] Ideologically, it took its cues from the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and, later, German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. As John Paul Himka describes, the defining features of the OUN included "its leader principle (*Fuhrerprinzip*), its aspiration to ban all other political parties and movements, its fascist-style slogan, its red and black flag, its raised-arm salute, its xenophobia and anti-Semitism, its cult of violence, and its admiration of Hitler, Mussolini, and other leaders of fascist Europe."[10] Over time, the movement also developed its own political thinkers. While never a formal member of the OUN, the writings of Dmytro Dontsov strongly affected the organization. Dontsov, who eventually migrated to the United States and then to Canada, agitated for a nationalism of the deed and the birth of a new man who was unafraid to mercilessly overthrow Ukraine's enemies.[11]

Followers of the OUN in Canada were initially concentrated in the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF), which was established in 1932. Soon after its formation, the federation, in line with OUN leadership in Europe, pledged its support for Hitler. While some foolishly believed that Hitler would free Ukraine of the Soviets, others supported the fascist dictator simply because

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[9] The guiding ideology of the OUN is unpacked in Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude Toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stetsko's 1941 *Zhyttiepys*," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 3-4 (1999): 149-184; Myroslav Shkandrij, "National Democracy, the OUN, and Dontsovism: Three Ideological Currents in Ukrainian Nationalism of the 1930s-40s and Their Shared Myth-System," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 2-3 (2015): 209-216. Footnote 36 of this chapter offers further context.

[10] The slogan is *Slava Ukraini! Heroiam Slava!* Translation: Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes! John Paul Himka, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome Elements of an Identity Project," *Ab Imperio* 4 (2010): 87.

[11] The most up to date investigation of Dontsov is Trevor Erlacher, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Age of Extremes: An Intellectual Biography of Dmytro Dontsov* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2021). For more on Dontsov see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, "The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 2402* (2015), 9-11; Myroslav Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Trevor Erlacher, "The Furies of Nationalism: Dmytro Dontsov, the Ukrainian Idea, and Europe's Twentieth Century," Ph.D. dissertation (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2017).

they agreed with him.[12] Upon the formation of the UCC in 1940, the federation became the largest constituent group under the nationalist umbrella.[13]

The movement's ranks were further bolstered in the postwar period, when approximately 35,000 to 50,000 Ukrainian displaced persons (DPs) were admitted to Canada.[14] The DPs were a varied bunch, comprised of OUN and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) members, volunteers and conscripts in the Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division (Galicia Division), *Ostarbeiter* ("Eastern worker"), and ordinary Ukrainians fleeing both Nazi and Soviet forces. Consequently, political diversity was much more apparent amongst them. Some adhered to far-right politics, brushing aside the more unsavoury elements, because they believed it was the only way to bring about national liberation. Other were fascistic not just in theory but also in practice, actively collaborating with the Nazis and/or participating in the Holocaust before coming West. Once in Canada, these groups continued to pursue the cause of national liberation, which was predicated on the demonization, if not outright destruction, of communism. Finding the UNF insufficiently militant, their interests were encompassed in the establishment of a new organization, the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (CLLU). The CLLU remained formally autonomous from the UCC for the first decade of its existence, but it was never entirely outside of the committee's grip. While tensions undoubtedly plagued this relationship, mostly due to individualized power struggles or differences of opinion on strategy, their common leadership

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[12] "Ukrainian National Organization," 13 October 1933, RCMP, RG146, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (UNO) or Ukrainian Military Organization," 13 October 1933, RCMP, RG136, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Ukrainians in Canada: Connection between the UNO, the Hetman Seetch, and the Canadian Fascist Groups," RCMP, RG146, vol 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[13] "Re: Ukrainian Nationalists, Canada – Generally," 25 January 1939, RCMP, RG146, vol.38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[14] Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 213.

was united behind the much larger political project of establishing a following for their ideas in Canada.

The majority of DPs were certainly far less dogmatic, seeing overt articulations of far-right politics as excessive, uncouth, or even downright depraved. For this group, their anti-communism was primarily fueled by their lived experiences under Soviet rule and, generally speaking, manifested itself well within the acceptable parameters of liberal democracy (electoral politics, lobbying, and support for Cold War foreign policy initiatives). While some joined the CLLU, the majority had no trouble entering existing organizations within the UCC, such as the UNF, which had diluted its most radical positions in order to take on a primarily Canadian focus. Yet regardless of which organization they may have belonged to, the DPs who participated in organized community life were successful at pulling the UCC further to the right. Generally authoritarian in thought and martial in organizational strategy, the newcomers' claim to legitimation often brought the UCC to heel rather than the other way around. Internal ideological disagreements may have separated far-right extremists from mainstream conservatives, and liberals from social democrats, but this émigré community was united by a ubiquitous and broad-spectrum anti-communism.

It is upon this foundation that the contemporary organized community rests. To be sure, not everything about the nationalist belief system as it was conceptualized then has survived. As ideologues and propagandists died off, and generational memory weakened, the most radical edges of the movement were discarded or simply fell away. Nor is the community now – just as it was not then – homogenous. The core principles outlined above, however, continue to fuel the community's collective political participation. The telos is that, more contemporarily, otherwise liberal-minded, democratic thinking, Canadian-born Ukrainians espouse what are fundamentally illiberal ideas that have become so hyper normalized that many do not even realize what they are

perpetuating. These ideas, rebranded as prescriptive expressions of an apolitical Ukrainian-ness, are examples of what Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci has described as the forging of *senso comune,* or common sense. Such a framework helps illuminate how the internalized mythology of this formidable generation of nationalists has become so hegemonic that, for more recent generations of Ukrainian Canadians who cannot access the contentious terrains on which the community was forged, even this understanding may appear as nonsensical. The knowledge required to challenge it has long ago escaped our common genealogy.

In part, this explains how I responded to the discovery of the Labour Temple on that fateful day in Winnipeg. To be clear, it was not that I did not know about communism. Again, in a way, it had entirely shaped my identity growing up and served as the larger purpose behind everything I did as a "Good Ukrainian." But it had always been an abstract enemy, an intangible phenomenon manifested on another continent and seemingly disconnected from my life and that of my community more generally. It was not a hypothetical adversary, though. Nor was it entirely disengaged from my community. In fact, much to my shock, it was producing Ukrainians who somehow looked just like me – down to the identical dance steps, embroidered blouses, and mutual love of perogies – yet who I was told were nothing like me. Who were the constituents of the Labour Temple if they were not Ukrainians? Aside from obvious political differences, was their Ukrainian identity any different than mine? Perhaps most importantly, why had I never heard of them before?

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My interest in the Ukrainian Canadian community, and particularly the Ukrainian left, grew as I pursued my undergraduate degree. Through my history courses, I learned that the movement, much like its nationalist equivalent, originated in the late nineteenth century. Under the immigration policy of Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton, who sought "men in sheepskin

coats" to "settle" the Prairies, Ukrainians began migrating to Canada. They came primarily from the regions of Galicia and Bukovyna, two of the poorest and most overpopulated areas in all of Europe. Drawn to Canada by promises of free land, hundreds of thousands sought reprieve from the regular violence levelled at European peasantry. While not all first wave migrants were attracted to left-wing or progressive populist politics, by the turn of the century their numbers were significant enough that local communities began establishing enlightenment societies and *chytalni* (reading clubs).[15] They were guided by an intelligentsia primarily drawn from the ranks of the Ukrainian Radical Party, a radical, socialist, agrarian, and anti-clerical grassroots political party in western Ukraine. Under their leadership, these spaces educated and mobilized their members on socialism, national liberation, and the unique challenges posed by life as a migrant "other" in a country highly shaped by Anglo supremacy.[16]

By 1907 most members of the enlightenment societies and *chytalni* had reformed into special Ukrainian-language branches of the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC). Prolonged disagreements with SPC leadership regarding the Party's rampant Anglo chauvinism and xenophobia led to the Ukrainian branches splitting off, first to form the Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats (FUSD) and then, in 1914, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party of Canada (USDP).[17] The USDP was integral to the development of the Ukrainian left in Canada, but its

[15] On the roots of Ukrainian radicalism and the quest for statehood see John Paul Himka, "Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890-1895," *Slavic Review* 41, no. 2 (1982): 219-235; John Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860-1990* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

[16] Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991), 24.

[17] For an overview of this early history see Peter Krawchuk, *The Ukrainian Socialist Movement in Canada, 1907-1918* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1979).

presence was ultimately short lived. The organization was officially banned during the massive waves of state repression that marked the so-called First Red Scare (1918-1919).[18]

From the ashes of martial law emerged the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA). Construction on the association's first Labour Temple – the very one I stumbled upon as a teenager – began in 1918. An example of what others have called "hall socialism," Labour Temples became the lifeblood of the Ukrainian left, servicing the movement's constituents in every facet of their lives. Long before the rise of the welfare state, the ULFTA implemented cradle-to-grave insurance through the Workers' Benevolent Association (WBA).[19] Members could access the goods of the People's Co-op, which, at its peak, operated two dairy plants, a lumber yard, and a public garage.[20] During the Great Depression, the association opened its doors to the downtrodden, running a soup kitchen and providing job retraining. all while zealously advocating for Canadian workers by organizing unemployed strikes.[21] The cultural programing of the ULFTA was unparalleled, treating the attendees of its plays, dance recitals, and music concerts to content that spoke to them as both Ukrainians and radicals.[22] The association also ran schools, literacy programs, and childcare. It had women and youth sections, offering a voice to those who were traditionally the most marginalized members of organized

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[18] For more on the First Red Scare see Daniel Francis, *Seeing Reds: The Red Scare of 1918-1919, Canada's First War on Terror* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2010).

[19] Mitch Bilecki, Anthony Repka, and William Sago, *Friends in Need: The WBA Story* (Winnipeg: Workers' Benevolent Association, 1972).

[20] Jim Mochoruk and Nancy Kardash, *The People's Co-Op: The Life and Times of a North End Institution* (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2000).

[21] Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996), 42-45.

[22] Kassandra Luciuk, "More Dangerous Than Many a Pamphlet or Propaganda Book: The Ukrainian Canadian Left, Theatre, and Propaganda in the 1920s," *Labour/Le Travail* 83 (2019): 77-103.

community life.[23] In sum, the ULFTA was both an outlet for the socio-cultural needs of its constituents and a vessel for radical change.

At university, I also learned of the movement's various mistakes and outright failures. In the 1930s, for example, the ULFTA exiled heretical voices who questioned troubling developments in Soviet Ukraine, such as Russification and the mysterious disappearances of activists. Periods of slavish adherence to the Comintern demanded a united front when it came to the revolution, which ironically precipitated the breakdown of organic expressions of working-class consciousness simply because they were tied up with ethnicity.[24] Once the ULFTA had retooled as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), the leadership's uncritical support for Soviet foreign policy, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, eliminated any pretense of safeguarding democracy, let alone realizing socialism or communism. More recently, a bizarre commitment to retrograde and anachronistic Stalinism, a penchant for paranoia, and an incessant whinging has made the group a warped pantomime of its former self.[25]

The point was that, in my university courses, I was discovering a new and alternative history of Ukrainians in Canada. This also included learning about other ethnic communities who were equally politically divided, including the Hungarians, Jews, and Finns.[26] As a result, I was

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[23] Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics: Canada's Ukrainian Left, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 50-74, 75- 102.

[24] Andrij Makuch, "Fighting for the Soul of the Ukrainian Progressive Movement in Canada: The Lobayites and the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 376-400; Jim Mochoruk, "Pop & Co versus Buck and the Lenin School Boys: Ukrainian Canadians and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1931," in Hinther and Mochoruk, *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians,* 331-375.

[25] The most comprehensive overview of this process can be found in John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto: PMA Books, 1979).

[26] Varpu Lindstrom, *Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988); Gerald Tulchinsky, *Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community* (North York: Stoddart, 1998); Gerald Tulchinsky, *Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jewish Community* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 1993); Carmela Patrias, *Patriots and Proletarians: Politicizing Hungarian Immigrants in Interwar Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's

developing a much more complete picture of my community – warts and all. I realized that the Ukrainian left was not missing from the *historical* record, but rather from the *community* record. The common-sense narrative I had grown up with, which felt so fixed and authoritative, was, at one time, just a single interpretation amongst many of what it meant to be a Ukrainian Canadian. In other words, there was nothing preordained about it, contrary to what I had always been led to believe. While I was still curious as to why the left was missing from community accounts of our history, I was now also interested in something else. What happened to these different articulations of Ukrainian-ness that no longer occupied a place within the collective consciousness of the community? How was it possible that, by my generation, Ukrainian-ness was so sewn up that I had only learned of the left by accident?

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These are the questions that have guided my research. This dissertation examines the process by which a singular Ukrainian Canadian identity was constructed and entrenched. In turn, it serves as an example of the way in which anti-communism became a serious phenomenon in Canada – if not its primary political outlook in the twentieth century. I employ a diverse source base that includes transnational archival research, state records (especially intelligence files), documents housed in non-traditional archives due to wariness of the state, newspapers, and a close read of Ukrainian-language primary sources. The latter category of sources are particularly noteworthy in setting this research apart. Community elites often spoke in two very different languages depending on their audience. My native fluency in Ukrainian allows me to illustrate the often chasmic discrepancies between the language of liberal democracy, commonly found in the

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University Press, 1994); Gerald Tulchinsky, *Canada's Jews: A People's Journey* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Patryk Polec, *Hurrah Revolutionaries: The Polish Canadian Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015); Jan Raska, *Czech Refugees in Cold War Canada, 1945-1989* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2018).

English-language sources, and the ultra-nationalism that often emerged unreconstructed in Ukrainian.

My approach to sources differs in other ways. Access to Information Requests, filed in 2016 and 2017 respectively, have yet to materialize. Beyond a damning inditement of the government's lack of transparency when it comes to our collective past, this failure to respond forced me to rely on previously filed requests that were subsequently made public. The majority of state records consulted, then, have already been utilized – or are at least known to – other scholars of Ukrainians in Canada. Yet while many may have laid eyes on these documents, we have come to startlingly different conclusions about them. At least in part, this difference is explained by the fact that many Ukrainian Canadian scholars come from, or are operative on the margins of, the nationalist milieu. While they may not necessarily support the narratives of the community as a whole, their analysis is often still coloured by its default discourse. Wittingly or unwittingly, obvious lines of inquiry have gone uninvestigated, the moral righteousness of preferred actors is assumed, and the broader consequences of nationalist dominion are essentially ignored.

Rather than allowing these unchecked assumptions to unconsciously guide me, or trying to suppress them, I explicitly identify them as constructed outcomes of a deliberate political program. To do this, I employ the ideas of several theorists. In addition to his coining of the term "anti-anti-communism," Clifford Geertz's thick description is particularly helpful as I read and interpreted the material used in this dissertation.[27] Geertz urges scholars to push beyond menial observations – thin description – to flesh out the context and deeper meaning of behaviour. The

[27] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30; Clifford Geertz, "Distinguished Lecture: Anti Anti-Relativism," *American Anthropological Association* 86, no. 2 (1984): 263-278.

role of the author is not to capture primitive facts, he argues, but to clarify what goes on and to reduce the confusion surrounding it.[28] By thinking about behaviour as a "stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures," scholars can reveal its motivations and how it is subsequently understood by others. In other words, it is semiotic and symbolic, imbued with greater meaning than is first apparent.[29] Geertz provides the necessary analytical tools to read events not as folkish or simple expressions of culture, but rather as politicized attempts at establishing a singular version of Ukrainian-ness.

I also draw on Michel Foucault's concept of an archaeology of knowledge. Foucault contends that systems of thought are governed by a set of subconscious discursive formations and rules. A genealogy of knowledge clarifies that this thought is not the outcome of rational or inevitable trends, but rather the deliberative turns of history.[30] Foucault's concept of governmentality and power, or the way in which "one conducts the conduct of men," are similarly helpful for understanding how populations, and their ideologies, are regulated. Foucault suggests that instead of looking for the center of power, we should pay attention to the more comprehensive microphysics of power. Power relations should not be assumed to be unidirectional and must be assessed from the bottom up – not only from the top down – to understand how subjects are moulded by the diverse and intersecting networks that dictate their lives. While the state plays an undoubted role in shaping Ukrainian-ness, Foucault reminds us that its actors were not exclusively responsible for the processes and outcomes explored in this

[28] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures,* 16.

[29] Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures,* 7.

[30] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1969).

dissertation. This was just as much an outcome of the community leaders who pulled at networks of power and eventually secured a piece of it themselves.[31]

It is the writings of Gramsci, and particularly his ideas on hegemony, that this dissertation finds most of its theoretical inspiration. In *Prison Notebooks,* Gramsci uses the concept of cultural hegemony to explain how and why the political orientation of the Italian working class had swung so far to the right in the era of Benito Mussolini's rule.[32] Gramsci suggests that the ruling class manipulates the culture of society to make its beliefs, assumptions, and values the default norm. This manipulation is facilitated through their institutions – media, libraries, schools, organizations, folklore, churches, courts, and even architecture – which form the superstructure.[33] To be most effective in maintaining consent, those on the receiving end need to be convinced that these beliefs, assumptions, and values are natural and inevitable – common sense – rather than being intrinsically shaped by interested ideological parties and contingent. This is an ongoing process and constantly in negotiation. Common sense, according to Gramsci, continuously transforms itself in order to create the "folklore of the future."[34]

While the specific intricacies of Gramsci's thought are not the primary concern of this dissertation, his general ideas on the construction and maintenance of hegemony within the multipolar systems of power are highly instructive. In the Ukrainian Canadian case, a relatively small group of ideologically committed actors worked alongside domestic Canadian powerbrokers to remove their ideological enemies from public and political consciousness.

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[31] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Vol I: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 1-14; 133-159.

[32] Joseph Buttigieg and Antonio Callari, eds., *Antonio Gramsci: Prison Notebooks Vol I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[33] Guido Liguori, *Gramsci's Pathways* (London: Brill, 2015), 79.

[34] Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 144.

Using many of the same superstructure institutions mentioned above, these removals progressively concreted their version of identity in the public and private spheres. They became so thoroughly common sense, in fact, that even the process of constructing hegemony has been largely obscured or forgotten. Concomitantly, through this process of coherence, the community bound specific aspects of their own ideology, now perceived as innocuous and apolitical, into mainstream Canadian – and even international – consciousness, further tightening the parameters of acceptable thought.

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This research is conversant with several historiographical camps. Most notably, it contributes to the field of Ukrainian Canadian studies, specifically during the twentieth century, for which a respectable (although sometimes problematic) trove of scholarship already exists.[35] Inspired by Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, this project seeks to enhance existing narratives by "reimagining Ukrainian Canadians."[36] In particular, it sheds light on the community as it first began interacting with the formal structures of politics and power in Canada. More generally, it offers a more honest assessment that does not deal in hagiography – or apologia – but rather in

[35] Manoly Lupul, ed., *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, 1899-1962* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1986); Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question, 1938-1951* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1987); Thomas Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians During the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988); Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, eds., *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Wsevolod Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992); Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place;* Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2002); Thomas Prymak, *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

[36] Hinther and Mochoruk, *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians,* 11-12. Notable exceptions to this challenging historiography include Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Bohdan Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Frances Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010).

the reality that Ukrainian Canadians are complicated, divided, and, perhaps most importantly, diverse in ways that have largely been concealed.

Secondly, it is in line with scholarship on the Canadian political right, which has seen considerable attention from scholars.[37] Perhaps because of the growing threat posed by the far-right today, historians are seemingly returning to this topic now to see what lessons can be drawn. There is a parallel histography that deals specifically with the transnational character of far-right politics and, within this, a body of work on the Ukrainian far-right.[38] This impressive

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[37] Howard Palmer, *Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); Julian Sher, *White Hoods: Canada's Ku Klux Klan* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983); S. R. Barrett, *Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Martin Robin, *Shades of Right: Nativist and Fascist Politics in Canada, 1920-1940* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Franklin Bialystok, "Neo-Nazis in Toronto: The Allan Gardens Riot," *Canadian Jewish Studies* 4-5 (1996-1997): 1-38; Michelle McBride, "From Indifference to Internment: An Examination of RCMP Responses to Nazism and Fascism in Canada from 1934 to 1941," Master's thesis (Memorial University, 1997); William Kinsella, *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network* (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2001); Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Paul Wells, *Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's New Conservatism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006); George Michael, "RAHOWA! A History of the World Church of the Creator," *Terrorism and Political Violent* 18, no. 4 (2006): 561-583; Kevin Young and Laura Craig, "Beyond White Pride: Identity, Meaning, and Contradiction in the Canadian Skinhead Subculture," *Canadian Review of Sociology* 34, no. 2 (1997): 175-206; Jean-Francois Nadeau, *The Canadian Fuhrer: The Life of Adrien Arcand* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 2011); Marci McDonald, *The Armageddon Factor: The Rise of Christian Nationalism in Canada* (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2011); James Farney, *Conservatism in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013); Samuel Tanner and Aurelie Campana, "The Process of Radicalization: Right-Wing Skinheads in Quebec," *Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Safety* (2014); James Pitsula, *Keeping Canada British: The Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Saskatchewan* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014); Katrina Ackerman, "In Defence of Reason: Religion, Science, and the Prince Edward Island Anti-Abortion Movement, 1969-1988," *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 31, no. 2 (2014): 117-138; Hugues Theoret, *The Blue Shirts: Adrien Arcand and Fascist Anti-Semitism in Canada* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2017); Allan Bartley, *The Ku Klux Klan in Canada: A Century of Promoting Racism and Hate in the Peaceable Kingdom* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 2020). See also a series of blog posts by the L. R. Wilson Institute for Canadian History on the History of Neoliberalism in Canada: https://wilson.humanities.mcmaster.ca/2021/01/11/preview-the-history-neoliberalism-in-canada-apercu-lhistoire-du-neoliberalisme-au-canada/

[38] Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Hans Joachim Torke and John Paul Himka, eds., *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994); Per Rudling, "Historical Representation of the Wartime Accounts of the Activities of the OUN-UPA," *East European Jewish Affairs* 36, no. 2 (2006): 163-189; David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007); John Paul Himka, "Obstacles to the Integration of the Holocaust in Post-Communist East European Historical Narratives," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 50 (2008); John Paul Himka, *Ukrainians, Jews, and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories* (Saskatoon: Heritage Press, 2009); John Paul Himka, "The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53 (2011): 209-243; John Paul Himka, "Debates in Ukraine Over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004-2008," *Nationalities Papers* 39, no. 3 (2011): 353-370; Per Rudling,

research offers a nuanced assessment of the nationalist movement and its various ideological currents. It also explores the so-called memory wars in Ukraine, tracing the creation of a national history and the deliberate obfuscation of the far-right within it. Yet most of this scholarship tends to focus more on European developments than it does on the diaspora. While the scholarship that does wade into these waters is helpful for assessing the specifics of the movement and its interpretations of the past, it rarely explicates the movement's broader impact on the community or society at large. It similarly atomizes the movement from the broader Canadian right, offering little to explain the general mainstreaming of conservative thought. This is an easily understandable omission given the tremendous scope of both fields and the often-disparate ways in which they present, but it misses when, why, and how the state apparatus is expanded to include far-right actors in order to facilitate the enforcement, and reinforcement, of anti-communism.

'Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization: Ukrainian Nationalist Monuments in Edmonton, Alberta," *Nationalities Papers* 39, no. 5 (2011): 733-768; Per Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths* (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2011); John Paul Himka, "Ukrainian Memories of the Holocaust: The Destruction of Jews as Reflected in Memoirs Collected in 1947," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 54 (2012); Per Rudling, "Warfare or War Criminality?" *Ab Imperio* 1 (2012): 356-381; Per Rudling, "They Defended Ukraine: The 14th Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Revisited," *The Journal of Slavonic Military Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 329-368; Olesya Khromeychuk, *Undetermined Ukrainians: Post-War Narratives of the Waffen SS Galicia Division* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013); Joanna Michlic and John Paul Himka, eds., *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Europe* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013); Karyn Ball and Per Rudling, "The Underbelly of Canadian Multiculturalism: Holocaust Obfuscation and Envy in the Debate about the Canadian Museum for Human Rights," *Holocaust Studies* 20, no. 3 (2014): 33-80; Grzegorz Rossolinksi-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist* ((Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014); Grzegorz Rossolinksi-Liebe, "The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 2402 (2015): 1-65; Per Rudling, "The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications," *Fascism (Leiden)* 5, no. 1 (2016): 26-65; Jared McBride, "Peasants into Perpetrators: The OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943-1944," *Slavic Review* 75, no. 2 (2016): 630-654; Jared McBride, "Who's Afraid of Ukrainian Nationalism?" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 17, no. 3 (2016): 647-663; Per Rudling, "Yuschenko's Fascist: The Bandera Cult in Ukraine and Canada," *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 30, no. 2 (2017): 129-178; Per Rudling, "Eugenics and Racial Anthropology in the Ukrainian Radical Nationalist Tradition," *Science in Context* 32, no. 1 (2019): 67-91; Per Rudling, "Saving the OUN from a Collaborationist and Possibly Fascist Fate: On the Genealogy of the Discourse of the OUN's Non-Fascism," *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 7, no. 1 (2021):179-214; Per Rudling and Andreas Umland, eds., *Tarnished Heroes: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the History Writing and Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2021).

Thirdly, Canadian historians have paid solid attention to the study of communism and anti-communism. Those interested in labour, the left, and the working class have done a particularly good job of detailing how grassroots progressive movements developed in Canada and were subsequently repressed by the state. By and large, this scholarship falls into two temporal camps. The first body of work deals with the period of capitalist consolidation, the rise of the labour movement, the creation of a revolutionary left in Canada, and the state's varied responses.[39] The second body of work focuses on the Cold War period, when anti-communism becomes official government policy both domestically and internationally.[40] This dissertation is

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[39] Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Irving Abella, ed., *On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada 1919-1949* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1974); Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada: A History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); Donald Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Paul Craven, *An Impartial Umpire: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980); Bryan Palmer, *Working Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1880-1980* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1983); Gregory Kealey, "1919: The Canadian Labor Revolt," *Labour/Le Travail* 13 (1984): 11-44; Mary Horodyski, "Women and the Winnipeg General Strike," *Manitoba History* 11 (1986): 28-37; James Conley, "Frontier Labourers, Crafts in Crisis, and the Western Labour Revolt: The Case of Vancouver, 1900-1919," *Labour/Le Travail* 23 (1989): 9-37; David Bercuson, *Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations, and the General Strike* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); Gregory Kealey, *Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism, 1867-1892* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Gregory Kealey, "State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact of the First World War," *Canadian Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (1992): 281-314; Chad Reimer, "War, Nationhood, and Working-Class Entitlement: The Counter-Hegemonic Challenge of the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike," *Prairie Forum* 18, no. 2 (1993): 219-237; J.M. Bumstead, *The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919: An Illustrated History* (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1994); Donald Avery, *Reluctant Host: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896-1944* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); Craig Heron, ed., *The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); David Bright, *The Limits of Labour: Class Formation and the Labour Movement in Calgary, 1883-1929* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999); Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, *Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Ian Angus, *Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada* (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2004); Steve Hewitt, *Riding to the Rescue: The Transformation of the RCMP in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1914-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Ian McKay, *Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the People's Enlightenment in Canada, 1890-1920* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008); Peter Campbell, "Understanding the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: The Canadian Left and the Moment of Socialist Possibility in 1919," *Labour/Le Travail* 64 (2009): 51-73; Daniel Francis, *Seeing Reds: The Red Scare of 1918-1919, Canada's First War on Terror* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2010); Stefan Epp-Koop, *We're Going to Ruin This City: Winnipeg's Political Left after the General Strike* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2015); Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, *When the State Trembled: How A. J. Andrews and the Citizens' Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). See also the Theme Week on the 1919 Strike Wave for Active History: https://activehistory.ca/category/theme-week/1919-strike-wave/

[40] Marilyn Weisborg, *The Strangest Dream: Canadian Communists, the Spy Trials, and the Cold War* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Denys, 1983); Jack Granatstein, *Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*

informed by both schools, which collectively benefit our understanding of how political hegemony in Canada is built, policed, and maintained. Both also shed light on the individuals and ideas that challenged this normativity and help explain their general inability to meaningfully penetrate or resist it.[41]

Fourthly, this dissertation nuances the character of anti-communism during the Cold War. Specifically, it goes beyond ideas of repression as individualized allocations of state discipline or as the overreaches of a paranoid state confronting an immediate foreign threat. Without discounting the significance of these policies and practices, I intervene in this framing by arguing that anti-communism was more of a systematic campaign and its impacts on society were much broader, if not also much more subtle. If we turn our shared attention away from formal exchanges, official repression, and geopolitical maneuvers - a common focus in existing histories of this era - and towards the everyday, liminal spaces of society, particularly in the socio-cultural realm, we can see where these political ideas were most forcefully activated. I argue that this

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(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986); Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Denys, 1983); Deborah Van Seters, "The Munsinger Affair: Images of Espionage and Security in 1960s Canada," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no. 2 (1998): 71-84; Jack Granatstein and David Stafford, *Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1990); Len Scher, *The Un-Canadians: True Stories of the Blacklist Era* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992); Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); David Kimmel and Daniel Robinson, "The Queer Career of Homosexual Security Vetting in Cold War Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (1994): 319-345; Gary Kinsman, "Character Witnesses and Fruit Machines: Towards an Analysis of the Anti-Homosexual Security Campaign in the Canadian Civil Service," *Labour/Le Travail* 35 (1995): 133-161; Franca Iacovetta, "Recipes for Democracy? Gender, Family, and Making Female Citizens in Cold War Canada," *Canadian Woman Studies* 20, no. 2 (2000): 12-21; Gary Kinsman, Dieter K. Buse, and Mercedes Steedman, eds., *Whose National Security? Canadian State Security and the Creation of Enemies* Richard Cavell, ed., *Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada's Cold War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 2006); Gary Kinsman, *The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as Sexual Regulation* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); Christabelle Sethna and Steve Hewitt, *Just Watch Us: RCMP Surveillance of the Women's Liberation Movement in Cold War Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018).

[41] Several works expertly straddle both periods. Larry Hannant, *The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada's Citizens* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Reg Whitaker, Gregory Kealey and Andrew Parnaby, *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). For an excellent overview of the Ukrainian communist movement in both periods see Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics.*

period saw the advancement of a brand of conservatism that enhanced the most reactionary elements of Canada's political discourse and, in some cases, even pushed the boundaries of acceptability further than they had ever gone before. Once enmeshed, this was nearly impossible to overturn.

Lastly, my work adds to a growing historiography on notions of whiteness and Anglo supremacy in Canada.[42] In particular, it addresses how Ukrainians who were deemed useful by the state were made socially and politically palatable. While individual expressions of prejudice did not disappear, the barriers that traditionally surrounded power in Canadian society were lowered for those whose politics aligned with the needs of those in charge. The mutability of whiteness has been well explored by historians. Fewer, however, have detailed the explicit and implicit privileges squeezed from it by opportunistic communities who fundamentally supported such hierarchical structures. This dissertation documents the numerous ways that a sudden access to whiteness, under the umbrella of anti-communist respectability, immensely benefited

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[42] On whiteness in general see Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995); James Barrett and David Roediger, "Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality, and the New Immigrant Working Class," *Journal of American Ethnic History* (1997): 3-44; Karen Brodkin, *How Jews Became White Folks and What that Says About Race in America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1999); David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Hong Kong: Blackwell, 2002); Thomas Guglielmo, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Theodore Allen, *The Invention of the White Race Vol. I: Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York: Verso, 2012); David Scott FitzGerald and David Cook-Martin, *Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the Americas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). For specifically Canadian interpretations see Leslie Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Richard Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Pamela Sugiman, "Privilege and Oppression: The Configuration of Race, Gender, and Class in Southern Ontario Auto Plants, 1939 to 1945," *Labour/Le Travail* 47 (2001): 83-113; Eva Mackey, *The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Sunera Thobani, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); Ivana Caccia, *Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime: Shaping Citizenship Policy, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010); Carmela Patrias, *Jobs and Justice: Fighting Discrimination in Wartime Canada, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Eve Haque, *Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Noula Mina, "Taming and Training Greek Peasant Girls and the Gendered Politics of Whiteness in Postwar Canada: Canadian Bureaucrats and Immigrant Domestics, 1950s-1960s," *Canadian Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (2013): 514-539.

organized Ukrainians. From a government bureaucracy dedicated to their acculturation to ongoing physical and ideological protection from the security state, nationalist Ukrainians found a soft place to land in Canada.

That a once marginalized group was able to procure formal political power is notable here, even for its simple existence. Sharing power or forcing the ruling elite to be more inclusive was not a goal of the Canadian immigration system. Yet over time, nationalist Ukrainians cultivated their conferred whiteness, using those protections and privileges to chip away at normative Anglo society. In doing so, they transformed certain corners of thought most concerning to them, remaking particularist and contingent arguments into default public understandings. This mainstreaming meant further internal legitimacy, which progressively solidified their chosen narratives within the community. After all, hegemony is a process of becoming and, like power, is subject to constant negotiation. This process expounds the historicity of deeply relevant brokerage politics in contemporary Canada. The UCC remains a driving force in both domestic politics and in influencing the country's foreign policy, particularly when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, both extremely relevant countries in today's international geopolitical climate.

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With these materials, methodologies, and historiographical interventions in mind, each chapter explores a key avenue through which Ukrainian-ness is solidified and anti-communist hegemony is enforced. Chapter One focuses on the role of state surveillance and political policing in shaping the community from 1938 to 1941. It argues that government and state actors took a surprisingly moderate approach to the nationalists because of their usefulness for weakening the domestic left. Even when the nationalists crossed all acceptable boundaries imaginable, such as

forcefully agitating for Ukrainian national liberation during wartime, little was done to rein them in.

This chapter pays specific attention to the establishment of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in 1940. A collaborative effort between the government and nationalist leadership, the UCC became an important way in which the groups communicated with one another to set their mutual political objectives. It was also a critical avenue through which the nationalists were able to confidently assert that they, and not the communists, were the true representatives of the Ukrainian community. State officials, particularly those in the security apparatus and political hatchet men, helped the nationalists along in this process through encouragement, active participation, coaching, and by offering legitimacy and political cover. It was a mutually beneficial relationship, giving both sides the political breathing room that they needed to expand on their ideological ideas and beliefs. I show how, at the same time, the ULFTA was outlawed under the Defence of Canada Regulations (DOCR), its leadership interned, its properties seized and sold to the nationalists, and its members terrorized by the increasingly tight grip of the state.

In the aftermath of Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union joined the Allied forces, the relationship between the government and its Ukrainian population became much more complicated. Chapter Two explores the consequences of this geopolitical shift in detail through the lens of the government bureaucracy and its technocratic interventions in the community. While the relationship between Canada and the Soviets warmed post-1941, there were few material benefits for the ULFTA. The association remained illegal, the internment of its leadership continued, the Labour Temples remained under nationalist control, and rank-and-file members lived in a heightened state of fear due to repression. In fact, rather than advocate for the ULFTA, the Soviets used most of their political capital to try to force the government to clamp

down on the nationalists, whose calls for national liberation and public showings of anti-communism were proving equally embarrassing for both the Soviets and the Canadian government. At first, the nationalists were kept under relative control by the Nationalities Branch, an offshoot of the Department of National War Services (DNWS) that worked around the clock to manage them. Over time, however, the branch was increasingly imposed upon by high-ranking officials who were resolute in appeasing the Soviets and, as a result, did not approve of the branch's work. This was made all the worse as the personal lives of the branch's main players, George W. Simpson, Vladimir Kysilewsky (Kaye), Tracy Philipps, and Watson Kirkconnell – the Branch Boys - started to seriously affect their ability to work efficiently in Ottawa. Deeply disillusioned by a perceived climate of pro-communism and a lack of support from the Nationalities Branch, the nationalists began acting out, forging their own path free from the whims and formal impositions of the state.

Chapter Three concentrates on one of the most significant consequences of this new dynamic: acts of anti-communist violence. The arrival of DPs in the postwar period significantly augmented nationalist ranks and provided the movement with a base of zealous anti-communist foot soldiers. Unlike the majority of the existing UCC membership, which had grown more moderate due to governmental interventions dating back to 1940, the DPs were much more willing to use extra-judicial means to conquer their ideological enemies. While the leadership of the UCC was somewhat concerned about DP militancy, they were unwilling to either surreptitiously censure or publicly condemn them. While perhaps not a strategy they would have themselves employed, violence proved extremely effective at quelling political participation from the communists, as the attacks instilled their spaces with a sense of danger and dread. High-ranking state, government, and judicial officials were similarly unwilling to condemn acts of violence that harmonized with their ideological proclivities. This sanctioning, and the

malleability of law and justice when it came to migrants who were politically palatable and useful, telegraphed the state's preferences and showed who was, and who was not, afforded full protection under the law. More broadly, this helped define the acceptable social, political, and judicial boundaries of postwar Canada.

The first three chapters document the explicit and hands-on phase of hegemony building, when the seeds of nationalist dominion and anti-communism were planted and then grew. The following chapters highlight moments in a later phase of this process when common sense had already been secured and was being hardened off through repetition. In other words, these chapters focus on spaces where politics were much less apparent to the casual observer or participant. In particular, they look at the cultural sphere, wherein political power and control over community narratives were reinforced through the seemingly innocuous. Culture, in this case, was politics by other means. In both cases, then, I argue public displays of ethnicity should not be strictly seen as migrant achievements and acts of agency. That was of secondary importance to the community's leadership who used cultural production to advance a deeper, and much more complex, political project.

Chapter Four investigates how the nationalists appropriated the increasingly popular rhetoric of multiculturalism and ethnic tolerance to advance themselves as the exclusive purveyors of Ukrainian culture. I show how they prevented the meaningful participation of the communists in national cultural events, such as the 1967 International and Universal Exposition (Expo 67) and Folklorama, on the grounds that it was their exclusive right to represent the community, and Ukrainian-ness more generally. Over time, with their ideological opponents all but neutralized, the nationalists commandeered the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Bi and Bi Commission) to implant their version of cultural identity and political narratives in the most important socio-cultural debate of the time.

Building on these themes, Chapter Five details the competing attempts of the nationalists and the communists to commemorate important cultural figures through monuments. By claiming these cultural figures as their own, and receiving the state's sanction to do so, the nationalists used the monuments to further solidify themselves as the sole arbiters of Ukrainian identity. In turn, they further castigated the communists, and their commemoration attempts, as anomalies to their supposedly normative efforts. These monuments also became a central way through which the nationalists advanced their anti-communist narratives. They (sometimes inappropriately) imbued their celebrated cultural figures with staunch nationalist politics and alleged that, if they were alive, they would denounce the AUUC's attempts to commemorate them, a messaging echoed by government officials. Erected as the Cold War intensified, the unveilings became important political stages on which politicians could solidify their relationship to the nationalists and concomitantly preach western exceptionalism. More generally, as it grapples with the complicated legacies of the past through memory and commemoration and wars, this chapter further demystifies the notion that monuments simply commemorate mutually agreed upon facts of history. Rather, they are always contentious, full of debate, and premised on tremendous forgetting – if not downright obfuscation.

Together, the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate how the nationalists asserted themselves as the singular spokespeople of the community and its historical narratives. Moreover, they show how a progressive feedback loop of common sense was created that, at each juncture, further cast the communists as odd deviations from supposedly self-evident truths that the nationalists represented. While this process did not outright destroy the communist movement, as my experience in Winnipeg shows, it did effectively neutralize it, sentencing the AUUC to irrelevancy and even stripping the movement of its own historical past.

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Making sense of what is, in essence, a conspiracy – albeit one that historians have long alluded to – is a difficult task. An imperfect evidence base only makes this harder. Piecing it together chronologically, with a mind for critical minutia and attention to change over time, is nearly impossible. Therefore, this dissertation utilizes a thematic approach to offer five distinct, yet interrelated, processes that collectively demonstrate this process. There are certainly limitations to a thematic approach, namely those outlined above regarding the intricacies of lived experiences and political beliefs within the community. I would argue, however, that it is the only way to properly explain an otherwise unintelligible and difficult-to-prove hypothesis.

A regrettable limitation of these technical decisions is the erasure of ordinary Ukrainian Canadians. In particular, the role played by women is underdeveloped. This lacuna is a consequence of the specific topic under review, which does not lend itself naturally to the regular contours of social history. Simply put, this is a history of high politics, bids for power, and the spread of radical ideology. In the period under examination, these were the exclusive domains of elite white men.

Rank-and-file community members also seldom enter the scene, appearing only if and when they participate in these processes as bit players or anonymous masses doing the bidding of their leaders. This is not to suggest that ordinary Ukrainian Canadians were altogether powerless or devoid of agency. Such an acknowledgement, however, does not change the reality that their actions were often reactive and highly influenced by those with power in their respective community enclaves. In part, this might further explain why those who participate in the organized community today approach efforts to unpack these power structures with tremendous suspicion, if not explicit opposition or downright hostility.

While this project is almost exclusively focused on Ukrainian Canadians and the state officials who courted them, it is not a traditional community study. Rather, it is a history of

community building and its political outcomes, a process yet to receive a comprehensive treatment from historians. Nor is this an institutional history of the UCC and/or the AUUC or the nationalists and/or the communists more generally. Specific taxonomies, shifting allegiances, organizational strife, and other matters that define these groups and movements are explored only insofar as they might help make sense of the specific phenomenon under review. More importantly, I am not interested in using this research to assign victory or victimhood in a teleological fashion, and it should not be taken as a document of support or antagonism. While it is impossible to entirely divorce the biases of historians from their work, particularly when it comes to political history, this project does not intend to romanticize or demonize the political proclivities of either group in their civil war over common sense. Rather, the aim of this project has always been to understand exactly how community narratives and identity were constructed and solidified and, when possible, to demonstrate the effects on society and culture.

Far from a parochial or hagiographic history, then, this is a case study – perhaps the most detailed one we have – about the building of anti-communist hegemony in Canada. Much like their Ukrainian counterparts, other ordinary Canadians were consuming and engaging with this process, which, over time, began to inform their own political proclivities as they participated in the body politic. They watched, for example, as communists were interned during the Second World War while the state gave the nationalists the communist halls as a reward for being freedom fighters against the Red Menace. They saw the state sanction acts of violence under the guise that they were avenging Old World traumas that would certainly become the norm if communism overtook Canada. They attended seemingly innocuous cultural festivals and, between bites of perogies and colourful dances, learned of the existential threats that communism poses to the continued existence of liberalism and democracy. They visited nationalist-controlled monuments, which served as physical reminders of nationalist dominion, but were also

ahistorical interpretations more telling for their silences than not. Canadians were consuming what were fundamentally proscriptive notions couched in the basic language of liberal democracy, and they increasingly defined their own historical and political horizons through them, unwittingly damaging civil discourse in the process.

Chapter 1

Organizational Life, Political Policing, and the Management of Ethnic *Isms,* 1938-1941

On 3 January 1939, Canadians tuning into the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) on their radios were treated to a special episode of *Frankly Speaking* featuring George W. Simpson, a professor of history at the University of Saskatchewan. Simpson had been tasked by the CBC to prepare a series of fifteen-minute lectures that, over the course of a year, would educate Canadians on what he considered to be the most pressing issue of the day: Ukrainian nationalism. Given the impending Second World War and the reasons for it – the rise of Hitler being chief amongst them – this was perhaps a surprising choice for listeners. Yet for Simpson, an expert in the history of Eastern Europe, the so-called Ukrainian Question (i.e., the question of national liberation) was of utmost importance and would soon demand the serious attention of the Canadian government.

Simpson informed his listeners that the movement for Ukrainian national liberation ran much deeper than "contemporary political fashions." The overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian people, he assured them, did not want dictatorship "whether it is of the Hammer and Sickle or of the German boot and gallows." Yet it could not be ignored that, at present, the movement was openly associating with Hitler. Ukrainian nationalists, organized in Europe through the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), observed an "anti-Jewish, anti-Masonic, and anti-democratic Nazi political doctrine." For some this was a relationship of convenience in order to achieve Ukrainian independence, a pipedream according to the professor. For others, however, their support of Hitler was ideological and clearly encompassed Nazi political ideas. Either way, Simpson warned that the

Ukrainian Question would soon boil over in Canada where a large number of politically active Ukrainians were settled.[43]

This chapter explores the way in which the Canadian government responded to the rise of Ukrainian nationalism between 1938 and 1941. I argue that, despite the threat posed by the movement because of its growing calls for national liberation and support for Hitler, the government was rather tepid in its approach to the community because of its utility in helping to discourage the spread of communism. Even when acting against the best interests of Canada, the blunders of the nationalists were repeatedly forgiven, and the community continued to receive sanction from the state. At the same time, the communist movement was systematically razed through increased surveillance and repression.

This dichotomy between the left and the right underscores what Reg Whitaker has described as a double standard in Canada's treatment of migrants based on their political preferences. The context of Whitaker's argument extends beyond the scope of what is under review here, but it serves as a guiding premise nevertheless.[44] Scholars interested in political policing, the milieu to which Whitaker belongs, have written extensively about the state's unique fixation on the left.[45] Profoundly influenced by this ground-breaking work, I add to our

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[43] George W. Simpson, *Ukraine: A Series of Seven Radio Addresses* (Saskatoon: Ukrainian National Federation, 1939), 4, 12-14.

[44] Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Denys, 1987).

[45] Gregory Kealey, "State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact of the First World War," *Canadian Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (1992): 281-314; Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, eds., *Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Daniel Francis, *National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian History* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1997); Gary Kinsman, Dieter K. Buse, and Mercedes Steedman, *Whose National Security? Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of Enemies* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000); Steve Hewitt, *Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Steve Hewitt, *Riding to the Rescue: The Transformation of the RCMP in Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1914-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Daniel Francis, *Seeing Reds: The Red Scare of 1918-1919, Canada's First War on Terror* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2010); Reg Whitaker, Gregory Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby, eds., *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada From the Fenians to Fortress America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Dennis Molinaro, *An Exceptional Law: Section 98 and the Emergency State, 1919-1936* (Toronto: University of

understandings of this phenomenon through the lens of a singular community, albeit an exceptionally important one in this regard. This narrowed-in focus serves yet another purpose. By going beyond the role of the security service, which has seen the most attention from scholars, I show how non-state actors collaborated in the enforcement of anti-communist hegemony. This further colours our histories of political policing, but it also identifies both when, and how, the state apparatus began expanding to include right wing migrants.

"A More Direct Intervention in Nationalist Affairs"

Since their arrival in Canada in the late nineteenth century, Ukrainians had been of keen interest to the Canadian government and its surveillance apparatus, the Dominion Police and later the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Most of this curiosity was reserved for the political left, which eventually coalesced into the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA).[46] The political policing of the ULFTA was overwhelming in both intensity and scope. It ranged from detailed reports on high-level policy to informant testimony on the minutia of everyday life in the Labour Temples. Whether it was a leadership meeting in Winnipeg, Manitoba or mandolin practice in Val D'or, Quebec, the RCMP most assuredly had a record of it.[47]

Surveillance of the community eventually expanded to include both political centrists and the right. The RCMP targeted three organizations in particular: the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF), the Ukrainian Self Reliance League (USRL), and the United Hetman

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Toronto Press, 2017); Christabelle Sethna and Steve Hewitt, *Just Watch Us: RCMP Surveillance of the Women's Liberation Movement in Cold War Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018).

[46] For a detailed history of the ULFTA see Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics: Canada's Ukrainian Left, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).

[47] Myron Momryk, "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Surveillance of the Ukrainian Community in Canada," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 28, no. 2 (2003): 90.

Organization (UHO).[48] Despite growing concern over their activities, reconnaissance on these outfits was rather limited. This was because of strict RCMP directives to observe only "revolutionary bodies" such as the ULFTA.[49] Ignoring political threats from the right was not an oversight, then, but rather an indicator of the political positions of the force's top brass. Charles Rivett-Carmac, for example, who was a former colonial police officer in India and the head of intelligence for the RCMP in the immediate postwar period, contended that fascism was less of a threat than communism because it did not involve an overthrow of the present economic order.[50] Meanwhile, Commissioner Stuart Wood, the descendent of a Confederate officer who had come to Canada to lead the Royal North West Mounted Police, argued that it was "not the Nazi nor the fascist, but the radical who constitutes our most troublesome problem."[51] The dominance of these positions on the force meant that nationalist organizations were given enormous space to act out their anti-communism long before the directives of the Cold War supported them.[52] In addition to favourable reporting and the occasional encouragement of their activities, their surveillance was incidental and not comprehensive.[53] In fact, the RCMP opened files only if the

[48] "The Ukrainians in Canada," Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00263, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

[49] Starnes to Stiles, 12 June 1929, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[50] Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism During World War II," *Labour/Le Travail* 17 (1986): 137.

[51] S.T. Wood, "Tools for Treachery," *The Canadian Spokesman: The Magazine on National Affairs* 1, no. 2 (1941): 1-6.

[52] "Secret Memorandum to Officer Commanding," 28 February 1933, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian (United) Hetman (Monarchist) Organization – Alberta," 21 December 1937, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[53] "Re: Ukrainian Hetman Federation, Sudbury, Ont.," 27 July 1939, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

nationalists engaged in activities that might disturb the Canadian public. Even then, however, little was done to actually discipline them.[54]

The state's attitude towards Ukrainian nationalist groups became more complicated as the inevitability of the Second World War grew in the late 1930s. On the one hand, state officials believed that they could serve an important purpose in checking the steadfast popularity of the ULFTA. As a result, the RCMP was generally averse to interfering in nationalist affairs, hoping instead to continue their policy of quiet and limited observation. On the other hand, as Simpson had predicted, the nationalists were growing increasingly loud in their activism on behalf of the Ukrainian Question. This included open statements in support of Hitler, the training of a militia on Canadian soil, and calls for the government to stand up for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty. The decision was finally made to ramp up surveillance after the nationalists staged a series of public rallies and organized a letter-writing campaign to Prime Minister Mackenzie King. It was now clear to those in power that the movement, if not properly contained, would serve as a considerable source of embarrassment as the country navigated the complex geopolitical waters of wartime.[55]

Canada's foremost bureaucrat, O. D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, was rather explicit in his assessment, branding the nationalists a domestic security threat. He subsequently initiated a more active surveillance strategy. Not trusting the Mounties on this

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[54] Examples include opening an aviation school or fighting with a warring nationalist organization in public. "Ukrainian National Organization," 14 August 1938, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; Munday to RCMP Commissioner, 17 December 1938, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Nationalists, Canada – Generally," 25 January 1939, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[55] Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, "A Prescription for Nationbuilding: Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian State, 1939-1945," in Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988), 85; Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 45.

matter, he requested that all existing files on the movement be turned over to him, which the RCMP only begrudgingly did.[56] In studying the files, which were limited, Skelton learned of the complex networks and not-always-palpable political differences amongst the organizations. The UHO, dubbed the "Ukrainian Fascist Association" by the RCMP – a telling label given the force's own inclinations – was the most ideological and militant of the groups.[57] Adhering to conservative monarchist principles, its members had a penchant for paramilitary trappings that they hoped to one day put to use in Ukraine. The UNF, to which most of the nationalist intelligentsia belonged, was closely tied to the OUN in Europe and had recently expressed their support for Hitler. Meanwhile, the USRL was ideologically liberal and generally oriented towards self-reliance and community uplift in Canada.[58] While sometimes only minor, these differences between the organizations meant that they were often far from simpatico. Plus, emerging blocs loyal to specific leaders or ideologies were appearing within existing organizations – such as the OUN split between Stepan Bandera (OUN-b) and Andriy Melnyk (OUN-m) – and creating entirely new ones as well.[59]

These petty squabbles, pursuits of power, and splinters only made things more complicated for government officials like Skelton. In an attempt to make sense of the nationalist community, he decided to meet separately with representatives from each organization to see if

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[56] Skelton to Wood, 27 January 1939, Department of External Affairs fonds (DEA), RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165-A, LAC.

[57] For more on the politics of the UHO see Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2002), 49-85.

[58] "The UHO Continues Its Existence Under False Pretenses," RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Re: the Opposition Movement in the UHO," RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Fascist Association," 28 July 1938, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Ukrainian National Organization," 14 August 1938, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Copy," RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC; "Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (UNO) or Ukrainian Military Organization," 13 October 1933, RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

[59] "Ukrainians in Canada: Connection Between the UNO, the Hetman Seetch, and the Canadian Fascist Groups," RCMP, RG146 vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

he might better understand their cause and simultaneously defuse their grievances with one another. He hoped that his visits would ultimately convince them to shelve their more extreme positions – at least for the duration of the war – in order to unite with the rest of the country and focus on the upcoming war effort. Much to his dismay, his appeals for unity were rejected. Instead, each group used its time to complain about the others. Unamused, Skelton made it clear that the government would neither accept further mutinous behaviour nor ever support their cause of national liberation.[60]

The meetings may have been an unmitigated disaster, but they clarified that the nationalists were essentially ungovernable. An early visionary of what would come to pass, Skelton began considering the possibility of "a more direct intervention in nationalist affairs." He imagined the creation of a government-monitored coalition group that could both oversee and subtly influence the community to promote the government's immediate needs. Skelton also considered more severe measures such as internment if the community refused to cooperate. On 3 September 1939, a mere week before Canada's entry into the war, the government passed the Defence of Canada Regulations (DOCR). Reg Whitaker and Gregory Kealey describe the DOCR as "putting the safety of the state first." By circumventing due process in a 'state of exception,' the government restricted free speech, gathered intelligence, raided and/or outlawed subversive individuals and organizations, and censored the press. In the months leading up to the war, the Committee on Enemy Aliens and Enemy Property had already met to solidify their plans to intern ULFTA members. After a meeting with Skelton, they also discussed the possibility of adding the names of several nationalist leaders to the list.[61] Several of the larger nationalist

[60] Kordan and Luciuk, "A Prescription for Nationbuilding," 88.

[61] RCMP Commissioner to Lapointe, 25 August 1939, Ernest Lapointe Papers (EL), MG27 III B10, vol. 50, LAC; Bland to Robertson, 18 June 1940, Norman Robertson fonds (NR), MG30 E163, vol. 12, LAC; Jack Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68* (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1981), 81-

outfits also appeared on the list of subversive organizations prepared by the RCMP, but they were all soon removed because of Skelton's ultimate desire to tread lightly.[62]

The nationalists were most likely tipped off about these conversations by Vladimir Kysilewsky (Kaye), who had recently returned to Canada from London where he had served as the director of the Ukrainian Bureau.[63] Well connected on both continents, he commanded considerable respect from the nationalists who saw him as a useful channel to the government. Ottawa likewise appreciated Kaye's moderating influence on the community.[64] His legitimacy was formidable indeed, so much so that he was even able to convince the groups to publicly drop the Ukrainian Question and declare their loyalty to Canada.[65]

In turn, Kaye was able to make moves towards the formation of a coalition group in Skelton's vision. On 3 February 1940, the UNF joined with the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC) and re-emerged as the Representative Committee of Ukrainians in Canada (RCUC). Proving that internal tensions had still not fully resolved themselves, the USRL and the UHO refused to join the RCUC and even criticized the group for using the nomenclature of a representative committee. Several days later, on 7 February, they formed their own group: the Central Committee of Ukrainians in Canada (CCUC). Both outfits formally distanced themselves

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83; Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism: The Origins of the Nationalities Branch, 1939-1941," in Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988), 4.

[62] Norman Penner, *Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond* (Toronto: Methuen, 1988), 170-172; Reg Whitaker and Gregory Kealey, "A War on Ethnicity? The RCMP and Internment," in Franca Iacovetta, Roberto Perin, and Angelo Principe, eds., *Enemies Within: Italians and Other Internees in Canada and Abroad* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 128-129.

[63] For more on Kaye-Kysilewsky's time with the Ukrainian Bureau see Orest Martynowych, "A Ukrainian Canadian in London: Vladimir J. (Kaye) Kysilewsky and the Ukrainian Bureau, 1931-40," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 47, no. 4-5 (2015): 263-288. For an overview of Kaye's activities after the war see Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 272; Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), 12.

[64] Caccia, *Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime,* 120.

[65] Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 46.

from European affairs and openly pledged their allegiance to the Canadian war effort. Ironically, perhaps because of their noteworthy differences, neither realized that their constitutions were virtually identical.[66]

These were critical first steps in bringing the nationalists together, but the competing representative committees were a haphazard solution at best. Two key players were then brought on board to move things along. The first was Simpson with whom Kaye was first acquainted in 1928.[67] The second was Watson Kirkconnell, a professor at McMaster University whose recent work on Ukrainian nationalism and domestic wartime unity had been well-received in Ottawa.[68] In their meetings with the RCUC and CCUC, Simpson and Kirkconnell tried to convince the committees that it was in their best interest to amalgamate. Not only would easing internal tensions be good for the community, but it would also go a long way with the government, which might then be more inclined to support the cause of national liberation after the war. Despite their best efforts, serious problems remained, and the two communities resisted further attempts to integrate them. Still, Simpson and Kirkconnell were convinced that enough had been done to

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[66] "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: The Origin and First Years of Activity," Jaroslav Rudnyckyj fonds (JR), MG31 D58, vol. 65, LAC; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 10 April 1940, Watson Kirkconnell fonds (WK), box 45, file 9, Ester Clark Wright Archives (ECWA); Watson Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1943), 22-23; Wasyl Veryha, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: Its Origin and War Activity," Master's thesis (University of Ottawa, 1967), 66-83.

[67] Simpson even visited Kaye in London, where he would have almost certainly met Tracy Philipps as well. Thomas Prymak, *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 121.

[68] In 1940, Kirkconnell was asked by the government to write specifically about the need for Ukrainian Canadian unity. In April, he published his findings in a pamphlet, "The Ukrainian Canadians and the War." Swystun to Kirkconnell, 14 March 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Watson Kirkconnell, *Canada, Europe and Hitler* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939); "War Aims and Canadian Unity," 29 January 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA.

temporarily smooth over the roughest edges of the nationalist movement and to lessen the gaze of the government.[69]

"Making Good Citizens Out of the Various Races We Have"

As Kaye, Simpson, and Kirkconnell developed a plan for further action, a mammoth change in the international situation offered a necessary push to fully implement Skelton's vision. Hitler's invasion of France and the Low Countries precipitated a public frenzy over the alleged threat of enemy agents on Canadian soil.[70] On the home front, the public reaction included a wave of patriotic dismissals, most of which targeted German and Italian workers.[71] King's aides were soon warning him that riot conditions were imminent in multiple jurisdictions.[72] The government's immediate plan was to release a series of announcements reminding Canadians to stay calm and, more importantly, to not take the law into their own hands. Public outbursts – and chaos more generally – only helped the enemy.[73] To accommodate the overwhelming number of workers in essential wartime industries who belonged to foreign-language groups, these

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[69] "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: The Origin and First Years of Activity," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 65, LAC; Watson Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists,* 24.

[70] Donald Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980); William Young, "Mobilizing English Canada for War: The Bureau of Public Information, the Wartime Information Board, and a View of the Nation during the Second World War," in Sidney Aster, ed., *The Second World War as a National Experience* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1981); Ann Gomer Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981); Carmela Patrias, "Race, Employment Discrimination, and State Complicity in Wartime Canada, 1939-1945," *Labour/Le Travail* 59 (Spring 2007): 9-42; Carmela Patrias, *Jobs and Justice: Fighting Discrimination in Wartime Canada, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

[71] Mikhail Bjorge, "Anti-Fascist Strikes and the Patriotic Shield? Canadian Workers and the Employment of Enemy Aliens in the Second World War," in Steve Marti and William John Pratt, eds., *Fighting with the Empire: Canada, Britain, and Global Conflict, 1867-1947* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2019), 142-165.

[72] Turnbull to King, 22 May 1940, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds (WLMK), MG26 J4, vol. 348, file 3771, LAC.

[73] "Fifth Column Activity," 26 May 1940, NR, MG30 E163, vol. 12, LAC; Davis to Aylen, 28 October 1941, G.W. Simpson fonds (GWS), MG7 S1, file 12, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA).

broadcasts were soon translated into several languages. Grants were also given to groups, like the Canadian Clubs, to expand their wartime information work amongst ethnic communities.[74]

The end of the so-called Phoney War in May 1940 likewise triggered concrete action when it came to managing Canada's foreign-born population. Three pioneers on this front were J.F. MacNeill of the Department of Justice, Norman Robertson, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and J.G. Gardiner, then the minister of agriculture. MacNeill and Robertson both sat on the Committee on Enemy Aliens and Enemy Property and were already sympathetic to migrants bumping up against the draconian measures of the DOCR. While they agreed that more extreme measures like internment would be necessary for some, especially those on the left, they believed that, migrants were generally innocent of any wrongdoing. MacNeill recalled meeting migrants whose only crime had seemingly been consuming information on the war effort printed by communists in their native tongue. How could migrants be blamed for reading this material if the government did not provide alternatives? Instead of responding with repression, he argued that the government needed to invest "a little time and money on making good citizens out of the various races we have in this country."[75]

In his own scathing critique, Robertson pointed out how the scapegoating of migrants during patriotic dismissals was making enemies of people who were good citizens when usefully employed. By incriminating migrants without merit, they would certainly become "first class raw material for enemy agents and propagandists when they find themselves out of a job for no fault of their own."[76] Perhaps the strongest case for integration and not repression came from Gardiner, however, who rooted his own analysis in a deep regret over the government's policies

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[74] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 6.

[75] Granatstein, *A Man of Influence,* 86-88; Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 4-5.

[76] "Memorandum," 13 August 1940, Department of National War Services fonds (DNWS), RG44, vol. 36, LAC.

towards migrants during the First World War. By denying them the ability to feel as though they were on equal footing with other Canadians, the government had made a critical mistake in managing its foreign-born population. This time around, authorities needed to take great pains to ensure that the foreign-born not only felt welcome, but also involved, in Canada's war effort.[77]

King's government soon passed the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) and, in turn, established the Department of National War Services (DNWS). Both were outcomes of a much larger necessity on the government's part to better manage the war effort. Still, they were exceptionally important for setting up the process by which the government would manage its foreign-born population during the war. Gardiner's words had obviously been effective and he was selected as the minister of the new department. Several days later, he was also given authority over the DNWS-affiliated Bureau of Public Information.[78] Thomas C. Davis, who had previously served as the attorney general of Saskatchewan, became the deputy minister. Much like his new colleagues in the DNWS, he had long been critical of expressions of xenophobia in Canadian society and was well suited for the job.[79]

The DNWS program of migrant acculturation was inextricably linked to paternalistic attitudes that were engrained in government circles. For example, officials believed that reading a communist newspaper was rarely an articulation of political consciousness, but rather an innocent flirtation with politics that a hearty dose of Anglo veracity could swiftly do away with. No foreigner was beyond saving from the Red Menace, nor immune to the mastery of Anglo exceptionalism. These programs demonstrate how the political predilections of migrants dictated their interactions with the state. Officials remained deeply concerned by the attitudes and

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[77] Gardiner to Coleman, 16 September 1940, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1964, file 855-E-39, LAC.

[78] "Press Release," 18 July 1940, WLMK, MG26 J4, vol. 239, file 2395, LAC.

[79] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 13.

aspirations of the nationalists. Yet every attempt was made to turn a blind eye to their waywardness and to smooth their integration into mainstream society, including dedicating a team of full-time bureaucrats to the cause.

The same could not be said for the ULFTA. As soon as the DOCR was implemented, the organization and its members came under attack. Notwithstanding the convenient justifications that the war may have produced, historians of the Canadian left have clearly demonstrated that this repression neither began in 1939 nor ended in 1945.[80] The anti-war position of the ULFTA, coupled with the signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), was nevertheless harnessed to justify outlawing the association on 4 June 1940.[81] It did not take long before many of the organization's leaders were arrested and interned, a story that has seen considerable attention from historians and does not bear repeating here.[82]

Internment, however, was only part of the government's plans for the ULFTA. Perhaps most crippling was the seizure of all one hundred and eighty of the association's halls, which had always been the lifeblood of the movement. Across the country, RCMP officers stormed these community centres, seizing much of the property inside and padlocking the doors.[83] Far from a

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[80] Reg Whitaker and Steve Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 2003); Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby, *Secret Service*.

[81] Both came as a surprise to communist leadership in Canada. Yet as Norman Penner describes, Comintern orders to abandon the popular front were not up for discussion. Norman Penner, *Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond* (Toronto: Methuen, 1988), 162.

[82] Kathleen Repka and William Repka, *Dangerous Patriots: Canada's Unknown Prisoners of War* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1982); Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism During World War II," 135-166; Ian Radforth, "Political Prisoners: The Communist Internees," in *Enemies Within,* 194-224; Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby, *Secret Service*; Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 103-132; Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Civilian Internment in Canada: Histories and Legacies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2020).

[83] "Re: Illegal Organizations – Canada, Generally," 16 July 1940, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: Complaint of Communist Propaganda," 30 September 1940, RCMP, RG146, vol. 43, access request 96-A-00023 pt. 1, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Manitoba," 28 October 1940, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba," 17 January 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 122, access request HH-2001/100022 pt.

minor inconvenience, the loss of equipment, furniture, musical instruments, theatrical costumes, and libraries was a fatal blow to the ULFTA. The association watched decades of their material culture vanish in a matter of days.[84] To make matters worse, the seizure of documents further bolstered the government's already intimate knowledge of the ULFTA, providing them with exploitable weaknesses that could later be used against the association. For example, in a search of ULFTA headquarters in Winnipeg, an officer tasked with poring over the documents left behind learned of the significant tensions between the ULFTA and the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) in the late 1920s and early 1930s.[85] Another discovered a series of membership purges that had occurred just a year prior because of rumours that some inside the organization had grown sympathetic to the UNF. Officers quicky contacted these expelled members in the hope that they might be put to work bolstering anti-communism in the community.[86]

A Ukrainian "On Tap" in Ottawa

While the ULFTA was being outlawed and slowly dismantled, Kaye was offered a permanent position working for the DNWS.[87] This connected him to his old friend Tracy Philipps, a British

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6, LAC; Mead to Major, 28 January 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 122, access request HH-2001/100022 pt. 6, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba," 1 March 1941, RCMP, RG156, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 2, LAC.

[84] Some of this was self-inflicted. Tipped off about the impending raids, John Naviziwsky, a ULFTA leader, was observed by the RCMP burning the organization's papers in his backyard. "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba," 17 January 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 122, access request HH-2001/100022 pt. 6, LAC; "An Appeal for Justice: The Case of the Seized Properties of the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," Prokop Family fonds (PF), ACC 2010-H0021, H-860 f. 32, Canadian Museum of History (CMH).

[85] For an overview of this history see Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996), 154-185; Jim Mochoruk, "'Pop & Co.' vs. Buck and the 'Lenin School Boys': Ukrainian Canadian Radicals and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-31," in Hinther and Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 331-375.

[86] "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba," 17 January 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 122, access request HH-2001/100022 pt. 6, LAC

[87] Leslie Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 72; Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers*, 12; Caccia, *Managing the Mosaic in Wartime*, 5; Prymak, *Gathering a Heritage,* 189.

diplomat and intelligence officer who had been advising the Canadian government since 1937.[88] The two men had met when Kaye was a graduate student at the University of London, and they bonded over Philipps' revelation that he had once worked in Ukraine. The men grew so close, in fact, that Philipps served as Kaye's best man at his wedding.[89] Now, Philipps was in Canada on a speaking tour sponsored by the Association of Canadian Clubs (ACC).

The initial reasons for Philipps' adventure in North America remain shrouded in mystery. Some have speculated that he was sent on behalf of the British Ministry of Information to vet Canada as a landing spot for the British elite in case of German invasion. Others have suggested that he was working for the RCMP or, at a minimum, passing information to them.[90] It has also been claimed that Philipps was an agent of right-winger Lord Halifax, sent to tackle the Ukrainian Question by uniting nationalist Ukrainians in North America. While this particular theory originated in the left-wing press, Philipps' archive includes clear evidence that he had attended events at the behest of the War Office and that he also had a strong personal friendship with Halifax.[91] Regardless of the reason for his trip, once in Canada, Philipps set out to deliver a series of lectures on the situation in Europe and the necessity of wartime unity.[92]

This tour was not exclusively focused on Ukrainians, but it did put Philipps in close contact with various nationalist outfits that welcomed him with open arms.[93] These encounters

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[88] Veryha, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee," 89.

[89] Kaye to Carol, 6 February 1967, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

[90] For more on Philipps' background see Mark Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 1-48; Caccia, *Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime*, 68-89.

[91] "Comparative Credibility," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," footnote 26.

[92] "National Council of Education of Canada," 15 May 1940, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

[93] Philipps compared his experiences with the nationalists to his time in the Near East working alongside T.E. Lawrence (of "Lawrence of Arabia" fame). Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom*, 4.

solidified his confidence in the kind of Canadianization programs that, unbeknownst to him, were already being proposed by government officials in the DNWS. He was, not surprisingly, indifferent towards the internment of ULFTA members, but firmly believed that the government generally needed to avoid a heavy-handed approach with foreign-born communities. Imprudent policy could not be allowed to expose an unpleasant contradiction between Canada's public proclamations of liberal order and the reality on the ground.[94]

When he was approached to do a second tour, this time specifically targeting Ukrainians, Philipps happily obliged. The tour was officially sponsored by the ACC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The DNWS was an enthusiastic unofficial supporter because the junket offered an opportunity to liaise with the Ukrainians and test the waters for Canadianization programs. Even better was that Philipps was free of the government's strict guidelines for its employees, which would certainly come in handy when working on the margins of propriety. There was yet another bonus in that Gardiner had been struggling to keep the DNWS going without a sufficient budget, staff, or even meaningful direction from King. Engaging someone who was not on the government's payroll, yet who was aware of the guiding principles of the DNWS, was the best of both worlds. As an insurance policy, Kaye was sent to accompany Philipps, a welcome proposition by the best friends who looked forward to spending some time together.[95]

Philipps and Kaye no doubt made a good team, but they failed to convince hardly anyone that a united front was both possible and necessary. Time and time again, their proposition to merge the representative committees was scoffed at or dismissed as a delusion. As the tour progressed, their frustration only grew in response to the rancor they were encountering. By the end of September they felt that nothing more could be done, and the duo returned to Ottawa

[94] Kordan and Luciuk, "A Prescription for Nationbuilding," 85-86.

[95] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 11, 17.

defeated.[96] Gardiner was disappointed yet wholly unsurprised by the news. For the minister, the outcome of the tour only reinforced the need for King to seriously invest in the DNWS. Amongst other things, Gardiner pitched King on hiring a "Ukrainian on tap" who could serve as a stable barometer for the community. The work would look similar to what Philipps and Kaye were already doing, but in a defined and official capacity. Such a role would do wonders for future relations with the nationalists, and it would also keep a close eye on a community who needed to be closely watched.[97] The recommendation was ignored by King. The prime minister may have been broadly sympathetic to the project of Canadianization, but he had other, more pressing matters to attend to.[98]

Fate intervened when the Ukrainian Catholic Church offered Philipps yet another opportunity to tour the community. It remains unknown why the church was so intent in the project, but their efforts proved paramount in finally bringing the community together. This time, Gardiner was hesitant to approve Kaye's participation, but he ultimately counselled him to join Philipps once again.[99] Almost immediately, Philipps and Kaye detected a shift – albeit a small one – in nationalist thinking about unification. Each group was suddenly in a much more congenial mood. This about-face was likely a response to what had happened to the ULFTA. According to RCMP informant Michael Petrowsky, many community leaders were living in fear

[96] Kaye-Kysilewsky to Philipps, 11 August 1940, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: The Origin and First Years of Activity," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 65, LAC; "An Intervention in Canadian Affairs?" 14 May 1943, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[97] When Gardiner began compiling a short list for the job, Kaye was his top choice. Philipps to Kaye, 26 September 1940, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

[98] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 17.

[99] "Memorandum," 26 December 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, LAC.

of the barbed-wire fence.[100] Yet as Bohdan Kordan suggests, it may have also been a result of rumours that Philipps had been authorized by the government to reopen the discussion of supporting Ukrainian national liberation. This was not true, but Philipps was more than happy to keep up the charade (a decision he would later come to regret). Regardless, the representative committees, which were jockeying for political legitimacy, felt that a meeting with Philipps and Kaye was now compulsory and were willing to do anything that the two men asked of them – even sharing space with their rivals. All happily accepted an invitation to meet on 6-7 November.[101]

Constructive Diplomacy: Creating the Ukrainian Canadian Committee

Little is known about the November meeting at the Fort Garry Hotel in Winnipeg. What is clear in the available documents is that tensions were high. Age-old personal grudges and fears about loss of autonomy quickly boiled over, and the day ended without a resolution. Despite counselling both representative committees in advance, Philipps had purposefully not attended the first day of meetings because he hoped that the issues could be resolved without outside interference. This was clearly wishful thinking. Worried that unity was once again slipping through the government's fingers, he resolved to do something drastic.

Employing what he called "constructive diplomacy," Philipps joined the meeting on the second day. After a prolonged silence, he spread an ominous stack of papers across the table. The documents, he explained, were intelligence reports on the community that detailed everything from the government's early discomfort with their politics to more recent,

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[100] This was also undoubtedly a psychological holdover from the internment operations of the First World War when Ukrainians were disproportionately targeted for surveillance and incarceration. Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 48.

[101] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 November 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Kordan and Luciuk, "A Prescription for Nationbuilding," 89; Bohdan Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 39.

unambiguous calls for their suppression via coercive means. As the realization set in on the faces before him, Philipps warned the representatives that if they left the hotel without a resolution this time nothing more could be done to protect them. This was their final warning and last chance. Philipps gathered his papers and left the room.[102]

The strategy was a risky one, but it was also effective; the representative committees agreed to form an umbrella organization and Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was born. The objectives of the UCC were as follows:

a. Coordination and intensification of the participation of Canadian Ukrainians in Canada's war effort with its concomitant principles of democracy, Christian civilization, social justice, and freedom to all nations
b. To maintain the Committee for the purpose of devising ways and means of solving problems in Canada common to all Ukrainian Canadians
c. To be of some assistance to the aspirations of the 45,000,000 Ukrainians in Europe so that they, too, may receive equal treatment and equal rights in the family of free nations

With the assistance of Kaye, Simpson, Kaye, Kirkconnell, and Philipps, those in the room worked out the remaining kinks, including how to balance power amongst constituent groups and how to best manage inevitable conflict. The solution was to offer each organization – ranging from extreme conservatives to social democrats – a seat on the executive committee.[103] Each organization also retained control of their own general development and internal policies. Most importantly, all agreed to set aside their differences for the duration of the war – the committee was meant to be disbanded afterwards – and to cause no further trouble for the government. The UCC's new motto: "In Unity Our Strength."[104]

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[102] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 November 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; "Report on Tour in Western Canada," 8 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "An Intervention in Canadian Affairs?" 14 May 1943, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[103] "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: The Origin and First Years of Activity," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 65, LAC; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 November 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Harry Piniuta, "The Organizational Life of Ukrainian Canadians; With Special Reference to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," Master's thesis (University of Ottawa, 1952), 51-56.

[104] Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 47.

Figure 1.1


All For One—One For All

Members of the Ukrainian Canadian committee which formed a united front of all Ukrainian organizations held their first session, Tuesday night, in the Ukrainian home, Mcregor street and Burrows avenue. In picture are: Front row, sitting, S. Chwaliboga, financial secretary; J. W. Arsenych, K.C., secretary; Rev. S. W. Sawchuk, vice-president and chairman of executive committee; Rev. Dr. W. Kushnir, president; W. Swystun, vice-president and chairman of co-ordinating committee; Dr. T. Datzkiw, treasurer. Second row, standing, Dr. M. Mandryka, J. Rudachek, T. Melnychuk, Rev. S. Semczuk, E. Wasylyshyn, Dr. B. Dyma, T. D. Ferley, A. Zaharychuk, P. Barycky, M. Stechishin.

Founding members of the UCC, 1940. Source: "All for One – One for All," November 27, 1940, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

News of an umbrella organization was generally well received amongst the rank-and-file community. *Ukrainsky holos* (Ukrainian Voice), the official organ of the USRL, expressed its support for the UCC and noted its shame that unity had not been reached sooner.[105] Speaking on behalf of the UNF, *Noviy shliakh* (New Pathway) conveyed similar sentiments, but also criticized the community as a whole for needing to rely on "people from the outside…to

[105] "Yednist," November 13, 1940, *Ukrainsky holos.*

reconcile us."[106] Their hope was that the inter-organizational misunderstandings amongst various groups would soon disappear and important work could be done to help the government advance Canada's war aims.[107] Government officials similarly welcomed the establishment of the UCC because it gave them direct access to one of the largest ethnic groups in Canada. They could could now effectively gauge the mood of the community, covertly influence their affairs to suit the needs of the government, and have them serve as a political watchdog against communism. Plus, for DNWS officials in particular, the UCC could be an important test case for their broader program of Canadianization.[108]

The intricate political work of the UCC would be advanced by an honorary advisory council composed of non-Ukrainians such as Philipps, Kirkconnell, and Simpson. As a government employee Kaye was much more hands off, pledging to step in only in an emergency – and always off the record.[109] A Coordination Committee was also established to look after the UCC's publicity and propaganda work and to initiate policies sanctioned by the advisory council.[110] Wasyl Swystun, the newly appointed Second Vice President of the UCC, was tapped to chair the Coordination Committee. A lawyer from Winnipeg, he was a founding member of the USRL before leaving to join the UNF in 1938. Under his direction, the UNF had undergone a massive political transformation to align more closely with Canadian interests.[111]

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[106] "U zviazku KUK," November 21, 1940, *Noviy shliakh.*

[107] "Zavdania KUK," January 23, 1941, *Noviy shliakh.*

[108] "Report on the Ukrainian Canadian Committee," 18 September 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 15, LAC; "Committee is Political Watchdog," 6 April 1957, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[109] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 5 March 1941, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Kossar and Pavlychenko to Kirkconnell, 14 March 1941, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; UCC to Simpson, 18 March 1941, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA.

[110] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 November 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Simpson to Swystun, 29 November 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 31 December 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA.

[111] "Report re: The Ukrainian National Federation of Canada," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 15, LAC.

Figure 1.2



UKRAINIAN UNITY: Leading Ukrainians met Saturday in Winnipeg and formed a committee to co-ordinate work in Canada for Ukrainian unity and independence. Above are shown, left to right, front row: Rev. M. Pelech, treasurer; Prof. Watson Kirkconnell, member honorary advisory council; Rev. Dr. W. Kushner, president; J. T. Thorson, K.C., member honorary advisory council; Prof. T. K. Pavlychenko, University of Saskatchewan, secretary. Second row: T. Melnychuk, W. Kossar, W. Swystun, members of committee.

Kirkconnell (first row, second from the left), representing the honorary advisory council, at the founding meeting of the UCC. Source: "Canadian Ukrainians in Move Towards Unity," February 5, 1940, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Swystun's rejection of the primacy of European politics deeply impressed the advisory council and he soon became their favoured community liaison. In the weeks following the November meeting, he was in constant contact with Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps. Overall, he reported that he was happy with the direction of things, save for some early personality clashes that had raised some doubts about the committee's ability to function in the long term and had almost even prompted him to resign.[112] But the well-supported committee had quickly found its footing. Once-warring organizations were more or less cooperating, sub-committees

[112] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 November 1940, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; Swystun to Simpson, 28 November 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA.

were emerging to tackle important issues, and a campaign supporting the Red Cross had even taken off.[113] When briefed on the developments by Kaye, Skelton was pleased to see that his idea was being implemented and seemed to be working. The Ukrainian Question was finally being sorted – just not enough for him to permanently call off the surveillance.[114]

Swystun's first major task was to bring in some publicity for the UCC. It was suggested that he rope in prominent Anglo-Canadians who would write about the UCC in a favourable light and dispel the public's common assumption that the majority of Ukrainians in Canada were members of communist outfits.[115] Philipps was first to lend a hand, setting out on a speaking tour of every major site of Ukrainian settlement in Canada to spread awareness about the committee.[116] Meanwhile, Kirkconnell contributed a series of articles for the Winnipeg press that informed the public of the UCC's creation, stated its goals, relayed its support of the war effort, and lent the inchoate committee at least a modicum of legitimacy.[117] Perhaps most significantly, Kirkconnell's articles introduced, for the first time, what would become the UCC's longstanding claim that it – not the ULFTA – represented the majority of Ukrainians in Canada. This was an important declaration, setting the scene for all future showdowns between the political opponents.

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[113] Simpson to Swystun, 29 November 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA; Simpson to Kushnir, 13 December 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA; "Ukrainian Canadians," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; "Ukrainian Canadians," n.d., TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

[114] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 44.

[115] Piniuta, "The Organizational Life of Ukrainian Canadians," 101.

[116] Veryha, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee," 99.

[117] Swystun to Simpson, 28 November 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA; Simpson to Swystun, 29 November 1940, GWS, MG7 S1, file 3, USA; "Factions' Differences Forgotten as Ukrainians Form United Body," November 18, 1940, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "New Found Unity," November 19, 1940, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Unity Among Ukrainian Canadians," November 25, 1940, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "United Effort," November 27, 1940, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

"An Open Straight Fight with Communism"

Praise for Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps was suddenly overflowing in Ottawa. They had seemingly done the impossible by bringing about the UCC's formation.[118] But for all four men, the victory only made it clearer that a machinery for direct contact between the government and its various ethnic groups was desperately needed. Unifying the Ukrainian community should not have been a slapdash effort, nor one forced by circumstance and executed in an emergency fashion. All recognized and were sympathetic to the substantial limitations placed on Gardiner, but they were incredulous that their extraordinary feat had not spurred King to properly invest in his bureaucracy.

Hoping to compel the prime minister to act, Philipps produced a detailed (somewhat self-congratulatory) report of his tours. The essence of his argument was that the government had failed its foreign-born by not providing adequate citizenship-training programs. They had gotten lucky with the UCC, but this had been done with a surgical intervention technique and was not sustainable. In fact, Philipps was convinced that the artificial nature of the UCC would one day lead to its undoing. The permanence of the cure, he insisted, relied on the quality of subsequent nursing.[119] Leaning into the same brand of paternalism that guided others in the bureaucracy, Philipps reasoned that the government needed to engage ethnic groups in a way that was "convenient to nature," wherein they were given "access to the sun." Migrant instincts for self-defence had to be replaced by a modest self-confidence if they were ever expected to "detach

[118] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 12.

[119] Philipps to Davis, 25 February 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; "Tour in Western Canada, November-December 1940," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 16, LAC; "Brief Report, As Asked, For the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

themselves from their ancient backgrounds" and transition towards Canadian-ness.[120] A slower but surer strategy, this method would facilitate citizenship training and, in the process, directly address the grievances of migrants.

Canadianization programs could be doubly useful for undermining the spread of communism and saving migrants from the "mental and political void caused by participating in subversive organizations."[121] Philipps held that, in the case of the Ukrainians, the majority had only dabbled in radical politics because the ULFTA had falsely promoted Soviet Ukraine as a free nation, an age-long yearning of the Ukrainian people. This kind of misinformation needed to be tackled by the government and adjacent groups like the UCC. Dubbing the committee "missionaries in freedom's cause," he believed it had the potential to one day become Canada's most effective counter-column against communism. But an open, straight fight against communism was only possible if the government committed to funding a specialized, interdepartmental branch that could create and manage UCC equivalents for other groups.[122] Practically speaking, such a unit would have to be small, consisting of two-person teams who specialized in a single ethnic group (one team member would be in Ottawa while the other conducted fieldwork). These teams would then be counselled by an advisory panel that consisted of the already assimilated foreign-born and all relevant governmental departments, including the

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[120] "Brief Report, As Asked, For the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; "Tour in Western Canada, November-December 1940," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 16, LAC; Philipps to LaFlèche, 26 December 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[121] "Submission to the Custodian of Enemy Property with Respect to the Use of Sundry Halls, and the Proceeds Thereof," 27 September 1940, WK, box 48, file 20, ECWA.

[122] "Part II – Notes and Suggestions," 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; Philipps to Kaye, 15 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Brief Report, As Asked, For the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, Simpson, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Philipps to LaFlèche, 26 December 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the RCMP.[123] Philipps' report was eagerly read by DNWS officials who all wholeheartedly supported his vision.

"Till They Become Good Canadians…Or Till the Police Arrive"

Philipps was also asked to comment on the potential future uses of the seized ULFTA halls.[124] Here too, he was guided by the notion that Ukrainians were not honestly interested nor committed to left-wing politics and had simply been duped or led astray. His argument centered on the highly dubious notion that the halls had been built by "public-spirited Ukrainians" and "good citizens in modest circumstances" who had nothing to do with communism or the progressive left more generally. To support his claim, Philipps pointed to the Winnipeg hall's being built in 1917-1918, several years before the formation of the CPC. What Philipps thought was a smoking gun was predicated on the false assumption that Ukrainian leftists were not formally organized prior to the CPC. To the contrary, they were already members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), whose final act before being outlawed by the same decrees now plaguing the ULFTA was building the hall for future use.[125] Philipps further bolstered his argument through evidence he obtained from the UCC regarding a hall in Teulon, Manitoba. In 1933, the local Ivan Franko Society successfully sued the ULFTA for the return of a hall that they claimed belonged to them. Their lawsuit alleged that the ULFTA had stacked the executive committee of the society and had subsequently commandeered the hall in order to

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[123] Philipps to Wood, 9 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; Philipps to Wood, 28 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

[124] "Canadian Unity and the Use of the Ex-Communist Halls," 22 March 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 18, LAC.

[125] "Communist Labour Halls and Other Closed Community Centres: To What Temporary Uses Can They Be Put?" TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; Peter Krawchuk, *The Ukrainian Socialist Movement in Canada, 1907-1918* (Toronto, Progress Books, 1979); Kassandra Luciuk, "Reinserting Radicalism: Canada's First National Internment Operations, the Ukrainian Left, and the Politics of Redress," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Civilian Internment in Canada: Histories and Legacies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2020), 63.

carry out their communist propaganda.[126] The case of Teulon provided the needed justification to assert that all Ukrainians – not just members of the ULFTA – had a moral claim to the seized halls.[127] Ordinary Ukrainians, tired from a day's work, had simply been outmaneuvered by the iron discipline and shrewd tactics of the communists. "The sufferers," Philipps opined, "are the mass…who built the hall for themselves and who have lost their community centre."[128]

Philipps proposed three potential solutions. His first solution involved reopening the halls to suitable Ukrainian groups as "strong but quiet counter-currents against communism." He imagined that this work would initially be carried out by trusted local appointees who could take action against the secret re-entry of communist cells into the halls.[129] Over time, they would be replaced by Canadianized elements of the community who understood the dangers of communism and its techniques.[130] Philipps' contention that the halls be turned over to those who had undergone government-sanctioned Canadianization made clear his adherence to the politics of friendship. Not only did the government have the power to seize the property of an organization that it did not like, but it could then control who the new proprietors of the space would be based on whether or not their political positions aligned with those of the government.

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[126] "Improper Use of Building Charged in Court Hearing," 20 June 1933, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association – Winnipeg," 22 June 1933, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00133 pt. 3, LAC; "Ukrainian Hall Restored to Ivan Franko Society," 3 August 1934, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," 9 August 1934, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00133 pt. 3, LAC; "Re: Ivan Franko Society – Anti-Communist," 12 March 1935, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00133 pt. 3, LAC.

[127] "Sequestered Halls," 13 January 1941, WK, box 48, folder 29, ECWA.

[128] "Communist Labour Halls and Other Closed Community Centres: To What Temporary Uses Can They Be Put?" TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

[129] Philipps to Coleman, 23 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

[130] "Communist Labour Halls and Other Closed Community Centres: To What Temporary Uses Can They Be Put?" TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; "List of Some of the Recommendations in Connection with the Inward (Departmental) Work," GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

Of particular interest to Philipps when envisaging this proposal was the Ukrainian Workers' League (UWL), a collection of disillusioned former members of the ULFTA led by Danylo Lobay.[131] Philipps had learned of Lobay through the documents seized by the RCMP from the Labour Temples. In all conceivable ways, he was the perfect candidate to take on anti-communist work for the government. In the halls, Lobay and his colleagues could promote "de-Marxation" and let in "light and air into the willful artificial fog and confusion of mind" that communism had let seep. Conceptualizing this as a home-front war service, he believed that the UWL would be a "high explosive to the fictitious forts of communism."[132]

Much to Philipps' dismay, however, the UCC had done very little to court the UWL. The leadership was actively denying the league seats on the executive and dismissing their calls to incorporate policy that would directly address the needs of working-class Ukrainians. Philipps somewhat understood the leadership's hesitations towards the UWL. Many believed that the league was little more than a communist trick meant to disrupt organizational life in the community.[133] Yet Lobay had been heavily vetted by the RCMP and this was simply not the case. In fact, he had even served as the state's key witness in the trial of several ULFTA leaders who had been interned.[134] This information was conveyed to the UCC, yet the resistance towards the UWL senselessly continued. "A wise church and state usually consolidate the one sinner that

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[131] For more on the "Lobayite" split from the ULFTA see Andrij Makuch, "Fighting for the Soul of the Ukrainian Progressive Movement in Canada: The Lobayites and the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians,* 376-402.

[132] "Part II – Notes and Suggestions," 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; "Sequestered Halls," 13 January 1941, WK, box 48, folder 29, ECWA.

[133] Veryha, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee," 72.

[134] "In the Matter of the Defence of Canada Regulations and Myron Kostaniuk," Jacob Lawrence Cohen fonds (JLC), MG30 A94, vol. 30, file 2917-0, LAC.

repenteth," assessed Philipps. Why was the UCC leadership hellbent on ignoring the most valuable group under the committee's umbrella?[135]

Perhaps because of his own biases, it did not occur to Philipps that flouting the UWL was by design. Regardless of the UCCs pledge to promote wartime unity and their loud proclamations in favour of liberal democracy, it was still a group that leaned heavily towards conservatism. Non-Soviet leftism, overt calls for workers' rights, and even notions of social democracy remained somewhat of an anathema for the committee. In other words, even those leftist Ukrainians who publicly rejected the ULFTA and the perversions of Soviet communism were not welcome. This underscores the very nature of anti-communism within the committee, which was not so much an ingenuous critique of Soviet policy or even lived experience, but rather a dismissal of liberalism altogether. By undermining the UWL and pushing its adherents out of the mainstream community, even if the politics of its members fell within the acceptable lines of Canadian democracy and could be useful to the committee's ultimate goals, the nationalists were working to solidify a particular version of Ukrainian identity that was fundamentally antithetical to progressive ideals.

This was certainly not on Philipps' mind as he attempted to court the UWL on the UCC's behalf. Still, it points to the way that government officials profoundly misunderstood the nationalists. Perhaps distracted by their goals of industrial peace and wartime unity, they did not initially see how their bolstering of the organization was contributing to the concretization of a brand of conservatism that ran counter to Canada's accepted political discourse. Despite an assumption of shared political principles and practices, government officials and the nationalists simply did not speak the same language. While courting militant anti-communists may have

[135] "Part II – Notes and Suggestions," 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

come in handy now and again as later chapters will show, it would pose a severe challenge in the long term. By cloaking the nationalists with the state's legitimacy without fundamentally understanding them, the government was unwittingly crafting a disruptive and partisan outfit that would soon come to interfere with Canada's foreign policy needs and, in turn, damage the overall health of the nation's body politic.

While somewhat less desirable than keeping the halls in the community, proposals to turn over the Prairie halls to extension departments of various universities were also entertained by Philipps. In submissions presented to the DNWS and the Custodian of Enemy Property, N.A. McLarty, university representatives detailed their concept for the spaces as training grounds for democratic ideals. The universities would employ full-time lecturers with experience in adult education and vocational training. Their curriculum would include music, folk dance, dramatics, and handicrafts, and would teach migrants to understand and utilize democratic methods and principles efficiently. Through self-help and cooperative community action, migrants would leave the halls transformed into 'Good Canadians.'[136] Without realizing it, those making this proposal actually fulfilled the original mandate of the ULFTA halls, albeit with the leftist politics stripped out and replaced by government-sponsored agitprop.

Philipps' third pitch involved bringing together migrants, regardless of background or ethnicity, into the halls for Canadianization courses. Through direct contact in a melting pot environment, the "alien bodies" of migrants could "favour fusion rather than sourness or explosion." Despite his imaginative and fervent description, Philipps admitted that the plan had its flaws. The communities in question were not made up of the professional class, but of much tougher stuff. Put another way, could the government reasonably expect Germans to mix with

[136] "Submission to the Custodian of Enemy Property with Respect to the Use of Sundry Halls, and the Proceeds Thereof," 27 September 1940, WK, box 48, file 20, ECWA.

Jews, Prussians to mix with Poles, or Ukrainians to mix with Russians? "Rabbits and ferrets, lions and lambs, cats and dogs, would all mix and dance together," he quipped, "till they became Good Canadians…or till the police arrived with the ambulances on the way to the morgue."[137] Philipps' assessment that the mingling of different ethnic groups would almost inevitably lead to trouble reveals a dissonance between what government officials would admit privately and their public proclamations of wartime unity. In public, Canadians were being treated to propaganda posters such as "Smith? Kelly? Cohen? Svoboda?" that stressed cooperation (and even inter-ethnic camaraderie) between Anglo-Canadians and foreign-language groups. Granted, the objective of the poster was to project an ideal, but this outward ambition of the government is in stark contrast to the more cynical disclosures of bureaucrats behind closed doors.

[137] "Communist Labour Halls and Other Closed Community Centres: To What Temporary Uses Can They Be Put?" TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

Figure 1.3



Be Canadian – Act British! Source: "Smith? Kelly? Cohen? Svoboda?" November 20, 1941, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Regardless of what the Custodian ultimately decided, Philipps was clear that under no circumstances should the halls be handed over to the nationalists without oversight. In fact, he boldly asserted that he would rather see the halls returned to the ULFTA (contingent on their war conduct and recruiting record) than have them fall under the exclusive control of any nationalist outfit.[138] Without a doubt, Philipps was a strong supporter of the UCC and its constituent groups, but he rightfully understood that factionalism would inevitably limit the reach of the halls and create negative feelings towards the government from those left out.[139] Not to mention, such an arrangement would surely guarantee that the halls would become hotbeds of intra-communal strife, a possibility that the government could simply not risk now.[140]

"Sold for a Song": Labour Temples as Sites of Anti-Communism

Philipps' report made its way through the official channels of government, but much to his dismay, it had very little impact on anyone in charge. In part, this stemmed from Gardiner's ongoing inability to convince King to employ further personnel for the DNWS. As Kirkconnell memorably noted, there were simply too many "philistine members of the House [who] would never grasp the point."[141] The purported idleness was also a consequence of Philipps' growing bad reputation. Unlike established bureaucrats, he took a rather unconventional approach to politics that did not mesh well with others. Officials disparagingly described him as a minor

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[138] "Ukrainians and Statistics," 17 July 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

[139] Philipps to Davis, 22 March 1941, WK, box 48, file 51, ECWA.

[140] "Canadian Unity and the Use of the Ex-Communist Halls," 22 March 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 18, LAC; Philipps to Coleman, 23 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 51, ECWA.

[141] "Memorandum," 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 16, LAC; Philipps to Kaye, 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 16, LAC; Philipps to Kaye, 4 February 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 16, LAC; "The Leftist Ukrainian Halls," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

British aristocrat who arrived in Ottawa as a "typical soldier-adventurer," marching to his own beat and ignoring age-old rules of engagement.[142]

These descriptions of Philipps were quite accurate. His highly condescending pretention, coupled with his poor interpersonal skills, made the disdain for him vehement. Still, his frustration was valid. He learned that McLarty, who had all but ignored Philipps' report, was approaching anyone who might be interested in renting or purchasing a hall – including the UNF. Upon learning this news, Philipps attempted to intervene, but his pleas went unheeded. When pushed, McLarty claimed that the move was hastened by tardy mortgage payments and dilapidated conditions that rendered the ongoing maintenance of the halls by the government irrational. Other spaces were simply nuisances. Despite boarding up the windows and doors and hiring twenty-four-hour security, several locations were repeatedly ransacked.[143]

In turn, sixteen halls were either rented or sold at fire-sale prices. The halls in Toronto, Winnipeg, and Edmonton were discharged to the UNF. Curiously, the UNF had not been the highest bidder in any case, but McLarty had reserved the right to reject any tender if, after an RCMP investigation, there were doubts about the bona fides of the bidder.[144] This codicil, another outcome of the politics of friendship, ensured that the buildings could not be returned to the ULFTA through clever backchannels. hen two ULFTA affiliates, the Workers' Benevolent

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[142] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom*, 3.

[143] Western Trust Company to Tucker, 30 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Western Trust Company to Tucker, 31 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; Tucker to Western Trust Company, 3 November 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; "Re: The Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association, Brandon, Man.," 6 November 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; Tucker to Western Trust Company, 12 November 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; Western Trust Company to Tucker, 13 November 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; "Re: The Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," 4 December 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, AH-1999/00132 pt.2, LAC; "An Appeal for Justice: The Case of the Seized Properties of the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," PF, H-860 f. 32, CMH; "The Leftist Ukrainian Halls," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

[144] Coleman to Wood, 31 March 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC.

Association (WBA) and the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland (UAAF), attempted to lease the hall in Winnipeg, even offering to pay more than the asking price, they were swiftly rejected.[145] McLarty also vetoed an offer from a group of Ukrainian educators and social workers who pitched using the halls as sites of Canadianization in a very similar to what Philipps had described. The decision to deny them was strange because they had been given the green light by the RCMP, even though they were all members of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).[146] It is not clear what ultimately compelled McLarty to deny a high bid from a sanctioned organization. A heavy drinker, he had been known to make rash and unreasonable decisions. In fact, a short while later, he was removed from his post after making a drunken speech in the House of Commons that contradicted the government's industrial relations policy.[147] Perhaps McLarty did not like being challenged by Philipps and moved forward with the UNF out of spite. Equally likely was the possibility that someone with a vested interest in promoting the much more sinister brand of anti-communism espoused by the UNF had his ear. Either way, the deed was done, and the halls were swiftly turned over.

The halls came with their contents still inside, save for what had been taken by the RCMP during their initial raids. Once the UNF took over, musical instruments, scenery, libraries,

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[145] Mead to Wood, 11 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; McLarty to Tucker, 16 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Mead to McLarty, 18 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Tucker to McLarty, 13 November 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Bracken to St. Laurent, 6 April 1942, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Wood to Edwards, 18 April 1942, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Wood to Bernier, 19 May 1942, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Leopold to Beckett, 29 January 1942, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: ULFTA – Portage La Prairie," 3 February 1943, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC.

[146] Secretary to Lapointe, 5 June 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Tait to Wood, 12 June 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; McLarty to Tucker, 20 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC; Tucker to McLarty, 22 October 1941, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 2, LAC.

[147] Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, 6 June 1941, item 22792, LAC.

and infrastructure were "sold for a song" or simply disappeared. In Toronto, the UNF was especially licentious, reporting the subversive material in the library to the Custodian. When McLarty showed no interest in claiming it, UNF members personally destroyed over three thousand books and pamphlets.[148] In Edmonton, some five hundred books, which had taken over fifteen years to collect, were burned in the street as a public performance of anti-communism that was eerily akin to Nazi Germany.[149] In Winnipeg, the UNF inherited a fully functioning print shop. Recognizing the priceless opportunity to speak directly to ULFTA constituents, a sub-committee was established to rejig the formerly leftist newspaper *Narodna Hazeta* (People's Gazette). Written with the help of the RCMP, the new version aimed to turn readers into "respectable pink socialists."[150] Wising up to the scheme, many readers returned the newspaper to sender wrapped in bricks and stones, incurring a massive postal debt that ensured the enterprise a quick demise.[151]

Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps were unsettled by the antagonistic actions of the UNF. Communism had to be aggressively fought, but this was not what they had envisioned for the organization – or any other nationalist group for that matter. At a gathering of the UCC's advisory council, they threatened members of the UNF who were engaging in provocative behaviour with expulsion from the committee. Meanwhile, on behalf of the DNWS, Davis instructed the RCMP to immediately stop assisting the UNF in such matters.[152] The men were

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[148] "An Appeal for Justice: The Case of the Seized Properties of the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association," PF, H-860 f. 32, CMH.

[149] Laurel Sefton MacDowell, *Renegade Lawyer: The Life of J.L. Cohen* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 339, footnote 151.

[150] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 January 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[151] Repka and Repka, *Dangerous Patriots,* 93-94.

[152] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 January 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

not pleased with McLarty either, whom they disparaged for making such a foolish decision to begin with.[153] To be fair, he was not the sole cause of the problem; he was emblematic of the larger unconstructive and imprudent attitude taken by King's cabinet towards Canadianization work. Yet at the rate that the UNF was moving to rattle feathers, there was only so much time before the makeshift structure built to defend the UCC would come crashing down.

"Liquidating the Swamps Breeding Destructive Communist Propaganda"

Despite their frustration, Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps continued to mobilize around the nationalists whenever a crisis hit. For example, in early 1941, the Toronto branch of the UNF applied for a public hall license for their newly acquired building at 300 Bathurst Street. When news of their application broke, the Civil Liberties Association of Toronto (CLAT), working on behalf of the ULFTA, petitioned the Board of Police Commissioners to reject the application on the grounds that the UNF was sympathetic to fascism. The Coordination Committee of the UCC quickly jumped into action, emphatically denying the charges and vowing to fight the CLAT before the commissioner. The committee also attempted to counteract negative stories that were appearing in the newspapers, from the progressively inclined *Saturday Night* to the more conservative *The Globe and Mail.*

Unlike in the past, Philipps did not want to take on this fight alone. He urged Davis and the DNWS to guide the UNF and run interference with the commissioners. If the government did not step up now, he warned, the entire project of ethnic outreach might unravel and all of their work to date would have been for naught.[154] Davis wanted to help, but he could not do so without the approval of Gardiner, who was already stretched too thin and did not believe it was necessary to involve himself in what appeared to be an extraneous squabble. Davis did what he

[153] Kirkconnell to Clarke, 29 January 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA.

[154] Philipps to Davis, 5 February 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC.

could by assuring the UCC that the government supported the committee and its constituents, but since the message was not tied to concrete assistance it ultimately fell flat.[155] However well-intentioned Davis may have been, his response marked the genesis of the UCC's disillusionment with the government, a dynamic that would play out in the years to come.

With the government unable or unwilling to intervene, Philipps rose to the occasion in his usual fashion. He did not believe that it was in the best interest of the UNF to engage the accusation that its members were sympathetic to fascism. Nor did he consider it necessary to have the organization release a statement condemning Hitler or the rise of fascism more generally. Instead, he coached the UNF on how to imbed the narrative that the campaign against them was nothing more than a communist plot to destroy Canadian unity during wartime. Above all else, the UNF needed to drive home the message that this was an irrelevant issue blown out of proportion by communist snipers hellbent on enfeebling the war and creating an atmosphere of distrust and racial resentment in Canada.[156] Meanwhile, Kirkconnell arranged for Swystun to meet with representatives of the CLAT and the editor of *Saturday Night.* While it is unclear how, Philipps managed to convince the CLAT to withdraw their complaint and the editor of *Saturday Night* to issue a "proper explanation" of the situation.[157]

There was still the matter of convincing the Board of Police Commissioners. When they met in February 1941, Kirkconnell and Philipps testified on behalf of the UNF. While conceding that the organization had said and done some rather foolish things recently, they both utilized

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[155] Davis to Lash, 24 February 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC.

[156] Philipps to Kirkconnell, 28 January 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC; "Ukrainian Nationalists and Canada," 3 February 1941, *The Globe and Mail;* Hirniak to Kirkconnell, 4 February 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; Kossar to Kirkconnell, 18 February 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; "Communist Labour Halls and Other Closed Community Centres: To What Temporary Uses Can They Be Put?" TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

[157] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 January 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

Philipps' constructed narrative that the accusations were a direct result of their fight against the ULFTA and the "other swamps breeding destructive communist propaganda." As for the charges that the UNF was sympathetic to fascism, a reality that Kirkconnell and Philipps could not outright ignore before the commissioners, they explained that organization had recently become "bitterly anti-Nazi after Hitler doubled-crossed the Ukrainians." While turning against Hitler had come a little late, this surely had to count for something, Kirkconnell argued, as did their well-established record of anti-communist work.[158]

The commissioners were torn and deferred their decision to Toronto's Chief Constable, Dennis Draper.[159] This worked to the advantage of the UNF, as Kirkconnell and Philipps knew Draper well and could press him to rule in favour of the UNF.[160] For good measure, the two men also informed Ernest Lapointe, minister of justice, of the situation.[161] Needless to say, this final push had its desired effect. On 7 March 1941, the UNF was officially granted its license.[162] It is important to note, however, that the verdict had not been unanimous. Several members of the commission, the most vocal of which was Inspector Douglas Marshall, voted against the license out of fear that a violent clash would soon erupt.[163] Privately, Kirkconnell and Philipps feared the same.

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[158] "Re: Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst St.," WK, box 45, file 18, ECWA; Kent to Kirkconnell, 7 January 1940, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[159] "Police Recruit Rule Changed," 14 February 1941, *The Globe and Mail.*

[160] Kirkconnell to Kent, 4 March 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[161] Swystun to Draper, 20 February 1941, WK, box 45, file 15, ECWA; Swystun to Lapointe, 20 February 1941, WK, box 45, file 15, ECWA.

[162] Kossar to Philipps, 10 March 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 18, LAC; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 11 March 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[163] "Communists Blamed for Damage, Mob Scene," 19 January 1942, *The Globe and Mail.*

Creating a Counter-Myth in the Nationalities Branch

These types of interventions on behalf of the nationalists were becoming increasingly difficult for Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps. They were tired of the headaches and disappointment that accompanied their dealings with the government. Plus, putting out fires for the nationalists felt increasingly senseless. While the UCC was generally cooperative, the UNF was seemingly becoming progressively more defiant and unruly. To make matters worse, the work was coming at a great personal expense. Philipps was only marginally employed by the government and was under constant financial stress. In order to keep him afloat, Davis secured him a temporary contract with the RCMP as the director of their European Section.[164] Philipps was initially hesitant to take the job, but he eventually found it to be rewarding. His fieldwork allowed hm to dedicate significant time to interacting with, and collecting data on, various ethnic communities. He was subsequently able to flesh out his vision for a dedicated ethnic acculturation branch and to figure out how best to articulate its critical need to those in charge.[165]

While Philipps was preoccupied with the Mounties, decisions in Ottawa were being made that would greatly impact the future of the DNWS. King had let Gardiner go and replaced him with Joseph Thorson, the chairman of the Select Committee on War Expenditures. In King's mind, Thorson was the ideal leader for the DNWS. An impressive bureaucrat in his own right, his Icelandic heritage was the icing on the cake that would surely impress the ethnic groups with whom the DNWS closely worked.[166]

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[164] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 16.

[165] Philipps to Wood, 9 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC; Philipps to Kaye, 15 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; Philipps to Wood, 28 May 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

[166] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 17.

Soon after Thorson's appointment, Davis briefed the new minister on the possibility of creating the long-discussed branch. Thorson liked the idea in theory and agreed to meet with Philipps and Wood to learn more.[167] In their pitch, the two men focused on the rekindling of European nationalism amongst foreign-language groups in Canada, a direct consequence of government inaction. Ukrainians, and others, were looking back to "where their race was bred." A counter-myth oriented towards Canada was desperately needed.[168] Thorson was impressed, but he wanted more information before making his final decision. In particular, he wanted to meet with the UCC to see first-hand whether the work of Philipps and others was working, more importantly, whether it could be replicated. Ultimately, Thorson was happy with what he saw and agreed to move forward with the branch.[169]

On 22 June 1941, everything changed when the Axis Powers invaded the Soviet Union. Known as Operation Barbarossa, the offensive precipitated the Soviet endorsement of the Allied war effort. In addition to fundamentally altering the course of the war, the united front against fascism ushered in a new, cooperative era in Canada-Soviet relations. By July, King's cabinet was meeting regularly to discuss the weighty challenges posed by the bewildering coalition.[170] While King industriously worked through Canada's increased military, economic, and political

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[167] Wood to Davis, 21 October 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 15, LAC; "Secret Report Re: The Ukrainian National Federation of Canada," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 15, LAC.

[168] Philipps to Wood, 13 April 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC.

[169] Philipps to Swystun, 16 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC; Swystun to Philipps, 16 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC; Swystun to Philipps, 22 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC; Philipps to Swystun, 22 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC; Davis to Wood, 24 October 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 15, LAC; Simpson to Philipps, 21 December 1943, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[170] For a general overview of these discussions see John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs: The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). On Canada's changing alliance with the Soviet Union see Jack Granatstein, "Changing Alliances: Canada and the Soviet Union, 1939-1945," in David Davies, ed., *Canada and the Soviet Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encounters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1991* (Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994), 75-87.

involvement with the Soviet Union, his bureaucrats struggled with the profound impact it would have on those Canadians who were adamantly anti-Soviet. In the case of the Ukrainian nationalists, warmer relations with the Soviet Union would understandably irk them and perhaps even hinder their participation in the war effort. The Ukrainian Question might also be raised once again, causing major problems with Canada's new Soviet allies who, immediately upon being in contact with Canadian officials, began complaining of the UCC's anti-communist activism.[171]

For Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps, the primary concern was how an official tolerance for communism might bleed into domestic affairs and derail their plans. It had not been all that long since the government had demanded the formation of the UCC, an organization that was now seen as objectionable because of this shift in foreign policy. It had been even less time since Thorson had signed off on establishing their branch within the DNWS. Yet much to their relief, government officials in the DEA who had the power to dismantle the branch did not seem to be giving the matter much thought. The decentralized nature of the bureaucracy ensured that, in the early months post-Barbarossa, conversations regarding the contradictory directives of foreign-policy and managing the country's (now politically unsavoury) ethnic communities were slow-paced and, at best, informal.[172]

Even when some of the ancillary implications of the branch were better understood by the DEA, Thorson remained adamant that its larger mandate of foreign-born integration and wartime unity was essential as "confusion of mind" grew. Those familiar with the file also reckoned that the branch's existence would be handy should a situation ever arise in which a foreign-language

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[171] Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, eds., *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question, 1938-1951* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1987), 134-136.

[172] "Ukrainian Canadians," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

group needed to be checked. This theory was put to the test when the UCC, who had hitherto kept its promise to avoid the Ukrainian Question, released a public statement expressing their indignation over the Soviet alliance and demanded that King use the alliance to advocate for Ukraine.[173] When their appeals went unheeded, Anthony Hlynka, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament, rose in the House of Commons to repeat the community's request.[174]

At first, DNWS officials were willing to cut the UCC some slack and dismissed their sloppy politicking as simple confusion over Canada's ever-changing list of enemies and allies. Yet Hlynka's outburst still irked some officials who questioned how a sitting politician could behave so undiplomatically. Many of these critiques were couched in the language of Anglo-supremacy and racism (a journalist for the *Canadian Grocer* called for Canada to reconsider its immigration policy and compared Ukrainians to the "cocky Japanese"), a clear sign that the work of the branch was still necessary. But the more critical justification for its existence was that it may have prevented the embarrassing situation from happening in the first place. With the international situation changing so dramatically, outbursts against the Soviets could simply not be tolerated. But as Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps had always maintained, they could not handle this kind of punitive work on their own. Without the weight and resources of the government behind them, there was little bite in their bark.[175]

Thorson officially pitched the idea to Cabinet War Committee on 6 August. In a drastic shift from earlier efforts, perhaps fueled by King's personal approval of Thorson or his fears

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[173] Thomas Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988), 56-57.

[174] Canada. *House of Commons Debates*, 2 February 1942 (Anthony Hlynka, Social Credit). https://www.lipad.ca/full/1942/02/02/15/#1254360

[175] Kordan and Luciuk, "A Prescription for Nationbuilding," 17-18.

about the ongoing management of ethnic groups, the proposal was accepted.[176] This was good news, but every step forward was countered by a step back. Following the sudden death of Skelton, he was replaced by Robertson as the Under Secretary of State for the DEA.[177] Much like others in Ottawa, Robertson was apprehensive of Philipps and hesitated to approve any plan that might elevate his status in Ottawa. He could not deny that Philipps was useful, and he mostly welcomed his participation in the DNWS, but under no circumstances could he be allowed to head the new branch, which had hitherto been the plan.[178]

Philipps did not take this news well. After all, he had poured his heart and soul into the project and, without him, little would have been accomplished. Yet sympathy for Philipps only went so far; he had clearly not learned the lesson in Robertson's denunciation of him. For weeks, he harassed Davis with never-ending dispatches pointing out the injustice in his demotion and accusing the government of discrimination.[179] This puerile reaction was most likely compounded by the RCMP's revelation that they did not plan to renew his contract (he offered them an equally ludicrous response). Philipps' treatment of Davis was the last straw for many in government, and he began his rather rapid descent as a *persona non grata* in Ottawa. While Philipps did not know it yet, this status would shortly work to unravel his entire career.[180]

The fuss about Philipps notwithstanding, Davis and Thorson forged ahead. In quick succession, plans for the newly minted Nationalities Branch were formalized. Above all, the branch aimed to help Canada win the war by managing its foreign-language groups. In the larger

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[176] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 19.

[177] Kirkconnell to Mess, 8 February 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 17, LAC.

[178] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 52.

[179] Dreisziger, "The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism," 19.

[180] Davis to Philipps, 23 September 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 24, LAC; Wood to Philipps, 2 October 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 7, LAC.

sense, it was attempting to integrate "foreign-born elements willingly and actively into the nation."[181] This work would be accomplished through close collaboration with the DEA, the DNWS, the RCMP, and the Department of State to ensure that its policies remained consistent with the broader plans of the government. Simpson would chair the branch, Philipps would serve as its European Advisor (a role that kept him busy without consigning him power), and Kaye would lead its editorial section.[182] An advisory group, the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship (CCCC) would assist the branch in its endeavours. Kirkconnell did not wish to become a bureaucrat due to professional obligations in academia and a fear of losing his autonomy, so he enthusiastically joined the CCCC alongside a dozen other prominent individuals.[183]

On 30 October, Thorson signed off on the updated plans and the Nationalities Branch was officially born.[184] The team of bureaucrats and prominent figures behind the branch was large, and the scope of their ventures even larger. But four men, Philipps, Simpson, Kaye, and Kirkconnell - "the Branch Boys" - stand out for their efforts on behalf of the nationalists. These Branch Boys were not only integral in establishing the UCC on the government's behalf, but they would continue to advocate in the best interests of the committee in the years to come. Even when Operation Barbarossa triggered a rethinking of Canada-Soviet relations, and the nationalists fell increasingly out of favour, the Branch Boys were steadfast in their defence of them. All had taken on the UCC project for different reasons, but what united them was a shared

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[181] "Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship," 23 September 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[182] "In Memoriam: George William Simpson," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 65, LAC.

[183] "Memorandum," 30 October 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC; Robertson to Davis, 3 November 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC; Robertson to King, 3 November 1941, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 2977, file 3426-40, LAC; Brief Report, As Asked, For the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[184] Davis to Thorson, 4 November 1941, DNWS, RG44, vol. 36, LAC.

belief that the organization represented the best of what foreign-language groups in Canada had to offer. That the UCC would not always live up to these expectations would soon become apparent, reflecting poorly on those who had worked so hard for the committee's creation and forcing the government to rethink its engagement with its foreign-born constituents as a whole.

Conclusion

By the end of 1941, Skelton's early vision for a bureaucratic machinery to guide foreign-language groups had been realized. Through the Nationalities Branch, the government had legitimized those it deemed politically palatable and engaged them in the war effort. At the same time, politically dangerous groups were neutralized through internment, the destruction of their infrastructure, and ongoing repression. The UCC's repeated missteps as it adjusted to the ever-changing foreign policy needs of war were swept under the rug and the committee was carefully steered towards acculturation. Meanwhile, the repression of the ULFTA was amplified tenfold.

This is not to suggest that the treatment of the nationalists was always rooted in fairness or that it was free of discrimination. Government officials, state actors, and the public frequently responded to them with racist vitriol and paternalistic drivel. Yet the very fact that such ignorance was challenged by a team of government officials, employed by a branch with a mandate to support the nationalists, illuminates the stark difference in the experiences of the left and the right. To be sure, the ideas and actions of the nationalists undoubtedly troubled those in charge, especially when they veered towards blanket or open support of fascism, but their disciplining was continuously softened due to their commitment to, and useful articulations of anti-communism.

This outcome was not always understood by those involved in bestowing legitimacy on the nationalists. The creation of the UCC had allowed the government some control over a foreign-language group, but it also generated an avenue through which the nationalists could

boost their acceptability and present themselves as spokespeople for the community. This trade-off seemed fine at first, as the government generally supported the UCC and was heavily invested in promoting labour peace and industrial discipline for the duration of the war. Ideology was also influential to some, namely the Branch Boys and those in the RCMP, but it was usually surpassed by a desire for wartime unity and smooth production in essential wartime industries.

For the UCC executive, however, harmony in wartime was of secondary importance to advancing the organization's political aspirations. Their followers may have pledged their loyalty to Canada, but this rhetoric was inflated to push forward the organization's needs. Exploiting the formal recognition conferred on them, the UCC began entrenching the narrative that it, and not the ULFTA, denoted the majority opinion. This line would be repeated in the years to come, becoming imbedded in community narratives and broader political consciousness until it was undoubtedly true.

As the ideas of the UCC became incompatible with the geopolitical reality post-Barbarossa and their legitimacy (temporarily) faded, the nebulous quality of their relationship with the government was revealed. Until this point, the nationalists had escaped their controversies unscathed, supported wholeheartedly by the men who became the Branch Boys. The nationalists had also always been able to count on a generally sympathetic bureaucracy in the DNWS, whose mandate involved ongoing consultation and cooperation. Anti-communism was supposed to be the nationalists' gold, but much to their chagrin, the government was now prioritizing foreign policy over its own domestic political needs – and those of its foreign-language groups. The nationalists struggled to understand this shift in thinking towards the Soviets and grew increasingly resentful over even the slightest signs of rapprochement with communism. To make matters worse, they would soon watch as the ULFTA emerged out of the ashes of its methodical destruction to boldly reclaim what was theirs. As uncertainty loomed, one

thing was clear: the global shift had instantaneously transformed the political capital of the nationalists into fool's gold.

Chapter 2

Statecraft, Technocracy, and the Limits of Liberalism during the Second World War

The 1942 arrival of Fedor Gusev, Soviet ambassador to Canada, put a stop to the government's plans for the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) and the Ukrainian community more generally. Almost immediately, the Soviet diplomat levelled charges that the nationalists were fascist sympathizers and requested that the government bring them to heel. Norman Robertson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, did not receive this order well. In a note to Dana Wilgress, Canadian minister to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), he admitted his major frustration with Gusev and the demands he was placing on the government. After all, the nationalists had kept their word: they had done very little to challenge wartime unity and had substantially limited their anti-Soviet activism. Yet Robertson knew that government officials would have no choice but to further distance itself from the UCC. While he would not go as far as to censor them under the Defence of Canada Regulations (DOCR) as Gusev may have wanted, Robertson assured him that the days of backroom deals and tacit collaboration with the UCC were over.[185]

This chapter examines the attempts of the Nationalities Branch to manage Ukrainian organizations between 1941 and 1945 in this new political climate. The interaction between Gusev and Robertson is illustrative of the consequences of Canada's foreign policy directives in the aftermath of Operation Barbarossa. Now integrated into the Allied war effort, the Soviets could reasonably make demands on Canadian officials to suppress the actions of those they

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[185] Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, 1899-1962* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1986), 92-93; Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); 44, 51, 94-100.

deemed politically unsavoury. Increasingly imposed upon by the directives of high-ranking officials who were resolute that Canada not disappoint its Soviet ally, the branch struggled to manage this new and challenging situation. It was made all the worse as the personal relations of the branch members began to affect their ability to work in Ottawa.

This sudden shift was deeply resented by the nationalists. Not only did they perceive the government's public pro-Soviet statements as a slight, but they similarly begrudged the way in which the communists, now organized as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), had been reanimated to reclaim what had been taken from them after several years underground. This chapter, then, demonstrates how a perceived climate of pro-communism, coupled with the decimation of the Nationalities Branch, triggered a wave of hostility from the nationalists who began to act progressively out of turn and forge their own political path. This breakdown in the relationship between government officials and the nationalist community would have significant consequences in the postwar period, a theme that is explored in more detail in later chapters.

The government's efforts to manage the smooth acculturation of foreign-language groups into the Canadian polity during the war has been well explored by historians.[186] The work of Mark Kristmanson and Ivana Caccia is especially noteworthy, serving as a useful roadmap for

[186] Sidney Aster, ed., *The Second World War as a National Experience* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1981); Howard Palmer, "Ethnic Relations in Wartime: Nationalism and European Minorities in Alberta during the Second World War," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 14, no. 3 (1982); Jack Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* (Oakville: Rock's Mills Press, 1982); Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988); Leslie Pal, "Identity, Citizenship, and Mobilization: The Nationalities Branch and World War Two," *Canadian Publication Administration* 32 (1989): 407-426; John Herd Thompson, *Ethnic Minorities During Two World Wars* (Toronto: Canadian Historical Association, 1996); Mark Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom: Nationality, Culture, and State Security in Canada, 1940-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Ivana Caccia, *Managing the Mosaic in Wartime: Shaping Citizenship Policy, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010); Carmela Patrias, *Jobs and Justice: Fighting Discrimination in Wartime Canada, 1939-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

understanding the various branches and committees involved in "managing the mosaic." This chapter is also in conversation with scholarship that specifically addresses the state's relationship to Ukrainian Canadians.[187] N.F. Dreisziger and Bohdan Kordan have been particularly instructive on this front. With a keen eye for critical minutia, they provide the roadmap for understanding Ukrainian integration into the government bureaucracy and their integral role in defining Canadian statecraft efforts. Their work also details the painstaking efforts of officials caught between foreign policy directives and their own personal and political adherences. Together, they collectively dispel the notion that the wartime bureaucracy was a well-oiled machine. There may have been overriding policy goals, but the day-to-day execution of wartime directives was clearly haphazard. This chapter builds on their observations to further reveal the dissonant and disjointed nature of the technocracy that managed the Ukrainians during the war. It argues that, despite the ad hoc character of state enterprise in this period, it produced outcomes with unintended consequences that reached far beyond what was imaginable at the time, seriously testing the limits of liberalism.

Quelling the Branch Boys

Despite the shift in foreign policy, the work of the Nationalities Branch forged ahead. After all, the smooth functioning of wartime industry and the advancement of unity amongst the populace remained a top priority for the government. Still, the leash on the branch was tightened; the

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[187] Bohdan Kordan, "Disunity and Duality: Ukrainian Canadians and the Second World War," Master's thesis (Carleton University, 1981); Oleh Gerus, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee," in Manoly Lupul, ed., *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 195-214; Bohdan Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations and the Ukrainian Ethnic Problem," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 13, no. 2 (1985); Bohdan Kordan, "Ethnicity, the state, and war: Canada and the Ukrainian Problem," Ph.D. dissertation (Arizona State University, 1988); Thomas Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988); N.F. Dreisziger, "Tracy Philipps and the Achievement of Ukrainian Canadian Unity," in Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, eds., *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 326-341; Luciuk, *Searching for Place;* Bohdan Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

budget was cut, a number of personnel were fired, and almost all in-person meetings were cancelled. Robertson also demanded increased oversight of the branch and warned that there could be no more stoking of anti-communist flames – officially or unofficially - amongst foreign-language groups.

Kaye, Simpson, Kirkconnell, and Philipps – the Branch Boys – did not take these developments particularly well. Their most damning appraisal of the new course of action was saved for a statement of record written by Philipps for the DNWS. Dubbing Robertson's crackdown foolish, Philipps asserted that the attacks on the UCC originated from outside of Canada by those who regarded foreign-language communities as "jungles reserved for them to exploit as hunting grounds for disciples." It was no coincidence, he claimed, that as soon as the Nationalities Branch had been "welcomed into the jungle" to help reinforce the Christian and liberal-minded elements of the center, the "fascists of the left" began calling for the censorship of those who stood in their way. This was a typical Soviet strategy of divide and rule, and it only made the work of the Nationalities Branch in "shedding light on these un-Canadian and alien issues" more important than ever.[188] This report, like almost everything Philipps wrote, had little effect.

Gusev's demands may have caused a shake-up in the Nationalities Branch, but they did not translate into material gains for the members of the AUUC. As far as state officials were concerned, the AUUC remained a serious security threat. The government did briefly consider releasing some of the internees as a good faith gesture towards their new Soviet allies, but

[188] "Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship," 23 September 1942, G. W. Simpson fonds (GWS), MG7 S1, file 12, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA); Simpson to Philipps, 21 December 1942, Tracy Philipps fonds (TP), MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); "Brief Report, As Asked, for the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, LAC.

nothing was ultimately done.[189] While the Soviets were fighting alongside the Allies and thus needed to be tolerated, senior officials described the about-face of domestic communists towards the war as being akin to Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. In the words of future prime minister Lester Pearson, their behaviour was "somewhat nauseating."[190]

The recent thaw in tensions between Canada and the USSR did, however, encourage the AUUC to test the (less hostile) waters. In a nod to their new position on the war, they established the Ukrainian Association for Aid to the Fatherland (UAAF) to organize relief efforts in the Soviet Union.[191] Not so subtly, the constitution of the new association called for the defence of democracy and an "irrevocable opposition to all enemies in Canada, and particularly against any Ukrainians who are fascist Hitler agents and fifth columnists."[192] AUUC leadership who managed to escape internment also established a newspaper, *Ukrainske zhyttia (Ukrainian Life),* to replace the banned *Narodna hazeta (People's Gazette).* The paper began to vigorously attack the UCC for declaring itself the sole representative of the Ukrainian community. The AUUC, the editors contended, was not down for the count yet.[193]

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[189] "Report Re: The Ukrainian People's Anti-Fascist Committee," 1 August 1941, Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Peoples Anti-Fascist Committee, Winnipeg," RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: The Ukrainian People's Anti-Fascist Committee, Meeting at the Palace Theatre, Winnipeg, 13-7-41," 14 July 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 2, LAC.

[190] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 115-116; Bohdan Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations and the Ukrainian Ethnic Problem, 1939-1945," *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 13, no. 2 (1985): 1-17.

[191] Kordan and Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question*, 77; John Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), 267; Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 52; Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 123.

[192] Kordan and Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question,* 77.

[193] Wasyl Veryha, "The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: Its Origin and War Activity," Master's thesis (University of Ottawa, 1967), 109; Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 52.

Similar articles soon followed in *The Hour,* an occasional newssheet printed in New York.[194] After an investigation into its origins, the RCMP revealed that the newssheet was operating as a mouthpiece for higher-ups in the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) who had fled to the United States in anticipation of DOCR crackdowns.[195] Distributed for free, it had become a favourite way for Canadian leftists to bypass libel and censorship considerations. Since the stories were published in the United States the information could be freely quoted in Canada with few – if any – repercussions.[196]

The articles that most interested the RCMP were written by Raymond Arthur Davies. Born Rudolph Shohan, Davies was a venerable member of the American Communist Party.[197] In 1933, he moved to Montreal to advance the goals of the popular front and later he supported the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War.[198] Inspired by the AUUC's wartime struggles with the nationalists, he penned, in 1943, *This Is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler.* Davies' goal was threefold. He wanted to discredit the nationalist leadership, make the case for the return of the Labour Temples, and build bridges between the left and moderate nationalist groups like the USRL.[199] Davies had been inspired by another recent publication, *Hitler's Agents*

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[194] "Attacks on Dominion-wide Ukrainian-Canadian Committee and on its Government-instructed founder," Watson Kirkconnell fonds (WK), box 45, file 24, Ester Clark Wright Archives (ECWA); "From the Editor of Ukrainian Life," January 15, 1942, *Ukrainske Zhyttia;* "Ukrainians Request Ban Be Withdrawn," July 15, 1941, *Ottawa Journal*.

[195] Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada: A History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 142-143.

[196] "An Intervention in Canadian Affairs?" 14 May 1943, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; "The Confiscated Halls," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

[197] Davies wrote extensively on the Soviet war effort. In 1944, he was one of the only journalists allowed into the Soviet Union to cover developments on the Eastern front. This put him under the constant watch of the DEA. Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 206.

[198] "Probe Ordered of Ukrainian Nationalists," 17 January 1941, *The Globe and Mail*; "Re: Labour and Farmer Temple Association," 2 July 1941, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 2, LAC; RCMP to Kirkconnell, 14 November 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[199] Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* footnote 34.

in Canada, which was written by leading AUUC activist William Kardash.[200] These books, coupled with numerous anti-UCC pamphlet drops in predominantly Ukrainian neighborhoods, began to damage the committee's reputation in the community and amongst the general public, which was growing increasingly sympathetic to the anti-fascist messaging that the AUUC was fostering.[201]

The Branch Boys did not escape unscathed. In a series of articles in *Ukrainske zhyttia* and *The Hour,* they were criticized for their heavy-handed approach amongst foreign-language groups.[202] Philipps was especially maligned, as the newspapers pointed to his allegedly pro-fascist sympathies and close ties to prominent Nazis in Europe.[203] As Mark Kristmanson points out, characterizations of Philipps as a fascist agent were both inaccurate and unfair.[204] His professional life, scholastic interests, and even private ideas were undoubtedly tinted by the racist, misogynistic, and ironclad hierarchies that marked the era. This was especially true for members of the imperial elite like Philipps. There is no evidence, however, that he held explicitly Nazi, or even pro-German, views. On the contrary, Philipps considered himself a liberal, one with a characteristically aristocratic revulsion for all "isms" and any radical expressions of politics – left or right.

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[200] William Kardash, *Hitler's Agents in Canada* (Toronto: Morris Printing, 1942); Raymond Arthur Davies, *This Is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1943).

[201] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 25 January 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; Hultay to Kirkconnell, 24 July 1941, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 12 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA; Philipps to Simpson, 23 July 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

[202] Kirkconnell to Schuman, 20 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 26, ECWA.

[203] "Ukrainian Canadians and the War's New Phase," July 12, 1941, *Saturday Night;* "Mr. Philipps Goes to Washington," September 26, 1942, *The Hour;* Watson Kirkconnell, *Seven Pillars of Freedom* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), 212.

[204] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 38.

Figure 2.1



Caricature of Kirkconnell. Source: Watson Kirkconnell Collection, Ester Clark Wright Archives.

Note: The origins of this particular political cartoon are unknown, but it is representative of the kind of commentary that the Branch Boys were subject to. Kirkconnell proudly displayed this humorous caricature in his personal archive.

Philipps may not have been a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party, but accusations that he was friendly towards prominent members of the far-right were much harder to deny or simply hand-wave away. In the years preceding the war, he openly mingled within appeasement circles in Britain, including Lord Halifax, the Cliveden Set, and Dowager Viscountess Dorothy

Downe.[205] Downe was a particularly interesting acquaintance. A prominent aristocrat – she was the only inheritor of the ancient ffolkes Baronetcy of Hillington and the god-daughter of King George VI – Downe was infamous for being a chief financier of British fascism.[206] A close friend and financial supporter of fascist leader Oswald Mosely, she was described as a "most fanatical admirer of Hitler…to such an extent that some of her acquaintances look upon her as a danger to the country."[207] But there was more to the relationship between Philipps and Downe. They were, in fact, related, the former being the nephew of Sir Francis Arthur Stanley ffolkes. While the editors of *The Hour* were able to connect them in some capacity, they inevitably did not know the full extent of the relationship. The nebulous world of peerage had saved Philipps from further fallout with England's most illustrious fascist.

Philipps was likewise well acquainted with, and sometimes even funded by, Jacob Makohin, a Ukrainian American millionaire. Makohin was an enigmatic figure. He claimed to be the orphan of a Russian nobleman and was also an active pretender to the Hetmanate throne. Once in the United States, he joined the army and eventually married well. He was active in Ukrainian nationalist circles, using his wife's fortune to fund various causes, including the Ukrainian Bureau for which Kaye had once worked. Makohin's backstory was almost a caricature of an obvious target for communist attacks. More of a Nazi voyeur than a hardened ideologue (a minor difference to be sure), he was, like many American industrialists at the time, unconcerned by the rise of fascism. His wealth allowed him to purchase a villa in Alassio, Italy,

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[205] Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel, *In Our Time: The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998).

[206] "The Dowager Viscountess Downe, Dorothy," 24 November 1940, KV-2-2146, British National Archives (BNA). See also Andrew Mitchell "Fascism in East Anglia: The British Union of Fascists in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, 1933-1940." Ph.D. dissertation (University of Sheffield, 1999), 354, 368.

[207] "The Dowager Viscountess Downe, Dorothy," 24 February 1940, KV-2-2146, BNA.

where he frequently hosted prominent European fascists. Yet the most damning accusations against Makohin that had originated in *The Hour* were outlandish and easily disprovable, including the claim that he had trained up an army of six hundred thousand Ukrainian fascists to fight against the Soviet Union.[208]

Regardless of the veracity of the accusations against Philipps and the company he chose to keep, the stories were difficult to contain. Soon enough, mainstream publications such as *The Globe and Mail, The New Republic,* and *Saturday Night* featured articles about his supposed penchant for fascism and friendships with prominent figures in the movement. He was eventually able to procure an apology and retraction from *Saturday Night,* which he proudly boasted about. Philipps' confident public persona, however, disguised a growing private malaise.[209] The articles had become the talk of Ottawa, and he was now under investigation by George Glazebrook from the Department of External Affairs (DEA) who was eager to show the Soviets that the government was serious about cracking down on foreign nationalisms.[210] Writing to Davis, Philipps disclosed his concern that the assaults on his character would soon compromise his ability to do his work. Philipps would soon learn just how right he was to worry, but for now Davis soothed his anxiety and placated him with weak assurances that all would be well. Robertson, on the other hand, remained nonchalant about the matter, openly admitting that he found the stories in the press against the UCC and the Branch Boys "not without humour." It

[208] Kaye's personal archive includes a photograph of Makohin and an Italian fascist general posing in front of the villa in black shirts. Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 26-27.

[209] Swystun to Sandwell, 16 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC; Sandwell to Swystun, 23 July 1941, Department of External Affairs (DEA), RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; "Ukrainian Canadians and the Russo-German War," July 26, 1941, *Saturday Night.*

[210] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 27.

seemed that authorities did not take the current attacks seriously and were unconcerned with their proliferation.[211]

"Effecting a Volte Face": Ukrainians and the Plebiscite

Matters of national importance temporarily dulled the focus on the personal affairs of the Branch Boys. When Arthur Meighen was elected leader of the Conservative Party in November 1941, he called for a total war that included compulsory overseas military conscription. Prime Minister Mackenzie King was in a difficult position given his promise not to introduce conscription. Now, however, mounting pressure and depleting pools of volunteers were forcing him to reconsider. Eventually, King had no choice but to announce plans for a plebiscite to vote on whether to release the government from its initial pledge.

For the nationalists, Canada's alliance with the Soviet Union complicated things. Most of the community now backed the war effort, but they worried that voting in favour of conscription would somehow be misconstrued as support for the Soviets. The Branch Boys believed that this was the perfect case for them to intervene. They could tackle disinformation about the plebiscite and simultaneously educate the community on the necessity of a Soviet alliance.[212] But DNWS and DEA officials disagreed and demanded that officials in the Nationalities Branch not get involved in such a blatantly political matter.[213]

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[211] "Report," 13 January 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; Kaye to Philipps, 7 April 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; Davis to Philipps, 4 December 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Simpson to Robertson, 4 April 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Philipps to Robertson, 17 July 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 10, LAC; Philipps to Robertson, 14 May 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 10, LAC.

[212] Simpson to Estey, 2 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; John Herd Thompson, *Ethnic Minorities During World War II* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 14; Jack Granatstein, "Ethnic and Religious Enlistment in Canada During the Second World War," *Canadian Jewish Studies* 21 (2013): 176.

[213] "Brief Report, As Asked, for the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, LAC.

The only option for the Branch Boys, then, was to assist the UCC in more subtle ways. In a frank discussion with the executive, Philipps made clear the gravity of the situation. A "no" vote would further alienate the committee and its supporters from government. It would also arm the communists with further ammunition to support their claims that the nationalists were pro-fascist. The Labor Progressive Party (LPP), which had replaced the CPC, recently established the Dominion Communist Labor Total War Committee (otherwise known as the Tim Buck Yes Committee). The UCC needed to put in the same kind of effort to bring their constituents to the polls. The executive understood the wider implications of the vote well and did not need much persuading to act. They immediately agreed to fund an internal education campaign in the form of a cross-country tour (with a special focus on the Prairies) and to exert total editorial control over the Ukrainian-language newspapers in order to get the message out.[214]

In a discussion with DNWS officials, Philipps recommended that the department sponsor the UCC's already set plans to rally the "yes" vote. Gardiner was slow to act, though, because he was preoccupied with other, much more pressing, wartime matters. Plus, he remained under exceptional pressure to keep the DNWS afloat with increasingly limited resources. It was no surprise, then, when he eventually decided not to support the tour. Simply put, Gardiner did not want his department involved in such shoddy activities so close to the vote. As a result, the UCC's plans largely fell apart.[215]

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[214] Gregory Kealey and Reg Whitaker, eds., *RCMP Security Bulletins: The War Series, 1939-1941* (Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1989), 52; "The Plebiscite and the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association," Stavroff Private Collection.

[215] Burianyk to Simpson, 13 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Simpson to Burianyk, 16 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Burianyk to Simpson, 23 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Simpson to Burianyk, 28 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Burianyk to Simpson, 30 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Simpson to Estey, 2 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

The "yes" vote won out in the end, but exit polling revealed that Ukrainian-heavy ridings in the Prairies voted overwhelmingly against conscription.[216] In a debriefing, Philipps conveyed his deep regret over the situation, but squarely blamed the government for doing nothing to meaningfully support the UCC.[217] Years of propaganda and paranoia had sunk deep into the community and the Nationalities Branch, despite having the wherewithal, had not been allow to "effect a *volte face.*"[218] The bigger problem, Philipps claimed, was that the UCC was now resentful of the government's inaction, perceiving it as a subtle pro-Soviet nod. It was important to tread carefully or risk the UCC pulling away to forge its own, certainly much more militant, path.[219]

One way to bring the UCC back on side was to have the Nationalities Branch publicly defend the committee when backlash from the vote inevitably came. Philipps recommended that a major investment of time and money be made to assist the Branch Boys in this endeavour. He was especially interested in overhauling the branch's policy towards the foreign-language press because it had been a main source of disinformation throughout the plebiscite vote.[220] These

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[216] "Where the 'Note' Vote Lay Here," April 29, 1942, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident,* 163; Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, *Creating a Landscape: A Geography of Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), map 22.

[217] "Brief Report, As Asked, for the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, LAC.

[218] In other words, the Nationalities Branch had not been allowed to change their minds.

[219] "Some Reasons Why Ukrainian Canadians Voted No," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Estey to Simpson, 27 May 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Simpson to Estey, 2 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Burianyk to Simpson, 3 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; Simpson to Burianyk, 10 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC; "Brief Report, As Asked, for the Personal Information of General LaFlèche," 26 December 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 30, LAC.

[220] "Committee on Cooperation, January 1942," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Committee on Cooperation, June 1942," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Memorandum on Broadcasting to Canadian Communities of Recent European Origin," 12 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Memorandum on Doukhobors," 15 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 36, LAC; "Nationalities Branch: Canadian Communities of Recent European Origin," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

suggestions were not well received by Robertson who viewed Philipps' ongoing defense of the nationalists, as well as his increasingly ardent anti-communism, irresponsible - if not downright suspicious. Philipps was beginning to treat his work as though it was his child, producing obviously biased reports that were impossible for government officials to view as objective. Robertson thus requested that all future briefs come from other members of the branch, cutting Philipps off from other officials and effectively preventing his ideas from spreading.[221]

Philipps continued to push. A particularly contentious interaction took place with Glazebrook who had already repeatedly warned Philipps against further encouraging the UCC. The government, he reminded Philipps yet again, could not be seen showing preference to a committee that decried any support for the Soviets. Philipps countered by arguing that his support of the UCC should not worry Robertson given the inconsistencies in the DEA's own policies. While the government rallied behind the USSR in Europe, domestic communists remained incarcerated and without possession of their properties. Was Robertson willing to lead by example and overturn the policies suppressing the Ukrainian left?[222]

Philipps then made an enemy out of John Grierson, the head of the Wartime Information Board (WIB). The heart of their dispute lay in Philipps' recommendations that the WIB establish guidelines for editorial content in the foreign-language press to counteract the kind of misinformation that was running rampant during the plebiscite. He also made an unsanctioned visit to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) to consult on their foreign-language broadcasting. Grierson saw this as highly unprofessional, but it also interfered with his own well-

[221] Robertson to Philipps, 10 September 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 223, file 4174-40, LAC; Wrong to Philipps, 12 September 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 223, file 4174-40, LAC; England to Simpson, 12 May 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[222] "Memorandum to the Under-Secretary," 4 September 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 223, file 4174-40, LAC; "Note for the File," 4 September 1942," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Committee on Cooperation, September 1942," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

laid plans for ethnic acculturation work. Grierson had long believed that the Nationalities Branch was placing too much emphasis on the wrong things and, as a result, "right-wing Ukrainians were closer to the right-wing Poles than they were to the left-wing section of their own community." The branch's work was absolutely necessary, but Philipps, with his biases and predilections, was driving it into the ground. In Grierson's mind, the only solution to the current problem was a WIB takeover of the Nationalities Branch. When Glazebrook learned of Grierson's desire to clean house, he offered his full support, suggesting that he start with the non-Ukrainians such as Philipps.[223]

"A Communist Ukrainian is Still More Inflammable than an Orange Irishman"

Despite being a lightning rod for controversy, Philipps had correctly identified a brewing problem that his colleagues were inexplicably ignoring. Philipps was not a zealous ideologue and could certainly sympathize with the difficult choices made by his colleagues because of changes to foreign policy. He was also not naïve; he knew that warmer relations with the Soviets were not going away - at least for the duration of the war. The Nationalities Branch no doubt had an active role to play in making this reality palatable to the UCC. In the aftermath of the plebiscite, however, the communists had, as predicted, upped their condemnations of the nationalists as fifth columnists.[224] At the urging of the Branch Boys the UCC had stayed quiet, but much of the committee's leadership believed that this was increasingly being interpreted as a sign of guilt. Philipps knew that it was no longer a matter of if – but when – the nationalists would retaliate.[225]

Philipps' premonitions were affirmed in October 1942. Perhaps for no other reason than to goad the communists, and to send a message to the government that they were no longer

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[223] Glazebrook to Robertson, 23 June 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC.

[224] Kossar to Kirkconnell, 19 May 1942, WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA.

[225] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 110.

willing to tolerate their second-class status, the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) staged a concert to celebrate the one-year anniversary of their purchase of the Labour Temple at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto, Ontario. Armed with sticks, stones, and clubs - and shouting "beat them, shoot them, the fascists" - demonstrators surrounded the building. Several windows were broken, and a confectionary located inside was looted. Before the police could arrive, a firehose was turned on the crowd, preventing the majority from entering. The mob eventually left after several arrests were made, and the evening's festivities carried on as planned under heavy police protection.[226]

This was far from the first time that political violence had broken out. On 28 December 1941, some two hundred supporters of the AUUC gathered in front of their old hall in Winnipeg to disrupt its re-opening as a headquarters for the UNF. As people arrived throughout the night, demonstrators charged at them, spurring a confrontation. Bottles, sticks, and eggs flew through the air and several fist fights broke out. The police were called, but they only made matters worse after they arrested eleven protestors and condemned them for not protesting in "a sensible way." Three weeks later, in January 1942, Toronto UNF members gathered at their then newly acquired hall at 300 Bathurst Street. At around seven o'clock in the evening, a crowd of over three hundred congregated out front. Urged on by calls to "smash the place," they threw eggs and bricks at the building. Mounted constables, who were already on site because the UNF had anticipated trouble, charged at the crowd. Even though the plans for the evening were cancelled, armed policemen stood guard over the hall throughout the night.[227]

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[226] UNF to St. Laurent, 19 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; "Called to Subdue Mob at Toronto," October 19, 1942, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[227] "Three Men Face Riot Charge After Fight at Euclid Ave Hall," December 29, 1941, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "8 More Arrests in Hall Fracas," January 9, 1942, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Communists Blamed for Damage, Mob Scene," January 19, 1942, *The Globe and Mail.*

In a note to the Branch Boys, the UCC expressed deep concern over the ongoing fighting. They believed they had been targeted for "taking innocent people away from [the communists]" at the behest of a government who was now largely ignoring them.[228] "I'll be absolutely candid in telling you," USRL leader Wasyl Burianyk wrote to Simpson, "that members of the Committee cannot figure out the milquetoast attitude of Ottawa towards the harmful activities of the communists. This communist scum is being given all the latitude to besmirch, denounce, and publicly cast vile aspersions against individuals and organizations that are opposed to communism," he continued, "[and] our people resent this very much."[229] Simpson was sympathetic, but he reminded Burianyk that the Branch Boys had always been against the UNF's acquisition of the halls and had warned them against taking McLarty's deal. Comparing the takeover to the Roman Catholic Church buying confiscated Orange Order halls, Simpson amusingly noted that "a communist Ukrainian is still more inflammable than an Orange Irishman." What had the UNF expected?[230]

Justified admonishment aside, Simpson assured Burianyk that the Branch Boys would help in any way they could to stop the attacks. Simpson meant what he said, but in a private meeting with the Branch Boys he admitted that the situation felt out of control. He was also beginning to doubt the usefulness of protecting the nationalists. Kirkconnell laid out the present problems as such: the insurance company had cancelled the UNF's insurance, police protection was becoming increasingly impractical, and the morale of the community was being poisoned. The communists were also organizing publicly again, as evidenced by the attacks, and an

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[228] Hultay to Kirkconnell, 25 January 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA; UNF to St. Laurent, 19 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC.

[229] Burianyk to Simpson, 3 June 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 32, LAC.

[230] Kirkconnell to Simpson, 29 January 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA.

interminable program of violence was almost certain. With this in mind, he pressed that they officially lobby the government for the return of the halls to the AUUC. This would have to be done carefully so as not to give the impression that the UNF was being punished. The emphasis needed to remain on preserving the peace between warring factions.[231]

In a meeting of officials to discuss the future of the halls, Philipps presented a dossier of his reports dating back to 1940 that collectively laid out the problem with the halls and called for their return to the communists. He also made it a point to note that these were minority reports; those with real power consistently refused to consider rescinding the sales.[232] This did little to ease his colleagues' contempt for him and, unfortunately, this meeting would prove no different. In the end, those in charge were not responsive to his suggestion to return the halls. They fully blamed the nationalists for the ongoing provocations, but still voted against taking the halls away from them. Some claimed that their decision was based on the potential financial complications of such a move.[233] Others were much more honest in their justification. E.H. Coleman, undersecretary of state, warned Philipps that he would fight tooth and nail to keep the halls out of communist hands.[234]

However sincere Coleman's proclamation may have been, it further underscores the inconsistencies in both the conceptualization and treatment of Soviet versus domestic

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[231] Kirkconnell to Simpson, 29 January 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA; Davis to Robertson, 26 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 10, LAC; Kirkconnell to Hultay, 28 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA; Luciuk and Kordan, *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question,* 110-113.

[232] "Sequestered Halls," 23 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 51, ECWA; Philipps to Coleman, 23 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 10, LAC; "Confiscated Halls," 13 May 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 19, LAC; "Finnish, Ukrainian, Italian, etc. Halls," 22 May 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 19, LAC; "The Confiscated and Sold Halls," 25 May 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 19, LAC.

[233] Simpson to Kirkconnell, 4 February 1942, WK, box 48, file 31, ECWA; Philipps to Coleman, 23 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 51, ECWA.

[234] Coleman to Philipps, 2 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 51, ECWA.

communists. If the government was to be taken at its word that it now supported the Soviets, why was Coleman so comfortable expressing his desire to continue the AUUC's subjugation? This in and of itself bothered Philipps, but he was even more perturbed by the way in which this would impact the nationalists. It was not just that they believed that the government had become pro-communist and were growing disillusioned. There were now material consequences for this supposed shift in thinking, including an uptick in violence. The problem all along, he explained, had been the communists. Ignoring this fact for the sake of positive relations with the Soviet was a grave political error. As the meeting ended, he once again warned that the nationalists were growing despondent and were increasingly less willing to take orders from the Branch Boys. The path forward would be difficult and fraught with problems if the situation was not properly handled.[235]

Blocking the return of the halls was baffling to the Branch Boys, but Simpson urged his acolytes to remain calm. A skilled bureaucrat, he believed that a constructive solution could still be reached in consultation with key players whose positions could be massaged through dialogue. But before further talks could take place, Simpson resigned from his position due to chronic illness and a generalized fatigue from a job that he found increasingly stifling and stressful. While he would remain active in the CCCC and on the UCC's advisory council, his decision to step back stalled things in the short term and profoundly altered the overall function of the branch in the long term. The remaining Branch Boys carried on as best they could, running the branch on an ad hoc basis. This was exceptionally difficult to do without a director, but Robertson repeatedly blocked every attempt to appoint someone out of a fear that it might lead to

[235] Simpson to Philipps, 23 October 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; Kirkconnell to Hultay, 28 October 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA.

giving Philipps more power. Soon afterwards, he cancelled all upcoming meetings of the Nationalities Branch and the CCCC, effectively halting the work.[236]

As employees of the government, Philipps and Kaye could do very little in the aftermath of Robertson's announcement. As a free agent, Kirkconnell was not restricted in the same ways and quickly jumped to action. Government officials may not have been interested in seeing the halls returned, but the Branch Boys agreed that this was a critically important step for achieving wartime unity. As a result, Kirkconnell met with the Civil Liberties Association of Toronto (CLAT), which had long been campaigning on behalf of the AUUC.[237] While he did not condone the actions of the association and maintained that their activities were both dangerous and subversive, he still wanted to work with them to push for the restoration of the halls on the basis of peace and justice. In exchange for Kirkconnell's advocacy, the CLAT agreed to postpone all upcoming demonstrations against the UNF and to adapt a slightly more critical perspective on the halls so as not to become, as Kirkconnell put it, "a vehicle for communist abuse."[238]

Kirkconnell also toyed with the idea of writing an article for *Saturday Night.* His conversation with CLAT members was the push he finally needed to put pen to paper. Without presenting "Satan as an angel," he wanted to offer up a frank assessment of the situation.

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[236] Simpson to Kirkconnell, 4 February 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA; Simpson to Thorson, 23 July 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Simpson to Thorson, 28 July 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Thorson to Simpson, 3 August 1942, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 14 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 25, ECWA; "Agenda for Meeting of the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship," n.d., GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[237] Kirkconnell to Sandwell, 3 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA; "Meeting Calls for Return of Seized Ukrainian Halls," February 11, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* Watson Kirkconnell, *Seven Pillars of Freedom,* 108.

[238] Patterson to Kirkconnell, 2 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Patterson, 4 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 24, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 14 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 25, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Sandwell, 14 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 25, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Patterson, 17 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 25, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 18 November 1942, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, file 11, LAC.

Kirkconnell's motivations were twofold. First, he hoped to force some constructive policy regarding the halls onto the government's agenda. Second, he wanted to show the "essential honesty" of the Branch Boys who had, for so long, been blamed for the AUUC's predicament.[239] For such an open forum, Kirkconnell was remarkably candid in the article he produced. He criticized the Custodian, the UNF, and even those government bureaucrats who were restricting the work of the Nationalities Branch. While he was not worried about the reaction of McLarty, or any other officials in Ottawa for that matter, he was somewhat concerned that he would offend the UCC or trigger further inappropriate actions from them. In the end, he justified his harsh assessment as an attempt to secure a peaceful and permanent solution for the Ukrainian community. The added bonus was that, with his position now on the record, the communists would "not have much ammunition left to shoot with."[240]

"A Program and a Record": The First Congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee

Perhaps in reaction to Kirkconnell's article, the nationalists continued to act out. Philipps learned that a small deputation of Ukrainian MPs planned to hand King a memorandum on the Ukrainian Question.[241] Following through on their threats to start making their own decisions, they also set plans to host a congress in Winnipeg in June 1942. Despite his resignation from the Nationalities Branch, Simpson remained a close friend of the UCC executive, and they turned to him as they finalized their plans. After learning of the specifics of the congress, and fearing that it would turn into an embarrassing mess, Simpson shared the developments with the DEA. Simpson was also

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[239] Kirkconnell to Philipps, 14 November 1943, WK, box 48, file 25, ECWA.

[240] Kirkconnell to Simpson, 29 January 1942, WK, box 48, file 21, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 21 November 1942, WK, box 48, file 26, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 2 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Simpson, 5 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 5 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 7 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA.

[241] Philipps to Simpson, 29 March 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

deeply troubled by the publication of a UNF booklet, *A Program and a Record,* which boldly restated the organization's commitment to Ukrainian liberation and its broader critiques of communism, domestic and foreign.[242]

News of the congress and the publication of the pamphlet was not well received in Ottawa. Robertson was especially irritated because he began fielding complaints from the likes of Gusev and Wilgress. He immediately requested that the UNF cease its activities or face his wrath.[243] Robertson's request was ignored by the UNF, so he retaliated by ordering all government officials to completely sever their ties with the nationalist community. As his fury grew, he also considered tabling a resolution to formally recognize Soviet Ukraine, a move that would surely demonstrate his displeasure with the nationalists. Officials even began to seriously consider the idea of returning the Labour Temples. This would deal a significant blow to the recalcitrant nationalists, but it would also help placate the Soviets.[244] While he wanted to see the halls returned, Simpson simultaneously did not want the government to act in haste and convinced Robertson to moderate his approach. A harsh response could lead to the total collapse of the UCC and clear the path for the communists to make organizational gains in the community. This was not what the government really wanted, he reminded Robertson, regardless of how angry he may have been.[245]

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[242] *A Program and a Record* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Federation, 1943).

[243] Glazebrook to Robertson, 14 June 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165-39c, LAC.

[244] King to Wilgress, 15 May 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Wilgress to King, 17 May 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Wilgress to King, 19 May 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Robertson to Wilgress, 28 May 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Robertson to Kossar, n.d., DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165-39c, LAC; Glazebrook to Robertson, 14 June 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165-39c, LAC; Robertson to King, 4 July 1944, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 89.

[245] "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary," 12 September 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Davis to Robertson, 6 October 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC.

Simpson promised to work with the UCC to craft a suitable program. He eventually convinced the UCC to shift the focus of the congress towards the committee's essential wartime work. This was well received in Ottawa and they allowed the congress to move forward, albeit a year later to accommodate all the necessary changes.[246] Like all best laid plans, however, the situation became more complicated when a dispute erupted between the Soviet Union and Poland regarding the latter's eastern borders. Unable to resist weighing in, the UCC wrote their second public memorandum to King demanding that Canada advocate for Ukrainian interests.[247] When word of the memorandum reached Gusev, Robertson once again did his best to smooth things over with the incensed diplomat. Admitting that he would have preferred the nationalists to see the world "through Canadian eyes," assimilation took time. The nationalists were simply not there yet, and the government could not push them much more. Either way, he assured Gusev, the nationalists had no sway over Canada's foreign policy, and he need not worry.[248]

It was not just government officials and the Soviets who responded negatively to the UCC's actions. With all pretenses gone that the congress would focus exclusively on Canadian issues, a series of withdrawals came flooding in from uncomfortable and/or politically savvy delegates. This included the Lobay-led Ukrainian Workers' League (UWL) who now doubted the efficacy of the congress. The loss of Lobay was significant as he was expected to deliver a

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[246] "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary," 12 September 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Davis to Robertson, 25 September 1942, Department of National War Services (DNWS), RG44, vol. 36, LAC; Davis to Robertson, 1 October 1942, DNWS, RG44, vol. 35, LAC; Davis to Robertson, 6 October 1942, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Robertson to Davis, 7 October 1942, DNWS, RG44, vol. 35, LAC; Arsenych to Kirkconnell, 3 June 1943, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA; "Ukrainian National Federation," DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; Simpson to Kirkconnell, 7 June 1943, WK, box 45, file 9, ECWA.

[247] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 79, 87.

[248] "Memorandum to the Prime Minister," 6 May 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC.

scathing exposé on his time as a member of the ULFTA, which government officials and the UCC had long desired.[249]

The most damaging withdrawal came from Wasyl Swystun who simultaneously resigned from his positions on both the UCC and the UNF executives. His decision was influenced by several factors. While he was not against a congress per se, he felt that this iteration was especially ill-timed and ill-conceived. He was also unconvinced that Simpson could prevent the weekend from descending into chaos. And, as a member of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, he knew that public conversations about the nationalists were growing increasingly negative. Simply put, the committee could not afford any more bad press. Above all else, Swystun was fueled by a genuine desire for the Ukrainian diaspora to maintain close contact with Ukraine.[250] Little could be done to alter the present political situation, he reasoned, so the nationalists needed to soften their attacks on the USSR and acknowledge its validity – even if only to keep lines of communication open with their relatives.

Swystun received some limited support from moderates in the USRL, but he was otherwise shunned by the community. Rumours swirled that the renegade had "sold himself to the communists" and had "ceased to be a Ukrainian." Others peddled gossip that his resignation stemmed from ongoing personal conflict with UNF President Wolodymyr Kossar. Tension between the men was real and certainly made Swystun's decision to leave the organized community easier, although it was by no means a primary factor. [251] Robertson was much more

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[249] "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC.

[250] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 13 May 1945, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 1, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 17 May 1945, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 1, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 28 February 1945, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 1, LAC.

[251] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 28 February 1945, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00134 pt. 3, LAC; "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-

concerned about Swystun's departure from community life. Describing him as the Ukrainian Canadian equivalent of John Lewis – a significant honour to be sure – he considered Swystun to be the most influential leader ever produced by the community "for good or evil." His absence from the congress and retreat from the organized community was a problem, and Robertson instructed the RCMP to increase their surveillance of the event tenfold.[252]

Nervous apprehension lingered in the days leading up to the congress. While they did not show it publicly, the cancellation of the UWL, strong opposition from Swystun, and generalized tensions with the government comingled to plant significant doubt in the minds of the executive committee that they would successfully execute the congress. According to an RCMP informant, this anxiety went largely undetected by rank-and-file delegates who claimed they were attending the congress "to demonstrate that the communists, Swystun, and other opponents…have all been wrong."[253] In fact, the formal proceedings of the congress were rather uneventful. By and large, speakers were competent self-censors who couched their more provocative opinions in careful ways.

The informal aspects of the congress proved much more problematic. In a surprise to all, it was Kirkconnell who most blatantly disregarded the carefully set rules by unleashing a vicious takedown of communism and its adherents during the congress' evening banquet. What exactly provoked Kirkconnell is not clear, but it may have been a poorly articulated apology to the nationalists for his piece in *Saturday Night*. He stood by what he said in the article, but he had recently learned that the CLAT had quoted him out of context and he was now suspicious of the

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00199, LAC; "Ukrainian Canadian Association," 13 May 1945, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request AH-1999/00132 pt. 1, LAC.

[252] "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC; Henry to Arsenych, 14 June 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 1896, file 165, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress," 29 June 1943, RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC.

[253] "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC.

group. It might also have been a result of his personal disgust towards the government for mismanaging the Nationalities Branch and the groups it was meant to help. For Kirkconnell, it was maddeningly difficult to reconcile the government's simultaneous dismissal and policing of the UCC. He would no longer stand by idly and watch the normalization of communism.[254]

Figure 2.2



Caricature of the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress. "Caricatured at Ukrainian Convention," June 25, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[254] "In Defence of New Canadians," 22 June 1943, RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC; "Communists Slander Loyal Ukrainians, Congress Told," June 23, 1943, *Vancouver Daily Province*; "Communists Flayed at Ukrainian Parley," June 23, 1943, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Kirkconnell Hits Canadian Communists," June 23, 1943, *The Globe and Mail*; "Charges Reds Are Slandering New Canadians," June 23, 1943, *The Evening Telegram;* "Claims Loyal New Canadians Slandered," June 23, 1943, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Professor Takes Part in Ukrainian Dispute," June 23, 1943, *Regina Leader Post;* "Totalitarianism Draws Fire of Ukrainians," June 25, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Ukrainians to Place Canada's Interests First," June 25, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Kirkconnell elicited big applause from the audience, but his remarks seriously irked Simpson. In the days following the congress, Simpson repeatedly expressed the humiliation caused by his colleague. Simpson knew Kirkconnell to be a careful political operator who was normally much better behaved, which made it all the more difficult to shake his personal acrimony towards him. Swystun also had some choice words for Kirkconnell, who had recently ended their friendship over the former's resignation from the UCC and the UNF. Kirkconnell had accused Swystun of undermining the community's work, but, ironically, he had now done so much worse.[255] His thirty-five-page speech was printed verbatim in community newspapers and was eventually released as a standalone booklet by the UNF. Simpson feared that it would be used by the AUUC to hammer the point that the nationalists were pro-fascist and the Branch Boys were their apologists. Worse yet, he worried the speech would also almost assuredly eliminate the last shreds of goodwill from the government.[256]

Delegates were also abuzz over a UNF member who repeatedly took to the microphone to call the Soviets the "enemy hand." Simpson tried to silence him, but Hlynka, who a few years prior had weathered his own public-speaking scandal, came to his defence. The term "enemy hand" was a figure of speech, he claimed, and was most appropriate when referring to the Soviets. Plus, Canadian communists had grown insolent due to the encouragement of the government. If this was the new normal, why should the community remain discreet in their protestations? As usual, Hlynka was barely measured in his politicking; it was unwise of him to speak out of turn. Yet he was right that the communists had grown emboldened. AUUC members spent the entirety of the weekend distributing an anti-congress handbill around town,

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[255] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 22 July 1976, WK, box 44, file 41, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Swystun, 26 July 1976, WK, box 44, file 41, ECWA.

[256] "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC; Kordan and Luciuk, *A Delicate and Difficult Question,* 101.

calling for the expulsion of the UNF and the UHO from the UCC. The handbill held out an illusory olive branch; the AUUC expressed their willingness to amalgamate with the UCC if they expelled these two groups from their ranks. The communists also held a rally at the same time as congress that was attended by several Soviet officials. Their presence was a strong statement from Moscow that they were not only aware, but also dissatisfied, that the congress was proceeding.[257]

Figure 2.3



Kirkconnell speaking at the Third Ukrainian Canadian Congress. Source: Watson Kirkconnell Collection, Ester Clark Wright Archives.

[257] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress," 29 June 1943, RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC; "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC

It was not just the Soviets who watched the congress unfold; both American and British intelligence reported on it too. Each drew similar conclusions that the congress was a manifestation of an alarming revival of nationalist thought in North America. For the British in particular, Philipps' "strange position" in stoking these nationalist flames were troubling. Their report noted this this was getting him into trouble with his fellow bureaucrats and that the DEA "would be very pleased if [Philipps] would go home. But for some reason which remains unexplained," the report continued, "they have been able to do nothing about him."[258] Unbeknownst to all, the DEA would soon get its chance.

The Kolessa Affair

In late 1942, Philipps once again became the subject of scandal. Rumours that he had mistreated his wife, Austrian-born Ukrainian Lubka Kolessa, began to spread in Ottawa's political circles. Philipps met Kolessa on the Orient Express in 1936 when he was working as the Commissioner for Relief for South Russia. She struck up a conversation after noticing that he was reading a Ukrainian book. A complicated and perhaps confused person, Kolessa bragged about her close association with members of the Nazi Party while simultaneously confiding in Philipps that she was married to a German Jew. In perhaps her only acknowledgement of her cognitive dissonance and highly inconsistent life choices, Kolessa revealed that she was receiving increasingly hostile warnings about *Rassenshande* (racial shame), which had become part of Nazi Germany's official racial policy after the implementation of the Nuremburg Laws of 1935. Not only was she losing work, but her and her husband's lives were increasingly at risk.[259]

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[258] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 149-150.

[259] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part I," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "Notes in Order to Complete the Background Picture," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA. Kirkconnell kept a detailed record of his investigation into Kolessa, which appear in his archive as a series of files labelled "Strictly Private and Confidential." These files include intelligence reports, private letters, notes on in-person meetings and conversations, newspaper clippings, photographs, and scraps of paper with his thoughts and ideas.

After talking the whole train ride, Philipps discovered that Kolessa was deeply knowledgeable about the world of far-right German-Ukrainian life. She had moved in the upper echelons of Ukrainian, Austrian, and German society as the daughter of Oleksander Kolessa, an intellectual and member of the Austrian Parliament, and a popular pianist in her own right. Indeed, she was well acquainted with just the type of people Philipps was interested in knowing. Kolessa was an inexhaustible mine of valuable information, and the young diplomat was highly intrigued.[260]

The two kept in close touch (rumour has it that they began a torrid love affair) as Philipps moved through Europe conducting his intelligence work. Then, in March 1939, the Germans surrounded Prague as part of their occupation of Czechoslovakia. Terrified of her noted record of *Rassenschande,* but unable to leave Prague because she had a German passport, Kolessa begged Philipps to marry her so she could flee. Philipps was sympathetic; he knew Kolessa's fate should she remain in Prague. This same courtesy was not extended to her Jewish husband. Selfishly, he also recognized her potential utility in advancing his professional career. And so, in the cover of night, in an unfurnished basement of a suburban building outside of Prague, Philipps and Kolessa were married. The next day, he used his diplomatic connections to rush a British passport for his new bride. As they watched terror-stricken crowds surround the British consulate in a last-ditch effort to leave Prague, they boarded the final train to London. Kolessa was safe.[261]

While the conditions of their passport marriage were clear to both, Philipps felt an affinity for Kolessa. He even declared the marriage as legitimate before his family and friends and formally announced it in *The Times.*[262] But the façade faded as Philipps realized that

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[260] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part 1," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[261] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part 1," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "Strictly Confidential," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[262] "Marriages," July 1, 1939, *The Times.*

Kolessa's pro-German sentiments reached far beyond an expression of a generalized Teutonophilia as he had once perhaps believed. Rather, her brand of German-ness was sympathetic to, if not approving of, the Nazi regime. Within a few months of arriving in London, she had visited the German attaché on multiple occasions and was associating with known Nazis in public. Philipps' suspicions of his wife become undeniable following the birth of their first son, Igor, in 1939, when she insisted that only German doctors attend the boy. Philipps questioned Igor's paternity for the rest of his life and, in later years, had little to do with him.[263]

Philipps' trust in Kolessa further deteriorated when he learned that the suggestion of a passport marriage had come from her Nazi friends in Berlin. This raised doubts in his mind as to whether their encounter on the train to London had been a coincidence at all, if there had ever been a viable threat to her life, and if she had even had a Jewish husband. When confronted by Philipps, Kolessa made no attempt to renounce her Nazi associations or to adopt to an English way of life. In discussing the matter with his mother, who had herself been involved in several physical altercations with her daughter-in-law, he diagnosed Kolessa as suffering from a German inferiority complex, a Nazi mentality, and perhaps even nymphomania (a condition he claimed afflicted most musicians!). Regardless, her ongoing behaviour was intolerable - "even by Nazi standards." It dawned on him, admittedly much too late, that there was more to Kolessa than met the eye. He wanted a divorce, but Kolessa refused to give him one.[264]

Given his troubles at home, Philipps was relieved when he was assigned to gather intelligence in Eastern Europe for six months beginning in May 1940. The mission was cancelled, but he happily accepted the next offer that came his way: a trip to Canada to conduct

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[263] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part II," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Caccia, *Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime,* 71.

[264] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part II," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "Some Motives and Some Means," 18 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

the tours for which he would eventually become known. Philipps and Kolessa agreed that she would accompany him to Canada. In Philipps' mind, he simply could not risk leaving her in Europe where her ongoing shenanigans might cause more trouble for his family's standing or his career. There was another, much more substantial reason too: Kolessa had agreed to a divorce after two months if Philipps brought her along.

Upon their arrival in Canada, Philipps made living arrangements for Kolessa and Igor at the Roxborough Apartments in Ottawa. Given the tensions in their marriage, and the fact that he had left her with the entirety of his two-hundred-dollar stipend, Philipps apparently did not find it curious nor strange when Kolessa failed to contact him for the entirety of his trip. When he returned, though, he received a peculiar note from Senator Cairine Wilson warning him that Kolessa was going around town alleging that he had left her and Igor destitute in an unfamiliar country. On several occasions, Wilson had also witnessed her accepting cash and used clothing from various organizations and church groups around town. Brushing it off as a misunderstanding, feminine weakness, or maybe even a desperate cry for attention, Philipps said nothing to his wife about Wilson's note.[265]

Despite their many problems, Philipps enthusiastically supported Kolessa's efforts to become self-sufficient as they inched closer to divorce. He worked his contacts in government to secure her a well-paying job playing the piano on air for the CBC and a performance with the Toronto Symphony. He also introduced her to Adine and Antonio Tremblay who ran the famous Tremblay Concerts in Ottawa. After hearing her play, they offered her an opportunity to perform on a recurrent basis. Kolessa was well placed for success, but Philipps continued to support her and little Igor regardless. When he began his work for the RCMP in May 1941, he left them their

[265] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part II," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

paid-for apartment, a maid, and a taxi service. He also consigned a third of his salary to her each month. Once again, he heard nothing from her while he was away. This time, upon returning home, he found that Kolessa and Igor were gone. Considering himself lucky to be free of the grief his wife and child of questionable paternity were causing him, Philipps did not inquire as to her and Igor's whereabouts.

But Kolessa was now back with a ferocious vengeance. Philipps learned that she had absconded to *Les Soeurs de l'Institut Jeanne d'Arc* (Sisters of the Joan of Arc Institute), a convent that she had frequented during Philipps' first business trip. She had also hired a lawyer and initiated legal action against Philipps for desertion and willful neglect. This was facilitated with help from her new, highly placed friends that she had met through the Tremblay family. Of particular help was Princess Alice, the viceregal consort of Canada, grandchild of Queen Victoria, and wife to Governor General Alexander Cambridge, 1st Early of Athlone. When the princess had learned of Kolessa's plight, she was moved to invite her to stay as her guest at Rideau Hall. The princess then assisted her in filing an official complaint against Philipps with the British High Commissioner.[266] For an aristocratically minded servant of the British Empire like Philipps, bringing the shameful ire of the royal family was among the worst of any possible outcomes imaginable.

Kolessa's new connections in high society ensured that wherever Philipps went his marred reputation followed. Whispers of her supposedly malnourished frame filled the restaurant of the Chateau Laurier as he ate. Tenants at the Roxborough Apartments nervously passed him in the halls because they had heard he had kicked Kolessa out over Igor's crying. Women at bridge parties hissed at him, and navy officers turned their backs. In turn, many of his contacts stopped

[266] "Strictly Private and Confidential: Part II," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

taking his calls. "Her calumny has penetrated every drawing room in Ottawa," he anxiously grumbled to Kirkconnell.[267]

The story was damaging enough as is in Ottawa, but it soon appeared in *Narodna volya (People's Will),* the newspaper of the American Ukrainian Workingmen's Association (AUWA). Founded in 1918 in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the AUWA was the successor of the Ukrainian Fraternal Association. Historically progressive and democratically oriented, the association was highly influenced by the politics of Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Drahomanov. For many years, as a pro-socialist – but not pro-communist – outfit, it played a key role in quelling the influence of militant Reds amongst Ukrainian Americans. In more recent years, however, the newspaper had turned pro-Soviet, joining the same milieu as *The Hour* and becoming slavishly adherent to the Comintern line.[268]

Kolessa's allegations, or at least the fact that they had become so public, devastated Philipps. "Any man used to public life takes it as a part of the job that his motives should be misrepresented by an opposition," he wrote to Davis, "[but] what is intolerable is…these attempts to destroy one's ability to serve one's country in its hour of need." While Philipps admitted that his marriage had been by and large loveless, accusations that he had abandoned or profoundly mistreated Kolessa were verifiably false.[269] Nursing an enduring fever and feeling as

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[267] The Kolessa Case," September 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "How an Actress Thumbs a Ride," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 26 February 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA; "Yours of the 3rd, burnt," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA; "P.T.O.," 6 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 9 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[268] During the Cold War, the newspaper's editor, Albert Kahn, was forced to testify before the Committee on Un-American Activities where its broader connections to the communist movement were exposed. The pro-Soviet turn precipitated a well-documented split within the UWA, which had reverberations in Canada. "By the Way," May 20, 1943, *Ukrainsky Holos;* Myron Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991): 220-229; Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* footnote 74.

[269] Philipps' personal records contain documents and receipts to back up his claims that he had adequately supported Kolessa. "The Kolessa Case," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "Strictly Confidential," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "Private and Confidential – Not for Circulation," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "Summary of Situation," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "Proofs that Mrs. Philipps (Lubka Kolessa) has been in receipt of ample funds," WK, box 49, file 5,

though he was suffering from a complete breakdown, he implored Davis to intervene on his behalf.[270] Davis was somewhat sympathetic, but not enough to feel that it was appropriate to get involved. Rather, he suggested that Philipps might consider leaving Canada for the greener pastures of Europe (an odd proposition in the middle of war). If this did not suit him, he counselled Philipps to connect with the RCMP to see whether anything could be done to quiet Kolessa. Given her fascist proclivities, perhaps she could be interned or, better yet, deported? [271]

In a meeting with RCMP officials, which was attended by the rest of the Branch Boys, Philipps detailed his ex-wife's penchant for fascism. Amongst the most interesting things that he revealed was that Kolessa had performed a private piano recital for Hitler![272] Despite this starting revelation, little was done to follow up or assess the fascist pianist. The RCMP claimed that the DEA was blocking every attempt to pursue the matter further. It may have also been the result of the RCMP's own disinterest in policing domestic fascism.[273] Saturated in existential dread and a continual hopelessness, Philipps delivered his resignation to Davis and began to pull away from governmental work.[274] Davis did not object; he was already in the process of discussing disbanding the Nationalities Branch with both Glazebrook and Robertson. Not recognizing – or at least not admitting to – their own role in the branch's ongoing difficulties, the

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ECWA; "Circumstances showing that the Prague formality of mid-March 1939 was a passport marriage," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 26 February 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Henshaw, 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "Summary of March 2nd 1944," 4 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA; "Strictly Confidential," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA; "Children's Aid Society Ottawa," 9 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 9 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[270] Philipps to Davis, 20 November 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[271] Davis to Philipps, 4 December 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[272] "Confirmation of Record: Secret," WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; "Re: Visa to travel in U.S. to perform," 27 June 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[273] "Yours of the 3rd, burnt," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[274] Davis to Philipps, 4 December 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

men complained about its lack of consistent policy and lenient meeting schedule. All agreed that the branch should be replaced with Grierson's version of an interdepartmental committee headed up by the WIB.[275]

In a twist of fate, Davis was appointed as the High Commissioner of Australia and left Canada without ever formally submitting Philipps' resignation. He did, however, manage to brief his replacement, Major General Léo Richer LaFlèche, on the debacle. LaFlèche admittedly did not know what to make of Philipps, but he refused to formalize his dismissal until he investigated the situation himself. He assigned this task to his deputy minister, Chester Payne. Philipps was informed of Payne's investigation and was ordered to stop all travel and remain in Ottawa, cease contact with foreign-language groups, and submit any outstanding work for executive approval. While he was admittedly relieved to not yet be fired, Philipps could not help but complain about the slow pace at which the probe was moving. He clearly did not realize that this was perhaps all that was keeping him employed.[276]

Payne's investigation did little to clarify the situation for LaFlèche. Like almost everyone else in Ottawa, he strongly disliked Philipps from day one and refused to tolerate his unconventional methods. In fact, he had even pre-emptively barred Philipps from his office and forbade him from taking any meetings with high-level officials. LaFlèche's avoidance of Philipps was so intense that Philipps complained in a letter to Simpson that the "master had not yet learned my name." At the same time, however, LaFlèche did not trust Grierson and certainly did not want anyone outside of the Nationalities Branch to dictate its policy. The problems within the branch were significant, but he was committed to fighting what he saw as a clear

[275] Philipps to Simpson, 17 October 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

[276] LaFlèche to Robertson, 27 February 1943, DEA, RG25 G1, vol. 2977, file 3426-40, LAC; Buchanan to Grierson, 4 June 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol, 1, file 33, LAC; Philipps to Simpson, 17 October 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

power grab by Grierson. For this difficult task he would need everyone rowing in the same direction, Philipps included.[277]

The Curious Case of Ladislaus Biberovich

The severe restrictions placed on Philipps gave him a lot of time to think about Kolessa. In particular, he was fixated on how the intricacies of his personal life had made their way into a left-wing Ukrainian American newspaper. Could the leak have originated from within the community? Philipps may have been barred from continuing a professional relationship with the nationalists, but his personal friendships remained intact. Hence, he turned to Swystun for help.[278] Swystun promptly confirmed Philipps' suspicions; the source of information was, in fact, a Ukrainian. His name was Ladislaus Biberovich.[279] The son of Ukrainian and Armenian stage actors, he had migrated to Canada in the 1920s and now worked in the Press Censorship Department of the DNWS. Philipps instantly recognized the name. Not only had they worked together in the past, but he happened to be the very person to whom Kolessa had fled when she first left him. It is of little wonder, then, that the men did not get along.[280]

Swystun dropped another bombshell: he believed that Biberovich's leak to *Narodna volya* was not personal, but rather political. According to Swystun, Biberovich had been turned. Once an ardent nationalist, he had, in recent years, allegedly become pro-Soviet and was hellbent on undermining the UCC and its allies in government.[281] As the Canadian correspondent for

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[277] Philipps to Simpson, 1 October 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

[278] "Some Motives and Some Means," 18 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[279] Swystun to Philipps, 29 December 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[280] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 21.

[281] Biberovich's information sharing with American communists was recorded by the Venona Project, an American counterintelligence program that decrypted messages transmitted by intelligence agencies in the USSR. Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, *The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2001), 418.

Narodna volya, he was responsible for dozens of disparaging articles on the nationalists and the Branch Boys.[282] Swystun was aware of Biberovich's betrayal because, until very recently, much of his information had come from a former executive member of the UCC, M. L. Mandryka. The rest of the executive had always been suspicious of Mandryka because of his close personal ties to various AUUC leaders, and they set a trap to see if he was sharing information with them. Much to their surprise, they discovered that the only person with whom he was sharing information with was Biberovich, whom they believed was a nationalist. Biberovich's close ties to *Narodna volya* were then discovered and Mandryka was expelled from the committee.[283] While the UCC executive had not thought to share this information with the Branch Boys, they had written to Sydney Roe, the Examiner of Publications. But the letter was never acknowledged, most likely because of Roe's personal friendship with Biberovich.[284]

Philipps was stunned. Sensitive to ill feelings towards him in Ottawa, he knew he would have to be methodical in building his case against Biberovich before bringing it to the attention of his superiors. For this difficult task he recruited Kirkconnell who still enjoyed the ear and respect of top bureaucrats and state officials.[285] Kirkconnell did not hesitate to accept Philipps' pleas for help. The men had grown close through their work for the DNWS. Plus, Kirkconnell's potent brand of anti-communism had generated a strong desire to intervene in what he felt was

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[282] "From Our Own Correspondents in Canada," 23 July 1942, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; "Confidential: Canadian Postal Censorship," 11 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; "News from Canada," November 5, 1942, *Narodna Volya.*

[283] "The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress," RCMP, RG146, vol. 37, access request 94-A-00199, LAC.

[284] Swystun to Philipps, 29 December 1941, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Arsenych to Biberovich, 20 March 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Arsenych to Biberovich, 18 April 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Arsenych to Robertson, 20 January 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 24 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[285] Philipps to Kirkconnell, 24 May 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA.

"one of the biggest and slickest inside jobs in the whole leftist campaign."[286] Kirkconnell seconded a cautionary approach as he knew that Biberovich had friends in nearly every branch of the government.[287]

He first wanted to vet Swystun because, since their fall out, he no longer trusted him to tell the truth. Kirkconnell's contact in the RCMP, Frederick Mead, soon confirmed that Biberovich was, in fact, an informant for *Narodna volya.* There was also a good chance that Biberovich had developed communist sympathies, but this was still being investigated by the force.[288] Mead requested that Biberovich's immediate supervisor, A. W. Merriam, subtly question him on his political ties.[289] Merriam eventually confirmed that Biberovich was working with the newspaper and that he was the author of the articles. He explained that Biberovich made no apologies for this and insisted that he was not a communist; he was a nationalist who had simply grown disillusioned with the UCC's incompetence. As for the personal attacks on Philipps, Biberovich was similarly unrepentant, suggesting that Philipps' accusations were a result of his bitterness over the collapse of his marriage. Describing Philipps as a pathological liar and a "typical soldier of fortune, with a rather shady past," he warned that he would surely create "much additional troubles and confusion owing to his unbalanced mind." Playing into the government's longstanding trepidations over Philipps, he questioned whether a man occupying a position in government should be allowed to launch such a police hunt against a fellow civil

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[286] Kirkconnell to Wood, 28 June 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA.

[287] Kirkconnell to Clay, 7 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 7 December 1942, WK, box 48, file 27, ECWA.

[288] "Confirmation of Record – Secret," 27 June 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Mead, 28 July 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Black to Kirkconnell, 10 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; "Confidential: Canadian Postal Censorship," 11 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; "Confidential: Canadian Postal Censorship," 21 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Philipps to Joliffe, 28 October 1942, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[289] "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

servant.[290] Merriam told Mead that these answers satisfied him and that he did not plan to discipline his employee.

Mead and Kirkconnell were not as assured. They wrote to Wilfrid Eggleston, Chief Censor of the WIB, to warn him of the "obvious red herring across the trail."[291] Much like Merriam, Eggleston was unconvinced of the charges; he had always known Biberovich to be a nationalist and a conservative. In fact, he had recently assisted the WIB in banning several communist publications without sounding any alarm bells. Besides, Biberovich had a number of conservative colleagues with "good noses for communism," none of whom had ever expressed concern over their colleague. If Mead and Kirkconnell had concrete proof, they would be "showing up cruelly a bunch of fairly bright people who have been in almost daily contact with him."

Biberovich's contributions to *Narodna volya* were admitted odd – Eggleston could not explain them – but he refused to let this influence his opinion overall. His support for Biberovich ran so deep that he even planned to appoint him as the Chief Advisor on New Canadians and the Foreign Language Press for the WIB. Kirkconnell urged him to rethink this decision not just because it would reward Biberovich for his destructive ways, but also because it was simply bad politicking. While it would be virtually impossible to find anyone *persona grata* to both left-and-right-wing Ukrainians, "if you try to cater to the former, you will certainly curdle the latter, and the former will be quite ready to rat on you if the directives change." Eggleston did not respond.[292]

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[290] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 35.

[291] Kirkconnell to Eggleston, 24 February 1943, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA.

[292] Kirkconnell to Philipps, 15 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Arsenych, 16 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 35.

"Plus On Remire La Merde, Plus Ça Pire"

Kirkconnell could not shake this interaction with Eggleston. Why would government officials take Biberovich at his word? Even if he was not a communist as Swystun had alleged, how could his superiors overlook a federal employee leaking information to a communist newspaper? In part, this can be explained by Philipps' ongoing unpopularity; no one besides the Branch Boys and select members of the RCMP were inclined to support him. It may also have also stemmed from the continuing need for restraint when dealing with matters pertaining to communism. If Biberovich was a communist, government officials could not relieve him from his duties for this reason alone. This situation was emblematic of the larger reality in which the Branch Boys now found themselves. No longer subscribing to the ideology *du jour*, they were growing increasingly isolated and, in turn, frustrated.

Yet the more Kirkconnell agonized about Biberovich's hold over their shared colleagues, the more he began to wonder if the parameters of his investigation were misguided. Kirkconnell could not believe that any serious government official, regardless of their own predilections, would so brazenly dismiss the clear-cut evidence he presented. There had to be more to the story. Writing to Eggleston again, he apologized for jumping to unwarranted conclusions and admitted that his comments were motivated by sheer exhaustion. The Nationalities Branch was weathering a constant storm and he could not help but to feel on edge. Kirkconnell promised to look into the matter further and through a more objective lens.[293]

The paper trail as Kirkconnell reinvestigated Biberovich is spotty. What is clear is that he quickly discovered that Biberovich's shifty record extended far beyond this particular incident, adding credence to the theory that this was not politically motivated. Between 1925 and 1927,

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[293] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 35.

Biberovich had been employed by the Canadian National Railway in Winnipeg as a special representative of the Department of Immigration and Colonization.[294] Here, he became involved in a scheme smuggling migrants into the United States. His partner in crime, Manual Mihaychuk, did the actual smuggling, so when they were eventually caught only Mihaychuk ended up in prison. While Mihaychuk was incarcerated, Biberovich poured salt on the wound and slept with his wife. Not confident in ruining only one life, he impregnated her, abandoning both mother and child shortly after.[295] But Biberovich's eventual dismissal from the CNR was unrelated to his criminal activity or his private conduct. Rather, in 1927, he embarrassed the company after he was denied entry into Poland during a business trip on the grounds of his Ukrainian nationalist activism.[296]

Luckily, Biberovich soon met Eugenia Jasanchuk, a "private nurse," whom he married in 1930. Jasanchuk had a reputation in Winnipeg as being "given to illegal operations" and was "locally notorious as a helper of girls in trouble." She supported him as he searched for his next career, first as a steamship agent and then as a German-language teacher.[297] Biberovich was soon on to his next scheme, this time as a producer of Ukrainian Hollywood films. With his parents' background in the theatre, he fit in quickly and found work with the Avramenko Film Company, which was led by namesake Vasyl Avramenko, an actor and dancer credited with the spread of

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[294] For more on Biberovich's work with the Canadian National Railway see Myron Gulka-Tiechko, "Ukrainian Immigration to Canada Under the Railways Agreement, 1925-1930," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 16, no. 1-2 (1991): 29-59.

[295] Mead to Kirkconnell, 10 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA.

[296] Kirkconnell to Podoski, 12 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Podoski to Kirkconnell, 17 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[297] "Secret," 24 May 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Mead, 12 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Mead to Kirkconnell, 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Secret," 24 May 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA.

Ukrainian folk dance across the world.[298] Biberovich was tasked with raising money for the company's next film, *Cossacks in Exile.* Interestingly, he spent a significant amount of time wooing the same Makohin who had financed the Ukrainian Bureau and was a close associate of both Kaye and Philipps. Makohin made no secret of his dislike of Biberovich and refused to support the film so long as he was involved.[299] Biberovich would evidently not forget the slight, explaining the vicious accusations against Makohin in *Narodna volya.*[300] Biberovich's career in Hollywood was cut short after he was caught embezzling one hundred thousand dollars from Avramenko.[301] He did this with an accomplice, Michael Gann, a Russian Jew who ran an entertainment agency back in Winnipeg.[302] The men became so close that Gann began an affair with Jasanchuk, which produced a daughter. This did not seem to bother Biberovich, and the three raised the girl together. "*Plus on remire la merde, plus ça pire,"* Kirkconnell responded to the revelations.[303]

Needing a new career yet again, Biberovich turned to a contact he had made during his time with the film company: Joseph Thorson. Thorson had attended several fundraising events for Avramenko and had even served as his solicitor. This put him in close contact with

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[298] For more on Avramenko see Orest Martynowych, *The Showman and the Ukrainian Cause: Folk Dance, Film, and the Life of Vasile Avramenko* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014).

[299] "Some Motives and Some Means," 18 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[300] "Mr. Philipps Goes to Washington," September 26, 1942, *The Hour*.

[301] Martynowych makes no mention of Biberovich and Gann's activities. Rather, he points to Avramenko's own personal immorality as the reason for his professional demise. "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Notes," 16 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "In the Matter of Paul Gegeychuk," 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

[302] Martynowych, *The Showman and the Ukrainian Cause*, 80.

[303] Translation: The more we stir the shit, the worse it gets. "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Notes," 16 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

Biberovich, and the two evidently kept in touch.[304] By the time Biberovich came looking for work, Thorson was well established in Ottawa, serving as the chairman of the Select Committee on War Expenditures before being appointed as the head of the DNWS.[305] When Biberovich inquired about a job in Ottawa, then, Thorson had little trouble finding a place for him in the Press Censorship Department. Bidding Gann adieu, Biberovich, Jasanchuk, and their daughter left for Ottawa.

The more Kirkconnell learned, the stranger and more scintillating the story of Biberovich became. To secure his job, he received a glowing letter of reference from none other than Ernest Lapointe, the leading Liberal cabinet minister from Quebec. A devout Catholic, Lapointe had been convinced to write on Biberovich's behalf by Father Josaphat Jean, a Ukrainian Catholic priest. According to Kirkconnell's sources, Father Jean had been urged on by Father Basil Gegeychuk, a close friend of Biberovich's and a co-conspirator in his migrant smuggling scheme. He was, in fact, the very accomplice who had taken the Biberovich family in upon their arrival in Ottawa.[306] Gegeychuk himself was no stranger to scandal; his career as a priest in Sudbury had ended after he was caught consorting with several young girls. In an interview with the RCMP, his brother Paul, also a priest, described him as a "queer kind of priest" and a bad seed. "Like Rasputin," he told the officer, "his trouble all along seems to have been mania for money and for sex."[307] Gegeychuk clearly felt at home with the quirky couple. Not only did he

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[304] Orest Martynowych, *The Showman and the Ukrainian Cause*, 97-99.

[305] "Secret," 24 May 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA.

[306] "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA

[307] "Notes," 16 August 1942, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Luhovy, 12 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Credibility of an Important Witness," 21 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 24 February 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA; "In the Matter of Paul Gegeychuk," 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA; "Notes," WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

find it amusing to watch Biberovich "as a mari-complaisant…cuddling the Jew's cuckoo egg," but he felt that their passion for sex and money suited him well.

Kirkconnell now believed that Biberovich was nothing more than a common grifter, a conman, some brand of sexual deviant, and a crook who liked to "play politics and get cash." As one RCMP intelligence report noted, "most of the private business with which he has been connected developed financial embarrassments, and he often replaced associations who were either anonymously blackmailed…or otherwise discredited and removed out of his path of progress." In fact, Kirkconnell and Mead noticed that every single informant whom they approached about Biberovich either feared him or held him in contempt.[308]

This theory was all but confirmed when Kirkconnell spoke to R.O. Sweezey, president of the corruption-plagued Beauharnois Light, Heat, and Power Company. Years prior, he had somehow hired Biberovich as the editor in chief of his media conglomerate, *The National Press.*[309] "Sleazy Sweezey" had purchased several newspapers in western Canada as a way to influence public opinion in the aftermath of the Beauharnois Scandal.[310] In particular, he focused on newspapers that targeted ethnic communities, such as the Ukrainians, since they represented a large constituency in the parts of Canada where the company hoped to sway public opinion. Sweezey also believed that the newspapers might help him establish a good reputation in Ukraine where he hoped to one day expand his business interests. Based on his interactions with

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[308] "Secret," 24 May 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Credibility of an Important Witness," 21 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 24 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "In the Matter of Paul Gegeychuk," 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

[309] Kirkconnell to Sweezey, 17 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[310] In 1931-1932, Sweezey was accused of making campaign donations to the Liberal Party in exchange for permission to divert a part of the St. Lawrence in order to generate hydroelectricity. For more on the scandal see T.D. Regehr, *The Beauharnois Scandal: A Story of Canadian Entrepreneurship and Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

Biberovich, Sweezey was confident that he was not a communist, but rather a staunch conservative. As for why he may have written for a communist newspaper, Sweezey believed that Biberovich had a hard time making money and was compelled to "take on distasteful jobs" to support himself and his family.[311] During his time with *The National Press,* he had never been above adjusting his opinion, even if it meant crossing moral and ethical lines, so long as he got paid.[312] "Similar sentiments had motivated Judas," quipped Philipps, "and he had to hang himself."[313]

For Kirkconnell, one crucial detail was missing. How had Biberovich and Kolessa met? It was entirely possible that the two had been acquainted while still in Europe. Yet it was just as likely that they had first met in Canada. It was no coincidence that Gegeychuk, Biberovich, and Kolessa were all affiliated with *Les Soeurs de l'Institut Jeanne d'Arc.* This was the convent where Senator Wilson had first spotted Kolessa, but it was also where Gegeychuk housed his young victims when they visited him in Ottawa. Regardless of their origin story, their common interests and common enemies soon converged, and their plot commenced.

Kirkconnell concluded that Biberovich may have been helping the Soviets, but this was a means to an end and not an ideological statement. In reality, his politics were much more closely aligned with Kolessa's. By teaming up with her, he hoped to render Philipps' work for the Nationalities Branch impossible so that he could become the government's new expert on foreign-language groups.[314] For Kolessa, Philipps' demise would soothe her extreme animosity

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[311] Sweezey to Kirkconnell, 8 September 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[312] Swystun to Kirkconnell, 17 September 1943, WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA.

[313] Philipps to Kirkconnell, 24 May 1943, WK, box 49 file 3, ECWA.

[314] "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Some Motives and Some Means," 18 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 23 September 1943, WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA; "In the Matter of Paul Gegeychuk," 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

towards her ex-husband, keep any potential cover as a Nazi agent intact, and propel her into a carefree life of indulgence and leisure.[315]

Even after learning about the intricacies of Biberovich's life, Kirkconnell could not shake his personal repugnance towards him. He was demonizing the UCC and the nationalist cause more generally, hindering the efforts of the Nationalities Branch, and irreparably damaging the reputation of the Branch Boys. Kirkconnell had always been prepared to fight against communism, but what he had not predicted was a wolf in sheep's clothing who would wreak more havoc than a Soviet plant perhaps ever could. Besides, was Biberovich's motive even relevant if the outcome of his actions still helped the Reds?

The whole endeavour only further convinced the Branch Boys of the need for their work. Proving that the veneer of Anglo paternalism remained intact, they argued that the actions of Biberovich, and Eastern Europeans more generally, premised on the Arthashastra proverb: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The schemes of such "foreigners" could only be handled by specialists such as themselves who had knowledge of central European case histories and conditions. Untrained Anglo-Saxons simply had no idea what the likes of Biberovich and Kolessa were capable of. These were "sordid intrigues of the worst class of East Slavic peasant-come-to-town" whose exploiter was not the capitalist or the landlord, but rather "that class that has lost the solid peasant virtues and not yet got any intellectual honesty from a veneer of higher education."[316]

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[315] "Strictly Confidential," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[316] "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Strictly Confidential," 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

"The Public Kiss of Judas and the Private Betrayal of Delilah"

Kirkconnell carefully updated his case against Biberovich. Even with the new evidence, however, the matter was dismissed as a manifestation of Philipps' personal spite.[317] Robertson was particularly hostile, reporting that he had recently met with Kolessa and wholeheartedly believed the story she had spun.[318] LaFlèche and Payne expressed similar sentiments, revealing to Kirkconnell that they too had met with Biberovich and Kolessa and were confident in their sincerity.[319] Government officials were clearly invested in Biberovich and did not want to burn the bureaucrats who had defended him. There may well have been more complicated conspiracies afoot, but ousting Biberovich, even if only because he was a swindler, would cause a minor scandal and distract from the vitally important work of managing the war.[320] Robertson may have also seen an opportunity to rid himself of Philipps and was willing to do whatever it took – including buying into Biberovich's obvious and rather dangerous lies – to accomplish this goal. Just as likely was that the tide was turning against Biberovich, but with the Soviets watching closely he could not be removed from his job on the grounds that he wrote for a left-wing newspaper, even if this was not the full story.[321]

Regardless of the actual reason, the widespread support for Biberovich was starting to feel as much insurmountable as it was baffling. The weight of the situation increased even more after Philipps secretly raided LaFlèche's office and discovered the plans drafted by Davis, Glazebrook, and Robertson to disband the Nationalities Branch and turn over control to

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[317] Kirkconnell to Philipps, 15 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[318] Kirkconnell to Robertson, 20 January 1943, WK, box 49, file 1, ECWA; Kirkconnell to MacCallum, 18 February 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 9 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[319] Kirkconnell to Philipps, 9 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

[320] "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[321] Kirkconnell to Swystun, 27 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

Grierson.[322] Philipps was not aware that LaFlèche had quashed these plans and so the discovery was a serious confidence killer. Having lived through a year of constant exasperation as his work was scrutinized and slowly suffocated, he slipped into what can only be described as a deep depression. Questioning the point of it all, he wrote to Simpson that his "confidence had faded on the stalk" and that he doubted "whether Pharaoh has any intention of letting the people go." Falling deeper and deeper into despair, his anger towards the government began to uncontrollably flow in his letters to the Branch Boys. Above all, he questioned why the government had established the Nationalities Branch and the UCC if it was not prepared to bolster either. This was a betrayal and, more troublingly, a symptom of a bureaucracy susceptible to Soviet influence. "Packs of harriers appear to enjoy more consideration from the government," he scoffed. Beyond the havoc it was wreaking on his personal life, this would assuredly cause an outflow of Ukrainian votes from the Liberal Party. It would also precipitate the permanent disillusionment of Ukrainians towards the government for years to come.

The ongoing filibustering proved too much for several of the Branch Boys. Kaye developed ulcers so significant he temporarily resigned from his work. He was soon followed by Simpson who had already left the Nationalities Branch and was now resigning from the CCCC too, ending his career in the civil service for good.[323] With less oversight than ever before, Biberovich was free to add to his litany of misdeeds. In his new role, he became the government's principal examiner of foreign-language publications and was single-handedly responsible for assigning value to books and periodicals that came across his desk. This was not a simple academic exercise; he was tasked with issuing a monthly survey of the material to

[322] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 33.

[323] Philipps to Simpson, 17 September 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC; Philipps to Simpson, 1 October 1943, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC; Philipps to Simpson, n.d., TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC.

relevant government officials that would, in turn, inform their policies. While Biberovich never betrayed his nationalist politics in this role, he certainly used the surveys to criticize the organizations and individuals within the community that he did not care for. Perhaps even more worryingly given his proven experience in human trafficking, Biberovich had the responsibility of hiring the department's foreign-language readers, providing jobs to people who would subsequently be indebted to him.[324]

The hits only kept coming when Mead informed Kirkconnell that the RCMP was removing itself from the investigation into Biberovich. As a parting gift, he recommended that Kirkconnell ask his friends in the UCC to lodge an official complaint against Biberovich with the prime minister. Having a community group as opposed to an individual lead the charge might prevent the usual suspects from dismissing the accusations. Mead directed Kirkconnell to focus the UCC's complaint on Biberovich's unsuitability for his job – not his connections to *Narodna volya*. The UCC could then request that the RCMP investigate his long list of transgressions, at which point Mead would be ready to present his already-compiled dossier.[325]

Kirkconnell accepted that Mead needed to step back from the investigation, but he was curious as to the timing of it all. The RCMP had never been swayed by the political whims of the day and had long collaborated with the Branch Boys on matters related to communism. Then, through an anonymous source, Kirkconnell learned that John Leopold, the RCMP's leading expert on communism and long-time undercover agent, had a signed photograph of Kolessa in

[324] "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Notes," 16 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "The Curious Case of Mr. Armen," 19 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

[325] Mead to Kirkconnell, 10 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 12 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; Mead to Kirkconnell, 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA.

his apartment.[326] At face value, a signed photograph of a famous pianist was innocuous. But upon reflection, Leopold's display of the photograph seemed significant. Not only would a shared penchant for reactionary politics have drawn the two together, but so would have their mutual dislike of Philipps. This was a worrying prospect for Kirkconnell who recalled Leopold's chilly demeanour towards him during their lengthy discussions of Philipps and Kolessa.[327]

When confronted by Kirkconnell, Mead confirmed that Leopold was the reason why the force was off the case. Curiously, he revealed that Leopold sensed a "certain communist tendency" in Biberovich's writing, although he did not consider it prejudicial. He also did not feel that Philipps' personal grievances were of interest to the RCMP, so he demanded that Mead cease communication with Kirkconnell on all things related to the case.[328] For Philipps and Kirkconnell, it was difficult to assess how far Biberovich and Kolessa had "seduced the key-man into hanging the Beauty-in-Distress on his wall." What was clear was that Leopold saw Philipps as a "monster of promiscuous neglect of an ill-used innocent."[329] Given Leopold's infamy as an anti-communist, it is telling that his personal enmity towards Philipps outweighed his desire to reprimand Biberovich, an admitted communist collaborator (regardless of his motivation). Not even the knowledge that Biberovich was doing serious damage to the anti-communist cause in Canada was enough to convince Leopold that Biberovich – and not Philipps – was the problem.

Philipps' already short list of supporters shrunk even further after it dawned on Mead that Philipps had revealed confidential information from the investigation to Paul Gegeychuk in order

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[326] "Stranger Perusing by Open Door," WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

[327] Kirkconnell to Leopold, 2 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

[328] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 39.

[329] Philipps to Kirkconnell, 5 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 7, ECWA.

to prepare him for his interview with the RCMP.[330] Kirkconnell tried to convince Mead that Philipps' coaching of the priest was the act of a desperate man. But it was too late; Mead was no longer sympathetic. This is because he had been given access to Philipps' file by Leopold so that he could learn of his long list of historical misdeeds. This included demanding that the RCMP physically intimidate Davies on his behalf and lodging serious threats against Grierson following a fight over foreign-language broadcasts at the CBC.[331] "Mr. Philipps apparently thinks he has become the victim of public and political sabotage and likes to play the role of a political martyr. If every public servant would be so sensitive," Mead wrote to Kirkconnell, "the courts of Canada would be devoting most of their time to hearing libel actions." Soon after, Mead stopped replying to Kirkconnell's letters altogether.[332] With Mead out of the picture, Simpson retired, and Kaye seconded to a new, much less stressful department, it was now Kirkconnell and Philipps against the world.

Playing the last card in his deck, Kirkconnell wrote to the UCC. He had been outmaneuvered by the crafty crook, however, as he learned that the UCC had recommended Biberovich as their representative on a newly formed DEA subcommittee for foreign-language groups. Filing an official complaint about Biberovich now would prove disastrous for the plummeting popularity of the UCC. In fact, it might become just the excuse needed by certain officials to completely cut the nationalists off. Worse yet, Philipps reported rather bitterly that many on the executive had become "something of politicians" in recent months and may have

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[330] Gegeychuk admitted to this on his death bed some years later. Mead to Kirkconnell, 4 March 1944, WK, box 49, file 6, ECWA.

[331] Philipps did not know it, but the RCMP had already opened a file on Grierson who would become one of the most infamous casualties of the Cold War witch hunts. Reg Whitaker and Steve Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 2003), 47-50.

[332] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 39.

"turned their sails according to what they're being led to believe is momentarily the favouring wind." Neither wanted to believe that the UCC would cross them, but they agreed that asking the organization to speak up against Biberovich had been a mistake. The constant overanalyzing that had once been reserved for Philipps was now affecting Kirkconnell, and he remained in a heightened state of anxiety as he awaited a reply.[333]

Much to the relief of both men, the UCC executive was under no illusions about Biberovich's intentions. They were fairly certain that he was poisoning official minds against them and they had only recommended him as their representative before the DEA as a way to keep an eye on him.[334] Still, they declined to get involved, feeling it was best to leave Biberovich to those who were currently so enchanted by him. While sympathetic to Philipps, the executive did not understand why the onus was on them to follow the nonsensical and counterproductive directives of government officials or to clean up their mess. Their disillusionment was real, and they made clear that they would no longer tolerate bureaucrats "following the usual policy of patting themselves on the back." Upon reflection, the executive could not think of a single instance since the UCC's formation where they worked alongside the government or were able to call on the Nationalities Branch for help. In fact, their only taste of government succor was through their policing or the unsanctioned activities of the Branch Boys. More often than not, they were entirely isolated from the very officials who had insisted on the amalgamation of nationalist groups into the UCC in 1940. "In building up a nation," the executive complained, "the best material has got to be cultivated, utilized, and drawn into, and

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[333] Kirkconnell to Mead, 16 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Arsenych, 16 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 24 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Philipps to Kirkconnell, 26 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 27 August 1943, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[334] Kirkconnell to Arsenych, 27 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Swystun, 27 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

not indiscriminately repelled and rejected." The UCC had no choice but to "shape our course of action accordingly, that is to say, consistent with our duties as Canadian citizens, but conscious of the fact that mutual confidence is lacking as of yet."[335]

Kirkconnell commended the executive for their work on behalf of Ukrainians in Canada despite their neglect. The blame, he contended, lay squarely on the supposedly "Sovietophile DEA" who had adopted a hostile attitude towards anti-communist nationality groups in the aftermath of Gusev's arrival in Canada. Communism was increasingly being tolerated in Ottawa, a reality that was lost on the alleged patriot Biberovich and his defenders in government. Perhaps it was now time for an "East-Block buster" such as a personal letter to King. It would have to be strongly worded, "knocking the guts out of Biberovich with a first salvo." Under no circumstances could Biberovich be allowed to escape once again or else "the parasite on the public will insinuate himself elsewhere." Besides, anything less than a knockout would surely be dismissed by personal assurances from officials claiming that the case against Biberovich was little more than petty intrigue.[336]

As the letter to King was being prepared, Biberovich learned of the full extent of the case against him. Despite his superiors already being aware of his work for *Narodna volya,* he temporarily stopped writing into the newspaper. He also immediately removed the Nationalities Branch from the WIB's list of groups who received their foreign-language press surveys, further weakening the branch's ability to function.[337] Kolessa followed Biberovich's lead and dropped

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[335] Arsenych to Kirkconnell, 25 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[336] Kirkconnell to Philipps, 12 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 2, ECWA; "Notes," 14 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Philipps, 15 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Mead, 20 September 1943, WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA.

[337] "Points for Consideration," 20 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 3, ECWA; Swystun to Kirkconnell, 24 August 1943, WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA; "Private and Confidential – Not for Circulation," WK, box 49, file 5, ECWA.

her legal case against Philipps. This was as much because a day in court was no longer necessary – the damage had been done – as it was a way to prevent Philipps from presenting concrete evidence against her and Biberovich in a court of law. With the case dropped, she seemingly abandoned her political intrigues in Ottawa, living out her days as a piano instructor with the Royal Conservatory of Music and McGill University.[338] For a brief moment Philipps felt at ease.

"A Diseased Limb of Government": Dismantling the Nationalities Branch

Officials in the WIB and the DEA carried on with their plans to dismantle the Nationalities Branch and let Philipps go. Working together, Grierson and Robertson compiled a dossier of errors made for presentation to King.[339] Describing the branch as a "diseased limb of government that had to be severed if the purity of the national culture was to be preserved," they called for Philipps' dismissal and the complete overhaul of the branch's work.[340] Unbeknownst to them, King was already aware of what was transpiring, having recently learned that Philipps was the sole employee left and that the work had grinded to a halt because of never-ending scandal and ghastly working conditions. The prime minister demanded that LaFlèche sort out this personnel problem and take control of his department once and for all.

In response, an overwhelmed LaFlèche called a meeting in January 1944 to discuss the structure, function, and future of the Nationalities Branch. After resisting Grierson's interference for so long, LaFlèche was tired. He agreed to transfer the branch's key responsibilities to the WIB and to hire a director who could facilitate a new, condensed mandate. Robert England was bought on board to help facilitate this transition. Philipps knew England well, and a small part of

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[338] "Strictly Private and Confidential – Part II," WK, box 49, file 4, ECWA.

[339] Ironically, at the same time that Grierson was preparing his complaint against Philipps, the two were working together on a project. W.E.B. Du Bois had asked them to counteract racist rumours circulating in a Quebec munitions factory that were dissuading workers from donating blood. Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 41.

[340] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 42.

him hoped that he would advocate for him. Yet he had also seen England around Ottawa with Robertson and Biberovich, which did not bode well for his chances.[341] In May 1944, Philipps was officially informed that he would not be appointed as the new director and was asked for his resignation.[342] Much to the relief of all involved in the campaign against him, this time his resignation finally stuck. Within the month, he had left for a new position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).[343]

Philipps had little good to say about his time with the Canadian government. Initially popular because of his high breeding and uncanny ability to wrangle with foreign-language groups, he did not appreciate being tossed aside after the immediate crisis of managing them had dissipated. Things were only further complicated by the turn to warmer relations with the Soviets. The Nationalities Branch had been given no support and even less encouragement, all while officials inanely criticized the nationalists for their non-compliance. Overall, Philipps categorized the work of the branch as a failure and deeply resented the indignities he suffered from "the most timid and procedural of Ottawa's bureaucrats." Foreign-language groups such as the UCC had hardly been acculturated, and their suspicion of the government was only growing. He now believed that it would take an entire generation before the slight would be forgotten, and another government to clear a better path forward.[344]

After learning of Philipps' ouster, the Branch Boys rallied round and thanked him for holding the bridge during a difficult period. Simpson even attempted to intervene with the

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[341] Philipps to Kaye, 1 March 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 4, LAC.

[342] England to Simpson, 18 May 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[343] Kaye had also applied to work for UNRRA, but Payne stopped this by providing him with a bad health report in a bid to keep him in the bureaucracy. This is in stark contrast to his letter for Philipps, which offered a glowing review in the hopes that it would help him leave quietly. Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 43.

[344] Philipps to Payne, 15 March 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 2, LAC; Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 43.

DNWS to negotiate a more structured transition for Philipps so that the "baby was not being snatched out of his hands, but rather handed over with due solicitude for parent and child." Simpson's pleas were rejected outright. The new officials wanted to reorganize immediately without any interference from Philipps, let alone any oversight in general.[345] For his part, Philipps expressed his veneration for his comrades in arms, describing his work alongside them as an unalloyed pleasure. The Branch Boys "never tried to avoid being found on the side of the weak against the strong, be they represented by intriguing Mandarins or myopic Meanies." This was simply the "bitter lot and final disillusionment of those of us who give our lives to work for men of other blood and less mechanized minds." But Philipps had finally had enough after suffering "the public kiss of Judas and the private betrayal of Delilah." He was excited by the prospect of returning home as he was "beginning to feel nostalgia for my own kind in my own home."[346] In bidding the Branch Boys adieu, he closed his final letter: *Votum Solvit Libens Merito* – discharges the vow freely, as is deserved.[347] His final letter to the RCMP, addressed to Commissioner Wood, was much more passive aggressive in tone. Attached to his note was an extract from American Congressman Martin Dies' testimony on communist smear campaigns of public officials.[348] Give or take some brief appearances as he helped settle displaced persons (DPs) in Canada in the aftermath of the war, Philipps all but disappeared from the Canadian political landscape, his long record either forgotten, obscured, or highly distorted by the scandals that once plagued him.

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[345] Payne to Simpson, 16 March 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Simpson to England, 16 May 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; England to Simpson, 18 May 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[346] Philipps to Swystun, 22 July 1941, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 22, LAC.

[347] Philipps to Simpson, 11 May 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[348] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 44.

As for Biberovich, he remained employed by the government, working as the principal translator for the Department of National Defence. In 1946 he was summarily dismissed, never to work in Ottawa again. Officially, Biberovich was let go because the department was reducing its numbers at the end of the war. But Eggleston refused to believe that his firing was justified and pestered Glazebrook for an explanation. Eventually, he was invited for a private, off-the-record conversation and soon after permanently dropped the mater. Theories as to what finally did in Biberovich vary from his involvement in the Gouzenko Affair to revenge by a Philipps' loyalist. His discharge was more than likely linked to his ongoing provocative conduct that had become impossible to ignore or justify, especially during the Cold War when liaising with a communist newspaper was simply inexcusable.[349] Just as quickly as he had made a name for himself, Biberovich vanished from the public record.[350]

Philipps' retreat was a victory for the government officials who had agonized over his presence in Ottawa for years. He was universally considered to be a nuisance and few, if any, in government mourned his exit. But the problems that Philipps was brought in to solve did not simply go away. Perhaps inspired by Philipps' move to UNRRA, the UCC began advocating that the government create the Ukrainian Canadian Refugee Fund (UCRF). They argued that, unlike other groups who would receive assistance from domestic governments after the end of the war, Ukrainians needed a special agency on account of their being officially stateless. This proposition stretched Robertson's patience to its absolute limits. He sharply countered that Ukrainians were not stateless – many just simply did not like the states that they belonged to – and he demanded that the UCC immediately abandon this scheme and throw their enthusiasm

[349] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 35.

[350] Obituary of Lydia Glover, September 27, 2016, *Ottawa Citizen*; Obituary of Joan Armstrong, January 27, 2018, *London Free Press.*

behind the Red Cross. To drive the point home, he instructed the DEA to ignore all further appeals from the UCC on matters relating to national liberation and statehood.[351] Interestingly, it was not Robertson's appeals, but rather the off-the-record intervention of Simpson that finally convinced the UCC to back down. It is unclear whether Simpson's mediation, this time as a private citizen, ever helped Robertson understand just how critical the work of the Nationalities Branch had been in keeping the nationalists in check for all these years.[352]

At the same time that the Nationalities Branch was dissolving, decisions were being made by Robertson regarding the Labour Temples. To be sure, this was not a softening in the government's stance towards the AUUC. Public proclamations and performative gestures aside, the government continued to draw a distinction between their Soviet allies and domestic communist outfits. The AUUC may have been the temporary beneficiary of such geopolitical changes, but this was little more than calculated horse-trading. Instead, Robertson and his colleagues were motivated by a desire to make clear to the nationalists that the government still did not support the Ukrainian Question. Returning the halls was a clear message showing exactly who made the rules, and who needed to follow them. The Branch Boys had long cautioned Robertson against such impulsive disciplinary measures. While they supported rescinding the sales for various reasons, they were steadfastly against comingling a governmental snub of the UCC with a AUUC victory. With the Branch Boys gone, however, Robertson could move ahead as he pleased. Slowly, the halls were returned, and the internees were released.[353]

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[351] Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question,* 163-167.

[352] Ruryk to Simpson, 13 April 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA; Simpson to Ruryk, 19 April 1944, GWS, MG7 S1, file 12, USA.

[353] "Campaign for the Return of ULFTA Properties," Prokop family fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, H-860, file 32, CMH; "Committee for the Return of the Properties of the ULFTA," WK, box 45, file 24, ECWA; "Halls Returned to Ukrainian Association," January 29, 1945, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Labor Temple Re-Opened," May 22, 1945, *Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian Labor Temple Re-Open," October 5, 1945, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Seizing ULFT Properties Cost Ottawa $152,000," May 31, 1947, *The Globe and Mail.*

Conclusion

By the war's conclusion, the Nationalities Branch had been entirely refashioned and placed under the direction of the Secretary of State (SOS). Now known as the Citizenship Division, it largely did away with the preoccupations of the Philipps era and returned to a focus on citizenship training.[354] The division's director, Frank Foulds, was a former bureaucrat with the department of agriculture. Initially, some in the DEA questioned his credentials and criticized him for his hazy conceptions of politics amongst foreign-born populations. Foulds, like many other inexperienced bureaucrats, saw the world in black and white. There were good foreigners (anti-communists) and bad foreigners (communists), all of whom could be either utilized or transformed through the power of technocratic bureaucracy. An ingenuous apparatchik, Foulds did not have a vehement or even strategic interest in politics, especially not the kind being advanced by the Nationalities Branch during the war. Over time, then, concerned officials came to see him as the perfect man for the job. Unassuming and unexceptional in every way, he would not stir the pot nor cause further problems for the government.[355]

This, of course, did not mean that the work of the Citizenship Division had lost track of the government's purported goals or that it had become apolitical. As Franca Iacovetta demonstrates, the division remained committed to promoting anti-communism in the postwar period and particularly as the Cold War progressed. Through citizenship training, it solidified the ideals of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism among New Canadians, profoundly shaping the political consciousness of the country for generations to come.[356]

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[354] Leslie Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 74-77.

[355] Kristmanson, *Plateaus of Freedom,* 45.

[356] Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers*, 12.

The loss of the Nationalities Branch and the Branch Boys, however, represented more than just a change in bureaucratic structure; it marked a turning point in the relationship between the government and foreign-language groups. The significance of the Nationalities Branch had always been in the keen ability of the Branch Boys to foster among ethnic groups intimacy with, and confidence in, the government. The relationship did not always run smoothly, particularly when strict foreign-policy directives and the personal animosity of government officials towards Philipps and the Branch Boys interfered, but it generally functioned to keep a critical constituency under control.

The reconstitution of the branch in the postwar period introduced a profoundly different dynamic. Bursting with disillusionment and a deep-seated sense of abandonment, the nationalists were no longer willing to follow along blindly. Guided by a comingling of Anglo-supremacy, paternalism, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the nationalists, government officials had not anticipated this outcome. Migrants were expected to fall in line and assimilate - not act out in ways that fell beyond the acceptable boundaries they had established. Yet with the Branch Boys gone, the nationalists began to act in what they felt was their own best interest, making clear that governments do not simply act upon their citizens, but are also acted upon in kind. As the chapters that follow show, the nationalists were self-determining agents who could negotiate power structures, even learning to subvert or control them altogether.

Chapter 3

Anti-Communist Violence, Law, and the Shaping of the Postwar Public Sphere

In Val D'or, Quebec, on the evening of 11 December 1948, members of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC) gathered at their local Labour Temple. The association was treating its constituents to a lecture by William Terecio, a member of the executive who had recently returned from a lengthy trip to the Soviet Union. A gifted orator, Terecio usually had no trouble delivering rousing speeches to inspire his audiences. On his current speaking tour of northern Ontario and Quebec, however, he was being frequently confronted by angry mobs of displaced persons (DPs) who challenged his narratives of life under Soviet rule with their own first-hand accounts.[357] According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), these DPs had recently formed local anti-communist blocks that were dedicated to breaking up any mass meetings by the AUUC in their cities and towns.

The situation in Val D'or would be no different. As Terecio began his talk, he was approached by twenty angry DPs armed with sticks, stones, and bottles. Had it not been for a diligent group of his supporters who quickly jumped up to protect Terecio, the DPs would have easily reached him. A serious scuffle ensued as the two sides exchanged explicit taunts and jabs. "Fascists!" the AUUC members hissed at the DPs across the room. "We are not fascists," they retorted, "but you are certainly communists!" The DPs were eventually removed from the hall,

[357] The term displaced person(s) is a somewhat contentious one. There is some evidence of the term being used as a slur against migrants as they arrived in Canada. Later arguments have problematized the way in which it reinforces notions of whiteness amongst a certain class of migrant in contrast to racialized peoples who were more commonly referred to as refugees. I am conscious of this context, but have chosen to retain the term for several reasons. DP was a self-identifying marker that was central to the communal identity of those Ukrainians who arrived in the postwar period. From a practical perspective, it is a clear way to distinguish between the established nationalist community, already operative in this period, and those who arrived after the war and brought with them their own distinctive social, cultural, and political outlooks.

but they were not done. After regrouping at their own hall just down the road, they decided that they would kidnap Terecio and drop him on the outskirts of town, a death sentence in the frigid temperatures of December. Upon returning to the Labour Temple, however, the hall was dark. Not satisfied with letting Terecio off the hook, the DPs divided themselves into groups of six to patrol the neighbourhood. In a scene eerily akin to wartime Europe, roving bands of Ukrainian nationalists shadowed the houses of communists well into the night.[358]

This chapter focuses on the role of political violence in shaping community identity. The relationship between migrants and violence has long been of interest to historians of Canada.[359] By and large, these studies have been approached from three distinct, yet interrelated, vantage points. First, historians have looked at violence directed *towards* migrants as well as to the violent xenophobic and racist discourse that shaped their lives.[360] Second, violence amongst

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[358] "Re: Vasil M. Terecio – Toronto, Ont.," 12 April 1948, Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146, vol. 33, access request 94-A-00182, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, Val D'Or, Que.," 11 December 1948, RCMP, RG146, vol. 33, access request 94-A-00182, LAC. On roving bands, see Dieter Pohl, "The Murder of Ukraine's Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine" in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds., *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 38; Omer Bartov, *Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018), 365-369.

[359] For a general overview of violence in Canada see Kenneth McNaught, "Violence in Canadian History," in J.S. Moir, ed., *Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald Creighton* (Toronto: Macmillan Publishers, 1970), 66-84; Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986); Scott See, "Nineteenth Century Collective Violence: Toward a North American Context," *Labour/Le Travail* 39 (Spring 1997): 13-38.

[360] See Marilyn Barber, "Nationalism, Nativism and the Social Gospel: The Protestant Church Response to Foreign Immigrants in Western Canada, 1891-1914," in Richard Allen, ed., *The Social Gospel in Canada: Papers of the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Social Gospel* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), 186-226; David Rome, *Clouds in the Thirties: On Antisemitism in Canada, 1929-1939* (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1977); Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978); Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Donald Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Ann Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981); Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1982); Howard Palmer, *Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); James Walker, *Racial Discrimination in Canada: The Black Experience* (Canadian Historical Association, 1985); R. Bruce Shepard, "Plain Racism: The Reaction Against Oklahoma Black Immigration to the Canadian Plains," *Prairie Forum* 10 (1985): 365-82; Hugh Johnston, *The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, Delhi 1989); Patricia Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and*

migrant men, rooted firmly in analyses of class and gender, is well accounted for in the scholarship.[361] Third, historians interested in the meaning behind public displays of spectacle have highlighted the ways in which migrants have participated in violent collective action as a means of securing social, political, and economic gains.[362]

Chinese and Japanese Immigrants 1858-1914 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); Martin Robin, *Shades of Right: Nativist and Fascist Politics in Canada, 1920-1940* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Ruth Compton Brouwer, "A Disgrace to Christian Canada: Protestant Foreign Missionary Concerns about the Treatment of South Asians in Canada, 1907-1940," in Franca Iacovetta, Paula Draper, and Robert Ventresca, eds., *A Nation of Immigrants: Women, Workers, and Communities in Canadian History, 1840s – 1960s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 361-384; Alan Davies, ed., *Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999); Carmela Patrias, "Foreigners, Felonies, and Misdemeanours on Niagara's Industrial Frontier, 1900-1930," *Canadian Historical Review* 101, no. 3 (2020): 424-449.

[361] J.K. Johnson, "Colonel James Fitzgibbon and the Suppression of Irish Riots in Upper Canada," *Ontario History* 58 (1966): 139-155; H. Clare Pentland, *Labour and Capital in Canada, 1650-1860* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981), 96-129; Michael Cross, "The Shiners' War: Social Violence in the Ottawa Valley in the 1830s," *Canadian Historical Review* 54 (1973): 1-26; Robert F. Harney, "Men Without Women: Italian Migrants in Canada, 1885–1930," in Betty Caroli, Robert Harney, and Lydio Tomasi, eds., *The Italian Immigrant Woman in North America* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1978); Jean Morrison, "Ethnicity and Violence: The Lakehead Freight Handlers Before World War I," in Gregory Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., *Essays in Working Class History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Gregory Kealey, "The Orange Order in Toronto: Religious Riot and the Working Class," in Gregory Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., *Essays in Working Class History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Ruth Bleasdale, "Class Conflict on the Canals of Upper Canada in the 1840s," in Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey, eds., *Pre Industrial Canada, 1760-1849* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); William Baker, "The Miners and the Mounties: The Royal North West Mounted Police and the 1906 Lethbridge Strike," *Labour/Le Travail* 27 (Spring 1991): 55-96; Peter Way, *Common Labour: Workers and the Digging of North American Canals, 1780-1860* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Angus McLaren, "Males, Migrants, and Murder in British Columbia, 1900–1923," in Franca Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson, eds., *On the Case: Explorations in Social History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 159–80; Nancy Forestell, "Bachelors, Boarding-Houses, and Blind Pigs: Gender Construction in a Multi-Ethnic Mining Camp, 1909–1920," in Franca Iacovetta, Paula Draper, and Robert Ventresca, eds., *A Nation of Immigrants: Women, Workers, and Communities in Canadian History*, 1840s – 1960s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 251–90; Thomas Dunk, *It's a Working Man's Town: Male Working Class Culture in Northwestern Ontario* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); Susan Brophy, "The Emancipatory Praxis of Ukrainian Canadians and the Necessity of a Situated Critique," *Labour/Le Travail* 77 (Spring 2016): 151-179; Jeremy Milloy, *Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Violence at Work in the North American Auto Industry, 1960-80* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017). While not exclusively focused on masculinity, a more recent example of the intersections of class and violence is Jeremy Milloy and Joan Sangster, eds., *The Violence of Work: New Essays in Canadian and US Labour History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020).

[362] J.K. Johnson, "Colonel James Fitzgibbon and the Suppression of Irish Riots in Upper Canada," *Ontario History* 58 (1966): 139-55; E.C. Moulton, "Constitutional Crisis and Civil Strife in Newfoundland, February to November 1861," *Canadian Historical Review* 48 (1967): 251-72; James T. Watt, "Anti-Catholic Nativism in Canada: The Protestant Protective Association," *Canadian Historical Review* 48 (1967): 45-58; Michael Cross, "Stony Monday, 1849: The Rebellion Losses Riots in Bytown," *Ontario History* 63 (1971): 177-90; George F.G. Stanley, "The Caraquet Riots of 1875," *Acadiensis* 2 (1972): 21-38; A. Jeffrey Wright, "The Halifax Riot of April 1863," *Nova Scotia Historical Quarterly* 4 (1974): 299-310; AJ.B. Johnston, "Popery and Progress: Anti-Catholicism in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Nova Scotia," *Dalhousie Review* 64 (1984): 146-63; J.R. Miller, "Anti-Catholic Thought in Victorian Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 66 (1985): 474-94; R. Miller, "Bigotry in the North Atlantic Triangle: Irish, British and American Influences on Canadian Anti-Catholicism, 1850-1900," *Studies in Religion* 16 (1987): 289-301; Allan Greer, "From Folklore to Revolution: Charivaris and the Lower Canadian Rebellion of

Despite this robust historiography, very little has been written on migrant violence in the postwar period.[363] This is especially true of the kind of political violence under review here, wherein confrontations between warring factions of communities were more than petty ethnic squabbles or individual acts of stochastic terrorism. This historiographical lacuna is especially curious given the onetime popularity of community studies that so often focused on the intra-ethnic schisms that dominated the experiences of migrant groups.[364] With this in mind, why has

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1837," *Social History* 15, no. 1 (1990), 25-43; Scott See, "Polling Crowds and Patronage: New Brunswick's 'Fighting Elections' of 1842-3," *Canadian Historical Review* 72 (1991): 127-56; Scott See, *Riots in New Brunswick: Orange Nativism and Social Violence in the 1840s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); John N. Grant, "The Canso Riots of 1833: 'the lawlessness of these people is truly beyond...comprehension,'" *Nova Scotia Historical Review* 14 (1994): 1-19; Ian Radforth, "Playful Crowds and the 1886 Toronto Street Railway Strikes," *Labour/Le Travail* 76 (2015): 133-164; Elizabeth Mancke, Jerry Bannister, Denis McKim, and Scott See, eds., *Violence, Order, and Unrest: A History of British North America, 1749-1876* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019).

[363] An exception remains the impressive and important work done on violence and immigrant women. Kathryn Harvey, "To Love, Honour, and Obey: Wife-Battering in Working-Class Montreal, 1869-79)" *Urban History Review* 19, no. 2 (1990): 128-41; Ellen Cole, Olivia Espin, and Esther Rothblum, eds., *Refugee Women and Their Mental Health: Shattered Societies, Shattered Lives* (Binghamton: Haworth Press, 1992); Frances Swyripa *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Frances Swyripa, "Negotiating Sex and Gender in the Ukrainian Bloc Settlement: East Central Alberta between the Wars," *Prairie Forum* 20, no. 2 (1995): 149-174; Marlene Epp, "The Memory of Violence: Society and East European Mennonite Refugees and Rape in the Second World War," *Journal of Women's History* 9, no. 1 (1997): 58-87; Marlene Epp, *Women Without Men: Mennonite Refugees of the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006); Stacey Zembrzycki, "I'll Fix You! Domestic Violence and Murder in a Ukrainian Working-Class Immigrant Community in Northern Ontario," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Re-Imagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 436-464; Shahrzad Mojab, "The Politics of Culture, Racism, and Nationalism in Honour Killing," *Canadian Criminal Law Review* 16, no. 2 (2012): 115-134; Franca Iacovetta, "Emotions, Marital Conflict, and Affect in the Multicultural Social Welfare Encounter," *Gender & History* 31, no. 3 (2019): 605-623.

[364] Anthony Richmond, *Postwar Immigrants in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967); N. F. Dreisziger, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); Anthony Rasporich, *For a Better Life: A History of the Croatians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982); Karl Aun, *The Political Refugees: A History of Estonians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985); Milda Danys, *DP: Lithuanian Immigration to Canada After the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1986); Alan Green, *Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976); Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987); Gerald Tulchinsky, *Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992); Marlene Epp, *Women Without Men: Mennonite Refugees of the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Howard Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry: The Truth about Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-1956* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Varpu Lindstrom, *Defiant Sisters: A Social History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada* (Beaverton: Aspasia Books, 2003); Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006); Vadim Kukushkin, *From Peasants to Labourers: Ukrainian and Belarusian Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Laura Madokoro, "Good Material: Canada and the Prague Spring Refugees," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 26 (2009): 161-171; Patryk Polec,

postwar political violence received such little scholarly attention?[365] Perhaps in part, it is a deliberate decision by historians who do not want to perpetuate unhelpful, if not outright racist, tropes about migrants.[366] It may also have to do with prevailing beliefs that Canada is a peaceable kingdom. This ideal, contends Scott See, continues to shape our understandings of violence, making it seem somehow out of place.[367] H.L. Nieburg shares this assessment and asserts that separating violence from the rest of society means ignoring the continuum between peaceable and disruptive behaviour. Not only does this deny the role of violence in creating and testing political legitimacy, but it also discounts how it conditions the terms of social bargaining and adjustment. For Nieburg, then, violence is a most natural form of political behaviour.[368]

With the assessments of See and Nieburg in mind, I argue that, at least in the Ukrainian Canadian historiography, violence has not been well assessed because it commonly seen as an aside to community building.[369] While not outright ignored in the scholarship, political violence

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Hurrah Revolutionaries: The Polish Canadian Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015); Jan Raska, *Czech Refugees in Cold War Canada, 1945-1989* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2018).

[365] Beyond academia, see Nina Bunjevac, *Fatherland: A Family History* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2014).

[366] Franca Iacovetta, "Manly Militants, Cohesive Communities, and Defiant Domestics: Writing about Immigrants in Canadian Historical Scholarship," *Labour/Le Travail* 36 (1995): 249.

[367] Scott See, "Nineteenth Century Collective Violence," 13-15. See also Michael Kelly and Thomas Mitchell, "The Study of Internal Conflict in Canada: Problems and Prospects," *Conflict Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (Summer): 10-17.

[368] H.L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), 5.

[369] Of the capacious body of literature on Ukrainians in Canada, violence is addressed only in the following cases and always tangentially. See Michael Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* (Winnipeg and Ottawa: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1970); Helen Potrobenko, *No Streets of Gold: A Social History of Ukrainians in Alberta* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977); John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto: PMA Books, 1979); Lubomyr Luciuk, *Ukrainians in the Making: Their Kingston Story* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1980); Jars Balan, *Salt and Braided Bread: Ukrainian Life in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984); Gregory Robinson, "Rougher Than Any Other Nationality? Ukrainian Canadians and Crime in Alberta, 1915–1929," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 16, no. 1-2 (1991): 156–7; Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996); Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Bohdan Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2002); Vadim Kukushkin, *From Peasants to Labourers: Ukrainian and Belarusian Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada* (Montreal and

is usually framed as a social aberration or as the unfortunate consequences of the otherwise formal process by which the community was forged. This chapter re-centers violence to elucidate its usefulness as a tool of community building and identity formation.[370] I argue that violence was an arena in which conflicting community narratives were articulated and lived political experiences were made flesh. These encounters were perhaps the only time that competing groups came face to face to discuss their political differences as their battle was otherwise abstract. In this theatre, the visceral immediacy of ideological differences had the power to quell political participation and even cultural association. For AUUC constituents, once familiar and sacred spaces were transformed into locations imbued with danger, dread, and disrepute.

The intensity of ideological commitment and the general political sophistication of the nationalists had been well documented by George W. Simpson, Vladimir Kysilewsky (Kaye), Tracy Philipps, and Watson Kirkconnell – the Branch Boys. It is why they had worked tirelessly trying to manage the community during the war years and so adamantly defied those government officials who repeatedly mishandled matters. But with the bureaucracy long gone, the political character of the nationalists was less understood than ever before by state officials, and particularly by the local police and courts who responded to the violence as it occurred. Many observers reasonably assumed that these outbursts of aggressive anti-communism were simply individualized retributions for Old World grievances.

Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Stacey Zembrzycki, *According to Baba: A Collaborative Oral History of Sudbury's Ukrainian Community* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014); Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics: Canada's Ukrainian Left, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018); Myron Momryk, *The Cold War in Val D'or: A History of the Ukrainian Community in Val D'or, Quebec* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 2021).

[370] Previous work done on the Orange Order and its adherence to vigilante justice has been particularly instructive. As See has argued, Orangemen engaged in conflict because of their "preservatist" attitudes and desire to maintain social, religious, and economic hegemony. Meanwhile, for Irish-Catholic migrants, See suggests that collective action was understood as "the only viable defense against a hostile reception in a foreign land." This conceptualization is similar in the case of the Ukrainian Canadian community. Scott See, "Nineteenth Century Collective Violence," 26.

These simplistic explanations were tactfully promoted by the upper echelons of the security service, namely those members of the RCMP who had long been involved in fighting the Red Menace in Canada. They gave credence to the notion that differences of opinion on the Soviet Union simply bred violent confrontation. Yet they knew that it was part of a continuation war linked to the ideological networks and convictions of the nationalist movement. Therefore, this chapter argues that anti-communist violence was not simply a manifestation of hot-headedness. Beyond verging on xenophobia and paternalism, such an explanation ignores the longstanding prominence of lost war and revanchist discourse within Ukrainian nationalist circles. When the realization of an independent Ukraine was eliminated with the solidification of Soviet rule in 1945, solving the communist problem in Canada became an acceptable consolation prize. In their interactions with the communists, DPs were putting their often formal (para)military training to work, believing themselves to be both contributing and continuing the global fight against communism. Regardless of intent, which was admittedly varied, state officials repeated an oversimplified excuse for the violence because of the narrative's widespread utility.

The chapter further suggests that the refusal of the security service, police, and courts to condemn the forms of extra-judicial violence that aligned with their ideological proclivities was, in fact, a form of state sanction. By either explicitly or implicitly approving acts of violence, the state and the security apparatus not only telegraphed their preferences, but also defined the societal, criminal, and judicial boundaries of postwar Canada. The intensity of ideological commitment and the political sophistication of DPs was not always understood, or was intentionally misunderstood, by the security service or government officials. When confronted, they almost always promoted the notion that differences of opinion on the Soviet Union naturally bred violence. This may have had some veracity in the micro sense, but, as I suggest, this was

not the driving force for DP violence. And yet, this line was supported because it had political and ideological utility for both the nationalists and state officials. For the nationalists, it kept the state's gaze far from their own affairs and core ideological beliefs. For the state, it shifted the focus towards an already hated and demonized enemy. Feeling out the acceptable boundaries of violence and criminality was a difficult dance for both sides, but they all liked the music.

"Hitlerites, Fascists, Gangsters, and So On": Greeting the DPs in the Industrial Hinterland

Violent confrontations between the nationalists and the communists were not exclusively reserved for the postwar period. Ever since distinct political factions had formed in the community, clashes had been commonplace. As the previous chapter shows, fighting became an especially popular outlet during the war when the communists tried to disrupt the use of the Labour Temples by the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF). But the arrival of DPs in Canada changed both the scope and intensity of this kind of conflict.[371] Once hindered by Canada's warmer relationship with the Soviets, the nationalist movement was reinvigorated in the postwar, Cold War period by an influx of anti-communist foot soldiers from Europe. While the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) supported the admittance of DPs for a broader set of reasons, they saw particular value in their ability to act outside the existing parameters that had hitherto guided the community's rapport with the communists and the state. This is not to say that the relationship between the UCC and the DPs was always smooth. As Lubomyr Luciuk indicates, the UCC was seriously concerned about the DPs on the grounds that they were rather irrepressible and their politics far too extreme. These grievances, however, were never publicly

[371] For a thorough overview of the DP experience see Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-51* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). On the Ukrainian experience in particular see Wsevolod Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds., *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II (*Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992).

aired, and very few in government knew the full extent of the friction.[372] Far more vocal in their opposition to the new migrants was the AUUC whose membership indiscriminately branded them all as fascists and war criminals. The association, alongside some in organized labour, likewise promoted the foolish and xenophobic trope that DPs would take Canadian jobs, which had some limited utility with the broader Canadian public.[373]

The opposition from the AUUC had little impact and, by 1946, Canada was already receiving Ukrainian DPs under limited family reunification provisions.[374] Continued labour shortages precipitated an even larger flow of DPs so that by 1952 approximately 35,000 Ukrainians had landed in Canada.[375] Most were approved for migration if they accepted labour contracts to fill chronic labour shortages in industries such as mining, lumber, and construction. For some state officials, particularly those in the security service, their arrival had the added bonus of contributing to the resolution of Europe's refugee crisis and invigorating the country's anti-communist ranks.

The first point of contact between DPs and members of the AUUC was usually on train station platforms as the former headed into the hinterland of Ontario and Quebec to settle into

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[372] Lubomyr Luciuk, "This Should Never Be Spoken or Quoted Publicly: Canada's Ukrainians and their Encounter with the DPs," in Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, eds., *Canada's Ukrainians" Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 103-122; Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 149-197, 245-263; Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry,*116-147.

[373] The AUUC's position on the DPs is outlined in its entirety in John Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990), 341- 358; Krawchuk, *Our History,* 284-287.

[374] For more on Canadian immigration policy in this period see Troper and Abella, *None Is Too Many*; Whitaker, *Double Standard*; Valerie Knowles, *Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2007* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992); Harold Troper, "Canada's Immigration Policy since 1945," *International Journal* 48:2 (Spring 1993): 255-281; Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry;* Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Julie Gilmour, "The Kind of People Canada Wants: Canada and the Displaced Persons, 1943-1953" Ph.D. dissertation (University of Toronto, 2011).

[375] This number may well have been higher, as some community estimates suggested that around fifty thousand Ukrainians had entered Canada by this point. Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 213.

work camps. Despite their significant opposition to the admittance of DPs into Canada, the AUUC initially tried to organize them into unions. Some of these exchanges were even successful.[376] In Thessalon, Ontario, the RCMP were closely following an uptick in subscriptions to *Ukrainske zhyttia (Ukrainian Life)* and opened a file on a couple of DPs who were even seen interacting with the communists.[377] These liaisons were sometimes more intimate in nature. For example, in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, the RCMP discovered that a DP girl employed by the Youville Hospital was betrothed to her organizer.[378]

In general, however, these interactions were far from amorous and rarely went the way of the communists. The case of AUUC organizers in Timmins, Ontario illustrates this well. In December 1947, fifty-nine DPs boarded a train in Toronto, Ontario bound for Timmins where they were about to begin working for the Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines. When the train stopped in North Bay, Ontario, communist organizers got on board and immediately approached the DPs to discuss the value of joining a union. Before they could finish, however, the DPs pounced. Beating the organizers to a pulp, they tossed them off the train at the next stop. Their actions were celebrated by the local press. When asked by a journalist about his participation in the fight, DP Mike Moskel remarked that the situation "was no good, we didn't like."[379]

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[376] "Re: Subversive Activities among DPs – General," 9 December 1947, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[377] This did not always mean that subscribers had been converted. One new reader wrote to the newspaper that while he was not in full agreement yet, he was nevertheless anxious to read the paper. "Subversive Activities, Raynor Construction Co., Thessalon, Ont.," 1 April 1949, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC, "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – Val D'or, P.Q.," 17 November 1949, RCMP, RG146, vol. 33, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[378] "Re: Communist Activities amongst Immigrants from DP Camps – Rouyn-Noranda, P.Q.," 24 December 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[379] "We Didn't Like: 59 DP Miners Toss 2 Off Train," December 16, 1947, *Toronto Daily Star;* "Welcome the Freedom Loving," December 24, 1947, *Montreal Gazette*; "Met at the Train," January 5, 1948, *Time.*

Stories like that of the DPs heading for Timmins were relatively common and precipitated a shift in strategy from the AUUC. According to one RCMP officer, the communists were done trying to win the DPs over and were now openly fighting them. At the highest levels, the AUUC mandated a return to the messaging that the DPs were fascists who had fled Europe because of their collaboration with the Nazis or in the Holocaust. This messaging was immediately evident in *Ukrainske zhyttia*, which condemned the "Hitlerites, fascists, gangsters, and so on" that were getting physical in the camps. "The fascist nurslings imported to Canada are getting down to their business – the cracking of heads of Canadian workers. After this," the editors warned, "we can expect from them strike-breaking, informing, and smashing of trade unions." The only solution was to isolate the DPs "like a contagion." In every factory, union, and community, they should be recognized "as if they carry a sign on their person, reading: A Fascist."[380]

This renewed antagonism quickly boiled over. Across the country, the RCMP reported on case after case of communist aggression towards DPs. In Beardmore, Ontario, an officer noted that small groups of Reds were threatening DPs in the hopes that they would leave the work camps and return to the Soviet Union.[381] In Wakaw, Saskatchewan, they interrupted a UCC meeting that was organized to educate its local members on the evils of communism. The meeting, held at the local Greek Orthodox Church, was attended by over 100 people, including a small group of communists who had hidden themselves in the back. When the speaker began his talk, one of the secreted communists jumped to his feet. Pointing his finger at the speaker, he

[380] "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – Grimsby, Ontario," 22 November 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Life," 25 December 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[381] "Re: Subversive Activities among DPs – General," 9 December 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

accused him of being a fascist who had once worked for the Polish police. He then set his sights on another DP close by, asking to see his *Blutgruppentätowierung* (Waffen-SS blood group tattoo). As the communists were pushed out the door, one briefly paused to address the crowd. "We don't want another war," he shouted, "and it's men like you coming here and getting things started for the next one."[382] In Winnipeg, Manitoba, the UCC alleged that male organizers were approaching DP girls working in the local hospital. On one occasion, the girls stated that, after leaving mass on Sunday, they were approached by a man who introduced himself as a distant relative. Asking the girls to accompany him to a nearby Ukrainian event, he brought them to the local Labour Temple. Recognizing the building – they had been taught to avoid it upon their arrival in Canada – the girls refused to enter. Unlike in Rouyn-Noranda, the girls were far less open to any sort of contact with the communists. When the man tried to get them to go inside, they began to scream.[383]

The DPs were also occasionally at the forefront of skirmishes with more established workers, so-called "old timers," who resented their presence in the camps. Many felt that the DPs were a dangerous element not trained to do any labouring work who had left their homeland for an easy life in Canada.[384] In Savanne, Ontario, a group of DPs were approached by two bushworkers, members of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, who urged them to abandon their labour contracts and return to Russia. The DPs retaliated by raising their fists and telling the

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[382] "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – Wakaw, Sask.," 10 March 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[383] "DPs Being Plagued by Canadian Reds," December 31, 1947, *Montreal Gazette*; "Communists Harass DPs – Bishop Ladyka," December 23, 1947, *Toronto Daily Star*. Christiane Harzig offers an excellent overview on the recruitment of DP women, mostly as domestics and nurse-aids. Christiane Harzig, "MacNamara's DP Domestics: Immigration Policy Makers Negotiate Class, Race, and Gender in the Aftermath of World War II," *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 10, no. 1 (2003): 23-48.

[384] For more on the relationship between bushworkers and DPs see Ian Radforth, *Bushworkers and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario, 1900-1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 165-167.

men that if they liked Russia so much, they could go there themselves.[385] On 14 October 1948, Ukrainian DPs working at a lumber camp in Trial Lake, Ontario gathered in the local hall for a religious service. They were joined be several "old timers" of English, French, Polish, and Ukrainian descent. The DPs immediately recognized several of the Ukrainians in the group as they had recently clashed with them over a portrait of Stalin hanging on their cabin wall. Approximately five minutes into the service, the group left, much to the confusion of the DPs. Soon after, a loud bang was heard on the roof and then a second, even louder, crash occurred. Several DPs ran outside to investigate, but the darkness of the night masked anyone who may have been hiding. Turning to go inside, the men noticed their French "street boss" emerge from the darkness holding a jagged rock. Without missing a beat, the DPs grabbed the rock from his hand and subdued him. They began beating him, but he wiggled free and fled towards the cabins. After a hot pursuit, the DPs came face to face with the group they had seen earlier in their hall. Had it not been for the timely arrival of the rest of the DPs from inside, a second, much more brutal, fight would have occurred.[386]

Meanwhile, in Hornepayne, Ontario, fourteen bushworkers were arrested after beating up a group of DPs. The fight was allegedly prompted by rumours that the DPs were given nicer sleeping quarters than they had been given. After a night of drinking, the men grabbed axes, knives, and chains and set out towards the DPs' cabin. Seeing the approaching mob, some DPs managed to escape to escape to the bush, hiding there until the next morning. Others were not so lucky; four DPs ended up severely beaten and had to be hospitalized. The perpetrators were eventually detained by police and charged with assault, disorderly conduct, and obstructing

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[385] "Re: Subversive Activities among DPs – General," 9 December 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; "Re: Winnipeg, Manitoba," 13 January 1949, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[386] "Re: An Incident in a Camp," 14 October 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

police.[387]

"They Will Crack Heads When the Communist Line is Expounded"

The ongoing assaults alarmed the UCC. Bohdan Panchuk, a community leader who had been integral in bringing DPs to Canada and who was serving as the director of the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, personally petitioned Prime Minister Mackenzie King to intervene.[388] "Through my constant contact with these newcomers," he wrote, "I am fully convinced that they are deeply religious and industrious, and they definitely despise fascism, Nazism, and communism." The DPs had a problem, however, in the "very malicious and dangerous work of communistic agencies" and were struggling to defend themselves. Panchuk begged King to devise some means to "prevent mental and possible physical torture to those who suffered most under the Nazi and Soviet regimes."[389]

The communist problem was fresh on King's mind, as anxious employers had recently began speaking publicly about fighting in their camps. In a lecture to the Kiwanis Club in Val D'or, Andrew Robertson, the manager of Golden Manitou Mines, explained that opposition to DPs could be heard almost every single day. This opposition mostly came from "Communist Party members, fellow travelers, or thoughtless persons repeating propaganda that is passed along to them." These groups, he argued, were carrying out their vicious campaign "in self-defence, because the immigrants, who had experienced suffering under red regimes, were able to expose them."[390] Similar sentiments were expressed by bosses in Rouyn-Noranda who were

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[387] "14 Arrested After Bitter Fight in Bush," June 18, 1948, *Ottawa Citizen*; "Lumberjacks in Bitter Camp Fight," June 18, 1948, *Ottawa Journal.*

[388] For more on Panchuk's role amongst the DPs and the organized Ukrainian Canadian community see Lubomyr Luciuk, *Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1983); Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 56-74.

[389] Panchuk to King, 2 March 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC.

[390] "Criticism of Immigrants Work of Reds- Robertson," March 11, 1949, *The Star.*

eager to rid themselves of the Reds and break the unions. In an editorial published in *The Star* in the aftermath of Robertson's talk, they confirmed his claims of an organized whispering campaign that was spreading throughout their camps. DPs were being implicated in every local crime and were constantly being accused of Nazi collaboration by the communists.[391]

These developments worried King, and he began discussions with his cabinet about what to do.[392] He forwarded Panchuk's letter to Arthur MacNamara, deputy minister of labour, who then shared the correspondence with John Sharrer, an official from the Department of Labour (DOL) who had been intimately involved in recruiting DPs to Canada. In his response to MacNamara, Sharrer confirmed Panchuk's allegation of communist belligerence and repeated many of the same points. "From the moment of their arrival in Canada, DPs are subjected to an intensive political campaign," Sharrer explained. His staff were trying to convince the DPs to refrain from fighting and to ignore the communists "in an attempt to plan the political equilibrium necessary in a democracy." But the government had to remember that a large majority of DPs "suffered personal losses through actions of communistic dominated governments. Their political sense," he assessed, "is limited at best." Sharrer was particularly concerned that, under the guise of unionism, DPs were being subjected to pro-communist sentiments and that the union movement as a whole had become a propaganda medium. This was a shame, he sighed, because most newcomers to Canada could benefit from a union if they would refocus on "the original ideal of labour organizations to help workers obtain better wages and working conditions."[393]

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[391] "The Anti-Immigrant Campaign," March 18, 1949, *The Star.*

[392] On the same day that Panchuk's letter arrived, King noted in his diary that the government would soon have to act in order to prevent the further migration of communists to Canada. Diaries of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, 2 March 1948, item 31855, LAC.

[393] Sharrer's desire to purge the union movement of its communist element eventually came to fruition. See Gary Marcuse, "Labour's Cold War: The Story of a Union That Was Not Purged," *Labour/Le Travail* 22 (1988):199-210;

What could the government do? Communist-led unions, and the communist movement more generally, were legal entities, so little could be done officially. Sharrer was clear that officials from the DOL should also abstain from entering discussions, or offering advice, on politics. But something much more covert was certainly possible; both the RCMP and community brokers could be brought onboard to facilitate a campaign against work camp communism. Sharrer's strategy was multifaceted. He recommended that the RCMP open channels of communication with New Canadians "until such time that we can be sure that they have found the necessary understanding and essentials to become Good Canadians." The UCC, under the guidance of the Secretary of State (SOS), should also be recruited to greet DPs arriving on ports and platforms and stage welcome receptions for them. The purpose of this work was twofold. It would edify the existing base of the UNF on the plight of the DPs and reinforce their commitment to anti-communism. It also offered the committee a chance to prepare the DPs for what greeted them in the hinterland.[394] This collective energy, Sharrer believed, could "make Good Canadians out of most newcomers rather than drive them into secluded national and racial groups, as has been the case so far."[395]

While DOL representatives kept mum at Sharrer's request, employers were put to use. Julie Gilmour has traced the steps taken by bosses to Canadianize their new workers and dissuade them from the "unhealthy political influence" of the communists. According to Gilmour, the primary vector of Canadianization was community language and citizenship classes, which were facilitated with the assistance of the DOL. In addition to the classes, it was

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Ron Verzuh, "The Raiding of Local 480: A Historic Cold War Struggle for Union Supremacy in a Small Canadian City," *Labour/Le Travail* 82 (2018): 81-117.

[394] "Re: Novy Shlyakh (The New Pathway)," 28 June 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC.

[395] Sharrer to MacNamara, 22 March 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

recommended that the DPs read *How to Become a Canadian Citizen* and *Facts About Canada,* booklets produced by the Citizenship Division in English, Polish, and Ukrainian.[396] Sometimes these classes ran in collaboration with government officials who had ties to the DPs so that they could interact with someone who spoke their language and understood the directives of the government. Vladimir Kysilewsky (Kaye), then working for the SOS, began facilitating Canadianization courses where DPs could learn English and/or French, philosophy, and "the privileges extended by the new land."[397]

Sharrer's recommendations were also forwarded to Stuart Wood, Acting Commissioner of the RCMP. With an officer assigned to every camp in which a DP could be found, Wood was already closely monitoring the situation. Casting doubt on Sharrer's claims that he was supportive of workers joining unions so long as they focused on the original ideals of the labour movement, he instructed the RCMP to prevent the DPs from speaking to communist organizers and representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).[398] Wood was not concerned about the possibility of many DPs joining the communist ranks. "Many of these DPs are brilliant men," wrote an RCMP officer, "some being doctors, professors, engineers, and teachers." Forced to live under communism, "they don't want any more of it [and] are very thankful to be in Canada."[399]

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[396] Gilmour, "The Kind of People Canada Wants," 206-213.

[397] "DPs in Mines Learning Customs of Canadians," February 20, 1948, *The Globe and Mail.*

[398] "Re: Displaced Persons, Ninette, Man.," 30 December 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; "Re: Communist Activities amongst Immigrants from DP Camps – Rouyn-Noranda, P.Q.," 15 April 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[399] "DPs Almost to Man Against Communism," February 23, 1948, *The Globe and Mail;* "Re: Communist Activities amongst Immigrants from DP Camps - Rouyn-Noranda, P.Q.," 15 April 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC.

Meanwhile, nationalist organizers were tasked with comforting melancholy men adjusting to Canadian ways of living and ensuring that they were not pestered by the communists. Of particular utility were John Hladun and Danylo Lobay, both former communists and members of the UCC-affiliated Ukrainian Workers' League (UWL). Described by the RCMP as secret weapons, the two men stayed busy disseminating anti-communist literature amongst the DPs and convincing them to join government-vetted unions that they hoped would serve as bulwarks against Red unions.[400]

Adherents of the Stepan Bandera's faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-b) were also quite active in the work camps. The OUN-b had grown substantially in the postwar years, likely as a result of Bandera's close relationship with the German Underground, an outfit in Bavaria whose members included former Hitler Youth leaders, Schutzstaffel (SS) officers, and other high-ranking Nazi Party members. According to a 1947 secret report from the Counterintelligence Corps of the United States Army, the German Underground was providing Bandera with significant financial support.[401] Although not as well funded in Canada, the organization was able to establish an elaborate and clandestine network under the direction of Stanley Frolick.[402] Frolick offered ideological training to the DPs in the camps. He also set up a

[400] "Need of Wider Contacts in Order to Study the Situation," February 1941, Tracy Philipps fonds, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "Ukrainian Canadians Condemn Communism," April 21, 1948, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Back Unions, Beat Reds, Ukrainian Workers Told," July 10, 1953, *The Winnipeg Free Press*.

[401] Jeffrey Burds, "The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 1505 (2001): 13.

[402] For more on the OUN in Canada see Lubomyr Luciuk and Marco Carynnyk, eds., *Between Two Worlds: The Memoirs of Stanley Frolick* (Toronto: The Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1990); Luciuk, *Searching for Place,* 198-244; Orest Martynowych, "A Ukrainian Canadian in London: Vladimir J. (Kaye) Kysilewsky and the Ukrainian Bureau, 1931-1940" *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 47, no. 4-5 (2015): 263-288.

newspaper, *Homin Ukrainy,* to boost their morale and convey the most important political messages of the day. Whether Frolick's work was sanctioned by the government is unclear.[403]

The majority of nationalist organizers, however, came from the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF), the largest constituent group of the UCC. They negotiated for separate bunkhouses for the DPs, arranged for the frequent visits of priests to perform moral policing and surveillance, and facilitated a steady stream of social activities to keep them busy. The RCMP also frequently employed these organizers to talk DPs out of organizing into unions and going on strike. In Regan, Ontario, for example, the RCMP intercepted the correspondence of communist organizers and a group of DPs who wanted to organize a wildcat strike to protest their working conditions. UNF organizers quickly arrived on scene and, soon after, all communications with the communists ceased.[404]

This was often to the real detriment of the DPs. When an entire camp of DPs went out on strike against the Driftwood Timber Company in Hearst, Ontario, they found little support from either nationalist organizers or government officials. The AUUC was quick to bask in this development. "Life is the best teacher," they wrote in *Ukrainske zhyttia.* "The DPs who several months ago came into the 'paradise' of Canada because they supposedly feared the 'hell' of Siberia are beginning to see Canadian life." The association believed that the DPs would soon learn about what it was like to toil for Canadian capitalists in the brutal and back-breaking

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[403] "Re: Novy Shlyakh (The New Pathway)," 20 September 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC; "Re: Alleged Subversive Activity Amongst Displaced Persons, Regan, Ontario," 10 February 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC; "Re: Alleged Communist Activities among Displaced Persons – Thessalon, Ontario," 14 January 1949, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; Kulyk to Frolick, 3 August 1947, Stanley Frolick papers, MG31 H32, vol. 3, LAC.

[404] "Re: Alleged Subversive Activity Amongst Displaced Persons, Regan, Ontario," 10 February 1948, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC.

lumber industry. "Well sirs," the article closed, "how are things with you? Not so sweet, is it?"[405]

Kirkconnell was also involved. Heavily jaded by his experiences working for the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship (CCCC) and the treatment of his friend Tracy Philipps, he was now a private citizen with no formal ties to the government. As a committed Cold Warrior, however, he continued to assist the nationalists in their anti-communist schemes. Writing from Kirkland Lake, Ontario, the executive of the local UNF branch complained that the communists were condemning the DPs as "God knows what" and were creating "a public opinion that might turn wholly against our organization." They called on Kirkconnell, "a great friend of Ukrainians," to help them.[406] Kirkconnell facilitated the publication of a series of newspaper articles, all written under pseudonyms, that were critical of the communists in the work camps and reinforced the notion that the DPs represented their strongest threat. "Stalin was mistaken if he thought DPs…would swell the ranks of his fifth column in this country," an editorial in *The Globe and Mail* stated. "They laugh bitterly when Canadian grown Reds try to sell them a bill of goods. They know too much," it continued, "and will not swallow the propaganda pill easily." In fact, there were those among the DPs who will "crack heads when the communist line is expounded."[407]

"A Mosquito Looking for a Wolf to Help Them Kill a Communist"

The AUUC did everything in its power to counter the intense opposition it now faccd, but the evolving and increasingly complex campaign against the association eventually forced them to

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[405] "Re: Ukrainian Life," 27 November 1947, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[406] UNF to Kirkconnell, 12 January 1948, Watson Kirkconnell fonds, box 45, file 24, Ester Clark Wright Archives (ECWA).

[407] "DPs Almost to Man Against Communism," February 23, 1948, *The Globe and Mail.*

contend with the reality that they would not win over many DPs, nor convince the government to send them back to Europe. In explaining the situation to its membership, the leadership cited an old Ukrainian proverb: even a mosquito can kill a horse with the help of a wolf. The nationalists, they asserted, were "a mosquito looking for a wolf [to] help them kill a communist."[408] Instead, the AUUC turned its full attention to internal organizing campaigns and began commissioning speakers to both educate its membership and reinforce the association's guiding principles.

The first major speaking tour in this new era was conducted by Wasyl Swystun, a former executive member of both the UNF and the UCC who had split from the nationalists over their approach to the Ukrainian Question. In the years since his departure from the nationalist camp, Swystun's relationship with the nationalists had only grown more sour. Perhaps most significantly, he strongly disagreed with the decision of the organized community to be in direct contact with DPs in order to help them migrate to North America. Swystun believed that this would only drive a further wedge between Canada and the Soviet Union at a time when the lines of communication needed to remain open. Rather than rejecting repatriation drives, he argued that Ukrainians in Canada needed to act as impartial interpreters to ensure their safe resettlement in Europe.[409]

The UCC responded to Swystun's criticisms by claiming that he was now a communist who could not be trusted. Their perception that Swystun was growing closer to members of the AUUC was correct, but he had not actually joined the association. Nor did he subscribe to its politics; he did not consider himself to be a leftist and remained a steadfast Ukrainian patriot. He had, however, rejected what he considered to be the ineptitude and political naïveté of the UCC

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[408] "Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, Winnipeg, Manitoba," 9 January 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 95, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[409] "Ukrainian Nationalists Criticized," December 21, 1945, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Swystun Repeats Charge Against Ukrainians," December 29, 1945, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

and could no longer support the committee. The AUUC seconded this assessment of Swystun's politics in their internal correspondence. His utility for the association was not that he had been turned, but in his willingness to openly admit that the nationalists were wrong in their approach to the Soviet Union. Others would soon follow, the executive believed, "and the masses that the UCC claims to represent will change their minds about Soviet Ukraine."[410]

It was in this context that Swystun's speaking tour in January 1948 became a significant source of hostility. In Fort William, Ontario, Swystun delivered a compelling speech on the need to promote good will between Canada and the Soviet Union and appealed to the community to let the people of Ukraine shape their own government and politics.[411] Unbeknownst to Swystun, a group of DPs were in attendance, and they began to heckle him. As they were pushed out the door by the unamused organizers, they provocatively began singing the Ukrainian national anthem.[412]

In addition to the incidents involving Terecio in Val D'or and Swystun in Fort William, a series of attacks throughout 1948 further shook the AUUC. In Kingston, Ontario, a group of DPs stoned the AUUC hall, shattering several windows. In Edmonton, Alberta, a November meeting of the AUUC was interrupted by the explosion of a bomb. Two days later, a mob of DPs stormed the AUUC hall in Spedden, Alberta and brutally pummeled a guest speaker. Later that month, another AUUC gathering in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan was attacked by a group of DPs.

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[410] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association, Winnipeg District Conference," 13 May 1945, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 95, access request AH.1999/0012, LAC.

[411] "Ukrainians Here Seek East-West Good-Will," March 15, 1948, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[412] "Re: Newspaper Clipping Taken from The Chronicle," 8 January 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC.

Meanwhile, in Toronto, the home of an AUUC executive member was broken into and he was robbed at knifepoint in a politically motivated crime.[413]

Another attack then occurred in Timmins. This time, the source of the tension was the AUUC's decision to celebrate Ukrainian Liberty Day on the same evening as the nationalists. Regardless of whether this decision was intentional or not, the DPs marched to the communist hall for a showdown. After forming ranks, they stormed the hall line by line. Once the dust settled, the DPs realized that the hall was empty save for a small group of volunteers who had stayed behind after the event to clean up the hall. They called the police, but by the time they arrived only one DP remained on site. He was "loudly and profanely advising the AUUC members of their pedigree" and was quickly escorted away.[414] Shortly after, in Val D'or, DPs attacked a lecture by Oscar Roy from the Labor Progressive Party (LPP). Assuming he was amongst comrades only, Roy opened the floor to questions and comments. A man, who was understood to be a recent AUUC recruit, took the microphone and admitted that he was, in reality, a nationalist in disguise who could no longer conceal his disgust with the likes of Roy. As soon as the audience realized what was happening, they tried to grab the microphone away from him. Ten other DPs then made their presence known and they too were thrown out of the building. Roy, a consummate professional, returned to the stage to joke that the DP had simply had too much to drink.[415]

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[413] "DPs Almost Man to Man Against Communism," February 23, 1948, *The Globe and Mail;* "Re: Communist Activities amongst Immigrants from DP Camps – Rouyn-Noranda, P.Q.," 15 April 1948, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC; "Ukrainian Urges Action in Riot," November 9, 1948, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* AUUC to Garson, 24 November 1948, Stavroff Private Collection.

[414] "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – Timmins, Ontario," 11 December 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[415] "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, Val D'Or, Que.," 28 April 1949, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 33, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

As with many political formations tied to ethno-nationalist politics, some of the most common and intense violence was saved for apostates, as only internal discipline could guarantee continued relevance.[416] Promoting an agenda of legitimated violence remained a solid guarantee that communism would not spread amongst the DPs. In Val D'or, two curious DPs began attending the social events of the AUUC and eventually joined the political arm of the organization. When word got out of their alleged treachery, other DPs began calling them "smelling Reds" and shunned them from community life.[417] Meanwhile, in Timmins, a DP was severely beaten for his decision to join the AUUC. Following his outing, he was fired from his job and an immigration official investigated his case to determine whether he should be deported. The fear of continued physical retribution, deportation, and job precarity eventually got to him, and he recanted his short-lived conversion.[418]

The growing audaciousness of the DPs – even towards their own – was worrisome, and it prompted the AUUC to write to Minister of Justice Stuart Garson. This was no longer about the DPs not knowing the Canadian way of doing things, the association suggested, but rather an expression of their "training in the sadistic methods of Nazi and fascist ideologies." If the government did not intervene soon, they would be sending a clear message that it would turn a

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[416] The OUN, for instance, killed more Ukrainians than any other nationality during the interwar period. During his 1936 trial for the assassination of Bronisław Pieracki, Bandera noted that treason to the Ukrainian cause necessitated a death sentence. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) directed its members to "kill all enemies of the UPA, including all Poles, Czechs, Jews, Komsomol members, Red Army officers, policemen, and all Ukrainians who even slightly sympathize with the Soviet authorities." Alexander Motyl, "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Interwar Poland, 1921-1939," *East European Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1985): 50; Jared McBride, "Peasants into Perpetrators: The OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943–1944," *Slavic Review* 75, no. 3 (2016): 638.

[417] "Re: Ukrainian Life," 22 January 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00198, LAC; "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians - Val D'Or, P.Q.," 23 March 1949, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 33, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[418] "Re: Ukrainske zhyttia (Ukrainian Life)," 22 April 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

blind eye to future confrontations.[419] Garson, however, was dismissed by Wood when he approached him to discuss the matter further. The DPs, Wood argued, had every right to be in attendance "for the purpose of hearing [speakers] praise this paradise on earth from which each of them recently managed to escape." He further reminded the minister of the critical utility of DPs in combating the domestic left, something that the entire government should be united behind with the Cold War underway. Wood explained that the greatest stumbling block for the AUUC in recent years was the DPs who could give personal accounts of existing conditions in the Soviet Union. The communists realized this and feared the possible repercussions for their organization, which explained why they were doing everything in their power to discredit the DPs. "Of course, the whole situation presents a considerable problem for the AUUC," Wood happily reported, "as in many instances the objectives of the tour are backfiring."

When it came to the increase in violence, Wood claimed that the communists would say anything to paint the DPs as law breakers. When violence did occur, this too was the AUUC's fault for "following the usual communist maneuver of building a minor incident into a catastrophe to serve their purpose." In Edmonton, for example, a bomb may have gone off, but "it was simply a tear gas bomb." Plus, he dismissively noted, the shrapnel landed within a five-foot radius of the explosion and had only injured a small group. Wood even refused to concede that the bomb had been planted by DPs. In his assessment, this was nothing more than an attempt by the communists to vindicate their own actions by publishing allegations against the DPs. Further attempts of a similar nature should be expected, he cautioned. Insofar as replying to the AUUC, Wood instructed Garson to tread carefully because experience had shown him that the communists would use any answer to their advantage. It was therefore suggested that the

[419] AUUC to Garson, 24 November 1948, Stavroff Private Collection; "Bombing – 300 Bathurst Street," Stavroff Private Collection.

minister simply reply to inform the association that the contents of their letter had been noted.[420]

"Next it May be a Jewish Synagogue or a Meeting of a Trade Union"

By the beginning of 1949, many DPs had been released from their labour contracts and began moving into cities and towns across the country, the most popular of which was Toronto. The move towards urban spaces was coupled with another influx of DPs into Canada in the 1950s. This demographic shift meant that the attacks from the right became much more systemized and impactful. Ukrainians who settled in Kingston serve as a prime example. Before the nationalists moved into their hall on Bagot Street, they owned a hall not far from the communists. Given their proximity, the groups would often get to drinking and would then throw their bottles at one another in the street. These petty squabbles escalated when political issues were raised. Threats were also sometimes more implicit. On at least one occasion, a group of DPs went caroling to the homes of local AUUC members to remind them that they knew where they lived. The children of AUUC members were likewise accosted in their schools by educators and priests who spoke of "the commies and the Reds as evil beings" and probed the children for information on where their parents gathered. RCMP officers and informants surveilled the hall constantly and did what they could to disrupt its members' lives. The communists felt a permanent unease in the Kingston air, and many withdrew from organized life altogether.[421]

Despite the intensifying nature of violence, some familiarity remained. Most attacks continued to occur at mass meetings and speaking tour stops. The tour of Peter Krawchuk, one of the most prominent leaders of the AUUC, became a lightning rod of violence. Krawchuk had just returned from two years in Soviet Ukraine where he had worked as a correspondent for several

[420] Wood to Garson, 27 December 1948, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[421] Luciuk, *Ukrainians in the Making,* 78-79, 84, 112-117.

publications, including *Ukrainske zhyttia.*[422] On 16 October 1949, he arrived in Winnipeg to report on what he had seen. As seven hundred and fifty people poured into the hall, officials noticed many DPs among them. They knew that trouble was imminent as Krawchuk's stop in Hamilton, Ontario just a few days prior had been disrupted, so they did their best to scatter the DPs throughout the hall. But this was in vain; the entire east side of the balcony, as well as large portions of the main floor, were filled with DPs. Quickly glancing outside, officials noticed about one hundred more DPs milling about. They decided to call the police for help.

Witness statements differ significantly as to who was responsible for the inevitable turn to violence. However, a general narrative can be established from police reports, newspaper accounts, and eyewitness testimonies. All, for example, agree that the formal portion of the evening concluded without trouble except for a minor remark made by a DP when the AUUC called on its members for donations. The DP snickered from his chair that he would donate enough to "buy a rope for Stalin," prompting several audible groans from the audience. The question-and-answer period was a different story. The first trigger was a DP who asked Krawchuk a series of hostile questions about conditions in Soviet Ukraine. Members of the AUUC were perceptibly irritated over this, hissing at the man as he spoke. Before returning the microphone, the DP told the audience that he was simply asking these questions because he had heard a lot of lies from Krawchuk. This suggestion proved to be a breaking point, and a sea of shouting erupted throughout the section of the hall where the DP had been sitting. Krawchuk began to calmly answer the questions posed to him by the DP, but he was drowned out by whistling and jeering from both sides.

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[422] Krawchuk, *Our History,* 285; Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 160.

Two police officers appeared to eject several DPs from the hall, but their removal did little to dissuade others from acting out. From the balcony, a DP began to shout at Krawchuk about language rights in Soviet Ukraine. Krawchuk's answer was apparently insufficient, and he was pelted with glass bottles from above. Occupying the low ground with missiles incoming, it was clear that further discussion would be impossible. A hasty motion to end the meeting was tabled, and the audience was dismissed, but the violence continued in the rotunda and the hall as participants filed out the door. One police officer described stumbling upon a communist who was being stomped, while another witnessed the windows being bashed in and the loose shards of glass being transformed into weapons hurled at fleeing communists. On the front steps, the group of DPs who had been waiting outside began grabbing communists and pulling them down the steps. Sixteen-year-old Robert Ciemny was hospitalized after a group of six DPs yanked him into the street and began kicking him in the head. Efforts to stop the fighting were futile; every time the police broke up one fight a new one would start. Moreover, the police struggled to understand the rioters and to differentiate amongst them. All that could be done was to push people out on to the street and try to disperse them. By six o'clock in the evening all was finally quiet on Winnipeg's northern front.[423]

[423] "Re: Disturbance at the Ukrainian Labour Temple," 18 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection, "Re: Fracas at Ukrainian Labour Temple," 18 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; Elliott to MacIver, 18 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; Talbot to MacIver, 18 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Temple," 22 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

Figure 3.1



Bruises And Broken Windows Mark Melee

A Free Press reporter points to the jagged remains of large plate-glass windows in the front doors of the Ukrainian Labor temple. Angry demonstrators put their fists through the windows and smashed the glass covering bulletin boxes beside them during a fracas following a meeting Sunday afternoon. In the right-hand picture a friend supports Ronald Ciemny, 16, of 997 Magnus avenue, who was badly beaten in a melee outside the hall.

Violence at the Labour Temple. "Bruises and Broken Windows Mark Melee," October 17, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

In the aftermath of the fracas, the AUUC issued a press release criticizing the unleashing of fascist violence upon the Labour Temple. They also criticized the police for their laxity in making arrests despite seeing the DPs smash windows, beat up a sixteen-year-old boy, and attack several women and children. "Squirm as they will," the AUUC asserted, "the defense attorneys of the Nazi-trained hoodlums cannot get around this simple fact."[424] The association demanded that a public inquiry be held to investigate the riot and, specifically, who was responsible for it.

[424] "Press Release," 17 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; "DP Gangsterism," November 15, 1950, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

"This certainly is not a communist question," an AUUC representative noted when asked about the inquiries, "it is an antifascist question. Public opinion as well as the authorities must make sure that there is no repetition of storm trooper activities in Winnipeg. There must be no whitewash of the activities of DPs or the inaction of city police in the violence." If nothing is done, the AUUC warned, "next it may be a Jewish synagogue [or] a meeting of a trade union."[425]

The AUUC was supported by several LPP aldermen who tabled a motion for a second inquiry into police methods during the riot. In making his case before his fellow aldermen, M. J. Forkin charged that the police had delayed the arrival of reinforcements, made no serious attempt to protect the AUUC or its property, and avoided the arrests of perpetrators despite the fighting having lasted for over an hour. Alderman A. H. Fisher was not as sympathetic, suggesting that "where there are communists there is likely too agitation and strife." Jacob Penner reminded his fellow alderman that even communists deserved protection, but Fisher was steadfast. In fact, he contended that the AUUC was probably "the same band of hooligans that broke plate glass windows here and smashed the plate windows of Forkin's election headquarters." This was a puzzling suggestion. There was no evidence whatsoever that the AUUC had been involved in vandalizing Forkin's office. Moreover, Forkin was a member of the LPP – not exactly a target for fellow communists. Still, Fisher's remarks were disconcertingly influential amongst the other aldermen. When a motion for a public inquiry was tabled, it was defeated fourteen to three.[426]

The inquiry into who was responsible for the riot was similarly tipped against the AUUC. Early on, Charles MacIver, Winnipeg's Chief of Police, publicly stated that the inquiry would be

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[425] "Forkin Urges Mayor Probe Charge Police Lax at Fracas," October 18, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Ukrainian Association Demands Probe of Riot," October 24, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[426] "Aldermen Ask Probe of Riot," October 18, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "MacIver's Report on Fracas Going to Commission," November 15, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

fair and would hold those implicated in the riot responsible.[427] The investigation, however, was left to Detective-Sergeant Robert Young, a member of the Subversive Squad, a newly formed special division that worked alongside the RCMP in surveilling, studying, and repressing subversive activity in the city.[428] In his report to MacIver, Young admitted that the most significant issue with his investigation was the conflicting accounts he received of virtually every single moment of the melee. Generally speaking, he believed that the nationalists were much more forthcoming with information and, as a result, had serious reservations about the communist narrative. While Young was much more inclined to believe the DPs, he ultimately acknowledged that, at this stage in the investigation, it would be very difficult to say who was responsible for the disturbance. Yet, in his mind, one thing about the narrative was crystal clear. The DPs had asked a series of embarrassing questions that "led to petty assaults and insulting remarks that ended in utter confusion."

This was a formally cautious assessment, but MacIver read between the lines. In his own assessment of the report, then, he concluded that the AUUC had a great deal to do with creating the trouble.[429] When the AUUC learned of Young's report, they immediately challenged his claim that they had not cooperated. In a sworn testimony, Anthony Bilecki attested that he had arranged for Young to meet with eyewitnesses on multiple occasions. When Young asked for even more introductions, Bilecki invited him to the Labour Temple later that afternoon. Young informed him that he was unavailable, but instructed him to phone the precinct if he thought of

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[427] "Police Study Riot Action," October 19, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[428] "New Subversive Squad Revealed," November 22, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune.* Prior to this incident, the Subversive Squad was unknown to the public. Its activities are briefly discussed in Doug Smith, *Joe Zuken: Citizen and Socialist* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1990), 137.

[429] "Re: Ukrainian Labour Temple," 22 October 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; "Re: Ukrainian Labour Temple," 1 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; MacIver to Board of Police Commissioner, 14 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

any important information to share with him. The next day, Bilecki did just that when he learned the name of one of the ringleaders of the attack. His phone call was never returned.[430]

The final recommendations of the inquiry were tabled on 16 November. In addition to fully absolving the police, which was not required of them, the inquiry placed full blame for the disturbance on the AUUC. The board also announced that, following a discussion with Crown prosecutor Orville Kay, they found no evidence to warrant the prosecution of any of the DPs known to be involved.[431] This outcome was widely celebrated in the media. *The Winnipeg Tribune* berated the communists for "creating disturbances in various countries in accordance with their general policy of fostering strife and chaos." They also believed that the finding of the commission would have a wholesome effect in preventing them from ever again blaming "what they call reactionary and fascist forces for the trouble" and in "setting the community on guard against repetitions of the affair."[432]

The AUUC was prepared for the report, but its members could not help but feel as though it was an impudent insult. In a letter to Coulter, the association protested what they felt was little more than a documentation of the political prejudices of the police. No serious effort had been made by Young except to "whitewash the DP hoodlums and Red bait our organization." The AUUC also reproached the chief for vindicating DP violence in a way that would only further encourage them in future incidents. "Your report," the association warned, "can be construed as a green light to hooliganism in this city, so long as it is committed in the name of anti-

[430] "Statement of Anthony Bilecki," 23 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

[431] MacIver to Board of Police Commissioners, 14 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

[432] "Police Commission Report," November 28, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

communism."[433]

"In Such a Breeding Ground, Fascism Grows Like a Weed in a Neglected Garden"

Despite the happenings in Winnipeg, Krawchuk's tour continued. On 11 December he arrived in Timmins for the last stop of his tour. This time, the AUUC felt better prepared to handle what would surely be another attempt by DPs to disrupt the evening's proceedings. When a group of DPs approached the doors of the Labour Temple, they were greeted by a large group of communists who successfully prevented them from entering. The DPs refused to go, stating that the meeting was advertised in the newspaper and was therefore public. But officials did not budge, and warned the DPs to leave for a second time.

As soon as the meeting started, the DPs began to bang on the door, yelling to be let in. Not knowing what else to do, AUUC officials called the police. When two officers eventually arrived on the scene, they witnessed a mob of two hundred DPs trying to break down the front doors, but they informed AUUC officials that they would not intervene. In their estimation, the DPs had not committed any crimes and apparently the police did not intervene in disputes occurring on private property. After politely asking the DPs to disperse they drove off in their cruiser, leaving the AUUC members trapped inside.[434]

The lack of intervention by the police was almost assuredly taken as sanction and further emboldened the DPs. They started throwing bricks through the windows and, after tearing a railing from the outside steps, used it as a battering ram to break down the front door. As the DPs

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[433] Bilecki to Coulter, 23 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection. Rhonda Hinther notes that a few days after appearing in Winnipeg, Krawchuk was confronted by DPs in an unnamed town in Saskatchewan. The situation eventually escalated, and a fight broke out amongst the factions. Hinther describes how, amongst other acts of violence, a woman slapped a man in the face and a DP, "having no handy weapon at his disposal," took off his shoe and threw it at Krawchuk. The AUUC was forced to finish their meeting at a nearby farm. The accompanying citation incorrectly identifies this incident as occurring in 1948. The tour took place in 1949, and most likely occurred between 18-21 October on Krawchuk's stop in either Regina, Moose Jaw, or Bienfait. "Krawchuk Itinerary," Stavroff Private Collection; Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 160.

[434] "AUUC Submission to Mayor and Council," 15 November 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

began filing in, women and children rushed through the rear doors and fire exits into the darkened streets. Those who stayed behind knew they had no choice but to fight. Grabbing bricks, stones, bottles, heavy sticks, and chairs, they readied themselves to defend their hall from the invasion.[435]

Thomas Kremyr, an AUUC member unlucky enough to be standing in the foyer when the assault began, was grabbed and dragged down the stairs. As he was beaten, his wife came running to his aid and she too was assaulted with sticks and rocks. After several minutes, Kremyr's comrades were finally able to reach him and his wife and pull them to safety. Kremyr's injuries were serious. Beaten unconscious, he was taken to the hospital with internal injuries and several broken ribs. Those who attempted to rescue Kremyr were also injured. Donald MacKenzie, a member of the CIO who was simply helping the AUUC with lighting and sound that evening, was taken to the hospital with chips in his spine. Steve Klapouschak, a sixteen-year-old, was treated for a deep cut to the back of his head. The hall was similarly wrecked.[436] The railings along the stairs were torn off, windows were broken, the door was smashed, and there was glass and detritus everywhere.

Similar to their strategy in Winnipeg, the AUUC went through official channels and demanded an inquiry into the attacks. "This is the second time within a year," noted Stanley Kremyr, the brother of Thomas and the association's spokesperson, "that our members have been forced to protest against the hoodlum attacks on our properties and members and to demand action." Kremyr emphasized that the attack was so severe that it had almost resulted in the death

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[435] "Seven Go to Hospital After DPs Hurl Bricks and Bottles at Meeting," 12 December 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

[436] The story of Klapouschak has a tragic ending. Five years later, he is murdered by a scorned lover in Dalton, Ontario. William McLeod, *Murder in the Schoolhouse: Sudbury, Ontario's Last Hanging* (Sudbury: Self Published, 2007).

of his brother who remained in the hospital in critical condition. The attack was also unprovoked; AUUC members had not gone anywhere near the nationalist hall in recent days. Something had to be done to hold the instigators accountable and to bring restitution for those who were injured.

Kremyr also demanded an investigation into the actions of the police. He explained that the AUUC had tried to be proactive, approaching them for a uniformed constable to watch over the hall at their own expense. Their request had been denied. When officers did eventually arrive on the scene, they refused to intervene and left the enforcement of the law in the hands of private citizens. To back his claims, Kremyr submitted sworn testimony from several bystanders, none of whom had ties to the association, in order to prove how bad the brawl had gotten. Witness A, a woman who lived across the street, stated that she was the one who called the police after she heard the door being bashed in. When she told an officer that that there were several very injured people, she recalled him responding that "those people have to look after themselves." Witness B saw the fight and ran to assist those being attacked. He identified the main aggressors to the officers, but they did not react and told him instead to beat it home. Witness C, who could also identify the main culprits, was told to mind their business. "These are but samples of witnesses that we have to the riot," the AUUC reported, "but we feel that their evidence is sufficient to indicate that the police were completely negligent in their duty, or else were for some other reason unbeknownst to us, being deliberately partial to our attackers."[437] While City Council agreed to an investigation into the riot, this was soon reneged upon because of a technicality; the council declared the AUUC's resolution out of order. The association then sent their resolutions to Dana Porter, attorney general of Ontario, asking for a public inquiry. Porter did not reply.[438]

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[437] "AUUC Submission to the Mayor and Council," 15 December 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

[438] Stevenson to MacLeod and Korol, 31 December 1949, Stavroff Private Collection.

All the while, the newspapers in Timmins and the surrounding area were flooded with unsympathetic articles, their rhetoric curiously mirroring the official anti-communist line propagated by both the nationalists and the security service. "Whom should we believe," asked a reader of *Northern Daily News*, "a Moscow sympathizer, Peter Krawchuk, or thousands of DPs who fled from a 'happy life' in Russia in threadbare clothes?" New Canadians, the reader asserted, came to hear Krawchuk's speech and he responded by "creating trouble so that the communists did not learn of the true facts about life in Russia." Others spun the narrative that the communists, armed with knives and chunks of coal, made the first move. Any injuries they obtained were their own fault, then, or invented for sympathy.[439]

All hope was not lost yet. Several days after the attack, John Alexandrov, a thirty-one-year-old DP who worked in the Hollinger Mines, was arrested for the attack on Kremyr.[440] The trial was twice delayed as Kremyr's injuries were so significant that they required an extended period of hospitalization, but the date was finally set for 17 January 1950. In preparation, the Timmins branch of the AUUC, alongside sympathetic actors, formed the Timmins Labor Defence Committee (TLDC). The committee also retained lawyer Joseph Sedgwick to act as a special prosecutor in the case. The TLDC was eager to land a conviction in the case as they felt that it could change the political complexion of Timmins. The case against Alexandrov would be tricky, but a united front was growing around the issue. In fact, support for Kremyr and the AUUC more generally was nearly universal amongst locals; a petition supporting the prosecution and deportation of those DPs responsible for the attack reached over two thousand signatures. Meanwhile, in Toronto, over five hundred people gathered at the Labour Temple to show their

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[439] "Claims Only New Canadians Know Truth of Communism," December 17, 1949, *Northern Daily News.*

[440] He was also fined ten dollars by the Magistrate's Court for creating a disturbance. "Kremyr Lays Assault Charge Against Man Held in Fracas," December 15, 1949, *Daily Press.*

support for Kremyr. Speaking before the crowd, spokesperson Mike Korol warned the crowd that another attack by the DPs was imminent. “They got off too lightly this time,” he protested, “and they know that the law will only smile and turn the other way.” In the past, the association had been too soft, too easy, and too dependent on justice that was not forthcoming. “In such a breeding ground,” Korol contended, “it was perhaps no surprise that fascism flourishes and grows like a weed in a neglected garden.”[441]

When Alexandrov’s trial began, his lawyers argued that he had simply been at the wrong place at the wrong time. While they admitted that their client had gone to the hall, they alleged that he left as soon as the DPs were denied entry. Alexandrov spent the remainder of the evening walking around town alone, returning only after the trouble was over. His lawyers also argued that the only reason he was even on the radar of the police was because he had been arrested for disorderly conduct after losing his temper in front of an officer. The blame for the violence, the defence ultimately contended, was on the AUUC.[442]

The prosecution hinged their case on several witnesses who each positively identified Alexandrov as one of the leaders of the attack and, more importantly, the man who pulled Kremyr down the stairs. But it was not enough to render a guilty verdict and, in the opinion of the AUUC, the prosecution was making mistakes. For one, they did very little to challenge the defence and let their allegation that the AUUC had been to blame linger in the air. They also inexplicably refused to call even a single police officer to the stand. The defence, meanwhile, had called three. The testimony of one officer significantly damaged the Crown’s star witness, Aileen Haillod. Haillod, the officer claimed, had recently been to his door with a petition

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[441] Stevenson to MacLeod and Korol, 31 December 1949, Stavroff Private Collection; Kremyr to Korol, 5 January 1950, Stavroff Private Collection; “Korol Speech,” 8 January 1950, Stavroff Private Collection; “Hitlerite Element Said Among DPs Now in Canada,” January 9, 1950, *The Globe and Mail.*

[442] “Kremyr Lays Assault Charge Against Man Held in Fracas,” *Timmins Daily Press*, December 15, 1949.

demanding the deportation of all DPs in Canada. In fact, the petition was already in evidence and clearly only advocated for the removal of those DPs who had been responsible for the attack. The prosecution similarly refused to challenge the officer's inappropriate and easily objectionable statement that, upon his arrest, Alexandrov did not look as though he had recently been in a fight. Nor did they call on Nick Hubaly, who had been the one to try to secure police protection prior to the event, or on Roy Kuzenko, who recognized Alexandrov as the ringleader of an earlier attack on the Labour Temple. Curious things were also occurring behind the scenes. While Porter never responded to the AUUC's request for an inquiry, he was quick to involve himself in the trial by barring Sedgwick from serving as a special prosecutor. "Behind this sordid story of official sanction and double talk lies another story," the TLDC noted in a statement after the trial. "Thus, it becomes crystal clear that behind the scenes, powerful hands are at work paving the way for the vicious attacks of the DPs against the AUUC. The citizens of Timmins are today grimly guarding themselves against further fascist terrorist attacks by these imported stormtroopers."

In his summation of the trial, Magistrate Atkinson clearly stated that a violent mob of DPs had stormed the Labour Temple and caused bodily harm to several of its occupants. Yet he informed the court that he was hesitant to convict on the grounds that not all of the prosecution's witnesses could identify Alexandrov by name at the time of the assault. Since a conviction might not stand up in a court of appeals, Atkinson claimed, it was best to dismiss the charges. In his concluding remarks, the magistrate shared a telling homily that perhaps gave insight into his own ideological proclivities. "Live amicably," he told the courtroom, "and remember we were all displaced persons at some time or another." Not taking Atkinson's advice, Alexandrov turned to

Kremyr on his way out of the courtroom and whispered, "now I'll be able to get you, you dirty son of a whore."[443]

In the aftermath of the verdict, members of the AUUC and the TLDC gathered to discuss their next steps.[444] While the possibility to appeal was on the table, they were cautioned against this by Sedgwick as the charges rested principally on the question of identification where some doubt, however dubious, remained.[445] They were also talked out of a civil lawsuit on the grounds that it would be too drawn out, costly, and "removed from the scene of struggle."[446] Sedgwick was not opposed to a public inquiry, although he cautioned the association that the odds here were also not good. But this was their only choice, it seemed, so the group pushed on, placing pressure on local authorities and arranging for a delegation to travel to Queen's Park to meet with Porter. While Porter rejected their request to initiate a public inquiry into the riot, he promised to have his department consult with city officials in Timmins to determine whether any further action was appropriate. Predictably, Porter did not follow up.[447]

The trial did not result in a happy ending for the communists, but it did further cast the spotlight of the federal government directly on them and their organization. Despite private promises that the government was not interested in the recent quarrels in Winnipeg and Timmins, MacNamara issued a statement categorically denying that the DPs were responsible for the brawls and laid the blame squarely on the AUUC. Repeating many of the same talking

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[443] "Press Release," 18 January 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

[444] In an unfortunate twist of fate, the biggest theatre in Timmins was owned by Leo Mascioli, the head of Mascioli Enterprises and the former treasurer of the National Unity Party of Canada. As a result, they were refused the rental and had to use a much smaller, and less convenient, space.

[445] Sedgwick to Terecio, 1 March 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

[446] Sedgwick to TLDC, 9 March 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

[447] "Demand Probe by Porter," February 28, 1950, *Daily Star;* "Timmins Delegation Protests to Porter Over DP Violence," 28 February 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

points that had been made in the past by the RCMP, he declared that the DPs had simply asked the communists embarrassing questions that provoked them to attack.[448] In their response to MacNamara, the AUUC noted their amazement that a government official would issue such a misleading statement. They reiterated to him that the attack was unprovoked and perpetrated "by a wild and disorderly mob of DPs, together with certain individuals who describe themselves as Ukrainian nationalists." Why was special leniency so obviously being practiced by the authorities? Had this been a group of trade unionists, they argued, the full weight of the police and courts would have been turned against them. With this in mind, they urged MacNamara to publicly disavow his original statement so as not to invite further brutality and violence from the DPs.[449] While nothing further ever came of the matter, one thing was certain: the DPs had been given their green light.

"The Men Behind this Bomb Have One Purpose Only: Mass Murder"

On the evening of 8 October 1950, the Toronto branch of the AUUC held a children's Thanksgiving concert in their Labour Temple at 300 Bathurst Street. By eight o'clock in the evening, nearly six hundred people had filed into the auditorium to watch the performance. Meanwhile, in the basement, approximately four hundred teenagers gathered for a dance. Just before nine o'clock, Michael Mutzak, the master of ceremonies, stepped onto the stage to introduce the next number. As he gave the cue for the music to start, a bomb exploded in the auditorium, shattering the large windows that flanked the hall and blanketing the crowd in terrifying needle-like shards of glass. Railway spikes, which had been attached to the bomb,

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[448] "Ottawa Turns Down Timmins Ukrainians," February 14, 1950, *Timmins Daily Press*; "Government Blames Reds For City Riot," February 23, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ottawa Blames AUUC Group For City Brawl," February 24, 1950, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Labor Dept. Clears DPs in Ukrainian Hall Fracas," February 24, 1950, *Timmins Daily Press.*

[449] AUUC to MacNamara, 8 March 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

blasted into the audience and the roof. In the hall, suddenly darkened by dust and smoke, all that could be heard were the loud screams of the injured and the frantic calls of parents looking for their children. As the cinders and shock settled, the damage was surveyed. When it was realized that the entire south wall had collapsed, the building was quickly evacuated. Yet some were not so eager to rush out the door. Rose Mickoluk, who was in the audience that evening, later told a reporter that "if it was a DP attack, I'd be safer inside."[450]

Figure 3.2



Damage at 300 Bathurst Street. Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, RG 146, vol. 2623, access request A-2015-00092, Library and Archives Canada.

[450] "Bomb Fuse Foot Long – 'Infamous Halychyna' Blamed as 11 Injured," October 10, 1950, *Toronto Daily Star.*

Figure 3.3



Damage to the door of 300 Bathurst Street. Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, RG 146, vol. 2623, access request A-2015-00092, Library and Archives Canada.

Figure 3.4



Outside view of damage to the door of 300 Bathurst Street. Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, RG 146, vol. 2623, access request A-2015-00092, Library and Archives Canada.

Figure 3.5



Outside damage at 300 Bathurst Street. Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds, RG 146, vol. 2623, access request A-2015-00092, Library and Archives Canada.

In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, the police switchboard was overloaded with calls. Neighbours reported that the explosion sounded as if an earthquake had struck the city. On Markham Street, just one block west of Bathurst, damage from the blast could be seen in the shattered windshields and windows. Reporters interviewed several of the victims who recalled hearing an awful noise before being hit by pieces of flying glass. They also expressed relief that the spikes had missed them. Mary Sankowski, who had been sitting in the second row of the auditorium, remembered feeling shards of glass hitting her face. She told the reporter that the explosion felt as though "the whole world was coming to an end."[451] In total, reporters counted eleven serious injuries, including six women and two children, all of whom were transported to the hospital.[452]

When the reporters asked who may have been responsible, there was a clear consensus amongst those interviewed that the attack had been orchestrated by DPs. Joseph Salsberg, Member of Provincial Parliament for St. Andrew, even remarked to *The Globe and Mail* that the attack was perhaps "the first fascist bomb to be exploded in this country." The AUUC executive seconded Salsberg's assessment, filling the journalists in on the long history between the left and the right. When asked where things stood now, they reported that tensions were at an all-time high because the Toronto branch had recently received a series of threatening letters that hinted at such trouble. Peter Prokop, national secretary of the AUUC, was much more direct. He blamed members of the Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, known informally as the Galicia Division, for the bombing. "They are obsessed with the mission of liberating the Ukraine from Soviet Russia," Prokop contended, "and they protest that by killing off Ukrainians who do not

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[451] "Ukrainian Hall Bombed, 10 Injured," October 9, 1950, *The Globe and Mail*; "Bomb Fuse Foot Long – 'Infamous Halychyna' Blamed as 11 Injured," October 10, 1950, *Toronto Daily Star.*

[452] "Re: Explosion, Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst St," RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

share their views." He further alleged that over a thousand members of the infamous unit had already been admitted to Canada as DPs.[453]

The shift from blanket charges against DPs as a whole to specific condemnations of the Galicia Division was a response to growing evidence that, despite an official ban in place, some individual members of the Division had gained admission to Canada as early as 1948.[454] Given the nature of these accusations, the RCMP was immediately informed of the incident. Detective-Sergeant Daniel Mann and Inspector K. Shakespeare, both of the professionalized anti-communist Red Squad, arrived on scene within the hour. The officers determined that the bomb was either dynamite or nitroglycerine and had been ignited by a fuse and detonator cap. They believed that the explosive had been placed outside near a fire escape that was easily accessible from a lane near the back of the building.

The morning after the explosion, the RCMP and several Toronto police officers returned to the hall to interview several eyewitnesses. They claimed that none were cooperative and had spent their time demanding the arrest Galicia Division members.[455] As the investigation carried on, the AUUC appeared before Toronto's Board of Control to demand a serious investigation into the actions of the DPs once again. The incident, they contended, could be directly blamed on the police and the courts who had failed to punish those responsible for previous attacks on the association.[456] "The men behind this bomb," they told the board, "have one purpose and one purpose only: mass murder." This was more than just a nuisance bomb to scare a rival faction. The country needed to face the fact that "we have in our midst a gang of terrorists" who were

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[453] "Former SS Troops Blamed for Blast at Labour Temple," October 10, 1950, *The Globe and Mail.*

[454] Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry,* 141.

[455] "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, 300 Bathurst St., Toronto, Ontario," 14 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[456] "City Reds Blame Bombing on Terrorists in Toronto," October 16, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

"Nazi SS men trained in the criminal school of Hitler." If they were not imprisoned or deported from the country, no Canadian would ever be safe from mass acts of violence.[457]

Several days later, the AUUC held concurrent mass meetings in Toronto and Winnipeg to condemn the attacks. In Toronto, the association passed a series of resolutions demanding action from government officials at every level who could no longer condone these attacks just because the perpetrators "hide behind an anti-communist smokescreen." They also publicly pledged a thousand-dollar reward, raised with the help of the United Jewish People's Order, for any information leading to the arrest of those responsible.[458]

[457] "Police Alert as Group Protests Bombing of Hall," October 12, 1950, *The Globe and Mail;* "Submission of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians to the Board of Control,"12 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[458] Resolutions," 15 October 1950, Stavroff Private Collection; "Submission of the Association of Ukrainian Canadians to the Board of Control," 12 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; NEC to AUUC Provincial Committee, 30 October 1950, Stavroff Private Collection.

Figure 3.6


Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

MAKE TORONTO SAFE

Root out the Terrorists

Come!

and bring your friends

to the

COLISEUM

•

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 15

2:00 p.m.

The Concert Program at this Rally will present the balance of the program interrupted by the Bomb on Sunday.

Directions:- Take Bathurst Car to Exhibition Grounds.

110
000061

Make Toronto Safe Flyer. Source: "Make Toronto Safe," 15 October 1950. Source: Stavroff Private Collection

Figure 3.7


Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

18-10-5

BOMBED!

On Sun., Oct. 8th the worst outrage in Toronto's history hit our city. At 9.10 p.m. a bomb exploded with terrific force at the Ukrainian Labor Temple while a children's concert was in progress. Several women and children were injured.

6 inch Rail Spikes in the Deadly Bomb used against women and children.

Who Planted the Bomb in the Thanksgiving Day Outrage?
Is **your** home, **your** family safe while terrorists are at large in Toronto?
Will your church, your synagogue or union hall be next on the list?

How Can We Make Toronto Safe?

For the answer COME to the

CONCERT RALLY

Sunday, Oct. 15, 2 p.m. at the Coliseum

000059

Concert Rally Flyer. Source: "Bombed!" 15 October 1950. Source: Stavroff Private Collection.

The UCC did not take too kindly to the charges of the AUUC. While the committee supported a fair punishment for the bombers – whoever they may be – it maintained that members of the Galicia Division could not have been responsible as they were not yet in Canada. Yet this was not entirely true. In addition to individual members who had arrived in Canada as early as 1948, Canada had reversed its wholesale ban on the Division in May 1950. While there were certainly some delays in their migration because of additional screening measures, it was entirely possible for its members to have been in Canada at the time of the bombing.[459] When this reality became impossible to deny, the UCC avowed that participation in the Division had been forced in every instance and did not necessarily correlate to fascist beliefs. This said nothing about whether or not they were responsible for the bombing. Either way, if the AUUC did not immediately cease their slanderous statements against "innocent people and the good name of Canadians of Ukrainian origin," the national executive of the UCC threatened to take the matter to the courts. [460]

The Toronto Police realized that the case was becoming much larger than anticipated, and they made a formal request to the RCMP for assistance. Specifically, they were looking for the RCMP's help in determining the whereabouts of specific individuals named by eyewitnesses. The investigation was initially slowed because the RCMP did not understand the full extent to which the Toronto police wanted them involved. To be sure, the RCMP was very willing to help, but they strangely believed that local police forces would somehow be better equipped to investigate suspects who were spread across the entire country. The Toronto police, however, did not want to rely on local forces. They tellingly admitted that they did not believe that any of the

[459] Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry,* 143-145.

[460] "Bombing May Cause Libel Case," November 20, 1950, *Toronto Telegram*; "Re: The Bombing of the Ukrainian Labour Temple," 21 October 1950, RCMP, RG146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

suspects were responsible and wanted to clear them as quickly as possible, something which only the RCMP could do.[461]

In early November the RCMP started its inquiry. In charge was John Leopold who had spent most of his career spying on the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) as a secret agent.[462] Leopold contacted various RCMP Divisions in which the suspects lived. Perhaps as a way of signaling to the officers what the outcome of their investigations should be, he notified them that the Toronto police did not believe anyone on the list to be guilty. Their job, then, was simply to eliminate them as suspects as expediently as possible.[463]

Leopold also floated the idea that the bombing may have been a false flag, an idea that he acquired after a series of private discussions between RCMP officials and high-ranking members of the nationalist movement.[464] "Obviously the bombing serves the purpose of the communists to an extent incomparable to that of the nationalists," Wood maintained. "The latter are forced to a defensive position, particularly because the fact cannot be evaded that the Galicia Division was formed by the Germans and was actively employed in the early war years. Considerable

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[461] Parsons to O Division, 20 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labor Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario," 25 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Leopold to O Division, 2 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[462] Andrew Parnaby and Gregory Kealey, "How the 'Reds' Got Their Man: The Communist Party Unmasks an RCMP Spy," *Labour/Le Travail* 40 (Fall 1997): 253-267.

[463] Leopold to C Division, 2 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Leopold to D Division, 2 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Leopold to K Division, 2 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[464] "Memorandum for the Monthly Letter," 18 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC. False flag operations had long been used by the nationalist movement to discredit their opponents. See Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-1933* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), Chapter 3-5; Michael Kellogg, *The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Emigres and the Making of National Socialism, 1917-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter Two; "Beyond Petliura: The Ukrainian National Movement and the 1919 Pogroms," *East European Jewish Affairs* 47:1 (2017): 45-61. An outline of Nazi false flag operations can be found in the details outlined by defendant Hanz Fritzsche during the Nuremburg Trials of 1945-1946. Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Vol VI* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 182-194.

representation had been made to have members of this Division enter Canada," he continued, "but the bombing has served the communist purpose of tarnishing the good name of the DPs."[465] Therefore, the RCMP could not entirely overlook the possibility that the bomb had, in fact, been placed by the communists. Either way, Leopold had no choice but to task his officers with determining if any of the suspects were involved with the Galicia Division.

Claims of the Division's war criminality and collaboration with the Nazis had long been in the air. In Canada, however, these concerns had always been dismissed as a communist invention meant to turn the court of public opinion against the émigrés. Indeed, just a month before the bombing, the British Foreign Office had sent Canadian officials a glowing recommendation for the Division that closed with a note decrying communist propaganda against the soldiers.[466] Questions had recently been raised by individuals and organizations beyond the usual suspects on the left and in the Jewish community, making them much harder for the government to brush away. As a result, a report on the Galicia Division was produced by the Joint National Defence–External Affairs Intelligence Board (JIB) in April 1950. A secondary investigation was conducted by the RCMP a month later.[467] While it is not entirely clear what was said in these reports, historians have shown that the Galicia Division was never seriously vetted by the Americans or the British.[468] The British, for example, had assigned Major Denis Hills, a self-described fascist, anti-communist, and adherent of the far-right, to vet and clear them. Hills quietly counselled SS leadership on avoiding detection and admitted to helping its

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[465] Varcoe to Wood, 28 December 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[466] More recently, security historian Stephen Dorril noted that "rarely have there been so many untruths in such a short statement." Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), 200-206, 240-242.

[467] Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry,* 143-145.

[468] For a riveting look at the efforts of the American government to search for war criminals see Debbie Cenziper, *Citizen 865: The Hunt for Hitler's Hidden Soldiers in America* (New York: Hachette Books, 2019).

most problematic members escape down Vatican ratlines. Only twenty Division members were ever subject to screening in the DP camps – and then only in a cursory fashion – out of a total of 8,272.[469]

Leopold's probe into the Division would be the third one in under a year. In the following months, reports about the suspects came pouring in to RCMP headquarters. Some cases were cleared rather quickly through meagre alibi checks that did not even see the RCMP officers talk to the suspects.[470] Other investigations simply stumped the officers. For example, while he was cleared because he had a solid alibi, DP John Savich was caught attending several meetings of the AUUC called to protest the bombing. This raised questions for the officers about his involvement in planning the Bathurst attack or perhaps something else. Might this have been the criminal returning to the scene of the crime?[471]

The investigation into Petro Bihus ended in his exoneration, but it simultaneously unlocked questions about his activities during the war. Bihus acknowledged that he had been a member of the Galicia Division, but that he did not fight. Rather, he worked as a pro-Nazi propagandist in the Ukrainian Central Welfare Committee (UCWC). The RCMP agreed with Bihus, concluding that he was simply "the intellectual type" and striking him off the list. An identical defence was tabled by Andrij Palij, who told the interviewing officer that he too was only a member of the UCWC. More specifically, he was a member of the Military Board that, in consultation with local German police and administrative authorities, was responsible for all

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[469] Stephen Dorril, *MI6,* 200-206, 240-242. For a historiographical consideration of the Division see Per Rudling, "'They Defended Ukraine': The 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) Revisited," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25:3 (2012): 329-368.

[470] "3 Suspects in Bombing Out of Town." *Toronto Telegram*, 6 November 1950; LAC, RCMP fonds, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ont.," 14 November 1950.

[471] "Re: John Savich – St. Catharines, Ont.," 30 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

recruitment activities for the Division. Palij, who had been tapped for the position because of his status in western Ukraine, was not conscripted.[472] When questioned by a reporter if he had ever fought with Hitler's army, Palij responded that he had not, "with a wry smile," demonstrating a cavalier attitude towards ever seeing any repercussion for his wartime activities.[473] While claiming no personal knowledge of the bombing, he confidently insisted that the bombing had been an inside job.[474]

Palij's declaration that the bombing was a false flag was not unique. In fact, it was quickly becoming the most common response to accusations that the DPs were responsible for the attack. In his interview, Roman Rakhmanny (an alias for Roman Olynyk), admitted to fighting for the Germans between 1941 and 1944. This admission was all but ignored by the RCMP who were far more interested in his claim that the bombing was the work of the communists as part of a psychological campaign to confuse and mislead the public. If the nationalists wanted to bomb the hall, he reasoned, they would not have chosen a time when there were children present and would have waited "until some big shot in the Party came to speak." While he denied any involvement with the attack, Rakhmanny boasted that the bombing would

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[472] For more on Palij's life see John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Littleton: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980); Taras Hunczak, *On the Horns of a Dilemma: The Story of the Ukrainian Division Halychyna* (New York and Oxford: University Press of America, 2000), 12-14, 25; Gabriel Finder and Alexander Prusin, "Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: the Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 34, no. 2 (2004): 95-118; David Alan Rich, "Armed Ukrainians in L'viv: Ukrainian Militia, Ukrainian Police, 1941 to 1942," *Canadian American Slavic Studies* 48, no. 3 (2014): 271-287; Tarik Cyril Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv: A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 127-128; Michael James Melnyk, *The History of the Galician Division of the Waffen SS Volume I* (Stroud: Fonthill Media, 2016), 38. Palij's involvement with the resettlement of DPs in Canada is traced in Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry,* 138.

[473] "Bombing Charge Refuted," November 6, 1950, *Toronto Telegram*.

[474] "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ont.," 23 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

not have been hard to do as he "knew something about homemade bombs." Except that when he made them back in Ukraine, "they didn't just injure people – they killed."[475]

In some cases, suspects could not provide the RCMP with a credible alibi. For example, an alibi for Dmytro Dontsov, a popular far-right political theorist, could not be established. Dontsov, who was then employed by the Université de Montréal despite having entered Canada under dubious circumstances, would not have been teaching on the weekend when the bombing occurred. Discreet inquiries within the local Ukrainian community also revealed that there were no functions that weekend at which he may have been invited to speak. As a result, it was very difficult to ascertain Dontsov's whereabouts. The only solution was to interview him directly, a proposal that the officer's superiors were quick to reject.[476] The inaction on the Dontsov file was even more peculiar because, in addition to not having an alibi, his name had recently appeared on a list of Ukrainians accused of wartime collaboration. Most likely obtained from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the list had been included as an attachment in the previous two inquiries into the Galicia Division tabled earlier that year. While not accused of physical participation in the genocidal violence of the Second World War, the SIS described Dontsov as an ideologue who popularized fascist ideas amongst Ukrainians. This characterization was reinforced by the RCMP, who themselves dubbed Dontsov as the top ideologist of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and "the pope" of Ukrainian nationalism. He had never been a formal member of the OUN and was even criticized by other nationalists for allegedly collaborating

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[475] "Holds Bomb Blast Work of Reds to Mislead Public," October 11, 1950, *The Globe and Mail*; "Ukrainians Charge Ex-Nazis Placed Bomb At Toronto," October 12, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Bombing of the Ukrainian Labour Temple at Toronto," October 16, 1950, *The Montreal Gazette.*

[476] "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ont.," 28 November 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

with the Polish regime. The RCMP nevertheless suggested that he was certainly "in favour of fascism, particularly the Italian form."[477]

Walter Harris, minister of citizenship and immigration, had seen the SIS list as part of the JIB report. In the aftermath of the bombing, he called the RCMP's attention to it and advised the officers involved in the investigation to be on the lookout for the individuals named. Harris was undoubtedly concerned about the allegations against the Galicia Division as he had been the one to lift the wholesale ban just a few months prior. Had he made the wrong decision? In the case of Dontsov, Harris would never know because Dontsov's presence in Canada was never reported to him. Inspector A.W. Parsons dismissed the more serious charges against him as communist propaganda, and the file was closed.[478]

This became a familiar tactic for the RCMP, whose officers were quick to dismiss any negative stories about the DPs as little more than communist disinformation. For example, when John Marshall of the Manitoba Peace Council urged Harris to investigate the Division's presence in Canada, his letter was forwarded to the RCMP for comment. Attached were the following questions from Harris:

1. Were [the men accused by the AUUC] members of the [Galicia] Division?
2. Are they acceptable under stage "B" in view of the complaint made by Mr. Marshall?
3. Has their conduct in Canada been exemplary?[479]

Inspector W. J. Monaghan responded that there was no indication of DP involvement in the bombing incident, nor that the perpetrators had been members of the Division.[480] Seemingly more concerned with the objector than the accused, Monaghan informed Harris that Marshall

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[477] "Confidential: Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel Halychyna Division," RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[478] "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario," 20 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[479] Baldwin to Monaghan, 16 June 1951, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[480] "Bombing Charge Refuted," November 6, 1950, *Toronto Telegram*.

was a fellow traveller or perhaps a tool of the communists. Either way, he suggested that Harris not worry himself with letters that "repeat the coined phrases familiar in communist verbiage." Repeating a different set of coined phrases, Monaghan reminded Harris that the DPs were so aggressively attacked because of their knowledge of conditions behind the Iron Curtain. This posed the biggest threat to the communist movement in Canada and explains why they had to resort to falsehoods and distortions in order to present the DPs "as a band of nefarious scoundrels, renegades, and Cains who have sold themselves to Anglo-American imperialism." Monaghan also parroted the nationalist line that the bombing had been a false flag operation, noting that the RCMP had not lost sight of the possibility that the communists had set the bomb themselves for propagandistic purposes. These claims were made despite Monaghan's own admission that no substantiation was forthcoming.[481]

The RCMP were just as critical of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) when its members raised the matter with F.P. Varcoe of the Department of Justice. Their letter was forwarded to Wood who once again repeated his belief that the charges against the DPs had been fabricated by the communists. Varcoe's reply followed a very careful template provided to him by Wood who thought that anything more might be used to further the left's propaganda campaign. After briefly acknowledging that the investigation was ongoing, he informed the CCF that no evidence had been obtained to indicate who had been responsible for the bombing. Varcoe then made clear that a considerable number of communist-dominated organizations had recently inquired about the investigation. Would the CCF like to be counted amongst them?[482]

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[481] "Re: Bombing – Ukrainian Labour Temple, 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario," 20 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

[482] Varcoe to Wood, 28 December 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Varcoe to CCF, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

By December 1950, the RCMP was describing the case as dormant. According to the Board of Police Commissioners, who met in January 1951, the Toronto police were still on the case and were trying to apprehend the suspects. But they had no new leads, and it was becoming increasingly doubtful that much more could be done. In fact, the entire investigation was reactive at this point, with both the RCMP and the police doing little to investigate leads from their intelligence work or updated suspect lists provided to them by the AUUC.

The records from the RCMP investigation also reveal that most of their energies were spent surveilling the AUUC as opposed to finding the perpetrators. In addition to keeping a detailed list of every organization and individual who wrote to the government about the bombing, officers kept themselves abreast of the association's campaign to publicize the incident. This included everything from the minor, like the delivery of informational pamphlets in McCreary, Alberta, to the more major, like the ongoing coverage of the case in *Pravda.* The force even spied on the victims of the attack, including fourteen-year-old Nina Breshko. Illuminating how the presence of women and children neither deterred acts of violence nor motivated the security service to investigate them if the victims were on the left, the RCMP was suspicious of Breshko because she had "received considerable attention during the bombing." This was a problem, the RCMP reported, because the child might try to use the bombing as a "springboard for further attacks on the government." Shortly after, the case was officially closed. No charges were ever laid.[483]

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[483] "Re: Labor Progressive Party, Canada Generally," 21 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC**;** "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – Bombing of Ukrainian Labour Temple – Oct. 8/50, Toronto, Ontario," 25 October 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Shakespeare to Wood, 2 December 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, McCreary, Alberta," 11 December 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; Levy to MacNeil, 20 December 1950, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC; "Still Looking for Gang that Bombed AUUC Hall," February 1, 1951, *The Ukrainian Canadian;* "Re: A. Breshko, Toronto, Ontario," 17 February 1951, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 25, access request 93-A-00062, LAC.

Conclusion

The AUUC was most likely wrong to suggest that the bomb had been a coordinated attack by the Galicia Division. While providing definitive proof of a criminal conspiracy has intrinsic difficulties, the bombing should instead be understood as the culmination of a low-level terrorist campaign unleashed by the nationalists in this era. Well-supported in their endeavors by the security service, the investigation and its outcome were pre-ordained, and its evidence highly skewed. In fact, the nationalist suspects named by the RCMP, who were never properly investigated, remain redacted in the records to this day. This illustrates the ongoing way in which this history is difficult to parse, as if by design.

The bombing was certainly not the last clash between the left and the right, but violence had largely tapered off by the mid-1950s. There are several reasons for its decline. As the population of Ukrainians in Canada became more urban and professional, there were fewer common spaces – and much less time – for the two groups to physically interact. Moreover, the aforementioned disagreements between the DPs and the organized nationalist community were largely resolved in this period. This was marked by the integration of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (CLLU), a DP outfit, into the UCC's umbrella. By agreeing to unite with the committee, the CLLU consented to generally operate in a much less militantly political way. Finally, as subsequent chapters show, the strategy of the nationalists towards their communist opponents became much more complex and sophisticated. As the AUUC had warned all along, the lack of punishment was interpreted by the DPs as a green light as well as an indicator that they would no longer have to serve as the state's political mercenaries. Alongside supportive state officials, they could develop new and more covert ways to undermine their political rivals and increase their own power in the years to come.

For the period when violence was the nationalists' weapon of choice, it was certainly effective in shaping the parameters of community identity and the public sphere. Those in charge understood that it was part of a transnational ideological movement that encouraged violence against its detractors, thus serving an essential role during the Cold War. The laxity with which the police, courts, press, and government responded to these ongoing incidents further reveals how law and justice were mutable and unevenly enforced depending on the political orientation of those involved. This is instructive for understanding the broader patterns in the irregular, and discriminatory, application of legal regimes in Canada. Yet is also revelatory of the predictable capriciousness with which criminality is articulated and enacted.

It is often believed that violence is a breakdown in communication. When two sides cannot agree, and a middle ground seems impossible, violence erupts instead, subverting further deliberation or the potential even for a resolution. In the case of the Ukrainians, however, I suggest the contrary. Violence did not represent a failure to communicate. Nor was it the result of an inability to find a middle ground. Rather, violence was both a central part, and the result, of starting a conversation; it was the continuation of political discourse by other means. Similarly, the end of violence was not a reflection of consensus, but of a victory being reached in the contest for hegemony. Violence did not end because it ceased to be effective. It ended because the battle had been won.

Chapter 4

Cultural Exclusion and the Forging of Future Folklore in the Era of Official Multiculturalism

A tense scene was unfolding in the conference room of the Sheraton-Carlton Motor Hotel in downtown Winnipeg on the morning of 10 December 1964. Described by a reporter as an "east-west showdown," Ukrainian displaced persons (DPs) were confronting a delegation of artists from Soviet Ukraine who had been invited to Canada as part of a cultural exchange. The DPs were peppering the delegates with questions about life in the Soviet Union and, between loud fits of screaming, they accused the visitors of being agents of Russification. The delegates vigorously denied the charges against them and repeatedly asserted that they were fierce supporters of a distinctive Ukrainian culture, both within the Soviet Union and beyond. Criticizing the DPs as myopic, ignorant, and naïve, the visitors challenged them to unpack their own assumptions about what culture entailed and, by extension, what it meant to be a Ukrainian. Was culture limited to the narrow definition imposed by an offshoot of Ukrainians who now lived in Canada? Were those who lived in Soviet Ukraine not good or accurate representatives of culture just because they lived under communism?[484]

While the situation was not as black and white as either group presented it, their encounter nevertheless offers valuable insight into the process by which culture was both negotiated and fought over in postwar Canada and, in particular, in the era when official multiculturalism was being implemented. Cultural production had been a popular outlet for

[484] Korol to Levesque, 27 May 1964, Association of United Ukrainian Canadians fonds (AUUC), MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 21, Library and Archives Canada (LAC); "Mandolin Orchestra Makes Winnipeg Debut," June 6, 1964, *The Tribune*; Léveillé to Korol, 11 June 1964, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 21, LAC; "Ukrainian Groups Stage Local Showdown," December 10, 1964, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Ukrainian Tourists Visit City," December 11, 1964, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Russians Rally Round the Maple Leaf Flag," December 17, 1964, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Ukrainians since their arrival in Canada. Beyond its potential to entertain and alleviate boredom, it could activate a comforting nostalgia for the homeland and soothe homesickness. Culture took on added importance in the interwar period when it became a useful bridge into mainstream society, wherein conceptualizations of Canada as a mosaic – and not a melting pot – were gaining momentum. Now, it was acceptable to proudly display and celebrate one's folklore as part of the country's new pluralistic identity.[485]

Scholars of the Ukrainian Canadian experience have paid considerable attention to the critical utility of culture and its attendant impact on the shaping of community life. Together, their collective scholarship shows how the traditions of the Old World were transmitted in the diaspora and eased the process of migrant acculturation.[486] Missing from this scholarship,

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[485] John Murray Gibbon, "European Seeds in the Canadian Garden." *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 25, no. 2 (1923): 123-124; Kate Foster, *Our Canadian Mosaic* (Toronto: Dominion Council of the Young Women's Christian Association, 1926); Watson Kirkconnell, *Canadian Overtones: An Anthology of Canadian Poetry* (Winnipeg: The Columbia Press, 1935), 76; John Murray Gibbon, *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1938), 299; Howard Palmer, "Reluctant Hosts: Anglo-Canadian Views of Multiculturalism in the Twentieth Century," in Gerald Tulchinsky, ed., *Immigration in Canada: Historical Perspectives* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 297-333; Richard Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), Chapter 7; Stuart Henderson, "'While There Is Still Time…' J. Murray Gibbon and the Spectacle of Difference in Three CPR Folk Festivals, 1928-1931," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2005); Antonia Smith, "Cement for the Canadian Mosaic: Performing Canadian Citizenship in the Work of John Murray Gibbon," *Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts* 1, no. 1 (2007).

[486] Andrew Gregorovich, *The Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto: Ukrainian National Youth Federation of Canada, 1964); William Darcovich, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Struggle to Retain their Identity* (Ottawa: Ukrainian Self-Reliance Association, 1967); Martin Kovacs, ed, *Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1978); Roman Petryshyn, ed., *Changing Realities: Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980); Jaroslav Rozumnyj, ed., *New Soil – Old Roots: The Ukrainian Experience in Canada* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1983); Mary Stefura, "Aspects of culture in the Ukrainian Community of the Sudbury Area," *Polyphony: Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario* 5, no. 2 (1983): 29-32; Iroida Wynnyckyj, "Amateur Theatre in Canadian Ukrainian Community Halls," *Polyphony: Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario* 5, no. 2 (1983): 87-94; Jaroslav Petryshyn, *Peasants in the Promised Land: Canada and the Ukrainians, 1891-1914* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1985); Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Period, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 30-59; Manoly Lupul, *Continuity and Change: The Cultural Life of Alberta's First Ukrainians* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian studies, 1988); Robert Klymasz, ed., *Art and Ethnicity: The Ukrainian Tradition in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1991); Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); John Lehr and Jeffrey Picknicki Morski, "Global Patterns and Family Matters: Life History and the Ukrainian Pioneer Diaspora," *Journal of Historical Geography* 25, no. 3 (1999): 349-366; John Lehr, "Shattered Fragments: Community Formation on the Ukrainian Frontier of Settlement, Stuartburn, Manitoba, 1896-1921," *Prairie Forum* 28, no. 2 (2003): 219-234; Frances Swyripa, "Ancestors, the

however, is a robust interrogation of the more arcane nature of culture, particularly as it relates to the postwar period. While some exceptions exist, notably Frances Swyripa's *Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* and Aya Fujiwara's *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971,* even these excellent studies are prone to undermining the deeper significance with which culture was instilled and imbued.[487] Therefore, this chapter challenges the notion that cultural production was wholeheartedly innocuous, politically neutral, or employed only to assist Ukrainian integration into the cultural mosaic. In fact, culture was a primary battleground on which the nationalists, under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), and the communists, represented by the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), fought for political power and control over community narratives. Building on the previous chapter, which surveys the role of political violence in policing the Ukrainian left and bolstering anti-communist sentiment, I argue that the cultural sphere became a new and equally effective way for the nationalists to cohere and to legitimize their political ideas while marginalizing their political adversaries.

Land, and Ethno-Religious Identity on the Canadian Prairies: Comparing the Mennonite and Ukrainian Legacies," *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 21 (2003): 43-70; Frances Swyripa, "Mother of the God Wears a Maple Leaf: History, Gender, and Ethnic Identity in Sacred Space," in Marlene Epp, Franca Iacovetta, and Frances Swyripa, eds., *Sisters or Strangers? Immigrant, Ethnic, and Racialized Women in Canadian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Natalie Kononenko, *Slavic Folklore: A Handbook* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007); Frances Swyripa, "Ukrainian Edmonton: Ethnicity, Space, and Identity in a Canadian Cityscape," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33-34 (2008-2009): 429-440; Karen Gabert, "Locating Identity: The Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Village as a Public History Text," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 54-84; Natalia Khanenko-Friesen, *Ukrainian Otherlands: Diaspora, Homeland, and Folk Imagination in the Twentieth Century* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); Kassandra Luciuk, "More Dangerous Than Many a Pamphlet or Propaganda Book: The Ukrainian Canadian Left, Theatre, and Propaganda in the 1920s," *Labour/Le Travail* 83 (2019): 77-103.

[487] Frances Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Aya Fujiwara, *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012).

The consequences of this encroaching nationalist dominion are best exemplified in this chapter's investigation of official multiculturalism. Much has been written about the role of the nationalists in shaping the policies that emerged from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Bi and Bi Commission).[488] Yet, in general, the historiography still tends to romanticize and/or depoliticize their involvement. By situating their participation in the commission within the broader context outlined above, wherein all culture was infused with set political outcomes, I push back on a historiography that tends to favour narratives of an intrepid community advocating for multiculturalism on behalf of the common good. Cunning and deliberate in their actions, the nationalists took advantage of the systematic repression and lack of political savvy of their ideological opponents to commandeer an unhampered role in the commission. Their participation as the official representatives of the Ukrainian community rewarded them well, as they were able to implant their narratives and political ideas within the most significant socio-cultural debate of the era.

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[488] Manoly Lupul, ed., *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1978), John Yavorsky, "A Case Study of the Canadian Federal Government's Multiculturalism Policy," Master's thesis (Carleton University, 1979); Manoly Lupul, "The Political Implementation of Multiculturalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1982): 93-102; Manoly Lupul, "The Tragedy of Canada's White Ethnics: A Constitutional Post-Mortem," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 7, no. 1 (1982): 3-15; Wsevolod Isajiw, "Multiculturalism and the Integration of the Canadian Community," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 15, no. 2 (1983): 107-117; Manoly Lupul, "Multiculturalism and Canada's White Ethnics," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 15, no. 1 (1983): 99-107; Evelyn Kallen, "Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy, and Reality," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1982): 51-63; Stella Hryniuk, ed., *Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures* (Winnipeg: St. John's College, 1992); Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1993); Manoly Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005); Julia Lalande, "The Roots of Multiculturalism – Ukrainian-Canadian Involvement in the Multiculturalism Discussion of the 1960s as an Example of the Position of the Third Force," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 38, no. 1 (2006): 48-49; Eric Woods, "Multiculturalism and Identity in Canada: A Case Study of Ukrainian Canadians," Master's thesis (University of Saskatchewan, 2006); Aya Fujiwara, "From Anglo-conformity to multiculturalism: the role of Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese ethnicity in the transformation of Canadian identity, 1919-1971," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Alberta, 2007); Gregory Smolynec, "Multicultural Cold War: Liberal Anti-Totalitarianism and National Identity in the United States and Canada, 1935-1971," Ph.D. dissertation (Duke University, 2007), 199; Thomas Prymak, "Inveterate Voyager: J.B. Rudnyckyj on Ukrainian Culture, Books, and Libraries in the West During the Long Cold War," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 51, no. 1 (2009): 53-76; Lee Blanding, "Re-branding Canada: The Origins of Canadian Multiculturalism Policy, 1945-1974," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Victoria, 2013); Thomas Prymak, *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

This chapter also adds to the growing scholarship that approaches multiculturalism from a critical perspective and elucidates its role in upholding both whiteness and Anglo supremacy. At the forefront of this pioneering work are the feminist and antiracist scholars Eva Mackey, Sunera Thobani, and Eve Haque, whose contributions benefit our collective understanding of the politics of belonging and show how multiculturalism served as a tool of racial ordering.[489] This chapter does not grapple with notions of whiteness and Anglo supremacy explicitly. It does, however, consider how a policy of multiculturalism bolstered anti-communism at the same time that it upheld racist notions. These developments were, after all, part of the same milieu of maintaining the political status quo at the expense of societal progress. They were also outcomes of the same reactionary authoritarian racism and conspiratorial anti-Semitism. Therefore, I argue that anti-communism served as a voucher for whiteness for incoming migrants. For the stewards of Anglo-supremacy who policed entry into the public sphere, their internal xenophobia and notions of racial hierarchy were trumped by the clear political utility of Ukrainian nationalists. In the same vein as Mackey, Thobani, and Haque, then, I reject celebratory narratives of the cultural mosaic that see ethnic participation as a victory of liberalism. Fundamentally ill-equipped to grapple with the silences and exclusions its produces, multicultural rhetoric and

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[489] Eva Mackey, *The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Sunera Thobani, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 143-175; Eve Haque, *Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). Several other books and theses have critically interpreted multiculturalism and multicultural policy and are worthy of note, including Leslie Pal, *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Neil Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994); Richard Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canada Diversity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Emerald Lee, "A Critique of Canadian Multiculturalism as a State Policy and its Effects on Canadian Subjects," Master's thesis (University of Toronto, 2013); Jack Jedwab, *Multiculturalism Question: Debating Identity in 21st Century Canada* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 2014); James G.E. Mitchell, "Racial Space Through the Whiteness of Multiculturalism: Does Multiculturalism in Canada Perpetuate Racial Space Through Whiteness?" Master's thesis (Athabasca University, 2016); Hugh Donald Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada: Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values* (Toronto: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Daniel Meister, *The Racial Mosaic: A Pre-History of Canadian Multiculturalism* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021).

policy was, by design, an instrument of reinforcing hegemony.

Ukrainian Canadians Join the Cultural Mosaic

During the Second World War, culture became an important way for the Ukrainians to demonstrate their patriotism and support for the Allied war effort. Ukrainian organizations of both the left and the right were struggling to ward off accusations of "divided loyalties" to either Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.[490] Consequently, both groups invested significant resources into their cultural activities. New infrastructure was built to host an increasing number of dance schools, choirs, orchestras and drama clubs. Local halls held handicraft, book, and food fairs almost every weekend. Competing summer camps popped up across the country to train up youth in their respective organization's cultural programming.[491]

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[490] The concept of divided loyalties within the Ukrainian Canadian community has been well explored. See Donald Avery, "Ethnic Loyalties and the Proletarian Revolution: A Case Study of Communist Political Activity in Winnipeg, 1923-36," in Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando, eds., *Ethnicity, Power, and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Methuen, 1981), 68-93; Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson, eds., *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 143-157; Bohdan Kordan, "Soviet-Canadian Relations and the Ukrainian Ethnic Problem," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 13, no. 2 (1985): 1-17; Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, 1899-1962* (Kingston: Limestone Press, 1986); Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989): 179-216; Donald Avery, "Divided Loyalties: The Ukrainian Left and the Canadian State," in Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, eds., *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 271-287; Frances Swyripa, "The Politics of Redress: The Contemporary Ukrainian Canadian Campaign," in Franca Iacovetta, Roberto Perin, and Angelo Principe, eds., *Enemies Within: Italian and Other Internees in Canada and Abroad* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 355-378; Bohdan Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Myron Momryk, "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Surveillance of the Ukrainian Community in Canada," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 28, no. 2 (2003): 89-112; James Farney and Bohdan Kordan, "The Predicament of Belonging: The Status of Enemy Aliens in Canada, 1914," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2005): 74-89; Jaroslav Petryshyn, "The 'Ethnic Question' Personified: Ukrainian Canadians and Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011): 223-256; Orest Martynowych, "Sympathy for the Devil: The Attitude of Ukrainian War Veterans in Canada to Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933-1939," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 173-220.

[491] "Summer School of Ukrainian Culture Opened," July 2, 1942, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Classes Sponsored by Ukrainian Group Open Monday," July 1, 1944, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian Music Course Mark Record Enrolment," July 8, 1944, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Ukrainian Centre Enrolls 61 Students," November 3, 1944, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Canadian Ukrainians Plan Wide Programme," October 28, 1947, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Winnipeg Enriched by Ukrainian Arts," January 4, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Concert Marks Opening of

This new socio-political climate especially benefited the AUUC.[492] As Chapter Two shows, wartime alliances in Europe post-1941 had tamed the worst excesses of state repression against the association's members. Communism was no more officially tolerated than before and state repression continued, but the public was far less tolerant of blatant discrimination against Soviet-adjacent groups. The ULFTA harnessed this to attract substantial audiences to its many concerts and fundraisers in support of the Allies.[493] While short-lived, these efforts were the closest that the association ever came to challenging nationalist dominance in the community and beyond.

The movement's cultural front was bolstered by a significant demographic shift amongst its members. Rhonda Hinther has described a "generation gap" between first- and second-wave migrants and Canadian-born Ukrainians.[494] She argues that, lacking the organic class-consciousness of those before them (perhaps because of the state repression leveled against the movement), many in the latter group became attracted to the movement almost exclusively along cultural lines. To survive, the left had no choice but to pivot in order to cater to the distinctive wants and needs of its younger membership. This new direction was formalized in 1946 when the ULFTA was shuttered and replaced by the AUUC. At its annual convention that year, the association voted to officially describe itself as non-political, cultural organization. This shift was also an attempt to appear less threatening at a time of growing anti-communism. But it did

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Ukrainian Conventions," February 11, 1952, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Four Honoured for Youth Club Help," November 25, 1952, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian," May 20, 1972, *The Tribune.*

[492] Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996), 295-348.

[493] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 13 February 1945, Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146 vol. 95, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC; "Soviet Visitors, Native Songs Entertain 7,000," August 26, 1946, *The Globe and Mail.*

[494] Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics: Canada's Ukrainian Left, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 139-140.

not mean that the AUUC would do away with politics altogether. Rather, the association simply embraced culture like it never had before and, for the first time, allowed its adherents to participate in its activities without being politically involved. Many members initially did both, seeing culture and politics as being inextricably connected. As each generation aged, however, this was less and less the case.[495]

The nationalists also had a long history of cultural production. During the war, the UCCC, with the support of the Branch Boys, established a network of local concerts, fairs, and festivals.[496] Not only did these events showcase Ukrainian culture and demonstrate the community's support for the war effort, but they also had the added bonus of brandishing the community's anti-communism. This only became more explicit in the postwar period, when the temporary détente with the Soviet Union officially ended and the Cold War began.[497]

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[495] "Resolutions for Arts and Culture Commission, 1954," AUUC, MG218 V154, vol. 2, LAC; Krawchuk, *Our History,* 80.

[496] "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 9 January 1945, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC; "Re: Ukrainian Canadian Association," 15 January 1945, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC; Panchuk to Kirkconnell, 17 August 1946, Watson Kirkconnell fonds (WK), box 44, file 37, Ester Clark Wright Archives (ECWA); "Re: Ukrainian Word," 29 January 1947, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC; "Ukrainian Canadians Open National Meeting in City," January 24, 1958, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "UCC: Resolutions Ideology-Politics and Cultural/Educational Question," Jaroslav Rudnyckyj fonds (JR), MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "Ukrainian Festival," August 6, 1968, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Canada Observes Ukrainian Festival," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, LAC.

[497] "Ukrainian Federation Gives Concert, Play," November 23, 1942, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Romanko in Recital," February 10, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Prydatkevytch Hailed on Tour," October 19, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; Simpson to Russell, 27 January 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC; Russell to Payne, 31 January 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; Philipps to Deputy Minister, 3 February 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "Ukrainian Dances Delight Audience," Tracy Philipps fonds (TP), MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "Ukrainians Widen Role in Community Life," January 27, 1945, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Thousands of Ukrainians at Memorable Festival," RCMP, RG146, vol. 90, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC; "Anti-Communist Unity Asked of Ukrainians," January 29, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Jamboree," September 9, 1950, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Festivities Welcome Ukrainian New Year," January 15, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press,* Simpson to Kindred, 22 May 1951, GWS, MG7 S1, file 5, USA; Pidhalny to Simpson, 7 June 1951, GWS, MG7 S1, file 5, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA); "Ukrainian Concert to Commemorate Church Suffering," June 20, 1952, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Anniversary Marked by 10,000 Ukrainians," August 8, 1955, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Canadians Open National Meeting in City," January 24, 1958, *The Winnipeg Free Press; "*Ukrainians Here Mark Anniversary," January 24, 1955, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Canadians Open National Meeting in City," January 24, 1958, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Independence Fete Tremendous Success," January 29, 1958, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "On Language and Culture," March 1962, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "Concert Marks Ukrainian Proclamation," January 29, 1968, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainians Mark Unity," January 27, 1969, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian Federation Gives Concert, Play," November 23, 1942, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Romanko in

"A Cultural Cloak for Communist Propaganda"

Tensions between the nationalists and the communists flared anytime the latter attempted to showcase Ukrainian culture, which the nationalists had declared their exclusive domain.[498] For example, when the AUUC announced their plans to establish a national folk festival in 1949, the UCC dubbed it a "cultural cloak for communist propaganda" and warned the public that they were being duped by "henchmen of Red sources overseas." Repeating their ongoing and dubious claim that it was impossible to be a Ukrainian and a communist at the same time, they demanded that the AUUC "show [its] true Red colour" and cease their claims to represent the community "who have nothing in common with them."[499] Having learned of the plans at too late a date, the UCC could not prevent the festival from moving forward. A concerted effort was nevertheless made to undermine any future efforts. The next summer, the UCC leaned on its contacts in Winnipeg's local government to renege on their agreement to rent to the AUUC an auditorium at no cost. When the AUUC learned that they could no longer use the space for free they complained, noting that the city had just recently rented the nationalists the same hall for free.

Recital," February 10, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Prydatkevytch Hailed on Tour," October 19, 1943, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; Simpson to Russell, 27 January 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, file 33, LAC; Russell to Payne, 31 January 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; Philipps to Deputy Minister, 3 February 1944, TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "Ukrainian Dances Delight Audience," TP, MG30 E350, vol. 1, LAC; "Ukrainians Widen Role in Community Life," January 27, 1945, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Thousands of Ukrainians at Memorable Festival," RCMP, RG146, vol. 90, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC.

[498] "To Our Canadian fellow Countrymen," G.W. Simpson fonds (GWS), MG7 S1, file 5, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA).

[499] "Ukrainians Join in Fete Plans," May 3, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ethnic groups stage colourful birthday preview," June 3, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Festival Called Red Cloak," July 28, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Who is Supporting Festival?" July 28, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Refugee Backs Attack on Ukrainian Festival," July 28, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Festival Not Propaganda," July 29, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Syrnick Answers Mokry in Festival Controversy," July 30, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Culture Fronts Hide Reds, Refugees Warn," December 12, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Despite their reasonable footing on solid precedent, the association was dismissed by the finance committee who told them to pay up or host their festival elsewhere.[500]

In June 1951, the AUUC announced their plans to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada.[501] Rather than compete with the AUUC this time, the nationalists set their own plans for the fall. This gave them extra time to plan a much more impressive showing and allowed them to spend the summer destabilizing the AUUC through smear campaigns and protests. That September, a crowd of over fifteen hundred gathered in Winnipeg to watch as Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, escorted by Cossacks on horse-back and a thirty-car cavalcade, descended on the legislature to unveil a commemorative plaque. The plaque was dedicated to pioneer settlers in recognition of their contribution to the development of Canada.[502] St. Laurent's attendance conveyed the government's clear preference for the nationalists and, in turn, legitimized them as the rightful benefactors of Ukrainian culture and identity. In another show of force, the prime minister spent the remainder of the month travelling with UCC leadership to various historical Ukrainian settlements across the Prairies.[503]

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[500] "Slavic Rallies Across Canada to Foster Unity," January 19, 1948, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "City Refuses Free Auditorium Rental to Ukraine Group," July 11, 1949, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "City Rejects Charge in Auditorium Grant," February 7, 1950, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainians Rap Auditorium Fee," March 3, 1950, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Canadian Slav Congress," March 23, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[501] "Greetings," RCMP, RG146 vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC.

[502] Paul Yuzyk, "The First Ukrainians in Manitoba," Manitoba History Society. http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/transactions/3/firstukrainians.shtml

[503] Kindred to Simpson, 19 May 1951, GWS, MG7 S1, file 5, USA; "Ukrainian Canadian Jubilee: Souvenir Festival Program," 30 June – 2 July 1951, Stavroff Private Collection; Stratychuk to Simpson, 26 July 1951, GWS, MG7 S1, file 5, USA; "Ukrainians Mark Anniversary," August 4, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Original Ukrainian Settler to Join in Festival Here," September 1, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Original Ukrainian Settler to Join in Festival Here," September 1, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Exhibit Tonight," September 7, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Red Slavs Pan Canada," October 26, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Cultural exchanges between Canada and the Soviet Union proved to be consistent flash points of contention due to relentless objections from the nationalist camp.[504] Exchanges had become exceptionally popular in the postwar period. This was, in large part, a result of the AUUC's covert formation of the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (also known as Society Ukraina), which was tasked with sustaining cultural ties with Ukrainians abroad. Through the programming of Society Ukraina, young Ukrainian Canadians were given the opportunity to visit Soviet Ukraine and immerse themselves in the country's culture. The society was well supported by the leadership of the AUUC because it gave its youth the chance to learn about Ukraine directly from the source and without the imposition of diasporic understandings and interpretations. It was also good at motivating its participants into taking a more active role in the association upon their return to Canada. In fact, many who took part in the exchanges became the next generation of cultural leaders in their respective communities.[505]

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[504] "Soviet Visitors, Native Songs Entertain 7,000," August 26, 1946, *The Globe and Mail;* "We Protest Against the Presence of Soviet Artists on Canadian Soil," April 24, 1954, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Tourists Visit City," December 11, 1964, *The Free Press;* "To All Branches and Committees of the AUUC," 29 September 1965, RCMP, RG146, vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC; Prokop to Cadieux, 14 February 1966, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 21, LAC; Cadieux to Prokop, 28 February 1966, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 21, LAC; "Re: Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 37, LAC; "Association for the Liberation of Ukraine," WK, Box 45, file 7, ECW; "Some Opinions, Proposals, and Questions for the Pre-Convention Discussion," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 3, file 14, LAC; "Cultural Exchanges Attacked," October 24, 1974, *The Tribune;* Canada – USSR Association to Crombie, 29 October 1973, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 8, LAC; Crombie to Shevchenko, 31 October 1973, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, LAC; "Re: Ukrainsky holos," 21 November 1973, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, LAC; "AUUC Circular," 19 September 1974, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, LAC; "They Are Robbing Their Children," March 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*; "Anti-Soviet Demonstrator, News Photographer Attacked," March 12, 1979, *St. Catharine's Standard;* "Why the Ukrainians Protested," March 15, 1979, *The Globe and Mail;* Mokry to Harasym, 30 July 1979, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 10, file 14, LAC.

[505] "New Leisure," November 10, 1973, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Discussion Outlines – 1975-1976 Special AUUC Projects," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, file 42, LAC; "Special Class at Fort San," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 40, file 3, LAC; "Social Notes," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 40, file 3, LAC; "Dance, everybody, dance!" September 3, 1975, *The Leader Post;* "Art Groups in Concert," February 24, 1975, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Circular," October 1975, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, file 42, LAC.

Ironically, as Hinther notes in her discussion of the generation gap, these programs increased a cultural interest in the association, but dulled the political aspirations of the participants. For example, after attending an exchange in 1976, Terry Polowy complained to the leadership about the lack of political savvy amongst AUUC youth who had travelled to Soviet Ukraine with her. In comparison to young nationalists, "who know who they are as a group and can defend their right-wing views and organizations," young AUUC'ers could rarely hold their own.[506] Polowy's grievances offer interesting insight into the differences in ideological training of youth amongst the competing factions. Simultaneously, they cast doubt on nationalist claims that the cultural output of the communists were "cloaks" for propaganda and indoctrination. On the contrary, politics were so seemingly tangential to the exchanges that, for many, they did not even register. Despite the lack of effectiveness of the exchanges in proselytizing to youngsters, the nationalists adamantly opposed them on the grounds that they served as unreconstructed communist indoctrination. They also accused cultural delegates arriving from the Soviet Union of being spies and saboteurs. More reasonably, the UCC petitioned the government to end the practice by contending that these were exchanges in name only. Until unrestricted travel to the Soviet Union was permitted, and Soviet citizens could consume cultural material from abroad without censorship, they argued, the work of Society Ukraina could not be supported by any Ukrainian with a clear sense of right and wrong.[507]

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[506] Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 199-200.

[507] "We Protest Against the Presence of Soviet Artists on Canadian Soil," April 24, 1954, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Hladun Opposes Cultural Exchanges," May 18, 1965, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Letters," April 29, 1968, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Figure 4.1



IN MEMORIAM — In loving memory of the death of millions of freedom-loving Ukrainians, and the demise and degradation of the Ukrainian nation and culture, started 62 years ago and still continuing. There will be a memorial service commemorating this tragic holocaust, and in conjunction with this service, there will be a general boycott against the supporters of this oppressive ideology, the Communist Shevchenko Ensemble, performing on Saturday, March 10, 1979, in the evening at the Shaw Festival Theatre, Niagara-on-the-Lake. Relatives and Friends of our dearly-departed brothers and sisters, and freedom-loving people in general are invited to participate.

Let the wide world
Learn against its wishes
What was done in Ukraine.
—From a poem by Taras Shevchenko.

Newspaper ad opposing exchanges. "In Memoriam," March 9, 1979, *St. Catharine's Standard.*

Note: Advertisements in the newspaper were a popular way in which the nationalists conveyed their anti-exchange position. Source:

The concerns raised by the nationalists regarding the Potemkin-like quality of exchanges and the broader cultural politicking of the Soviets were undoubtedly valid. Yet the community continued to struggle with establishing a coherent critique that distinguished the intentions of the state from those of ordinary Ukrainians living under Soviet rule, many of whom embodied a genuine and unalloyed commitment to culture. This inconsistency had long been a point of contention within the community. As Chapters Two and Three show, nationalist ranks had split

in 1942 over the question of how best to approach Soviet Ukraine. Some prominent figures, like Wasyl Swystun, advocated for a more nuanced approach that kept lines of communication open with family and friends behind the Iron Curtain. Yet the movement's hardened ideologues remained uncompromising in their rejection of all things Soviet, dismissing the potential benefits of even the most benign concessions such as maintaining open communication.

With the latter group in charge, it is unsurprising that the UCC aggressively lobbied the government to deny entry visas and commanded its constituents to actively boycott any courses, seminars, workshops, and meetings organized by Society Ukraina. If they happened to stumble upon any such events, the rank-and-file were encouraged to shout insults and throw rotten eggs – anything to cause a commotion and voice their displeasure.[508] Over the years, their labours successfully prevented the entry of dozens of delegations.[509] In the odd instance when a delegation made it to Canada, such as the Red Army Chorus in 1967, the nationalists managed to throw the event into disrepute by protesting in front of the venue.[510] This ultimately had a cooling effect on exchanges, which all but stopped following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the government restricted the travel of Canadians to the Soviet Union.[511]

The communists responded to the clear sabotage of the nationalists by pointing to the inconsistencies in their anti-exchange position. "The nationalists," wrote community leader Peter Krawchuk, "are in a panic over an infiltration from Ukraine – of song, music, dance, books, and

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[508] "Cultural Exchange – For Whose Benefit?" October 30, 1976, *Homin Ukrainy.* .

[509] "Red Cultural Group Fails to Get Visas for Visit," June 20, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Fifth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians," 29 June 1956, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "Rap Red Tactics in Franko Festival," June 30, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; AUUC to UCC, 3 June 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Eleventh National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 9-12 April 1964, RCMP, RG146 vol. 95, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; AUUC to UCC, 3 June 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; Krawchuk, *Our History,* 84.

[510] "Red Army Show Fills Arena with Its Personality," April 19, 1967, *The Tribune.*

[511] "Cool Relations Not the End: Sharp," October 14, 1968, *The Tribune.*

statues. They scream that their children must be fenced off from the culture of contemporary Ukraine with barbed wire," he snickered, "and that their homes must be locked against it with seven locks." It seemed to him that the nationalists were "alarmed that Ukraine exists and is developing without them."[512]

While meant to ridicule them, Krawchuk's comments nevertheless underscore the discrepancies between the policy and practice of the nationalists. On the surface, it is hardly surprising that they did not want to work with the AUUC, or any Soviet representatives at that. But when approached more critically, their rebuffing points to a deeper crisis that the communists' cultural displays were provoking. Despite evocations of romanticized narratives of their homeland, and the centrality of blood and soil rhetoric to their ideology, the nationalists were profoundly disinterested in consuming art produced in the present territory of Ukraine. Culture, as they understood it, was fixed and immutable, untouched by the vitiating relentlessness of modernity and secular thought. Conveniently, the "pure" version of culture they adhered to was articulated exclusively through the channels policed and controlled by their ideological predecessors. Any change or expression of culture that they did not control, then, was not progress or a regular symptom of the mutability of life and society – it was destructive iconoclasm of the worst sort. Rather than support the efforts of ordinary Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union, many of whom may have even privately favoured elements of the nationalist cause, their fundamentalist approach prevented them from supporting any manifestation that was not in their ideological purview.

Perhaps more fundamentally, many in the public who passively consumed Ukrainian culture could not differentiate between the material of the communists and that of the

[512] "They Are Robbing Their Children," March 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

nationalists. While the Soviets were certainly advancing the horizons of cultural production back home, their dances, music, costumes, and instruments in Canada were not just similar to that of the nationalists – they were identical. If this was the case, and the communists were not fundamentally altering culture, therefore not posting a threat, what was the messianic mission imbued in the singing and dancing of the nationalists? And perhaps most importantly, what was so important about their specific articulations of culture if the Soviets were doing the same thing? What specific cultural value were the nationalists adding?

"Both a Birthday and a Birthright": The Rise of the Folk Arts Movement

With this in mind, the nationalists' wholesale denunciation of Soviet culture illuminates the internal hierarchy that guided nationalist thinking. Culture was simply politics by other means, and their claims to be the exclusive purveyors and protectors of it served a strategic purpose. This was made especially clear in their reactions to the AUUC attempts to be active in the public sphere. In 1962, the Canadian government announced plans for the 1967 International and Universal Exposition, or Expo 67 as it became universally known. The significance of Expo 67 is well beyond the scope of this study, but it is worthwhile to note that it represented an important moment in cohering an increasingly civic version of Canadian identity – alongside relentless nation building. Gary Miedema notes that the exposition reinterpreted Canada to Canadians at a time when the nation was at its most divided. Expo 67, it was reasoned at the time, would help Canadians put the turmoil of the 1960s behind them and rally around a more wholesome message of pluralism and tolerance.[513]

For ethnic groups in particular, Expo 67 offered a chance to present their respective communities before the public. Their efforts would be helped along by the National Folk Arts

[513] Gary Richard Miedema, *For Canada's Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, and the Remaking of Canada in the 1960s* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 65.

Council (NFAC), which was tasked with facilitating meaningful ethnic inclusion in the centennial celebrations. Its creation led to what has been described by other scholars as a systematized national folk arts movement.[514] The leadership of the UCC immediately understood the significance of being represented on the NFAC board. Most significantly, it would offer them control over the entirety of the exposition's Ukrainian programming, including a special Ukrainian Canadian week that was scheduled for the beginning of August. It had the added bonus of giving them insider information regarding the Soviet Pavilion, which would be useful for helping them plan protests and pickets in front of it.[515]

Securing a seat at the table for one of its own was not difficult for the UCC to arrange. The national chairman of the NFAC was Leon Kossar, a member of the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) and vocal supporter of the UCC. The AUUC similarly petitioned the NFAC for inclusion on the board or, at a minimum, an invitation to the council's numerous planning conferences. Unsurprisingly, their requests were flatly denied by Kossar as a matter of course. In a formal complaint to Maurice Lamontagne, the secretary of state, the AUUC called the exposition "both a birthday and a birthright" for all ethnic groups in Canada. As far as they were concerned, the UCC did not speak on behalf of all – or even the majority – of Ukrainians in Canada. Precociously, the association noted that representation was needed so that a "privately initiated act of discrimination would not be elevated to the status of official centennial policy." Such an outcome, they warned, would be antithetical to the stated goals of the exhibition.[516]

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[514] Bohdan Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community," in Manoly Lupul, ed., *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1978), 103; "History," Folklore Canada International, https://www.folklorecanada.org/history/

[515] "Ukrainian Groups at Expo 67," April 29, 1967, *The Tribune;* "Canadian Ukrainian Week Held at Expo 67," August 6, 1967, *Svoboda Ukrainian Daily.*

[516] Sago to Lamontagne, 7 December 1964, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 25, file 8, LAC; Sago to Lamontagne, 17 November 1964, Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-875, file 33, Canadian Museum of History (CMH);

Kossar pushed back on the charges of discrimination. In his private response to the AUUC, he argued that their exclusion logistical, not political. Only one organization could reasonably represent any given community on the council. As a compromise, he unironically welcomed the AUUC to pass on their suggestions for the exposition to the UCC. In public, however, Kossar sang a different tune. He claimed that the AUUC was a communist front with no leg to stand on before the council.[517] This narrative gained sufficient traction in the press. Time after time, reporters reprinted Kossar's allegations that the AUUC's cultural work as disingenuous and warned their readers that, if the Reds had their way, they would ruin Canada's centennial celebrations. Not only did this close the door on the AUUC's chances of gaining access to the NFAC, but it preemptively undermined any remaining sympathy or interest that the public may have had in the association's inclusion in the exposition.[518]

The UCC could not ultimately prevent the AUUC from participating in Expo 67. Several performing arts groups affiliated with the AUUC performed, but they did so at their own expense and did not receive the support of the NFAC.[519] Representing neither the Ukrainian Canadians nor the Soviets, their showing lacked a broader significance and barely resonated with the crowds. This was in contrast to the UCC, which presented their performing arts groups as the

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"Memorandum in Respect to the Exclusion of the AUUC from Participation in the National Folk Arts Council," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 25, file 8, LAC; "In Defence of a Right that Belongs to Every Canadian," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 25, file 8, LAC.

[517] Kossar's statements were highly influenced by his close friend Watson Kirkconnell, whom he publicly cited, alongside Progressive Conservative George Drew, as the greatest fighter against communism in Canada. "Kossar Warns Communists Use Ukrainian Groups," March 26, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[518] "Newsletter," January – February 1965, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 13, file 13, LAC; "Re: Association of United Ukrainian Canadians – National Executive Committee," 12 February 1965, RCMCP, RG146 vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC; "Folk Arts Council Picketed by Ukrainian Group," July 17, 1965, *The Globe and Mail;* "Sabotage is Charged," July 24, 1965, *The Globe and Mail*; "Ukrainians Charge Bias," March 21, 1966, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "National Folk Arts Program for 1967," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 25, file 25, LAC.

[519] "Thirteenth National Convention – Organizational Report of the National Executive Committee," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 2, file 29, LAC; "A Personal Letter to all Members," March 1967, RCMP, RG146 vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC; "Ukrainians Mark Centennial Event," April 19, 1967, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "A Matter of Great Importance," RCMP, RG146, vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC.

official representatives of Ukrainian-ness on the most important cultural stage at the time.[520] On the surface, the colourful costumes and fast-paced dances of the nationalists conveyed a fun and innocuous version of culture. Yet when read semiotically, and with critical insight into how displays of multiculturalism were highly curated and riddled with both silences and exclusion, the deeper significance of their showing at Expo 67 is revealed.

A similar dynamic unfolded in 1970 during Folklorama, Winnipeg's Centennial Folk Festival. Folklorama was organized by the provincial offshoot of the NFAC, the Manitoba Folk Arts Council (MFAC). Much like its countrywide equivalent, the MFAC was chaired by a nationalist Ukrainian, Cecil Semchyshyn. Similarly to Kossar, Semchyshyn excluded the AUUC from participating in the council's deliberations on the grounds that the UCC was the official representative of the Ukrainian community. Unlike Kossar, however, he would not allow the association to petition the council through the UCC, claiming that it was nothing more than a splinter group with no meaningful claims to the community.[521]

The AUUC took their complaint against Semchyshyn to city council, but he only doubled down, accusing the association of masquerading as a cultural group in order to disseminate communist propaganda. Echoing Kossar once more, he warned that politically oriented groups like the AUUC could not be allowed to partake in Folklorama as they would certainly bring chaos to the entire affair. Alderwoman June Westbury agreed. While she was against political displays of all stripes appearing at Folklorama, she admitted that her primary concern was that

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[520] "Ukrainian Groups for Expo," November 18, 1966, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "A Personal Letter to All Members," March 167, RCMP, RG146 vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC; "Ukrainians Mark Centennial Event," April 19, 1967, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Ukrainian Groups at Expo 67," April 29, 1967, *The Tribune;* "A Matter of Great Importance," 29 May 1967, RCMP, RG126 vol. 47, access request 96-A-00026, LAC; "Re: Soviet State Ukrainian Folk Chorus Performing At Expo 67," 6 October 1967, RCMP, RG146, vol. 84, access request 98-A-00232 pt. 2, LAC.

[521] "Singer Seeks Unique Culture," October 26, 1968, *The Tribune;* "Folk-O-Rama Entry Barred to Group," June 17, 1970, *The Tribune;* "Committee Rejects Communist Group," June 17, 1970, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

the left might use the festival to promote their cause.[522] The alderwoman's anxieties are indicative of the extent of intolerance towards ideas that fell beyond the conventional political outlooks of the day and the way in which this impacted the AUUC's ability to claim ownership over culture. This public perception was taken advantage of by the likes of Semchyshyn, whose politics were already largely transformed into common sense positions that were rarely – if ever – interrogated for their thinly veiled political substance.

Much like with Expo 67, the AUUC had effectively been blocked from meaningful participation in Folklorama, so they established their own Festival of Song, Music, and Dance. Organized rather hastily, the event was still a minor success, featuring over three hundred and fifty performers (including a French and an Indigenous group) and a crowd of over fifteen hundred.[523] It was a fine consolation prize for the association's members, although it certainly caused worry and consternation for the leadership.

Fortuitously for the AUUC, the popularity of Folklorama had inspired the MFAC to run the festival annually as a celebration of the province's ethno-cultural diversity. This development ushered in a new era for the council, including oversight from Laurent Desjardins, the province's Minister of Tourism, Recreation, and Cultural Affairs. It also involved the appointment of lawyer and Liberal Party insider Julius Koteles as the council's new chair.[524] Neither Desjardins nor Koteles cared for the petty conflict that had emerged between the Ukrainians in the festival's inaugural year. An annual event was a massive and complicated undertaking at the best of times, and they had no desire to inherit the situation that Semchyshyn had allowed to fester.

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[522] "Committee Rejects Communist Group," June 17, 1970, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Organization Complains About Festival," June 26, 1970, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[523] "Ukrainians to Mark Centennial," April 13, 1970, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian Festival to Mark Centennial," April 16, 1970, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian Festival Drew Large, Appreciative Crowd," May 16, 1970, *Tribune Metro News.*

[524] "Desjardins' Position on Pavilion Attacked," June 30, 1972, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

The hands-off approach of Desjardins and Koteles meant that when the AUUC submitted an application to host a Folklorama pavilion at its hall they did not object. The nationalists were immediately up in arms, claiming that having more than one Ukrainian pavilion would confuse the public and allow the communists to stake claim to a culture that did not belong to them. They were also deeply offended that the AUUC had named their pavilion after the western Ukrainian city of Lviv. According to the nationalists, Lviv represented a hub of resistance to Soviet communism and, therefore, it was morally wrong for the AUUC to choose it as their namesake. Ironically, the nationalists selected the much more Russified and Soviet city of Kyiv. It is unclear why the nationalists did not pick the city themselves; they had submitted their application long before the AUUC had.[525]

The complaints of the nationalists were ignored by Desjardins and Koteles, which only intensified the furious tenor of their complaints. Speaking to the press, UCC representative Eugene Hyworon accused Koteles of running the MFAC in a dictatorial manner. They charged that, amongst other things, he had ceased all communication with members of the council, hid financial statements pertaining to Folklorama, and had issued public statements as an official spokesperson of Folklorama without the council's approval.[526] Hyworon's accusations cast a significant shadow over the festival and precipitated a minor public relations crisis. Curiously, the UCC retracted their statements against Koteles after receiving a five-thousand-dollar grant awarded by the MFAC to facilitate an official Ukrainian Week during the festival. In a classic case of horse trading, Ukrainian Week would be officially sanctioned – and directly funded – by the MFAC, ensuring that the nationalists would continue to establish themselves as official

[525] "An Appeal of Concern to All Winnipeg Citizens," Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-892, file 5, CMH.

[526] "Folk Council Run Dictatorially: Rep.," October 9, 1973, *The Tribune;* "Koteles Gives Reply," October 10, 1973, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

representatives of the community. The AUUC pavilion would once again not get the same attention.[527]

Unfortunately for Koteles, the bad press piqued the curiosity of the RCMP who looked into his dealings with the council and uncovered a series of shady money transfers and missing funds. While it is unknown whether the nationalists had something to do with the unexpected investigation, it is worth noting that the AUUC – and not the UCC – was audited as part of their investigation into Koteles. This is despite the fact that the association had received very little funding from the MFAC over the course of its existence. In fact, unlike the UCC, which had actually received significant funds, most of the money that had been earmarked for the AUUC was stolen by Koteles and never made it to the association.[528] Koteles was charged with stealing over one hundred thousand dollars from the council, but he was eventually found not guilty because a solid paper trail could not be established.[529]

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[527] "Tribute to Ukrainians," January 18, 1968, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian week festival planned," December 23, 1972, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian culture, fun ahead," January 24, 1973, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian Committee Gets Funds," December 29, 1973, *The Tribune.*

[528] Mokry to Harasym, 20 June 1978, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 3, file 16, LAC; Hnatiw to Harasym, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 25, LAC; Harasym to Hnatiw, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 25, LAC.

[529] The scandal did not seem to impact his reputation too much. Koteles was appointed as the chairman of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (later renamed the Canadian Ethnocultural Council), which served as the formal link between ethnic organizations and Ottawa's multicultural bureaucracy. "Koteles Hassle Likely to Linger," September 9, 1977, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "RCMP Mysteriously Ends Two Investigations of Alleged Mountie Theft," March 24, 1978, *The Globe and Mail;* "Folk Arts Chairman Not Guilty of Theft," October 27, 1980, *The Globe and Mail;* "Address by Mr. Julius Koteles," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 3, file 5, LAC.

Figure 4.2



AN APPEAL OF CONCERN
To All Winnipeg Citizens
Re "LVIV" — the so-called
Ukrainian Pavilion at "Folklorama" '72

This Pavilion "Lviv", located at 595 Pritchard Ave. — this is a Pavilion which is being sponsored by Communists.

"Lviv" — does not represent Ukrainian culture at Folklorama '72. This is a Communist political propaganda Pavilion . . .

They are using the name "LVIV" the Communists profaned the name of the old Ukrainian city, which still is a symbol of struggle against Communists.

Why are the Communists ashamed of their ideology, covering up with Ukrainian names? Why do they not call their Pavilion, "Labor Temple"; "Red Star"; "Red Square"; "Kremlin"?

We object and protest against them using the name "LVIV".

We believe the so-called — Association of United Ukrainian Canadians — is a political and Communist organization.

We are very disappointed that, the Folk Arts Council of Manitoba allowed the Communists to have the Lviv Pavilion.

We question under whose authority the Folk Arts Council divided the Ukraine into two parts: "Kiev and Lviv"?

This is an offence to most Ukrainian people and is a political crime, just as the division between East and West Germany; North and South Vietnam; have caused wars and created enemies throughout the world.

Surely, it is not the intention of our Provincial Minister of Cultural Affairs, to create divisions within our ethnic groups and in particular the good Ukrainian Canadians?

In order to avoid this in the future, we suggest, that there should be only one Pavilion for each ethnic group, as in past years.

COMMITTEE AD HOC OF THE CANADIAN UKRAINIANS IN WINNIPEG.
Rev. S. Izyk - 418 Aberdeen Ave.

An appeal regarding Lviv Pavilion. Source: "An Appeal of Concern to all Winnipeg Citizens," Prokop Family fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, box H-893, file 5, Canadian Museum of History.

Ukrainian Canadians and the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission

The battle over ownership of the cultural sphere also morphed into something much more multifarious and complex, seeping into broader debates regarding culture and belonging that were occurring in Canadian society. Most notably, Ukrainians became exceptionally active in the debate surrounding official multiculturalism. Fueled in equal parts by the multicultural

movement (that the Nationalities Branch had earnestly attempted during the war), the solidification of the postwar liberal consensus, and the rise of nationalism amongst French Canadians, setting a policy on this front became a top priority of Lester Pearson's Liberal government. In response to these and other vexatious questions, the prime minister officially established the Bi and Bi Commission in 1963. The commission was tasked with investigating the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in the country and making recommendations for Canada moving forward.[530]

The announcement of the Bi and Bi Commission precipitated a shift in thinking amongst the UCC leadership. This was influenced, in part, by Watson Kirkconnell who had worked tirelessly during the war to better acculturate ethnic groups to Canadian society and vice versa. As Chapter Three shows, he remained a dedicated friend to the committee, assisting them long after the collapse of the Nationalities Branch and his formal retreat from government circles. Kirkconnell urged the committee to make the socio-cultural sphere integral to its political strategy in order to take advantage of these developments at the federal level. Unlike Diefenbaker, who had little trouble courting ethnic voting blocs because of his early and unreserved support for multiculturalism, Kirkconnell knew that Pearson was struggling to secure a wider base of support amongst ethnic groups. Liberal Party strategists were trying to remedy this by having the prime minister cultivate relationships with ethnic groups in the cultural sphere – by attending their dinners, concerts, ceremonies, and special events.[531]

The UCC shifted its internal policy towards securing clear guarantees and concessions to Ukrainian culture and language "as a rooted fact of Canadian national life." Assimilation, they

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[530] "Terms of Reference on the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 19 July 1963, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 5, file 1, LAC.

[531] Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community," 101; Lalande, "The Roots of Multiculturalism," 49; Blanding, "Re-branding Canada," 91.

contended, was destructive. Instead, the community wanted to promote the "various talents of [Canada's] mosaic cultures." The committee further pledged to "realize the fundamental claim that the Ukrainian churches, schools, cultural and educational institutions, press, societies and organizations constitute part of Canadian life" and that they are "entitled to recognition and privileges including moral and material support."[532]

Their first step was to kick their existing cultural events into overdrive. Under slogans such as "It's fun to be Ukrainian" and "Ukrainian power," the community ran a series of music and dance festivals, food and handicraft fairs, public tours of churches and other community spaces, tributes to cultural heroes, art exhibits, film screenings, and sports tournaments. In 1971, the Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Village in Alberta was established to showcase the socio-cultural lives of first-wave migrants. The committee also daydreamed about the future possibilities, including Ukrainian inscriptions on postage stamps, Ukrainian lettering on public buildings, and famous community figures on special issues of Canadian money.[533] While obviously deliberate and occasionally downright insincere, the strategy of the UCC was exceptionally effective. Having secured their position as the sole legitimate arbiters and purveyors of Ukrainian culture, they proceeded to transform cultural practices into loaded acts imbued with a deeper meaning and purpose. In other words, culture became a useful and aesthetically innocuous proxy for facilitating their acquisition of recognition, funding, and political power.

The realization of this political maneuvering was made clear when Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, a professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba, was appointed to the Bi and Bi Commission. As others have correctly noted, Rudnyckyj's nomination to the committee as a

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[532] Basil Kushnir and W.J. Sarchuk, "Brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," September 1964.

[533] "Ukrainians Wind Up Congress," October 12, 1972, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Ukrainian was supposed to be a largely symbolic gesture. An academic who had successfully penetrated mainstream society, and a fluent speaker of both English and French, he was perceived mainly as a member of one (or both) of the so-called "founding races."[534] That he happened to be a Ukrainian was simply icing on the cake. For the nationalists, however, who knew Rudnyckyj to be a committed nationalist and anti-communist, the appointment was a much-celebrated choice. Working alongside other prominent Ukrainians in government, such as Progressive Conservative Senator Paul Yuzyk, Rudnyckyj served a vital role in advancing the nationalist agenda within the context of the commission.[535]

The second major victory of the nationalists was their tenacious remoulding of the Bi and Bi Commission's scope. Over time the commission's frame of reference was forcibly altered by so-called "Third Force" Canadians, a loose conglomerate of ethnic groups who objected to its limited focus on the English and the French.[536] The nationalists were amongst the most vocal of this group. As soon as the commission was announced, the UCC began lobbying politicians and passing resolutions at community meetings.[537] Manoly Lupul, a professor at the University of

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[534] Blanding, "Re-branding Canada," 99.

[535] "New senator Ukrainian history expert," February 6, 1963, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ethnic Groups Should be Co-Partners, Yuzyk Says," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 17, LAC; "Commission Misnamed," November 15, 1963, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Third Element in Canada Cited," February 27, 1964, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Canada Multicultural, Yuzyk Tells Convention," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 6, LAC; Paul Yuzyk, "Canada: A Multicultural Nation," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 7 (1965).

[536] More recently, scholars have challenged the legitimacy of the term "Third Force" due to its implications of homogeneity and consensus amongst the distinctive groups it describes. Some have chosen to use the term "multicultural movement" instead. I distinguish between the multicultural movement, a longstanding movement to promote tolerance and unity in society, and "Third Force" Canadians, a stand-in for those activists who traded in multicultural rhetoric for political power.

[537] "*Zaproshenia*," 27 September 1963, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 3, LAC; "The Manitoba Advisory Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 30 January 1964, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 3, LAC; "Submission of Curatorium of Ukrainian Catholic Schools," 22 January 1964, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 3, LAC; "Notice of Meeting," 10 February 1966, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 9, LAC; "Re: Brief Report on 5th Ukrainian Canadian University Students Union Congress," 18-20 February 1966, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7 file 9, LAC; "Panel on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 15 February 1966, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 9, LAC; Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, "Ukrainian Canadian Council of Learned Societies," *Slavistica* 62 (1968); "Motions to the 9th Congress of the Ukrainian Canadian

Alberta who became one of the fiercest promoters of multiculturalism, likewise delivered a series of educational lectures in support of the community's stance and lent further academic credibility to the enterprise.[538]

These efforts collectively set the tone for the preliminary hearings of the commission, which began in 1963. Overall, the community submitted at least thirty-one submissions, a relatively profound overstep that irritated all of the commissioners except for Rudnyckyj.[539] While there were certainly some minor differences in the submissions, all generally advanced the idea that Canada was a multicultural – and not a bicultural – nation.[540] Biculturalism, they claimed, took for granted the significant contributions of ethnic groups to Canada and sometimes even discriminated against them. The narrow terminology used by the commission meant that Ukrainians, and others, were often relegated to the status of immigrants and 'New Canadians.' While the paternalistic and infantilizing nature of such taxonomies was an irritant, the real goal was reaching – both formally and informally – something resembling equality with the English and French. Ukrainians, one community activist penned, "had been left in the cold by the Battle of the Plains of Abraham and its aftermath."[541] A policy of multiculturalism could remedy this

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Committee," 12-14 October 1968, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 9, file 7, LAC; "Teach in Program: Ukrainian Canadians in the New Confederation," 12 October 1968, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 9, file 7, LAC.

[538] Lupul's perspective is best summarized in his memoir: Manoly Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005).

[539] This figure does not yet include submissions from Ukrainian-adjacent groups or individuals. "Multiculturalism is Topic for Ukrainian Women's Convention," November 7, 1963, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community," 105; Olha Woycenko, *Canada's Cultural Heritage: Ukrainian Contribution* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1964); Blanding, "Re-branding Canada," 135, 144, 163; Lalande, "The Roots of Multiculturalism," 49.

[540] "Statement of the Conference of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 30 September 1963, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC.

[541] Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism Preliminary Hearings, 1963*,* 219-220; "Jean Baptistes Criticized: New Canadians Win Praise as Forward-Looking Citizens," November 11, 1963, *Toronto Daily Star;* "Ukrainians Wind Up Congress," October 12, 1971, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainians Pawns in Struggle: Hlynka," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 2, LAC; "Ukrainians Ask Wider Commission," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC; "Bilingualism Commission's Mention of Only Two Races in Canada Deplored by Polish, Ukrainian Groups," March 30, 1965, *The Globe and Mail;* "B and B Basis Challenged by Ukrainian Group," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file

inequality by recognizing the reality that Canada was, as Yuzyk described it, an unmistakable "nation of minorities."[542]

Canada may have been a nation of minorities, but the submissions of the nationalists made clear that some in the community still believed in a hierarchy amongst said minorities. The Ukrainians were not like other immigrants, they contended, but rather founding peoples in their own right. In their estimation, had it not been for their ancestors who began arriving in Canada in the 1890s to "settle" the Prairies, the nation-building project may well have failed. With this in mind, they demanded a special status above the rest that would recognize their unique level of sacrifice for Canada.[543] It is not clear how much of this was genuine belief versus clever politicking. On the one hand, some of the more extreme elements within the community certainly adhered to notions of superiority over their ethnic compatriots. They would have also had no trouble promoting settlement narratives premised on Indigenous erasure and romanticized struggle. It seems more likely, however, that this position reflected a calculated negotiating strategy. By starting with far-fetched - even unreasonable - demands like equal status to the English and the French, the policy of multiculturalism seemed remarkably reasonable by comparison.

The submissions also struggled with how best to strengthen Ukrainian language rights. Some provincial branches of the UCC supported the concept of "multiple bilingualism," wherein respective mother tongues were recognized alongside either English or French (depending on the province). Others advocated for regional ethnic language education, which would guarantee

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28, LAC; "Ukrainians Urge Equal Status Law," September 26, 1967, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* Lalande, "The Roots of Multiculturalism," 49-51.

[542] Canada, Senate, *Debates of the Senate,* 3 March 1964, 52.

[543] Smolynec, "Multicultural Cold War," 199; Lalande, ""The Roots of Multiculturalism," 51.

Ukrainian language instruction in locations heavily populated by Ukrainians. The national executive of the UCC took a much more hardline approach, suggesting that English should be the only official language of the country.[544] Rather than contend with the unique problems of Quebec that could be settled in a provincial referendum, the committee suggested that the government use the commission to investigate the potential of establishing a federal ministry of culture. Moreover, they pushed for a related inter-ethnic advisory board that could recognize, support, and nurture Canada's multicultural and multilingual population.[545]

"Culture as a Critique of the Status Quo": Challenging Nationalist Narratives

Not everyone supported the recommendations peddled by the nationalists. Revealing the limits of Anglo-Canadian tolerance for foreigners – even if they were of the correct political persuasion – *The Winnipeg Free Press* published a scathing editorial that admittedly misrepresented the nationalist position. The editorial claimed that their submissions were promoting a policy that would elevate Ukrainian to the same level as English and French. Dubbing it "linguistic chaos," it warned their readers that if the Ukrainians had their way they would "transform Canada into a real Tower of Babel." The nationalists tried desperately to correct the misunderstanding, issuing a series of articles that laid out their opinions in a clear, matter-of-fact way. But few listened and the editorials continued to warn of the foreign threat to Anglo-Canadian hegemony.[546]

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[544] For a fascinating overview of the tensions that emerged between ethnic groups and French Canadians see Blanding, "Re-branding Canada," 131-141.

[545] "Brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "A Just Language Policy for a Just Society," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 16, LAC; "The Third Element as a Cultural Balance in the Canadian Identity," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 59, LAC; "Bilingualism and Multiculturalism: What do the Ukrainians Want and Why?" JR, MG31, D58, vol. 68, LAC; "Equality for all Urged in Brief to Government Probe," September 30, 1963, *Free Press;* "UCC Aim: Language Equality," December 9, 1968, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian Canadian Governor-General Suggested to B-B," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC; "B&B Commission prof wants Ukrainian as regional language," December 22, 1967, *Manitoban;* "Speaker Proposes Region Languages," February 24, 1968, *The Daily Times Journal.*

[546] "Linguistic Chaos," February 4, 1964, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Two languages are enough," March 31, 1965, *Toronto Daily Star*; "The B and B Again: Cries from the Heart," December 13, 1965, *The Winnipeg Free Press.* For an excellent history of Anglo-Canadian approaches to multiculturalism during the twentieth century see Howard

Not all Ukrainian Canadians supported the recommendations of the UCC either. Wasyl Swystun, now firmly out of the nationalist camp, critiqued the committee's submissions for not meaningfully addressing the broader problems facing the country.[547] Speaking out from within the UCC umbrella, the leaders of the Ukrainian Canadian Students' Union (SUSK) also strongly condemned the UCC for their insincere deployment of multicultural rhetoric in order to gain political power. Highly influenced by the writing of Myrna Kostash, whose groundbreaking book *All of Baba's Children* critically examined Ukrainian identity in Canada, they pushed back on the committee's fixation on anti-communism that reinforced the Cold War geopolitics of the Canadian and American governments.[548] This came at the expense of the community confronting the unique problems facing Ukrainians in Canada. Highly influenced by both the New Left and the New Consciousness movement, the students' union was strongly supportive of Quebec's right to self-determination, Indigenous rights, environmentalism, the women's movement, labour organizing, and human rights protections. They condemned the way that the UCC continued to dismiss these issues in favour of waging their primary war against communism.

SUSK leadership feared that the UCC's multicultural activism would look much the same. "Cultural activity on its own is an activity of the ghetto," Kostash insisted. "Only when we begin to see ourselves in relation to social and political developments will that culture be dynamic. An exploration of culture isn't satisfactory if it isn't also a critique of the status quo." Taking matters into their own hands, members of SUSK joined forces with *Les Sortileges,* a

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Palmer, "Reluctant Hosts: Anglo-Canadian Views of Multiculturalism in the Twentieth Century," in Gerald Tulchinsky, ed., *Immigration in Canada: Historical Perspectives* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 297-333.

[547] "Ukrainian Group Calls Inquiry a Mistake," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 7, file 3, LAC.

[548] Myrna Kostash, *All of Baba's Children* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1992).

French-Canadian folk ensemble, for a concert tour of western Canada that would conclude with a joint performance at Folklorama. A pilot project driven by SUSK's disillusionment with "idle talk about how Canadian should learn to live together," the groups came together to "show Canadians how it could be done." SUSK also spearheaded a creative project known as Video-SUSK, which documented how Ukrainians across the country interpreted and presented their culture. The project would culminate in a series of educational videos to be shared with the public.[549]

The AUUC responded to the submissions of the nationalists in much of the same way. Highly influenced by the briefing submitted to the commission by the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), they supported the principle that Canada was a "country of two nations." While the association did not agree with how the separatist movement was manifesting, it was highly sympathetic to Quebec's unique situation and supported the province's right to national self-determination. These considerations shaped the association's opinions on the efforts of the "Third Force" to restructure the commission. While the AUUC pushed for the inclusion in the commission's inquiry of Indigenous peoples, whose shameful treatment by the state was "a cancer that continues to sap the health and vitality of our country," they did not approve of any further alterations to the committee's scope. Any valid assessment of history, they argued, would agree that Canada was a bilingual and bicultural nation at its core. Efforts to address the present crisis of Confederation needed to first acknowledge the English–French divide. Only if and when these problems were solved could a cohesive cultural policy be developed to serve the needs of all Canadians.

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[549] *On Language and Culture* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1962); "Ukrainians Wind up Congress," October 12, 1971, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian culture preserved," August 30, 1972, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian week festival planned," December 23, 1972, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian culture, fun ahead," January 24, 1973, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainians to discuss future," August 17, 1978, *Manitoban;* "Ukrainian culture revitalized," October 17, 1978, *The Tribune.*

The AUUC certainly recognized the integral role of ethnic groups in shaping the country and wholeheartedly supported strategies that celebrated and even bolstered them. A policy of official multiculturalism, however, was vulnerable to corruption. Describing their experiences during Expo 67 and Folklorama as political favouritism run amok, they worried that "it is the size of the vote that can be swung and the colour that others presumptuously attach to your political philosophy that are all important." Urging unity and understanding was imperative, but in their current form these policies were nothing more than "colourful window dressing hiding intentions to maintain the status quo."

Multiculturalism also hinged on the concept of "one country, one nation," which opened the door to "serious, irresponsible, and harmful distortions of Canadian reality and perspectives." In other words, "it perpetuated the greatest inequality by using misleading euphemisms and deliberately employed blind spots to deviate the presence of two national communities in Canada." The victims of this, they warned, were not just the French, but rather Canadians as a whole. Ensuring that their briefing made them absolutely no friends, the AUUC went on to criticize the government for what they believed were disingenuous intentions influenced by the need for political expediency. "The political aim of multiculturalism is directly related to the conditions of crises in Confederation. The federal power, in seeking a countervailing force against the national aspirations of the French-Canadian people, sees a potential ally in the ethnic field. This is obvious," they asserted, "from the political terms of reference in the development of this policy and from the speeches of some of its main advocates."[550] Theirs was a principled position, but it would cost the AUUC significantly.

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[550] Morrison and Lacoste to AUUC, 10 October 1963, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 23, file 35, LAC; "AUUC Statement on Multiculturalism," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, file 23, LAC; "Official Raps Bias Against Ethnic Groups," May 23, 1968, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainians in Canada: A Few Facts and Figures," Stavroff Private Collection; "A Message from the National Secretary," Stavroff Private Collection; "Statement on Tabling the Brief of the National Executive Committee, Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," Prokop fonds, ACC

Third Force Activism in Action: Crafting Linguicide and the Pioneer Myth

It was certainly laudable for the AUUC to take a principled position and call for an inquiry that was rooted in historical fact rather than mythology. Noteworthy too was its stance against positions that unfairly and disproportionately prioritized the desires of the distinctly self-interested "Third Force," even when it could directly benefit their association and its membership. Yet their approach was also exceptionally shortsighted. While the AUUC would continue to enthusiastically promote cultural work, their brief signaled that they would not participate in a debate regarding multiculturalism on a terrain chosen and set by the nationalists. Moreover, the association was neither willing nor interested in appropriating multicultural rhetoric in exchange for political power. This was a fight that the nationalists were going to wage regardless of what the AUUC did, and by taking such a hard stand the association all but removed themselves from the conversations and debates. With no opposition on the record, the nationalists were able to infuse their own narratives and political aspirations into the emerging policy.

One of the consequences of this unchecked influence can be found in Rudnyckyj's writings on "linguicide." He defined and outlined the consequences of linguicide in a minority report that was attached to Volume I of the commission's findings:

> Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or part or to prevent the natural development of a language or dialect should be considered as a linguicidal act:
>
> a) Killing members of a community speaking a respective language or dialect (genocide)
> b) Imposing repressive measures intended to prevent the natural, organic development of a language or dialect
> c) Forcibly inflicting on a bilingual (two language) community conditions of cultural development calculated to transform it into a unilingual group

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2010-H0021, Box H-875, file 33, CMH; "Submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-875, file 33, CMH; "Multiculturalism and Canadian Reality: Cultural Policy and the Other Ethnic Groups," Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-880, file 19, CMH; "AUUC Statement on Multiculturalism," Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-880, file 19, CMH; "Submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by the Communist Party of Canada," Prokop fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, Box H-884, file 31, CMH.

d) Against the will of an ethnolingual group denying the right of a language to be taught in public schools, to be used in mass media (press, radio, television, etc.)
e) Against the demand of an ethno-lingual group refusing moral and material support for its language maintenance efforts and cultural endeavours

As a trained linguist, community authority, and member of the commission, Rudnyckyj's avowals that Ukrainian was on the decline, and was maybe even being actively repressed, struck a chord with the nationalist community. There was some evidence to support his claims. But by referencing genocide, the degradation of human rights, and even the threat of a "linguistic pogrom," a deliberate choice of words that inappropriately equated language degradation with mass anti-Jewish violence, Rudnyckyj's warnings were purposely weaponized to generate a moral panic.

Those who internalized the admonitions of Rudnyckyj stoked and nurtured a perpetual victimhood mentality that convinced them of an ongoing, existential threat to the Ukrainian people. Perhaps, in part, this historical negationism explains why the nationalists behaved so forcefully during the preliminary hearings of the commission despite the audible irritation of the commissioners. They maintained that their language and culture were under active assault and that it was a moral imperative for them to take immediate action. Over time, this thinking adhered a messianic element to simple acts of cultural reproduction. In other words, the threat of linguicide created a dynamic where quotidian cultural and linguistic maintenance was valorized and assigned world historical importance. "Good Ukrainians," it came to be understood, were those who would prevent linguicide from taking root and help language and culture flourish.

Of course, "Good Ukrainians" were also anti-communists. The nationalists claimed that linguicide was a direct result of communist ideology that wanted to destroy Ukrainian language, culture, and identity. In Canada this was manifest in the AUUC, an association that needed to be aggressively attacked and prevented from participating in the cultural sphere at all costs. In the Soviet Union, Ukrainian-ness – at least in the way that it was understood by the nationalists –

was under attack from the state and was far more difficult to counter. But since Russification had been implemented in Soviet Ukraine, nationalists in the diaspora saw themselves as an integral front line defense in the safeguarding of culture. It was critically important to preserve what the community had built in Canada because, unlike other ethnic groups, they had no homeland culture to return to.[551] These narratives of multiculturalism as a defence against the progression of communism played well with the commissioners. Indeed, the patience of co-chair André Laurendeau with the nationalists grew significantly after a private conversation with UCC President Wasyl Kushnir on this very topic.[552] They were also well-received by government officials and politicians who began to frequently evoke the concept of linguicide in their public speeches and political displays. Through an exploration of monuments and commemoration, Chapter Five further details how politicians used the cultural sphere as a vector for their anti-communist messaging.

Another consequence of unchecked nationalist influence over the commission was their development and exploitation of the so-called pioneer myth. This myth is still prevalent today and continues to shape how Ukrainian Canadians conceptualize both their history and identity. The roots of this idea can be directly traced to the era of the commission. Because of their push for special status as a founding peoples of the Prairies, the nationalists began writing community histories "to fight for the truth about Ukraine and to take credit for our part in Canadian

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[551] "Language Rights and Linguicide," 1968, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 22, LAC; "Linguicide: A Contribution to Sociolinguistics," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 22, LAC; "Linguicide," December 22, 1967, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 23, LAC; "Linguicide warning given by commissioner," January 22, 1968, *The Ottawa Citizen;* "*Movovbyvstvo,*" JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 23, LAC; "*Lyngvytsyd – movovbyvstvo*," February 3, 1968, *Nasha Meta;* "Fifth Freedom," February 1968, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 23, LAC; "Freedom from Linguicide Advocated by B&B Member," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 23, LAC; "Telegram to Ottawa," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 23, LAC; "From Behind the Official Languages Curtain," April 12, 1972, *Ukrainsky Holos;* "Letters to the Editor," March 3, 1978, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Linguicide warning given by commissioner," January 22, 1968, *The Ottawa Citizen.*

[552] Blanding, "Re-branding Canada," 141.

history."[553] Central to this was the hoary trope of "men in sheepskin coats."[554] Focused on narratives of hardship and struggle, the pioneers were described as role models – even heroes – who turned the apparently empty wilderness into fertile land. At first these arguments were widely disseminated by community leaders and their supporters in the state apparatus. Over time, as the field of community studies grew, this task was taken on by academics and community activists. Together, they developed an extensive body of scholarship that further solidified the pioneer myth in the consciousness of their constituents.[555]

As Franca Iacovetta notes, this scholarship was wanting, if not outright problematic. Chronically insular and hyper focused on agency, resiliency, and success, it often downplayed the way in which race, class, gender, and political persuasion shaped migrant lives. It also homogenized migrant groups in ways that overemphasized the role of community leaders and

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[553] Lalande, "The Roots of Multiculturalism," 53.

[554] "Men in sheepskin coats," a term coined by Vera Lysenko, borrows from the famous quote by Clifford Sifton, minister of the interior from 1896 to 1905. When describing his ideal migrant, Sifton remarked that a "stalwart peasant in a sheepskin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen children, is good quality." While not intended as a compliment, Ukrainian Canadians embraced the term in the period under review as part of their crafting of the pioneer myth.

[555] A sample of this work follows. Vera Lysenko, *Men in Sheepskin Coats* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949); Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); Paul Yuzyk, "The First Ukrainians in Manitoba," *Transactions of the Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba,* Series III (1951-1952); Peter Lazarowich, "Ukrainian Pioneers in Western Canada," *Alberta Historical Review* 5, no. 4 (1957): 17-27; Illia Kyriiak, *Sons of the Soil* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959); Vladimir Kaye, *Early Settlements in Canada, 1895-1900: Dr. Josef Oleskow's Role in the Settlement of the Canadian Northwest* (Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, 1964); J. G. MacGregor, *Vilni Zemi (Free Lands): The Ukrainian Settlement of Alberta* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969); Harry Piniuta, *Land of Pain, Land of Promise: First Person Accounts by Ukrainian Pioneers, 1891-1914* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1978); William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980); Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1918-1951* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981); Michael Ewanchuk, *Pioneer Profiles: Ukrainian Settlers in Manitoba* (Winnipeg: M. Ewanchuk, 1981); Olenka Negrych, *Toil and Triumph: The Life and Times of Anton and Yevdokia Smerechanski, Pioneer Ukrainian Settlers of Manitoba's Interlake* (Winnipeg: John Shanski, 1981); Paul Yuzyk, "The Political Achievements of Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1981," in Jaroslav Rozumnyj, ed., *New Soil – Old Roots: The Ukrainian Experience in Canada* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1983), 303-316; Michael Ewanchuk, *Reflections and Reminiscences: Ukrainians in Canada, 1892-1992* (Winnipeg: M. Ewanchuk, 1995); Peter Humeniuk, *Hardships and Progress of Ukrainian Pioneers: Memoirs from Stuartburn Colony and Other Points* (Steinbach: Derksen Printers, no date); Marshall A. Nay, *Trailblazers of Ukrainian Emigration to Canada: Wasyl Elaniak and Ivan Pylypow* (Edmonton: Brightest Pebble Publishing, 1997).

brokers (who were almost exclusively male, conservative, and religious) at the expense of individuals with disparate lived experiences.[556] Regardless of the triumphalist and hagiographic character of the pioneer myth, it was unquestionably consumed by community members who began to see themselves, through their descendants, as having served an integral role in nation building.

Central to these conceptions was a program of active forgetting, which entailed an intentional or unintentional rejection of anything that may have challenged the veracity of the myth. Active forgetting included Indigenous erasure. By describing pioneers as having turned wilderness into fertile land, the community advanced assumptions and arguments that the space they occupied had been previously uninhabited. And by campaigning for recognition as a founding peoples, they help to further entrench a settler colonial narrative laden with innacuracies. The nationalists also conveniently overlooked that Ukrainians were not the first nor last pioneers to participate in "settling" the West. While they were certainly statistically significant, their story was hardly unique and, therefore, should not countenance a special status. Yet this claim was repeated until it simply became fact and any potential deterrents either folded into their ranks or no longer had any influence or power.

Even more significantly, the pioneer myth as a core tenet of Ukrainian identity only made sense if the entire community could be linked back to the first wave of migrants who had arrived in Canada between 1891 and 1914. This, of course, was not the case. The vast majority of the nationalists driving this narrative had arrived in either the second or third wave and settled mostly in the urban locales of eastern Canada. While nationalist and religious organizations undoubtedly existed at the time of the first wave, migrants generally gravitated towards the

[556] Franca Iacovetta, "Manly Militants, Cohesive Communities, and Defiant Domestics: Writing about Immigrants in Canadian Historical Scholarship," *Labour/Le Travail* 36 (1995): 238-240.

ULFTA or the populist outfits that occupied the ideological center. At least in part, this can be explained by the ULFTA's concomitant commitment to ethnic patriotism, workers' solidarity, and community self-reliance. Even when they were not explicitly political, the experiences of migrants in Canada, which were riddled with xenophobia, exploitation, and homesickness, led them towards organizations like the ULFTA, which uniquely understood, and could offer solutions for, the hard realities of their lives as migrants. These demographic realities were obfuscated and ignored, however, and the utility of the pioneer myth for political gain was cemented. Nationalist leaders had gained control of an integral narrative and remade it in a way that shaped the overall political consciousness of the community from then on.

The legitimate (albeit not exclusive) claims that the AUUC could make to represent first wave of migrants were rarely mentioned in the scholarship. Rather, first-wave migrants were described as apolitical, members of populist outfits, or as full-fledged nationalist patriots. When leftists were mentioned at all, it was usually only to disparage them or in snide and derogatory asides. For example, in his book on the history of Ukrainian settlement in Manitoba, Yuzyk titled his chapter on the left as "The Ukrainian-Communist Delusion." The chapter focused on the multiple ways in which the left had given Ukrainians in Canada a bad name before relishing in the movement's ultimate decline due to the work of the nationalists.[557]

When alternative histories were produced, they were quickly delegitimized. While it predated the commission by several years, the publication of Vera Lysenko's *Men in Sheepskin Coats: A Study in Assimilation* is particularly instructive on this front. The book was widely criticized for its allegedly pro-communist leanings. In January 1948, Watson Kirkconnell wrote to Lysenko's publisher, Lorne Pierce of Ryerson Press, claiming that Lysenko was a communist

[557] See Chapter Seven of Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba.*

dupe who had written the manuscript at the behest of the CPC. If the book was not withdrawn from publication, threatened Kirkconnell, he would publish a scathing review that would damage Lysenko's personal reputation and publicly accuse Pierce of carrying on propaganda for the Party. Pierce refused to back down and the book remained in print, but Kirkconnell's intervention ensured that its Ukrainians readership was limited at best. Moreover, the damage to Lysenko's career lingered. When, in the 1950s, Pierce published a series of her novels on the Ukrainian Canadian experience they were similarly disparaged by Yuzyk who referred to them as "subtle communist propaganda."[558]

The walling off of first-wave migrants from the ULFTA and progressivism more generally was further reinforced by government officials. In 1966, Pearson joined the nationalists in celebrating the seventy-fifth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. In his speech, the prime minister boldly asserted a direct link between the nationalists and the pioneers and commended the audience for being "hard-working, God-fearing, and courageous" like their forefathers. In a transparent dog whistle, he extolled the community for their longstanding fight for freedom, a luxury not afforded to their Soviet counterparts. "There are many here tonight who know from bitter experience what its loss means – who have experienced the horror and brutality of its forced replacement by despotism," Pearson told the audience in a direct appeal to DPs. "We deeply respect and honour the sacrifice they have made for freedom. We will not let the ideal behind these sacrifices die," he assured them. "We will not have true peace until that ideal of freedom is realized everywhere."[559]

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[558] Sandra Campbell. "Lorne Pierce of the Ryerson Press and Vera Lysenko's Men in Sheepskin Coats (1947): Resisting the Red Scare," https://digitalcollections.mcmaster.ca/hpcanpub/case-study/lorne-pierce-ryerson-press-and-vera-lysenko-s-men-sheepskin-coats-1947-resisting-red-scar?page=0,2

[559] "Remarks by the Prime Minister," 10 May 1966, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 26, LAC.

For the government, Pearson's appearance served yet another purpose. By this time, the leadership of the UCC was already aware that the first volume of the Bi and Bi Commission's findings would not be favourable to them; the commissioners planned to support an official policy of bilingualism.[560] Rudnyckyj was preparing a response that would argue for a recognition of regional languages and the UCC drafted a White Book to demand constitutional guarantees for Ukrainian language rights.[561] This was a problem for Pearson who had not yet managed to steal the Ukrainian vote away from Diefenbaker. Some serious pandering was desperately needed to draw Ukrainians into the Liberal Party. Reinforcing the nationalists' hold over the pioneer myth was just the way to do this. Pointing to the industry, tenacity, and resourcefulness of the pioneers, Pearson applauded Ukrainians for "carving out of the lonely, unbroken Prairie a new life for themselves and new wealth for their adopted country." Canada, he professed, is in debt to those sturdy pioneers. With their sacrifices in mind, Pearson assured the community that the government would not force bilingualism or implement a hierarchy of citizenship that prioritized the founding races. While it was a historical fact that Canada's original foundation was English and French, "the superstructure which it supports consists of people of every origin and creed and colour; but all, Canadians." Ukrainians, the prime minister told the audience, would play an important role in shaping the policies of the future. "With you," he concluded, "I believe in our Confederation; in the full and positive and equal part which all Canadians of all origins can play in the destiny of this country."[562]

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[560] "Yaremko says the Bi-Bi probe ignore ethnic 'third element,'" February 28, 1969, *The Toronto Star;* "Wider Ethnic Rights Favored," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC; "Confliction on minority rights," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC.

[561] Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, "Ukrainian Canadian Letters: A Case of Literary Regionalism," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 12, LAC; "Professor Faces 'The Great Task,'" July 23, 1963, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Migrants Must Keep Culture," December 9, 1970, *The Australian;* Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community," 106.

[562] "Remarks by the Prime Minister," 17 July 1966, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 26, LAC.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Policy of Official Multiculturalism

Evoking the pioneer myth was mutually beneficial. For the nationalists, it further engrained the precarious linkages between the pioneers and the nationalists and, in turn, cemented the UCC's dominion over the community. Little ambiguity or room to debate remained. The committee spoke for all Ukrainians – past and present – and questions of national belonging and group coherence were being subsumed into a project and narrative, guided by ideological actors, which reflected their own political vision and self-interested needs. For the government, it served as an evocative means for strengthening its bonds with a key constituency.

On this front, Pearson was ultimately successful, and the community came out in full force to support the election of his successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau.[563] During his first years in office, Trudeau oversaw the conclusion of the Bi and Bi Commission, which released its final report on "The Cultural Contributions of Other Ethnic Groups" in April 1970. Because of Pearson's previous work in appeasing them, the UCC was satisfied with the recommendations made in the final report. While they continued to take issue with the characterization of Canada as a bilingual and bicultural nation, they concluded that there were some admittedly useful policies being proposed. Plus, at the provincial level, the governments of Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario were each beginning to administer programs geared towards supporting multiculturalism that directly benefited the community.[564]

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[563] Not everyone was on board. Conservative Senator Paul Yuzyk warned that Trudeau's meteoric rise in popularity was a socialist plot and that his election would put Canada in danger of becoming a socialist state. "Yuzyk Brands PM Socialist," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 56, LAC.

[564] "Toward a Cultural Mosaic?" November 5, 1970, *Free Press;* "Calls for Language Policy," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 28, LAC; "Ukrainian Heritage Village: An Exciting Historical Project East of Edmonton," Stavroff Private Collection; Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Community," 106-107; Smolynec, "Multicultural Cold War," 191.

Despite a promising early relationship between Trudeau and the nationalists, things quickly turned sour. In addition to their constant lobbying for multiculturalism, the community was now advocating on behalf of jailed anti-Soviet Ukrainian dissidents. This clashed with Trudeau's personal politics, which were both critical of nationalism and somewhat soft on Cold War pugilism. Plus, similarly to how they had complicated King's wartime relationship with the Soviets, the nationalists were muddling Trudeau's foreign policy. On a trip to the Soviet Union in May 1971, Trudeau did not intervene on behalf of Soviet dissidents despite repeated requests from the UCC to do so. When asked about it by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Trudeau caused serious controversy by explaining that he was not sympathetic to "anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism."

Trudeau's answer was cold but calculated. He very well understood that advocating on behalf of the dissidents would invite comparisons with his own treatment of the Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ). If he challenged the Soviets, they would surely ask why Canada "should… put your revolutionaries in jail, and we shouldn't put ours?" Regardless, Trudeau's comments triggered a series of hunger strikes across the country to protest his apparent apathy towards imprisoned dissidents. The Set Them Free Committee, as the protestors came to be known, demanded a personal meeting with the prime minister and his commitment to a definite policy on dissidents.[565] Things only worsened when Trudeau compared the Soviet Union to Canada's federal system. While perhaps poorly articulated, his comments were actually sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause. The prime minister saw the rise of the FLQ, and Quebec separatism more generally, as responses to the same feelings of internal colonialism that informed Ukrainian independence. As the nationalists repeatedly made clear during the

[565] "Hunger strike in third day to protest prisoners' plight," October 8, 1971, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainians Wind up Congress," October 12, 1971, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

commission, however, they had a poor grasp of the historical positionality of French Canadians within Confederation. Therefore, they failed to make the connections that the prime minister was making and erroneously accused him of suggesting that Ukraine was a willing and equal partner in the Soviet Union.[566]

With these political blunders in mind, it is no coincidence that Trudeau selected the triennial congress of the UCC to announce his policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. As Gregory Smolynec explains, official multiculturalism was long in the works and Trudeau's reasoning for introducing it goes far beyond scoring some cheap political points. The prime minister chiefly saw it as a way to separate "the state from the nation" and weaken nationalism in Quebec.[567] This does not mean, however, that Trudeau's choice of venue for the announcement was an accident. Trudeau clearly understood that some good old fashioned brokerage politics were desperately needed to salvage his relationship with the community. The utility of this was reinforced to him by Rudnyckyj, who wrote to the prime minister in the days leading up to the congress to urge him to use the event to his advantage.[568]

Trudeau's speech was masterful. His evocation of the pioneer myth seamlessly transitioned into a skillful polemic about the benefits of a multicultural society. As he built to his crescendo of announcing official multiculturalism, he took great care to compliment the many

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[566] "Tory MPs Attack Trudeau Statement Linking Ukrainian Nationalists, FLQ," June 1, 1971, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian spokesman raps PM," June 1, 1971, *The Tribune;* "PM lacked intestinal fortitude on Ukrainian issue, MP declares," June 1, 1971, *The Globe and Mail;* "Trudeau Explains Stand," June 2, 1971, *The Tribune;* "Trudeau Apology Sought," June 2, 1971, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainians," June 5, 1971, *The Globe and Mail;* "Benefits linked to old feuds in immigrants, June 5, 1971, *The Tribune;* "Ukrainian council criticizes Trudeau," June 8, 1971, *The Tribune;* "PM Apologizes to Ukrainians," June 8, 1971, *Winnipeg Tribune;* "Letter to the Editor," June 11, 1971, *The Globe and Mail;* "Has Trudeau Alienated Many?" June 21, 1971, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Ukrainian Group Hails Trudeau Trip," June 28, 1971, *The Tribune;* "Group Hits Criticism of Visit," June 29, 1971, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Charles Lynch," October 7, 1971, *The Tribune.*

[567] Smolynec, "Multicultural Cold War," 196-197.

[568] Rudnyckyj to Trudeau, 22 September 1971, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 5, LAC; "Ukrainians expect PM to give new literary, artistic support," October 8, 1971, *The Tribune.*

contributions of Ukrainians to shaping Canada's mosaic and thanked them for their active participation in the Bi and Bi Commission. In quick succession, Trudeau then announced a series of policies that included:

a) Federal support for cultural groups who have demonstrated a desire and effort to grow and contribute to Canada
b) Assistance to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society
c) Promotion of creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity
d) Support for immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society
e) Programs to bolster the work of National Museums, the National Film Board, the National Library, and the Public Archives

These specific policies were new, Trudeau contended, but the principle behind them was "as old as Canada." Quoting Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, he declared that he wanted "the marble to remain marble, the granite to remain granite, and the oak to remain oak, and out of all these elements I would build a nation great among the nations of the world."

Yet Trudeau also recognized the distinctive needs of each community, central of which was anti-communism for the Ukrainians. While he was not a committed anti-communist in the way that past prime ministers had been, and he urged the nationalists not to engage in the "illusory and self-destructive luxury of hatred…towards persons or governments beyond our borders," Trudeau nevertheless played into the community's desires. After reciting a poem by Ukraine's national bard Taras Shevchenko, whose own role in the battle over the community is explored in more detail in the next chapter, Trudeau praised the UCC for its integral role in preserving Ukrainian culture in Canada where it was free from the degrading influence of the Soviets. He urged the community to maintain hope that Ukraine would one day be free, "for as long as hope still dwells within the heart, there let it live, and drive it not away." Cajoling the

crowd, he ended his speech by mustering his best *diakoyu* (thank you). The crowd jumped to their feet to deliver him a roaring round of applause.[569]

Trudeau's showing at congress explains just how formidable the cultural politicking of the nationalists had become. While it had long been central to their political strategy, culture had evidently taken on even more value in the era of official multiculturalism. Now able to command the serious attention of a sitting prime minister - on their own terms that - the nationalists were coming ever closer to achieving uncontested legitimacy. While the AUUC continued to stage their own cultural displays, and even tried to actively reclaim the pioneer myth as their own, the ship had sailed. Stripped of any rightful claims to sustaining folklore and culture over the course of the century, they only drifted further to the margins of community and public consciousness.

[569] "Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress," 9 October 1971, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 8, file 27, LAC.

Figure 4.3



The AUUC trying to salvage the pioneer myth. Source: Ukrainian Canadian Jubilee Festival Souvenir Program, July 1951, *Ukrainian Canadian.*

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how cultural production became a key arena in which nationalist hegemony was entrenched. Through their close collaboration with state officials and their own growing power, the nationalists successfully undermined every effort undertaken by the communists to lay claim over the cultural sphere. As a result, the communists' ability to either maintain existing levels of popularity or to make further inroads into the community was significantly hindered. At the same time, the nationalists succeeded in asserting themselves as the exclusive representatives of the community both internally and before the public.

The unchecked status rewarded the nationalists with control over community narratives. To advocate for special status before the Bi and Bi Commission, they coopted the pioneer myth as their own. It not only gave the false impression to outsiders that the nationalists were the direct descendants of first-wave migrants, but it also marginalized the communists from any rightful or meaningful connection to what was actually their internal community history. Meanwhile, their introduction of the concept of linguicide directly linked support for multiculturalism to a broader intellectual program of anti-communism, explaining the larger implications of this consciousness-raising on society as a whole.

This history further exposes the inherent problem of seeing multiculturalism as exclusively progressive in nature. Returning to the insights of Mackey, Thobani, and Haque, the Ukrainian case well illustrates how the supposed liberalism of multiculturalism was, at its core, a fundamentally conservative ideology of whiteness. To get what they wanted, the nationalists were more than willing to appropriate the discourse of race as well as anti-communism. Culture is neither neutral nor singular. It is actively constructed, disputed, and oftentimes even reshaped. Yet the reality of the heterogeneity and multiplicity within culture is often tacitly disguised behind liberal notions of inclusivity and migrant agency. Rather than interrogate who, and what, is presented to the public, these liberal concepts directed audiences to see what was in front of them as the only way to be.

Chapter 5

Manufacturing Monuments, Manufacturing Memory in the Cold War

On 4 August 1964, an article appeared in *The Globe and Mail* detailing the story of two Ukrainian summer camps located across the road from one another in Palermo, Ontario, just outside of present-day Oakville. The camps, described as a having a "vague scent of the Cold War," were political rivals. Camp Kiev, run by St. Vladimir's Ukrainian Orthodox Church, serviced the nationalist crowd. Camp Palermo catered to the constituents of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC). Rooted in the cultural milieu of both the nationalist and communist movements, these community hubs were critical sites of leisure, childcare, and ethno-cultural instruction. At their peak, each camp attracted thousands of visitors per weekend from across Canada, the United States, and sometimes even Ukraine.

Interviews conducted for the article make clear that tensions between the two groups were at an all-time high. In fact, a councilor from the nationalist camp requested that they not even be mentioned in the same article. "They are communists," he remarked, "and are a thorn in our side."[570] This heightened friction was the outcome of recent animated attempts by both the nationalists and the communists to commemorate Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national bard, on the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his birth. Both had long celebrated Shevchenko, claiming him as their own while reproving similar efforts by their ideological opponents. But the 1961 unveiling of a monument to Shevchenko by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) reignited hostilities to such an extent that it was now deemed newsworthy by the mainstream Canadian media.

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[570] "Rival Ukrainian Camps Highway Neighbors," August 4, 1964, *The Globe and Mail.*

Shevchenko, of course, was not the only poet so highly revered by Ukrainians in Canada. Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka, arguably the next most popular cultural figures to emerge from nineteenth century Ukraine, were also highly exalted. Together, these poets represent the most significant cultural figures in the psyche of Ukrainian Canadians, and monuments erected in their honour were a testament to their abiding relevancy in the community's collective social, cultural, and political consciousness. More importantly, however, they became a major focal point for hostilities and important sites of contested history and memory.

This chapter concentrates on the competing attempts of the nationalists and the communists to commemorate cultural figures as the Cold War intensified. Analogous to the cultural projects investigated in the previous chapter, these monuments were stand-ins through which broader political disagreements were articulated. In turn, they became a central way in which the nationalists strengthened, and ultimately solidified, their claims as the sole, legitimate voice of Ukrainians in Canada.

In a broader sense, this chapter is a glimpse into the world of high politics and the wielding of power that so rarely leaves behind a paper trail. By erecting monuments that promoted an ethno-nationalism rooted in anti-communism, the nationalists strengthened their ties to the state, further legitimizing their version of Ukrainian-ness. Beyond concreting and then neutralizing the political undertones of the own positions, this effectively hindered their communist counterparts by further castigating them as an aberration to the supposedly normative version of identity that the nationalists represented.

The historiography on commemoration is extensive and global in reach, due in large part to the seminal scholarship of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Pierre Nora, and Eric Hobsbawm. Each approaches the topic from a different ideological vantage and field of inquiry, but their conclusions all make clear how commemorative efforts shape and entrench official state

narratives, national identity, and collective memory. Whether interrogating imagined communities, invented traditions, or sites of memory, they articulate how people envision their relationship with one other, as citizens, in a nation state.[571]

As a more recent survey of the field by Matthew Hayday and Raymond Blake shows, historians of Canada rely heavily on this theoretical underpinning in their own efforts to write about commemorative practices.[572] Indeed, Canadian historians have long probed the role that commemorative projects play in moulding a citizenry that reflects the nation's perceived values. They have likewise been attentive to the constructed nature of these national narratives, acknowledging that they are neither static nor impenetrable. Rather, state-sponsored commemoration is routinely, and often successfully, challenged by individuals and groups who demand more inclusive and experiential narratives.

The historiography on Ukrainians in Canada maintains an emphasis on the way in which the community, capitalizing on growing tolerance for "white ethnics," used commemorative projects to challenge Anglo hegemony.[573] In this era, Ukrainian participation in the Canadian

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[571] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[572] Matthew Hayday and Raymond Blake, eds., *Celebrating Canada: Holidays, National Days, and the Crafting of Identities* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 4. For a general overview of commemoration and the contemporary debates that surround it see Veronica Strong-Boag, "Experts on Our Own Lives: Commemorating Canada at the Beginning of the 21st Century," *The Public Historian* 31, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 46-68. For an overview of how the state deals with commemoration see Brian Osborne, "Figuring Space, Marking Time: Contested Identities in Canada," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 2, no. 1-2 (1996): 23-40; Yves Pelletier, "The Politics of Selection: The Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada and the Imperial Commemoration of Canadian History, 1919-1950," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 17, no. 1 (2006): 125-150; Yves Pelletier, "Conscripting Canada's Past: The Harper Government and the Politics of Memory," *Canadian Journal of History* 49, no. 1 (2014): 49-65; Cecilia Morgan, *Commemorating Canada: History, Heritage, and Memory, 1850s-1990s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

[573] Frances Swyripa, "Ukrainian Edmonton: Ethnicity, Space, and Identity in a Canadian Cityscape," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33/34 (Summer 2008/Winter 2009): 429-439; C. S. Ogden, "Edmonton's City Hall as Visual Archive and Collector of Memory," in Annie Gérin and James McLean, eds., *Public Art in Canada: Critical*

polity grew because of the popularity of rhetoric that conceptualized the country as a cultural mosaic. By publicly brandishing their poets, the community used the established parameters of inclusion to build a socio-cultural armour against intolerance and gain legitimacy in the cultural mainstream. This scholarship also sheds light on the use and influence of homeland symbols in the diaspora. Nods to the Old World not only comforted wistful migrants, but they were also practically useful for increasing membership rolls and securing regular attendance. For the AUUC, this was especially important as the Cold War precipitated a need to prove their loyalty to Canada.

A limited amount of work has taken a more critical approach to monuments. Per Rudling's investigation of nationalist monuments in Edmonton, for example, skillfully engages the more sinister consequences of migrants usurping multiculturalism to unseat dominant Anglo narratives. Rudling, however, ignores what I call 'benign monuments' – commemorations of relatively innocuous cultural figures like Shevchenko, Franko, and Ukrainka – in favour of explicitly political ones that appealed exclusively to one political set. Rudling's work is important for documenting how internal nationalist narratives were constructed, but his focus on commemorative projects that were neither contested nor fought over offers little in terms of understanding how nationalist narratives become hegemonic in the community and, in turn, shaped Canadian political consciousness as a whole.[574]

Perspectives (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Frances Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Aya Fujiwara, *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012).

[574] Per Rudling, "Multiculturalism, Memory, and Ritualization: Ukrainian Nationalist Monuments in Edmonton, Alberta," *Nationalities Papers* 39, no. 5 (2011): 733-768. These themes are similarly explored in Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, "Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton: The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada," *Kakanien Revisited* 12 (2010): 1-16. The transnational implications of this are explored in David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007).

This chapter, then, departs from the established historiography to argue that framing access to public space as an inherently progressive action or anti-racist victory ignores the underbelly of these commemorative projects and the deeper political ambitions with which they were imbued. For nationalist Ukrainians in particular, these advantages were of secondary importance. Therefore, when monuments are seen primarily through the liberal optics of inclusivity, migrant agency, and cultural cultivation, their value for understanding how power is exercised is obfuscated.

In the same vein, an analysis of divergent interpretations of the work of Shevchenko, Franko, and Ukrainka is futile. While there were certainly differences in how the nationalists and the communists read their canonical heroes, they were often minor in nature. For different reasons, both groups appreciated the revolutionary and liberatory potential of all three poets. Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement between the groups involved the supposed political affiliations of the poets and to whom they may have "belonged." For many Ukrainians, this was deeply relevant and fueled their active participation in the battles to claim them. For the leadership, however, these debates were nothing more than symbolic proxies for their larger interests in deciding who could speak on behalf of Ukrainians and who could not. The cultural significance of these monuments for rank-and-file Ukrainians should be taken seriously, but they should also be seen as politics by other means, wherein battles over them were about more than presenting Ukrainian-ness to the public. Instead, as this chapter will show, it was about advancing a version of Ukrainian-ness that aligned with nationalist predilections and eradicated alternative points of view.

"Making a Red Hero Out of Shevchenko"

As Chapter Four illustrates, both the nationalists and the communists were eager to evoke and capitalize on the pioneer myth. Therefore, they each set out to commemorate the sixtieth

anniversary of Ukrainian migration in Canada in 1951. Perhaps influenced by the UCC's recently stymied attempt to build a monument to Shevchenko in Winnipeg's St. John Park, the AUUC decided that they would mark the event with a monument.[575] Still recovering from the devastating political repression of the Second World War and the subsequent attacks from a growing nationalist movement, the association turned to the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) for help with the massive logistical and financial undertaking. This was not an unusual move for the association or any other ethnic organizations that made up the communist movement in Canada. As other chapters have shown, outfits such as the Association for Cultural Relations with Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Society Ukraina), and the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society had long connected the diaspora with the homeland.[576]

During a summer meeting in Kyiv, Ukraine, the national executive of the AUUC discussed the idea of a monument with Dmitry Manuilsky, foreign minister of the CPU, and Nikita Khrushchev, the CPU's first secretary, who enthusiastically supported the project. Being well-versed in the complicated dynamics of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, both men understood the need for prompt action so as not to tip off the nationalists. Following the swift approval of Joseph Stalin himself, the AUUC was assigned a Soviet sculptor, M. H. Lysenko, and awarded a budget of two million rubles to construct and then transport the finished product to Canada.[577] With the logistics sorted and construction of the monument underway, the AUUC

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[575] Peter Prokop, "Monument to a Heritage and People," July/August 1976, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

[576] For an overview of the connections between Canadian and Soviet communists see Jennifer Anderson, *Propaganda and Persuasion: The Cold War and the Canadian-Soviet Friendship Society* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2017). For more on Society Ukraina, see Hinther, *Perogies and Politics,* 198.

[577] Petro Tronko, ed., *Na skryzhaliakh istorii: Z istorii vzaiemozv'iazkiv uriadovykh i hromadskykh kil Ukrainy z ukrainsko-kanadskoiu hromadoiu v druhii polovyni 1940-1980-ti roky* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainky NANU, Fundatsiia ukrainskoi spadshchyny Alberty, 2003), 158-160.

formally announced their plans to unveil a monument to Shevchenko on 1 July 1951 at Camp Palermo. The monument's unveiling would be accompanied by the opening of a Shevchenko exhibit, a lecture series, and a concert. The selection of Dominion Day for the opening was no coincidence. This was a deliberate gesture during the Cold War to convey the loyalty of the AUUC's members to Canada and to make clear their place, as citizens, with roots deeply imbedded in Canadian soil.[578]

Word of the monument's pending arrival in Canada spread quickly and the nationalists were soon charging that the communists were "making a red hero out of Shevchenko."[579] As with other attempts to prevent the AUUC from celebrating Ukrainian culture, the association responded by boldly reinforcing their claim to the poet. After all, a representative from the association quipped, "we are Ukrainian nationalists of Canada."[580] This response, while somewhat of a slight-of-hand, was fitting given the association's longstanding efforts to promote Ukrainian cultural endeavours in Canada. The communists were not shy about pointing out the hypocrisy in nationalist thinking about cultural ownership. Indeed, this was not a monopoly, and being a nationalist - in so far as this meant enjoying, participating in, or building up Ukrainian culture - was not their identity to exclusively claim.

Because of the AUUC's established record in the cultural sphere, or because this was the first monument of its kind in Canada, the grassroots support for the association was significant. Shortly after announcing the upcoming unveiling, tens of thousands of dollars poured into the

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[578] Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996), 82-83.

[579] "Ukrainian D.P. Seeks Spiritual Answer to Reds," March 13, 1950, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[580] "City Ukrainian Leader Defends Memorial Plan," March 20, 1950, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

association from Ukrainians across the country.[581] This was deeply troubling to the UCC who immediately activated their extensive network of supporters.[582] In a series of exchanges with both Watson Kirkconnell and George W. Simpson, the committee was urged to waste no time in planning their own festivities in order to distinguish themselves clearly from the Reds. As Chapter Four shows, it was too late for the UCC to place a monument of their own or to organize an elaborate celebration. The committee was, however, able to arrange a series of smaller, local events for September.[583]

Kirkconnell began corresponding with his contacts in the government and the media to clearly outline the nationalist position.[584] Deeming the monument a Trojan horse and an insult to the "loyal majority of the Ukrainian community," he warned his associates not to fall for communist attempts to "steal the nationalist Christian poet."[585] So as to twist the knife further, he made sure to draw significant attention to the fact that much of the current AUUC leadership had been interned during the war for sedition against the British crown. When prompted, he even shared their RCMP records, which were provided to him by Detective Sergeant Daniel Mann. Mann also agreed, on Kirkconnell's request, to contact cultural organizations like the Polaris Foundation to warn them against speaking favourably about the monument.[586] These actions were a sure-fire way to divert potential support from unwitting politicians and other public

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[581] "Ukrainian Meet Raises $6,000 for Memorial," March 12, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[582] Zaharychuk to Kirkconnell, 15 March 1951, Watson Kirkconnell fonds (WK), box 45, file 11, Ester Clark Wright Archives (ECWA).

[583] Kindred to Simpson, 19 May 1951, G.W. Simpson fonds (GWS), MG7 S1, box 2, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA); Stratychuk to Simpson, 26 July 1951, GWS, MG7 S1, box 5, USA; "Ukrainians Mark Anniversary," August 4, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[584] Kirkconnell to Zaharychuk, 30 March 1951, WK, box 45, file 11, ECWA.

[585] Kirkconnell to Ottawa Journal, 29 March 1951, WK, box 56, file 18, ECWA.

[586] Kirkconnell to Young, 2 April 1951, WK, box 56, file 18, ECW; Wolter to Kirkconnell, 26 April 1951, WK, box 56, file 18, ECWA.

figures away from the communists. Moreover, Kirkconnell successfully petitioned several politicians to try, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent the monument from being imported to Canada.[587] He convinced others, including Governor General Viscount Alexander, to renege on their commitments to attend. To make matters worse for the AUUC, Alexander agreed to attend the UCC's celebrations in September instead.[588] These were significant feats for the nationalists. But perhaps more significantly, they underscore the tremendous influence of Canada's professional Cold Warriors like Kirkconnell. Their ability to command the country's elite and implement the tacit directives of the Cold War afforded the nationalists real opportunities to undermine their opponents in rather sophisticated ways.

The rhetorical attacks against the monument continued until the day of the unveiling.[589] Several nationalist groups even travelled to Palermo to protest.[590] Politicians likewise made good on their promise to Kirkconnell; all but local communist politicians, who were already sympathetic to the AUUC, boycotted the event. Not even Soviet politicians made the trek, a wise move as the Cold War heated up and accusations of Soviet influence on Canadian soil became increasingly dangerous for all involved. The political chicanery, however, seemed to have little impact on the crowds. According to George Kidd, a reporter for *The Telegram,* nothing could seemingly stop people from pouring into the campground.[591] The unveiling was a tremendous

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[587] "Pamyatnyk Shevchenkovi i KYK-ivski Patrioty," August 2, 1951, *Ukrainske zhyttia.*

[588] Kirkconnell to Lawson, 29 March 1951, WK, box 56, file 18, ECWA; "Alexander Won't Attend Feting of Pro-Red Body," June 28, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[589] "Ukrainian Group Ignores 70-Ton Statue of Poet," June 28, 1951, *The Globe and Mail*; Krawchuk, *Our History,* 82; Fujiwara, *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity,* 138.

[590] Krawchuk, *Our History*, 82.

[591] John Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991), 293.

success indeed, with over one hundred thousand people passing through Palermo over the course of the weekend.[592]

When it came time to the unveiling, the ribbon-cutting was fittingly reserved for William Pylypiw, son of the first Ukrainian migrant to Canada. As the white shroud covering the monument fell to the ground, it revealed a bronze Shevchenko marked by a plaque with a dedication from the people of Soviet Ukraine for Ukrainians in Canada.[593] As he wiped tears from his eyes, Pylypiw led the crowd in the singing of Shevchenko's evocative poem "Zapovit."

> Oh bury me, then rise up
> And break your heavy chains
> And water with the tyrants' blood
> The freedom you have gained[594]

In addition to being one of Shevchenko's most popular works, it subtly indicated the way in which the AUUC conceptualized Shevchenko's relevance to its overwhelmingly working-class membership.

In the aftermath of the merriments, the AUUC was pleased by the impressive showing. The weekend was well attended by members of the general public as well as by Ukrainians who were aligned with various nationalist outfits.[595] The evident popularity of the unveiling revealed to the AUUC that, for all but the most politically committed of the nationalists, any effort to commemorate a national hero was worthy of support. While genuinely committed to promoting Ukrainian culture, this could also be capitalized on to recruit more members to the cause and demonstrate their loyalty to government and state officials. The success of the unveiling certainly

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[592] Mitch Sago, "25 Years Ago," July/August 1976, *The Ukrainian Canadian*; Krawchuk, *Our History,* 82.

[593] Peter Krawchuk, "Flashback to July 1, 1951," July/August 1976, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

[594] This is the translation work of John Weir, a member of the AUUC, and most closely reflects both the translation and interpretation that would have been shared by the majority of the audience. John Weir, *Taras Shevchenko: Selections* (Toronto: The Ukrainian Canadian, 1961), 79.

[595] Krawchuk, *Our History,* 82-83.

did not go unnoticed by government and state officials, but not for the reasons that the AUUC had hoped. Quiet inroads were soon made to firm up material support for, and political sanction of, the UCC's own efforts to mark Shevchenko in September.

As Chapter Four discusses, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent joined the UCC in Winnipeg to unveil a commemorative plaque on the grounds of the provincial legislature in honour of Ukrainian settlers. The thinly veiled subtext of St. Laurent's efforts was an evident indication of the government telegraphing its preferences and invigorating the organization friendlier, and more useful, to its own political interests. That evening, alongside the lieutenant-governor, premier, and attorney general, St. Laurent also attended a banquet where speakers Jaroslav Rudnyckyj and Vladimir Kysilewsky (Kaye), now working for the Citizenship Division, delivered lectures on the evils of communism. The professor and bureaucrat repeated what would become a well-worn line that, if Shevchenko were still alive, he would assuredly be a nationalist and would denounce Soviet tyranny. In a nod to the DPs, who at this time were still actively engaged in their campaign of violence, they also suggested that Shevchenko would "hit [a] Soviet."[596]

Kirkconnell was put to use at a series of smaller events where he slammed the AUUC as a "seditious outlaw group who almost stole the show." When forced to address their impressive showing in Palermo, Kirkconnell took great pains to downplay the significance of the event. In fact, each time he delivered his speech, he lowered the number of people he claimed were in attendance. The whole affair, he contended, had gone almost unnoticed. The current celebrations

[596] "Speaker Claims Ukrainian Poet Would Hit Soviet," April 5, 1949, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Soviet Falsified Ukrainian Bard, Says Professor," December 11, 1950, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Ukrainian Canadian Jubilee: Souvenir Festival Program," 30 June – 2 July 1951, Stavroff Private Collection*;* "Original Ukrainian Settler to Join Festival Here," September 1, 1951, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Ukrainian Exhibit Tonight," September 7, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Red Slavs Pan Canada," October 26, 1951, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Propaganda Charged in Use of Poet's Name," March 14, 1955, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

spearheaded by the UCC were much larger and much more appropriate. Best of all, they were not being held on a communist picnic ground, he quipped, which he compared to the "historic barn near Guelph, Ontario where, in May 1921, the crocodile's egg of sedition first hatched out into the Communist Party of Canada (CPC)."[597]

Figure 5.1



Nationalist concert in Toronto commemorating Shevchenko. Source: "Salute to Shevchenko," July 10, 1961, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[597] "A Salute to Ukrainian Canadians," 29 September 1951, WK, box 27, file 31, ECWA.

"Franko, the Foe of Communism"

The activities of the nationalists did not go unheeded, but there was very little that the AUUC could do. Instead, the association responded by preparing for their next event, the National Ukrainian Festival of Folk Songs, Music, and Dance. Scheduled for the 6-8 July 1956, the festival would combine the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Franko with the sixty-fifth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. Included in the festivities was the unveiling of a monument to Franko on the grounds of the Winnipeg Labour Temple on Pritchard Avenue.[598] As a socialist and founder of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, Franko was a much easier figure for the AUUC to claim. His nationalist politics, which certainly became much more pronounced later in his life, were not ignored by the association. Rather, they saw in Franko the perfect blend of radical politics and patriotism for one's homeland. He was, according to the association's resident Franko expert, a hybrid patriot-revolutionary who intimately tied national liberation and social emancipation together.[599]

While plans were underway, the geopolitical and the domestic merged in sharp relief when Khrushchev's Secret Speech was leaked in March 1956. Although the leadership of the CPC was aware of the speech's existence in advance, the public revelations had two paradoxical consequences for the AUUC.[600] Internally, the speech precipitated a defection of members disillusioned by the realities Khrushchev had laid bare.[601] Publicly, it resulted in a general, albeit temporary, warming of east-west relations that alleviated the most intense manifestations of anti-

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[598] "National Ukrainian Festival Souvenir Programme, 6-8 July 1956," Association of United Ukrainian Canadians fonds (AUUC), MG28 V154, vol. 39, file 14, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

[599] John Weir, *Ivan Franko: Poems and Stories* (Toronto: Ukrainska Knyha, 1956), 15-16.

[600] Norman Penner, *Canadian Communism: The Stalin Years and Beyond* (Toronto: Methuen, 1988), 241-243; Matitiahu Mayzel, "Israeli Intelligence and the leakage of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech,'" *Journal of Israeli History* 32, no. 2 (2013): 275.

[601] Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion,* 177-199.

communism directed at the association. With this in mind, the AUUC's decision to invite the UCC to collaborate on the Franko celebrations becomes clearer. Perhaps this was an attempt to counteract their hemorrhaging membership rolls and capitalize on the UCC's more recent success in the cultural sphere. This might explain why the association chose the same weekend as the UCC's fifth congress to unveil the monument. Yet it could also be taken as a good-faith gesture made in the spirit that marked Khrushchev's early rule. After all, the association reasoned, Franko, just like Shevchenko, belonged to all Ukrainians. Celebrating him together might serve as the perfect opportunity to mend the fractured community. Plus, a joint event might have the added bonus of boosting the reputation of the entire community before the public.[602]

Regardless of the AUUC's possible rationale, it seemed for a moment as though their olive branch would be accepted and that rapprochement was not far behind. The internal correspondence of the UCC leadership shows that the committee recognized the utility of a collaborative effort for raising the community's public image and was seriously considering responding positively to the invitation.[603] Unfortunately, the hope for amity was short-lived because of the intervention of the more radical sect of DPs from the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (CLLU). Despite not yet being formally organized under the UCC's umbrella, the CLLU exerted tremendous influence over the committee, pushing back against even the slightest hints of détente with the communists.

This is not to suggest that others in the UCC were not committed to more virulent forms of anti-communism – they certainly were. But unlike the systems that guided the most militant,

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[602] Krawchuk, *Our History,* 84.

[603] "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Ninth National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 21 November 1960, Royal Canadian Mounted Police fonds (RCMP), RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

wherein ideology trumped practice, the corporatist nature of the UCC generated a polyphonic environment that could often temper the most extreme among them. Sometimes it could even generate feelings of compromise and conciliation, although this approach was now rebuffed by the DPs. As Chapter Three shows, the DPs often manifested their political opinions in physical ways, wherein fiats were exchanged for fists. In this case, however, it appeared as a weaponized guilt levied against the upper echelons of the UCC. The CLLU criticized the organization for being much too focused on maneuvering Ukrainians into the halls of Canadian power, implying that they had forgotten – or never really understood – the nationalist cause in Ukraine. They likewise scolded the mollified UCC over their supposedly feeble position towards Khrushchev and, by extension, the AUUC. Signaling their longstanding desire to quell the Red Menace through force, they rebuked the UCC's willingness to debate with the enemy.[604] The leadership of the UCC privately maintained that a joint effort may have been advantageous, but they told a different story to their constituents, namely that they had rejected the AUUC's calls for cooperation because the poet was not theirs to commemorate.[605]

With no plans for collaboration, the leadership of the UCC worried that the unveiling of the Franko monument would serve as the perfect propaganda ruse to detract attention away from their congress. Analogous to the Shevchenko case, the committee had made minor arrangements to recognize Franko at their congress, but they were nowhere near as elaborate as what the communists had planned. Moreover, the fact that the communists had now erected not one, but two, monuments before them was not lost on the leadership. The UCC, they agreed, would have

[604] "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Ninth National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 21 November 1960, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

[605] Kohan to Delegates of Fifth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, 29 June 1956, Jaroslav Rudnyckyj fonds (JR), MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC.

to become much more aggressive than ever before to destabilize the upcoming event. If not, their cause might be dealt a serious blow.[606]

The constituent organizations of the UCC began making public statements condemning the monument as the work of a fifth column.[607] At the same time, the leadership became involved in a campaign to deny entry visas to a Soviet delegation travelling to Canada for the unveiling. The delegation included Franko's granddaughter, Zinovia Franko, whose attendance was a critical way in which the AUUC planned to establish their legitimate claims to the poet.[608] This was a serious setback, as was the news becoming public that the visas had been denied because the government dubbed the AUUC a communist organization and it was thus not allowed to invite visitors to Canada. This gave the nationalists all the proof they needed to smear the AUUC as a Soviet front group, a sure-fire way to guarantee membership loss and promote ill will from the general public.

Zinovia's barring was worsened when Franko's own daughter, Anna Kluchko, who had migrated to Canada after the war, declined the AUUC's invitation to participate in the unveiling. Kluchko insisted that her father had not been a communist and would never have wanted such an association to commemorate him. In fact, she told the AUUC, she was certain that if her father had still been alive, he would have been killed or exiled to Siberia by the Soviets. An active member of the nationalist community, Kluchko was persuaded by the UCC to release her correspondence with the AUUC to the press. The AUUC's embarrassment only continued when

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[606] Kohan to Delegates of Fifth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, 29 June 1956, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "Hostile Note for Opening of Congress," July 3, 1956, *The Winnipeg Tribune*.

[607] "Ukrainian Youth Group Raps Reds for Adopting Franko," July 3, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Ukrainian Warning Aimed at Communism," July 4, 1956, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[608] "Red Cultural Group Fails to Get Visas for Visit," June 20, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; Kohan to Delegates of Fifth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, 29 June 1956, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "Rap Red Tactics in Franko Festival," June 30, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; Peter Krawchuk, *Our History,* 84.

Kluchko announced her plans to attend the UCC congress instead of the unveiling. An extraordinary win for the UCC, the committee reinforced its grip on Franko and guaranteed that their congress now had the bigger draw.[609]

More subtle interventions were also made. Just a month before the unveiling, Alderman Jacob Penner petitioned Winnipeg's city council on behalf of the AUUC to rename Pritchard Avenue "Ivan Franko Avenue." The location was most appropriate, as Pritchard Avenue housed the Labour Temple on whose grounds the monument would soon stand. When Penner brought the motion before the Civil Public Works Committee it was unexpectedly seconded by Alderman Slaw Rebchuk, a Ukrainian and staunch supporter of the UCC. Rebchuk's intentions were far more deceptive than they seemed; seconding the motion was his way of getting to speak to it. When he took the floor, Rebchuk accused Penner of having a poor understanding of Franko and boldly declared himself the only proper representative of Ukrainians on city council. Franko's own daughter, he informed the council, wanted nothing to do with the AUUC's communist schemes. Penner countered that changing the street name was an entirely separate matter and that it would benefit all Ukrainians in the city. But Rebchuk insisted that no renaming was better than one spearheaded by the communists, and the motion was defeated twelve to five.[610]

Not content with targeting the AUUC alone, the nationalists also aimed at those whom they saw as soft on communism. This included Winnipeg's mayor, George Sharpe, who had agreed to write a welcome letter for the Franko festival. The UCC publicly scolded the mayor for his perceived support of the association. In response to repeated media requests, Sharpe eventually released a statement explaining that it was his simply his job to welcome guests to the

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[609] "Franko Never a Red, Daughter Tells UCC," June 30, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "Rap Red Tactics in Franko Festival," June 30, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[610] "They All Like the Poet, Penner Not So Popular," June 19, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

city, irrespective of their political affiliation. Still, he conceded that the greetings may have been inappropriate and admitted that he had to "get straightened out on these Ukrainian groups" so as not to make the same mistake again. On behalf of the UCC, Rebchuk accepted Sharpe's apology and told reporters that the organization did not blame Sharpe. Like many others, he had been duped by the communists. According to Rebchuk, though, there was an easy solution to mending the fence with the *actual* community; he could attend their upcoming congress. In an instance of building nationalist dominion by simply stating it, Rebchuk claimed that, unlike the Franko festival, the congress would feature "all true representatives of the Ukrainian community."[611] Sharple took the UCC up on its offer. The public admonishment was working, and the list of public refutations that the AUUC had to weather was growing.

Kirkconnell, meanwhile, was particularly concerned about the AUUC's efforts to produce a collection of Franko's poems translated into English. Written by John Weir, *Ivan Franko: Poems and Stories* was published in May, just in time to be distributed at the July celebrations. Kirkconnell was particularly worried that Weir, a committed communist, would translate Franko in such a way that emphasized his most radical positions. When Kirkconnell received an advanced copy of the book, he wrote to the UCC with his initial impressions, which were, unsurprisingly, negative. To justify his poor review, Kirkconnell claimed that Weir had cherry-picked passages and somehow tampered with the text's original meanings in order to characterize Franko as pro-communist. Wanting to write a review for the *University of Toronto Quarterly,* he requested that the UCC direct him towards trusted scholars in the community who could confirm his suspicions.[612] This was a curious request from someone who sold himself as an expert on Ukrainian language and culture. Nevertheless, the ever-growing, yet semi-

[611] "A Welcome," *The Winnipeg Free Press,* June 22, 1956.

[612] Kirkconnell to Yaremovich, 17 July 1956, WK, box. 45, file 11, ECWA.

clandestine, network of nationalist sources within the academy would serve Kirkconnell well as he expanded his anti-communist crusade to Canada's universities.

Kirkconnell's belief that Weir had altered the text turned out to be false – his interpretations were reasonable – but he nevertheless wrote a scathing review of the collection. In making the claim that Weir had inappropriately usurped Franko as a socialist, he pointed to his omission of certain poems that he claimed emphasized Franko's evolving nationalist politics. This criticism, however, ignored Weir's careful descriptions of Franko and the association's rather nuanced approach to internationalism that still allowed for celebrations of ethnicity and culture.[613] For Kirkconnell, however, anything less than total emphasis on the nationalistic undertones and confessional glances of Franko's work was unacceptable. It is no surprise, then, that in condemning Weir, he pointed readers to Volodymyr Doroshenko, a more favourable scholar of Franko, whose work on the poet included "Franko, the Poet of Ukrainian Independence," "Franko, the Foe of Communism," and "Franko on Behalf of the Faith and the Church."[614]

Having done their best to shift attention and support away from the AUUC, the nationalists were now sure that their congress would be a smashing success. By all accounts it certainly was, with over five hundred people attending the formal sessions and several thousand flocking to the evening banquet to hear Kluchko speak. In her remarks, Kluchko explained her reasoning for declining the AUUC's invitation. Simply put, she could not go along with the association because of her own anti-communist convictions and her belief that her father wrote for all Ukrainians and not just one political party. Ironically, by connecting his work with contemporary nationalist arguments regarding the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian state as it stood

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[613] Weir, *Ivan Franko*, 15-16.

[614] "Publications in Other Languages," JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC.

and emphasizing a myopic of Ukrainian-ness that was relevant only to the nationalist camp, Kluchko's speech made clear that, in her mind, Franko was not, in fact, for all Ukrainians. Regardless, her speech, coupled with appearances by Paul Martin and George Drew, reinforced the UCC's claims to Franko in the eyes of the community while simultaneously bolstering the anti-communist sentiments already so dominant in the room.[615]

Compared to Shevchenko and Ukrainka, little is known about the AUUC's unveiling of their Franko monument. This lack of documentation perhaps speaks to the tremendous success of the nationalists in shifting the conversation away from the festival and towards the manufactured controversies surrounding it. Whereas the unveilings of Shevchenko and Ukrainka were closely followed in the press, leaving behind a rich evidentiary base, the minutia of the Franko story has been lost, overshadowed by book reviews, mayoral scandals, and even Kluchko's scathing polemic. It is clear that, unlike the Shevchenko unveiling where the general public made up the majority of the attendees, those who came to see Franko were from the AUUC's more customary ranks. This mark of dwindling participation was worrisome for the leadership as it suggested that they might have increased difficulty engaging and maintaining the public moving forward. The lived realities of the Cold War, coupled with the extraordinary offensive front of the nationalists, certainly did not help either. When several thousand members of the AUUC gathered on the property of the Workers Benevolent Association (WBA) for a casual picnic after the unveiling, they were greeted by RCMP officers who began arresting people for bootlegging.[616] Given that

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[615] Program – League for the Liberation of Ukraine," 1 July 1956, Ukrainian Collection (UC), box 18, Multicultural History Society of Ontario (MHSO); "Hostile Note for Opening of Congress," July 3, 1956, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Franko Wrote for All Not One Party," July 5, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Russia Greatest Colonial Oppressor, Martin Tells UCC," July 6, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Thousands Mark Poet's Centenary," July 9, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

[616] "Ukrainians Gather for Big Festival," July 6, 1956, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Big Concert Scores Hit," July 9, 1956, *Winnipeg Tribune*; "Redcoat Raid," July 10, 1956, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

two representatives from the Soviet embassy were present, the picnic turned into a minor scandal as it further linked the AUUC to the Soviets. Just as significantly for participants, the police raid reminded them of the risk of active participation in the organization, even if only in the cultural realm. The security service was always watching.

"There is Only One Taras Shevchenko!"

The year 1961 marked the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Shevchenko. For the UCC, it was also an opportunity to finally catch up to the AUUC on the commemorative front. Soon after the Franko affair, the committee struck a national committee to plan the unveiling of a Shevchenko monument on the grounds of Manitoba's legislature. Perhaps in light of the happenings of 1956, the AUUC once again declared its desire to work together with the UCC. This monument, like the others, was the business of all Ukrainians in Canada regardless of organizational affiliation. "As the saying among Ukrainians has it," the NEC wrote, "there is only one Ukrainian people and only one Taras Shevchenko!"[617] But the AUUC's appeal for cooperation was once again denied. While a formal statement was never issued, the message was made crystalline several times over. In 1959, the CLLU officially joined the UCC.[618] Their formal participation in the committee ensured that no concession, no matter how small, would be made to the communists. The AUUC also learned that the committee had recently commenced a million-dollar fundraiser, of which fifteen cents per dollar would be set aside for the building and installation of the monument. When Prime Minister Diefenbaker personally endorsed the

[617] AUUC to UCC, 3 July 1959, Prokop Family Fonds (PF), ACC 2010-H0021, box H-871, file 19, CMH; Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians,* 352.

[618] Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 242.

fundraiser and it reached its goal with over a year to go, the AUUC realized that a collaborative effort was superfluous. The nationalists could build the monument on their own.[619]

The AUUC was critical of the fundraiser, especially after learning that the remaining eighty-five cents of each dollar were being set aside as a nest egg for the UCC's other activities. The comingling of the monument with the committee's general affairs seemed disingenuous and took advantage of the community's desire to advance Ukrainian socio-cultural causes in Canada. These concerns, however, were never aired publicly. Nor did the organization speak up when it learned that the UCC had petitioned the city to change Winnipeg's McGregor Street to Taras Shevchenko Street, a seemingly hypocritical choice given the nationalists' painstaking efforts to stymie the renaming of Pritchard Avenue just a few years prior. In a larger sense, the committee's decision to petition city council about McGregor Street, after protesting similar efforts by the AUUC, elucidates that their goal was not simply the promotion of Ukrainian culture in Canada. All commemorative work had to be sifted through a particular ideological lens, offering the committee a form of social or political stock. Relatedly, their non-reaction to the eventual decision not to rename the street (one stunned journalist reported that they accepted the news "without a spark of the expected fireworks") is telling.[620] Culture, the Canadian front, and even the expansion of inclusivity and citizenship rights were simply not the end goal.

The leadership of the AUUC perhaps did not realize this and came to the defense of the nationalists after local Winnipeggers pushed back against the renaming. The AUUC urged Canadians to acknowledge the immeasurable contributions of Ukrainians in the building of the

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[619] "Fund Now at $100,000 Mark," April 7, 1960, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Information Bulletin," 10 November 1959, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 44, LAC; "AUUC Pamphlet," Ukrainian Canadian Committee fonds (UCC), MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; "Consider our Children's Future! Contribute to the Ukrainian Canadian National Fund," 1975, UC, vol. 18, MHSO; "Shevchenko Centennial Souvenir Book," 8-9 July 1961, UC, vol. 18, MHSO.

[620] "Taras Street Is Ruled Out," April 15, 1961, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

nation and suggested that the renaming of McGregor Street was both appropriate and overdue. The proposal was ultimately turned down, not because of any communist intervention, but because of the city's fears that it would turn council chambers into an endless parade of ethnic communities clamoring for public space.[621] Expanding on a theme explored in Chapter Four, the response to the renaming highlights that even ethnic groups with the correct politics could come up against the edges of Anglo tolerance. The city's decision makes clear what government officials were, and were not, willing to expend their political capital on. It further clarifies what officials saw the role of the nationalists to be in civil society. Endless political cover could always be found for anti-communist activities and for discursive support, but when these demands came into conflict with the mainstream, the balancing act became much more difficult to manage.

The design for the nationalists' monument was selected after an international competition, but there were still some internal reservations about its aesthetic. The winning selection featured a sitting, older Shevchenko, which, according to some, made him like a "forlorn old beggar." As this outrage spread, the nationalist press worked overtime to reports of internal tension. They claimed that any flak about the monument's design was coming from the communist camp. Anyone who may have shared these views was no better than the Reds – or maybe even a secret Red. There was no better way to silence what were certainly very real and legitimate criticisms. For their part, the AUUC strongly denied accusations that they had planted the seeds of doubt about the design. While the communist press had provided updates about the

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[621] "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Ninth National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 21 November 1960, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; "McGregor St. to Taras Shevchenko?" December 29, 1960, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Shevchenko Street Has Complications," February 8, 1961, *The Winnipeg Tribune;* "Another Hero," February 28, 1961, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Measure of Respect," February 28, 1961, *The Winnipeg Free Press*; "McGregor Will Keep Its Name," April 7, 1961, *The Winnipeg Tribune*; "Taras Street Is Ruled Out," April 15, 1961, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

monument, they had refrained from making disparaging remarks because they knew of the trouble it would cause. Besides, the AUUC was not against the monument. Not only had they asked to collaborate on it, but they had even defended the nationalists during the street-renaming debacle. "This is a fact which cannot be concealed by any of the nationalist experts in raising the bogey of communism," the leadership conveyed to its membership at the annual convention that year, "even by those who studied this professional craft under Goebbels."

The evocation of Goebbels hints at the strong feelings held by the communist leadership regarding the ongoing battle over Shevchenko. Rather than arranging for a nation-wide celebration of the poet, the AUUC believed that the nationalists simply wanted to stage a political farce. This kind of internecine strife had not been seen since the Civil War in Ukraine, they contended, and only further exacerbated the unhealthy state of the Cold War. But no matter how much the nationalists may have wanted to saddle the AUUC with the blame for their problems with the perception of the monument, their problem stemmed from "a decay in the spiritual foundations of Ukrainian nationalism, which, though invested in the embroidered Ukrainian shirt, was and remains alien." By perpetuating these tensions and presenting their distorted view of Shevchenko to the public, they argued, the UCC was committing a crime against both the present and future generation of Ukrainians. "The UCC should keep in mind that it is but a passing phenomenon," the leadership wrote, but "the genius of Shevchenko is immortal."[622]

At their convention, the AUUC also outlined their own plans for Shevchenko that July. This included a National Shevchenko Festival of Ukrainian Song, Music, and Dance at the

[622] "Proceedings and Resolutions of the Ninth National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 21 November 1960, RCMP, RG146, vol. 39, access request 94-A-00182, LAC.

Varsity Arena in Toronto.[623] The festivities would then move to Palermo, where the association would mark the tenth anniversary of their monument's unveiling.[624] While celebratory and lighthearted in nature, the occasion was also meant to bring the meaning and message of Shevchenko to the widest possible circle. The association arranged for a series of lectures and even a mass pilgrimage to the poet's grave in Kaniv, Ukraine. Planning this activity would not be easy. The leadership was exceptionally mindful of the polemical nature of competing Shevchenko celebrations and, relatedly, worried about attracting a crowd. This was driven home after the association staged a series of smaller Shevchenko concerts in preparation for July and each one was publicly renounced by the nationalists. These unfailing attacks and the persistent Red-baiting made it almost impossible for the AUUC to build on its previous success. By the time that July rolled around, then, friction between the two groups was palpable.[625]

The first to present its tribute was the AUUC on 1 July. Unlike the 1951 showing, which was criticized by the nationalists for its lack of patriotism, the program began with the singing of "God Save the Queen." The arena darkened and a spotlight illuminated a kobzar on one side of the stage and a choir on the other. As the kobzar plucked his bandura, the choir began to sing Shevchenko's "Dumi Moyi":

> So welcome them, my Motherland
> Ukraine, into your home!
> Accept my guileless, simple brood
> And take them for your own![626]

Much more focused on patriotic evocations of the homeland, this poem was quite different in

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[623] "The Concept of the Festival Program for July 1, 1961, in Toronto," 15 March 1960, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 46, file 19, LAC.

[624] "The Tenth Anniversary of the Shevchenko Monument in Palermo," 2 March 1960, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 29, file 2, LAC.

[625] "Memorandum with the Plan for the Educational Program of the AUUC for 1961," 30 September 1960, PF, Box H-875, file 4, CMH; "Festival Disowned," May 24, 1961, *The News Chronicle.*

[626] John Weir, *Taras Shevchenko,* 27.

tone than "Zapovit," which they sang in 1951. The concert then closed with the full cast of performers singing "O Canada." The organization was certainly far afield from their younger days of singing "The Internationale" while waving red flags. Showing just how deep political policing of the association had penetrated, their leftist fervour was replaced with significantly different markers of political fealty.

By all accounts, the concert was a smashing success. More importantly, there had been no disturbances from the nationalists beyond a minor, silent protest in front of the arena. The same could not be said for Palermo, where about fifteen thousand people gathered the next day. Shortly after the formal program began, a low flying plane began dropping thousands of leaflets on the startled crowd. "Fellow Canadians!" it read. "Today you are attending a festival sponsored by the AUUC to pay tribute to the memory of the great Ukrainian poet Shevchenko. Your intentions are pure and noble," the leaflet continued, "but you are responding to the call of an organization which uses the name of the great poet to promote its own treacherous and subversive aims. Shevchenko," it reminded, "does not belong to those who advocate slavery, tyranny, and exploitation. Shevchenko belongs to those who believe in freedom and justice and who are fighting against the communist tyranny and Russian imperialism." The leaflet ended with a call to leave the festivities immediately and advertised the upcoming celebration of Shevchenko in Winnipeg organized by the "democratic and loyal Canadian Ukrainians."[627] Several days later, Ronald Mills of the Toronto Flying Club was summonsed to appear in court on a littering charge stemming from the incident. He admitted that he agreed to the flight as a favour for the CLLU who, in recent years, had been training its members to fly in case they

[627] "Liberation of Ukraine Pamphlet," PF, Box H-875, file 6, LAC.

needed to quickly return to Ukraine to fight the Soviets.[628] As the organization was made up of many ex-paramilitary members, the leaflet drop symbolized more than just a simple stunt or propaganda effort. The reminder that the nationalists were airborne, coupled with several dozen incidents of vandalism and graffiti on the Palermo campground throughout the sixties, made clear that it was still war.

Figure 5.2



FELLOW CANADIANS!

Today you are attending a festival sponsored by the so called Association of United Ukrainian Canadians to pay tribute to the memory of the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko.

Your intentions are pure and noble, but you are responding to the call of an organization which uses the name of the great poet to promote its own treacherous and subversive aims. This organization belongs to the Canadian Communist formations, and together with the Communist Party of Canada, it receives orders from Moscow, trying to undermine our democratic way of life.

There is a good reason for the Canadian Communists to celebrate the centennial of the death of the Ukrainian poet. Taras Shevchenko, martyred by Tsarist Russia, fought for the freedom of the Ukrainian people, and as the most prominent spokesman of the idea of a united front of all the nations enslaved by Russia, he called them all to struggle against the Russian imperialism. Moscow realized long ago the power of Shevchenko's poetical works which contain the Ukrainian political credo. Moscow also realized that she could not win fighting Shevchenko, and so she took him over and made of him a forerunner of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. Shevchenko's poems were rewritten and "adjusted" to the Moscow line, and the Communist fellow-travellers in various countries were instructed to prepare centennial celebrations.

It is necessary for you, fellow Canadians, to realize the true meaning of this Communist-sponsored Shevchenko festival. The Communists are deceiving you when they claim that they are paying tribute to this great poet of Ukraine. Taras Shevchenko does not belong to those who advocate slavery, tyranny and exploitation. Shevchenko belongs to those who believe in freedom and justice and who are fighting against the Communist tyranny and Russian imperialism.

Fellow Canadians!

If freedom and justice mean anything to you, and if you are willing to preserve your democratic way of life, do not follow the predatory Communist appeals, but help us to fight Communism and Russian imperialism! Remember the words of the great Shevchenko who called:

"... and you, great-hearted heroes,
God will not forget you.
Struggle on and be triumphant!
God Himself will lead you;
At your side fights truth and glory,
Right and holy freedom".

There will be a festival to honour the memory of the great poet arranged by democratic and loyal Canadian Ukrainians in Winnipeg on July 8th and 9th, 1961. Those interested are cordially invited to attend.

ASSOCIATION for the LIBERATION of UKRAINE

Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine pamphlet dropped in Palermo, Ontario. Source: Prokop Family Fonds, ACC 2010-H0021, box H-875 file 6, Canadian Museum of History.

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[628] "Pilot Summonsed," July 5, 1961, *The Globe and Mail*; "Litterbug Summons for Pilot," July 5, 1961, *The Winnipeg Free Press;* "Re: Ukrainian Nationalists – Canada – Generally," 28 September 1938, RCMP, RG 146, vol. 38, access request 94-A-00180, LAC.

Figure 5.3



Vandalism in Palermo, Ontario reading “Taras Wanted Liberty.” Source: Stavroff Private Collection.

Figure 5.4



Vandalism in Palermo, Ontario reading: “Ще не вмерла Україна - Ukraine has not perished.” Source: Stavroff Private Collection.

On 8 July, the UCC unveiled its own monument. Unlike the AUUC's event, the ceremony was well attended by government officials from all levels, including Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, and former Branch Boys Kaye, Simpson, and Kirkconnell.[629] As Diefenbaker cut the ribbon, the crowd joyously sang "O Canada," "God Save the Queen," and Shevchenko's "Zapovit." In his speech, Diefenbaker connected Shevchenko's legacy to the ongoing Cold War, dubbing the monument a tribute to freedom and reminding "Shevchenko's children in Canada" that they enjoyed rights and privileges that were unattainable in the Soviet Union. "It is to your great credit," continued Diefenbaker, "that one of the tasks you have set is to keep sirens sounding to warn the nations of the dangers of appeasement, complacency, or false security in the fact of the monster menace of International Communism." The monument, he asserted, helped justify the hopes of contemporary Ukrainians for the liberation of their homeland. The relationship between the nationalists and Diefenbaker was generally positive, but not always smooth. In fact, just like Trudeau after him, the prime minister was accused of undermining the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian language by referring to it as "a dialect" in his remarks. While it was meant positively, he was nevertheless forced to apologize.[630]

[629] Diefenbaker to Rudnyckyj, 31 July 1961, JR, MG31 D58, vol. 48, LAC.

[630] Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes,* 169; "Shevchenko Centennial Souvenir Book," 8-9 July 1961, Toma Kobzey fonds (TK), Oseredok Ukrainian Cultural and Education Centre.

Figure 5.5



Diefenbaker (center) unveiling UCC monument in Winnipeg, Manitoba on 8 July 1961. Source: Shevchenko Foundation https://shevchenkofoundation.com/about/our-history/

Figure 5.6



Diefenbaker posing with a sculpture presented to him by the UCC. Source: "A Double Dief," December 13, 1969, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

Note: The sculpture was made by Leo Mol, who also created their Shevchenko monument in Winnipeg.

The AUUC did not protest the unveiling, but they did release a statement condemning the nationalists for "war politics against the Soviet Union." The association also criticized the

Canadian politicians in attendance who in one breath extolled Shevchenko and in another attacked Soviet Ukraine, "the Ukraine of Shevchenko." The event, they claimed, was nothing more than attempt to use the poet's name for "base Judas aims."[631] Again, however, the loudest opposition came from members of the Canadian public who argued that a monument to a Ukrainian poet was not in the best interest of the community. In a letter to *The Winnipeg Free Press*, a local Winnipegger suggested that the organization should have instead commemorated John A. Macdonald, Wilfrid Laurier, or Clifford Sifton as a token of gratitude for being in Canada.[632]

This time, however, the UCC responded to the criticisms quite differently and staunchly defended the monument. They pointed to the significance of Shevchenko taking his place on the legislature grounds next to tributes to Queen Elizabeth, Major General James Wolfe, and Lord Dufferin.[633] But beyond representation in the public sphere, the UCC took this bout of public controversy much more seriously because of its wider political ramifications. While the name-change campaign would have been a welcome win and a humorous jab at the AUUC, it was trivial in the long run. The monument, on the other hand, was an opportunity to reinforce Cold War narratives and undermine the AUUC. For the same reasons, government officials also responded differently. In this particular case, the choice between appeasing the public and reinforcing anti-communism came easily.

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[631] Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians,* 354.

[632] A monument to Louis Riel was unveiled on 31 December 1971 and was greeted with similar controversy. It seemed that only symbols of imperial rule received a warm welcome in Winnipeg. Shannon Bower, "Practical Results: The Riel Statue Controversy at the Manitoba Legislative Building," *Manitoba History* 42 (2001/2002): 30-38.

[633] "Gesture of Gratitude," June 17, 1961, *The Winnipeg Free Press.*

"A Psychological Weapon against Communist Propaganda"

In 1964, both organizations set out to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth. Much as they had in 1956, the AUUC applied for visas on behalf of several cultural leaders from Soviet Ukraine who were interested in marking the occasion in Canada. Also as in 1956, their request was denied. For the third time, the AUUC approached the UCC for a joint event.[634] "Let us remove the main barrier to the things that can unite us by finishing with the Cold War in our midst! If nations can work towards a thaw in the Cold War," they reasoned, "surely we can achieve even better results in the less complicated life of the Ukrainian community in Canada."[635] The appeal was predictably ignored and their efforts to commemorate Shevchenko in 1964 were largely thwarted.

Meanwhile, the UCC carried on with its own celebrations in Winnipeg. Despite losing power to Pearson in 1963, Diefenbaker lent his sanction and emceed the festivities. In his address, he repeated the seasoned and long-repeated postulation about Shevchenko's feelings towards the Soviet Union. "What would be Shevchenko's message today to his people if he were able to speak? Shevchenko," he told the crowd of over ten thousand people, "would ask for an end of the subjugation of the people of Ukraine and others. He would ask for free elections, for self-determination of their destiny, and would want the USSR to live up to the principles of the charter of the United Nations."[636] In the meantime, the monument would stand as "a psychological weapon against communist propaganda." By merely existing, it challenged Soviet

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[634] AUUC to UCC, 3 June 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; "Proceedings and Resolutions of the 11th National Convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians," 9-12 April 1964, RCMP, RG146, vol. 95, access request 94-A-00182, LAC; AUUC to UCC, 3 June 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC.

[635] "There is Much to Unite Us," 12 April 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; "There is Much to Unite Us," 4 September 1964, *The Winnipeg Tribune.*

[636] "Monument to Shevchenko is Weapon – Diefenbaker," *The Winnipeg Free Press,* September 7, 1964.

attempts to subjugate and consume the identities and cultures of oppressed nations. So long as Ukrainians abroad continued to forcefully exert their right to Shevchenko, he argued, communism would never win.

Figure 5.7



An AUUC attack on the UCC for rejecting their cooperation in 1964. Source: "Z Shevchenkom proty Shevchenka," July 26, 1964, *Ukrainske zhyttia.*

Diefenbaker's analysis of the Shevchenko monument was popular amongst Ukrainian nationalists in North America. Perhaps for this reason, several more monuments to the poet appeared across the continent in quick succession. On 27 June 1964, a monument was unveiled to Shevchenko in Washington by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), the American counterpart of the UCC.[637] Placed on federal land, it sat at the intersection of 23 Street and P Street.[638] There are several striking parallels between the Canadian and American cases, highlighting the transnational and interconnected nature of both the professional Cold Warrior set and far-right émigré political formations. Perhaps most significantly, Frances Swyripa has argued that Canadian commemoration of Shevchenko was primarily about nation building, whereas his American equivalent was a symbol of Cold War tensions.[639] I suggest instead that both were clear manifestations of anti-communism that dealt blows to Soviet claims over Ukrainian culture and shaped political consciousness in both countries. Moreover, this was the same cast of characters, both within the nationalist movement and in terms of the broader political actors involved.

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[637] For more on the UCCA see Wsevolod Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds., *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992).

[638] "Diefenbaker Honors Shevchenko, Blasts Moscow for Debts to UN," October 15, 1964, *The Ukrainian Bulletin*. The location, inscription, and pose of this monument was similarly criticized from within the Ukrainian American nationalist community and remains a heated issue. See Yarsolav Bilinsky, "Two Monuments in Washington: The Politics Behind the Shevchenko and Holodomor Monuments," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 69, no. 1-4 (2013); 31-46.

[639] Frances Swyripa, "History, Ethnic Legitimacy, and Public Space: The Shevchenko Statues in Winnipeg and Washington," presented at *Cross-Stitching Cultural Borders* (1998).

Figure 5.8



The author (far left) in front of Shevchenko's Washington monument in 1994. Source: Author's private collection.

Secondly, the most vocal opposition to the monument came not from the domestic political left, but rather from the public who questioned the appropriateness of the placement in nation's capital. After all, as a nineteenth-century Ukrainian poet, Shevchenko had no connection to the United States. He was, according to a letter to *The Washington Post,* "the poet of a small minority, whatever his poetic merit." Others rooted their opposition in a political framework. The monument, wrote a reporter in *The Washington Post*, was merely a "blunt weapon in a fierce

Cold War propaganda campaign [and a way] to advance the UCCA's own implausible goal of Ukrainian nationhood."[640] Besides, another editorial asked, was Shevchenko not a Soviet hero? The UCCA were seemingly operating under the strange idea that by putting up a statue to the poet in Washington they would somehow "kidnap a communist hero and make him into their own hero."[641]

These narratives were troubling for the UCCA as well as the government officials who supported them. From the outset, they saw the monument as an important tool in the east-west tug of war. In fact, the land designation was only approved after it was discovered that the Soviets were planning to build their own monument to Shevchenko in Moscow. The monument, then, served the much larger purpose of reinforcing the notion that communism would be defeated. Unfortunately for the Americans, however, the Soviets managed to unveil their Shevchenko monument seventeen days earlier. Despite losing some political capital because of this, the government refused to withdraw their support for the monument. Such a decision could impact the delicate political optics of the era and might be used by the Soviets to claim that the United States was not sincere in its desire to honour the poet. Retracting their support might also be interpreted as an affront to the large Ukrainian American population, an unwise decision in the months leading up to a presidential election.[642] The potential alienation of a segment of the Ukrainian population was especially touchy because, similarly to Canada, a schism was present between the more moderate nationalists in the UCCA and the recently initiated DPs, most of whom were members of the OUN-b. While the moderates were still committed to vehement anti-

[640] "The Shevchenko Affair," October 13, 1963, *The Washington Post*; "Udall Urges Review of Shevchenko," December 6, 1963, *The Washington Post.*

[641] "Shevchenko Again," November 12, 1963, *The Washington Post.*

[642] "The Status of a Statue," November 10, 1963, *The Sunday Star.*

communist ideology and policy, the DPs were assiduous in their pursuit of effecting a mulish form of ultra-nationalism in the organization's constituents. Pulling support might be an unnecessary provocation of the more militant who saw anything less than total war with the Soviet Union as an unacceptable concession.

Also similarly to Canada, American DPs were determined to set their own vision for the monument and overpowered the UCCA's Shevchenko Memorial Committee to repudiate the participation of all but OUN-b partisans. Their decisions, heavily influenced by ideology and not practical considerations, were often costly. For example, a year before the unveiling, a literary organization based in Kyiv offered the memorial committee soil from Shevchenko's grave to scatter at the feet of the monument. The offer was widely supported by members of the UCCA. But in a strange interpretation of blood and soil rhetoric, it was refused by the memorial committee on the grounds that the delegates were Soviet. Criticism only grew when a second volunteer, a committed and reputable member of the UCCA, was similarly denied by the memorial committee to personally carry the soil back to the United States because he was not a member of the OUN-b. Mary Bek, a well-known nationalist figure in Washington, was eventually given the honour. The soil, collected in an urn, was sealed in the granite in the base of the monument a year after the unveiling.[643] Because of these sorts of decisions, many in the UCCA began to wonder if the unveiling was devolving into a propaganda ruse by the most militant further inflame Cold War tensions.

These suspicions were all but confirmed when it was announced that former President Dwight Eisenhower, accompanied by Republican Party presidential candidate and conservative

[643] "Why Did They Want a Monument?" 15 September 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC; "Sequel to Dedication of Shevchenko Monument in Washington Features Permanent Encasement of Soil from Poet's Mound in Ukraine," July 1-15, 1965, *The Ukrainian Bulletin.*

extremist Barry Goldwater, would personally unveil the monument. Current Democratic President Lyndon Johnson and former President Harry Truman cancelled their appearances soon after. If the eleventh-hour cancellation by Johnson and Truman did not make the new direction of the unveiling clear, the siren calls of the OUN-b during the unveiling certainly did. "Every vote for President Johnson will only strengthen the forces that are hostile to us," shouted Stepan Horak. The Democrats were "left opportunists" who followed in the trail of Bolshevik propaganda. This was why the Ukrainian community needed to give its vote to the Republican Party.[644] The message was clearly effective for some. As Eisenhower pulled the rope to reveal Shevchenko, the crowd did not sing Shevchenko's "Zapovit" or even "The Star Spangled Banner," but rather chanted "down with communism!" and "we like Ike!"[645] That evening, at a special banquet, Eisenhower was awarded the Shevchenko Freedom Award by the UCCA in collaboration with the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, an organization run primarily by the Melnyk faction of the OUN (OUN-m). Diefenbaker would receive the same award in 1967.[646]

Several nationalist newspapers were openly critical of the event. "Some explanations are in order as to why the Ukrainians were drawn into the channels of the Republican Party," demanded the editors of *Ukrainian Life.* "It looked as if someone was interested in driving a wedge between the Ukrainian community and the Democratic Party. This mixing of the

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[644] Horak, a DP, supporter of the OUN-b, and newly appointed member of the memorial committee, utilized the same network of anti-communist academics as Kirkconnell to secure a job as a professor of Russian and Eastern European history at Eastern Illinois University. For more on his academic and community work see Leonid Rudnytzky, "The Founders of the Association for the Study of Nationalities: The Case of Stepan Horak (1920-1986) and the Shevchenko Scientific Society, USA," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 6 (2012): 829-832.

[645] "Why Did They Want a Monument?" 15 September 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC.

[646] "Shevchenko Freedom Award Plaque to General Eisenhower," July 1-15, 1965, *The Ukrainian Bulletin*.

Ukrainian community, which has enough problems with its own parties, with the party problems of the general American public, was most unsavory."[647]

While the explicit partisanship may have been objectionable to some, it was strongly supported by the CLLU and the professional Cold Warriors that bolstered them. In fact, Kirkconnell was closely following the happenings in the Washington and even assisted in countering the bad news coverage in *The Washington Post*. As a result, he was invited to deliver a keynote address at the one-year anniversary of the monument's unveiling. While Shevchenko may have been the topic of his speech, the anti-communist undertones were less than subtle. In highlighting the ongoing relevancy of Shevchenko, Kirkconnell inexplicably spoke of an incident at the Kengir Soviet labour camp when, in June 1954, approximately five-hundred Ukrainian women and girls were raped and subsequently trampled by tanks. Harkening back to the classic anti-communist trope of nationalizing women, Kirkconnell cautioned that what had happened in Kengir could soon happen in North America if communism conquered the land. There was, however, a small comfort that the community could count on. Even under a communist takeover, the spirit of Shevchenko would live on as a "trumpet to rouse men up to liberty."[648]

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[647] "Why Did They Want a Monument?" 15 September 1964, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 61, LAC. The relationship between Ukrainian nationalists and the Republican Party, and especially their mutual participation in the Heritage Groups Council, is explored in Ross Bellant, *Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party: Domestic Fascist Networks and Their Effect on US Cold War Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1999).

[648] Shevchenko Memorial Committee to Kirkconnell, 13 December 1963, WK, box 45, file 21, ECW; Kirkconnell to Shevchenko Memorial Committee, 23 December 1963, WK, box 45, file 21, ECWA; Shevchenko Memorial Committee to Kirkconnell, 16 June 1964, WK, box 45, file 21, ECWA; Kirkconnell to Shevchenko Memorial Committee, 10 May 1965, WK, box 45, file 21, ECWA; "The Shevchenko Monument," 22 May 1965, WK, box 45, file 21, ECWA. More on the Kengir incident can be found in Steven Barnes, "In a Manner Befitting Soviet Citizens: An Uprising in the Post-Stalin Gulag," *Slavic Review* 64, no. 4 (2005): 823-850.

Figure 5.9



Kirkconnell at the one-year anniversary of the monument's unveiling. Source: Watson Kirkconnell Collection, Ester Clark Wright Archives.

Kirkconnell closed his remarks by reciting a poem he had composed in honour of the occasion. The poem, although quite lengthy, is worthy of partial reproduction here:

> More than a hundred years have passed away,
> And still Shevchenko's spirit broods today
> To see his nation once again constrained,
> Briefly unfettered but as quickly chained.
> The throne has been replaced by 'Marxist culture,'
> The Tsar's black eagle by a bold Red vulture;
> Prometheus still is shackled to the crag;
> The angry Cossack, with a Party gag,
> Now tends the assembly line or ploughs the turf -
> A kolkhoz-peon or a factory-serf.[649]

[649] "The Shevchenko Monument in Washington," 22 May 1965, WK, Box 45, file 21, ECWA.

Kirkconnell's poem so aptly captured the feelings in the room that he received a roaring standing ovation. He would repeat the recitation many times in the years to come in his capacity as a Shevchenko virtuoso and a trusted old hand of the nationalist community.

Figure 5.10



Kirkconnell (first row, third from right) posing in front of the Shevchenko monument in Washington. Source: Watson Kirkconnell Collection, Ester Clark Wright Archives.

"Advocates of a Counter-Culture that is Wholly Consumed by its Cold War Goals"

The AUUC had long wanted to celebrate Ukrainka, a feminist, revolutionary, and advocate of Ukrainian liberation from tsarist rule. Serious discussions to build a monument in her honour, however, did not materialize until 1973 when the AUUC commissioned a Soviet sculptor,

Halyna Kalchenko.[650] The association decided that the monument should be placed in Saskatchewan due to the province's large Ukrainian population. Therefore, the association's provincial committee, led by Anne Lapchuk and Gene Swityk, was brought on board.[651] In June 1974, Lapchuk and Swityk began approaching representatives of Saskatchewan's provincial government to arrange for the monument's placement in Regina's Wascana Centre Park, adjacent to the Legislative Assembly. Mirroring the stories of both the Franko and Shevchenko monuments, there was real apprehension from certain officials who worried that it would set a precedent for ethnic communities to ask for public space. There were still other concerns about the bureaucratic headache of Wascana Centre Park in particular, as all three levels of government had some measure of jurisdiction there. These combined worries eventually overpowered any potential benefits of the monument and governmental support for the project was pulled.[652]

Lapchuk and Swityk then took their proposal to Bill Godsalve, Saskatoon's City Commissioner. They hoped that the city, which had a much smaller bureaucracy, could easily push the project through. Godsalve had reservations about a much larger adversary, however: the UCC. As a result, he deferred a decision on the monument until he could speak to representatives of the committee's provincial executive in person. Cognizant of the delicate political situation, especially in light of the struggle over the Shevchenko and Franko monuments, the AUUC agreed to the commissioner's request for time.

When Godsalve met with the UCC, he outlined the proposal for the monument and explained the city's desire to accept it. After what Godsalve described as a "friendly and very

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[650] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

[651] NEC to Lapchuk, 31 January 1974, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 11, LAC.

[652] Lapchuk to NEC, 12 August 1974, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 11, LAC; Moran to NEC, 16 September 1974, AUUC, MG28 V153, vol. 31, file 11, LAC.

eager meeting," the UCC declared that it had no objections to the project and that it would raise no challenges to the monument's erection. This decision was perhaps also fueled by the UCC's own recent unveiling of an Ukrainka monument in Toronto's High Park. For the first time, the committee had beat the communists to the punch.[653]

On 26 May 1975, Saskatoon's City Council officially accepted the gift by publicly announcing its upcoming placement in Friendship Park on a bank of the Saskatchewan River. The tentative date for unveiling was scheduled for some time in May 1976.[654] The city's approval was a not an inconsequential victory for the AUUC. Many of the city's politicians, including mayor Bert Sears, were personally thanking the association for the thoughtful and generous gift of the monument. It was almost unbelievable for the AUUC given their previous experiences with placing monuments.[655] With the Ukrainka monument, the public repute of the association was being boosted, reinvigorating a constituency who could still just barely recall the esteem that the Shevchenko monument had brought some twenty years prior. Planning continued throughout 1975. A particularly important meeting introduced the AUUC to Alderman Morris Cherneskey, the city's appointed chairman of the Ukrainka planning committee. Cherneskey was a staunch nationalist and supporter of the UCC, which understandably made the AUUC anxious. Yet, in light of the UCC's recent sanctioning of the monument, Cherneskey actually spoke

[653] Lapchuk to NEC, 20 January 1975, AUUC, MG28 V153, vol. 31, file 11, LAC; "Report No. 16-1975 of the Chief City Commissioner," 7 April 1975, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 12, LAC; "Na proslavy Lesi Ukrainky," 19 October 1975, UC, vol. 14, MHSO.

[654] Kreutzweiser to Lapchuk, 28 May 1975, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 12, LAC; "Chronology of Main Events Regarding Lesya Ukrainka Monument," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 16, LAC.

[655] Sears to Society Ukraina, 8 July 1975, AUUC, MG28 V153, vol. 31, file 12, LAC.

positively of the undertaking and even offered to help link the unveiling with the nationalist's local Ukrainian Festival.[656]

The first major hurdle came not from the UCC, then, but from the sculptor. Kalchenko had long been in poor health and, in March 1975, passed away.[657] Her death made it impossible to deliver the monument in time for a May 1976 unveiling. In consultation with the city, the AUUC decided to postpone their event to September so that a new sculptor, Anatoly Fuzhenko, could finish the project. The move to September, while unavoidable, proved to have far greater consequences than anticipated. Early in 1976, a new provincial executive of the UCC was elected. Composed mostly of CLLU members, this election closely resembled the broader ideological shift occurring in the UCC at the time, wherein more radical elements within it were beginning to rise to leadership positions. The new provincial executive was highly critical of their predecessors' decisions regarding the monument, criticizing them for their political correctness, lack of ideological commitment, and a lackadaisical mobilization against communism.[658]

In turn, the new leadership reversed the committee's stance on the monument. Using identical arguments as those made earlier and in the cases of the other poets, they insisted that only they could speak on behalf of Saskatchewan's Ukrainians, that they were the true representatives of Ukrainka, and that the communists were using her for a propaganda ruse.[659]

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[656] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

[657] "Beautiful Lesya Monument on Pedestals of Love," June 1976, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

[658] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

[659] UCC to Sears, 22 March 1976, V.O. Buyniak fonds (VOB), MG134, file 1, University of Saskatchewan Archives (USA).

Cherneskey then officially petitioned the city to reverse its decision.[660] This move was deliberately kept secret so that he could continue liaising with Lapchuk and Swityk. In fact, just a day after filing his petition, Cherneskey was contacted by them to inform him that the monument was ready to ship and to request a delivery address. Not knowing that Cherneskey had already double crossed them, they did not find it suspicious when the alderman gave them a city building as a delivery address, which would put the monument in his direct control.[661]

Cherneskey also did not let on that something was afoot when the AUUC repeatedly requested that a date for the unveiling be set. Therefore, when the news broke on the morning of 27 April that the city had decided to reverse its decision to accept the monument, the AUUC was absolutely shocked. Speaking to *The Star Phoenix* shortly after the announcement was made, Cherneskey regurgitated the position of UCC provincial executive. If city council had followed through with the monument, he claimed, it would face heated opposition from Canada's real Ukrainian community.[662] Sears seconded Cherneskey and explained that the city would revisit a monument to Ukrainka in consultation with the UCC. Pandering directly to them, he told the newspaper that he would be contacting the committee directly to see "if there is any further service the City of Saskatoon could perform for them."[663]

The AUUC had seen these tactics before, but they were still incensed about Cherneskey's betrayal. On the advice of George Taylor, a communist alderman and ally of the AUUC, the

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[660] "Report of Citizens' Committee on Sculpture of Lesya Ukrainka," 12 April 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 16, LAC.

[661] "Chronology of Main Events Regarding Lesya Ukrainka Monument," AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 16, LAC.

[662] "Cherneskey Says Statue Vehicle of Propaganda," *The Star Phoenix,* April 27, 1976.

[663] "Report No. 1-1976 of Citizens' Committee on Sculpture of Lesya Ukrainka," 26 April 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, file 43, LAC. The offer was repeated again in a personal letter from the City Clerk to the UCC informing them of the city's decision. Kolynchuk to UCC, 5 May 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, USA.

association stayed quiet and focused their energies on keeping lines of communication open with Sears.[664] In demonstrations of quiet diplomacy, the association reached out to their various contacts in the city to see whether anything could be done. Most would suddenly not take their calls. The full extent of the UCC's reach was realized during a phone conversation between Swityk and Sears. It seemed that the mayor had adopted a new line on the monument that closely resembled that of the nationalists. Sears also now insisted that the city had rejected the monument because of mass interference from Soviet Ukraine. In particular, he was bothered that he had received an interview request from a Soviet reporter, which he argued had the potential of ruining his political career and transforming the unveiling into an international incident.[665] When asked why this had not been raised with the AUUC directly and in advance, Sears was evasive, repeating only that the project had gone beyond what the city was interested in, and capable of, doing.[666]

With the monument already on its way, a potentially disastrous situation was unfolding. On behalf of the national executive, Peter Krawchuk and Michael Korol were sent to Winnipeg to confront Sears and Cherneskey directly. In their meeting, both city officials maintained that there was still a desire to see the project move forward, albeit with new conditions. For Cherneskey, this included a complete rethinking of the monument's location. Friendship Park was too accessible to the public and was often used as a demonstration site. Ukrainka, he claimed, deserved a home where she would be honoured and respected. Ironically, the nationalist

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[664] Harasym to Swityk, 12 March 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 16, LAC; "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian.*

[665] "Telephone Call Re: Lesya Ukrainka Monument Unveiling Developments," 27 April 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 16, LAC; Swityk to AUUC, 27-28 April 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 17, LAC; Swityk to NEC, 18 May 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 15, LAC.

[666] Swityk to AUUC, 27-28 April 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 17, LAC.

community made the exact opposite argument about the Ukrainka monument in High Park, which they claimed was being treated like a political prisoner because it stood behind a fence and could only be accessed with special permission.[667] Conveniently, Cherneskey knew of just the place for the monument: the grounds of the nationalist-run Museum of Ukrainian Culture and Folk Art. Perhaps not fully understanding that this would shift control of the monument into nationalist hands, Sears agreed that such a transfer made sense.[668] The fact that the monument was addressed to the city meant that the mayor's consideration of a new location posed a real threat. Ukrainka could not fall into the wrong hands or, worse, be shipped back to Soviet Ukraine. When the association had little left but cultural relevancy, this sort of failure was potentially catastrophic. To look foolish, incompetent, and as if they had been outmaneuvered would only add a further sting.

This not-so-subtle attempt by Cherneskey to move the monument makes clear the superficial and perfunctory nature of the nationalist attacks on communist monuments as mass-produced pieces of Soviet propaganda. This hypocrisy was reflected in the press statement released by the AUUC on 3 May. "One could almost be excused for having visions of Ukrainka's statue distributing Soviet leaflets on the streets of Saskatoon in the dead of night," the statement joked. On a serious note, the UCC had become its own Trojan horse and Cherneskey his own propaganda vehicle. Neither could ever convince the community that what they had just done served any purpose other than to obstruct, disgrace, and demean Ukrainian culture life. More and more, the UCC was becoming "the advocates of a counter-culture that is wholly consumed by its Cold War goals." Whether the nationalists liked it or not, the AUUC pledged,

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[667] "Lesya Ukrainka – Prisoner in High Park," January 12, 2016, *Noviy shliakh.*

[668] "Further Developments in Saskatoon," 11 May 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 15, LAC.

the monument would be planted in Canadian soil.[669] With this in mind, the AUUC made a final, much more direct appeal to Sears.[670] They warned the mayor that the association, which had been so beaten down already, had nothing left to lose by exposing the city's backroom dealings with the nationalists. Did Sears want such a potentially embarrassing situation on his hands?[671] Soon after, the mayor agreed that he would not release the monument to the nationalists and would re-address it an address of the AUUC's choosing.[672] A small victory at last, the association now had to move quickly to find a new location for the monument as it had just arrived on the docks of Montreal, Quebec and was on its way to Saskatoon.[673]

"The AUUC has the Ukrainian Cause in Heart Too"

Ukrainka found her champion in Robert Begg, the president of the University of Saskatchewan. While it is unclear how Begg initially learned of the monument, he expressed his keen interest in having it placed on campus. While the AUUC negotiated the terms with Begg, Anthony Bilecki of the national executive of the AUUC received a strange phone call from none other than Wasyl Kushnir, former president of the UCC, who wanted to meet in person the updated plans for the monument. Bilecki was coy and calculated in his response so as not to let on that plans were not yet finalized, but he eventually confirmed Begg's interest in Ukrainka. Despite his hesitancy to say more, Bilecki was curious about Kushnir's opinion on the matter and, more importantly, whether or not the nationalists would once again protest. In a surprise to Bilecki, Kushnir

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[669] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

[670] Harasym to Constituents, 13 May 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 33, file 43, LAC.

[671] Lapchuk to Harasym, 12 May 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 15, LAC.

[672] "Telephone Call Re: Lesya Ukrainka Monument," 1 June 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 15, LAC; McLeod to Pidsukha, 3 June 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 15, LAC.

[673] Pidsukha to Harasym, 2 June 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 28, LAC; Harasym to Custom Brokers, 7 July 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 13, LAC.

admitted that he now understood that the AUUC "had the Ukrainian cause in heart too" and he approved of the monument's new home. Moreover, he assured Bilecki that there would be no interference on the part of national executive of the UCC. The provincial executive was a different story, he warned, as it had been totally overrun by the OUN-b. After speaking for nearly two hours, the men parted ways, agreeing to keep in touch.[674]

Such a meeting was not entirely surprising; leading figures of the UCC and the AUUC met surreptitiously every so often to discuss issues of mutual importance. Yet this get-together held a greater significance than normal, raising larger questions about Kushnir's intentions. Just five years prior, Kushnir had been all but excommunicated from the UCC because of scandalous accusations of theft and of infidelity in his marriage.[675] These accusations were coupled with a shift in the way that the committee remembered his tenure because of the successful subversion of the CLLU who scoffed at his supposedly liberal policies. With this in mind, perhaps Kushnir's entreaty to Bilecki was a fishing expedition in an attempt to curry favour with his former chums. Yet the curious maneuver may have also been a retaliative transgression, a thrilling dance with the devil for an embittered formal president. Either way, his assurance that UCC national would not raise any objections made clear that he was no longer in the know. In fact, the committee had already written to Begg in support of the provincial executive's position.[676]

On 5 August, the AUUC officially received word from Begg that the monument had been approved by the university's board of governors. Not wanting to waste any more time, Begg

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[674] Bilecki to Harasym, 23 July 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 13, LAC.

[675] Kushnir served two terms, from 1940-1953 and from 1959-1971. Ukrainian Canadian Congress, "Presidents of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress," Accessed February 21, 2019. https://www.ucc.ca/about-ucc/history/

[676] Bashuk to Begg, 26 October 1976, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 45, LAC.

suggested an unveiling date of 25 September.[677] With Begg's confirmation, the association breathed a collective sigh of relief. The hits kept on coming, however. First, they learned from the monument's broker that it had gone missing; it had apparently been placed on a ship to Italy by accident, although rumours swirled that the nationalists were responsible. As it would take several weeks to return to the continent, an executive decision was made to further postpone the unveiling until 30 October.[678] More bad news arrived when the UCC demanded a meeting with Begg. Unbendingly in his support of the monument, yet aware of the delicate politics surrounding it, he agreed to meet with two committee representatives. The men repeated the same argument that they had made in front of the city and that had been parroted over the decades; the UCC were the only organization who could claim Ukrainka and the monument was communist propaganda. An exasperated Begg listened to their allegations, but made clear that their outrage had become vexing. The monument was not about politics, he argued, but about culture and the chance for the university to diversify those whom it commemorated. Taking this stand was especially relevant for the University of Saskatchewan, which had a thriving Slavic Studies program. "How could we, as a university, reject her?" he asked defiantly.[679]

While he was attempting to be reasonable and conciliatory, Begg's response only further angered the provincial executive. Counting on the support and further proliferation of their message from the nationalists and the Canadian press, they issued a public statement. Stressing

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[677] Begg to Harasym, 5 August 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 13, LAC.

[678] Harasym to Begg, 18 August 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 13, LAC; "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*; "Do zayavy TOYK," March 16, 1977, *Homin Ukrainy.*

[679] Stratychuk to Begg, 11 August 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, US; Stratychuk and Worobetz to Begg, 17 August 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, US; Begg to Stratychuk, 23 August 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, US; "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*; Stratychuk and Worobetz to Begg, 17 August 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, USA.

that Ukrainka would have never identified with either the Soviet Union or the AUUC, they branded the monument of "cynical mockery of Soviet reality." In accepting it, the university was consenting to the oppression of literary, linguistic, and cultural freedoms, all tenets that Ukrainka held dear.[680] The monument was a "one-way cultural infiltration" as the Soviets would never accept a monument from the nationalists on their soil.[681]

The statement's effectiveness is questionable. Very few news outlets – Ukrainian or Canadian – seemed interested in picking up the story. Anti-communism remained the central plank of the government and security state, but by the seventies it engendered a limited interest from the media and public, a sign that Cold War anxieties were perhaps winding down. In fact, the only reactions came from those already committed to boycotting the event. Senator Paul Yuzyk seized on the opportunity to condemn Begg for allowing communist propaganda to spread at the academic level. As if it was not already clear, he informed Begg that he would not attend unless the UCC was brought on board and they were given control, "no strings attached."[682] Begg was still resolute, however, reminding the senator that Canada's official relationship with the Soviet Union had long allowed for such exchanges - at least on paper.[683] Moreover, was the UCC's attempt to strongarm him not their own version of attaching strings? It was disappointing to observe the UCC concentrating so obsessively on the political overtones of the event and trying to spark a debate that would only embarrass them both. The nationalists had

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[680] "Press Release," 31 August 1976, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 36, LAC; Wowk to Editors, 4 September 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 17, LAC.

[681] Bashuk to Begg, 26 October 1976, UCC, MG28 V9, vol. 45, LAC.

[682] Yuzyk to Begg, 13 September 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, USA.

[683] In 1978, Begg approved a five-year academic and cultural exchange program between the university and Chernivtsy State University of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This precipitated the official twinning of Saskatoon with the city of Chernivtsi, Ukraine. "Links Forged with Ukrainian University," February 1978, *University News.*

completely lost site of the monument's broader potential for putting Ukrainian culture on the map, which he incorrectly assumed had been their goal."[684]

Yuzyk's embargo was embraced by other politicians. Most notably, Diefenbaker not only declined Begg's invitation to participate, but also skipped, for the first time since his appointment as chancellor of the university, a convocation ceremony being held that same day. While Diefenbaker's official reasoning was that he wanted to remain in Ottawa where his wife was in hospital, rumours swirled that Begg's request to unveil the Ukrainka monument had both embarrassed and insulted the former prime minister.[685]

Begg held firm with the nationalists, but he had clearly taken some of their words to heart. Shortly after his conversation with Yuzyk, he contacted the AUUC to inform them that they could no longer officially participate in the unveiling. They were welcome to attend, but the work of important actors like Lapchuk and Swityk would go unrecognized. While disheartening for the AUUC, Begg's backtracking is understandable in the face of such intense backlash from a powerful senator and the prime minister. His admonishment also reveals the actual process by which individuals, even if they were not committed to an active anti-communism, learned to fall in line.

In the weeks leading up to the unveiling, the AUUC remained quiet in the hopes of not provoking the UCC further. In fact, a mild wave of paranoia gripped the leadership and they denied all interview requests. For example, when Swityk received a call from the university's news agency asking for details on the composition of the statue, she refused to answer any questions because, in her mind, something did not sound right. The fear of further setbacks was

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[684] Begg to Yuzyk, 21 September 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, USA; Stratychuk to Begg, 29 September 1976, VOB, MG 134, file 1, USA.

[685] "Diefenbaker to Miss Convocation," October 29, 1976, *The Star Phoenix*; "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

simply too much to bear.[686] While the pressure from the UCC would not stop the monument *in toto*, the combined actions of the UCC and their supporters successfully clouded the entire process. Even when the nationalists ostensibly lost, they still managed to win. It was a war of position, after all, and there was still much to be pulled from the rubble.

The strategy to stay quiet seemingly paid off, and the day of the unveiling arrived without further scandal. The festivities were well-attended by the AUUC, delegates from Soviet Ukraine, and representatives from the Soviet embassy. Unsurprisingly, no Canadian politicians were in attendance. Members of the UCC and the Ukrainian Canadian Youth Association, a scouting group with strong ties to the OUN-b, stood behind the monument in silent protest, glaring at the unnerved audience. While they did not speak, they carried placards decrying the ongoing human rights violations in the Soviet Union.[687]

The formal program of the day opened with remarks from Begg who, ignoring politics altogether, spoke of Ukrainka as a brilliant daughter of the Ukrainian people whose words crossed boundaries and oceans. These remarks were followed by Victor Buyniak, the chair of Slavic Studies at the University of Saskatchewan. Despite being active in the nationalist community, Buyniak supported the monument's placement on campus because of its cultural benefits. These apparently irreconcilable notions earned him the wrath of the UCC, who accused him of being a sell-out, an opportunistic snake trying to climb the university's bureaucratic ladder, and even a victim of Begg's tyrannical administration.[688] All of these scenarios neglected to consider that, as a professor, Buyniak had dedicated his life to the study of Slavic language

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[686] Swityk to Harasym, 17 September 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 17, LAC; Harasym to Swityk, 22 September 1976, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 31, file 17, LAC.

[687] "Statue of poetess draws demonstration," November 4, 1976, *Shadowfax.*

[688] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

and culture. Moreover, he understood the tremendous value of such a monument being placed on a Canadian university campus, regardless of who may have funded it. A progressive liberal, he also valued that the university's first monument to a non-Anglo was a woman. Ukrainka could serve as a rallying point for all women in campus in their quest for equal rights and justice, something that Ukrainka fought for in her own life. Buyniak believed that the monument could inspire Ukrainian women to behave "such as in Northern Ireland where women of opposing camps have jointly manifested their desire to end internal strife in their homeland."[689] The professor was alluding to Women for Peace, a non-sectarian, non-confessional, grassroots movement led by Northern Irish women working for peace in 1976.[690] More than an interesting anecdote tying the local to the international, the comment mirrored the second-wave feminist zeitgeist of the time. More importantly, it hinted at an involved understanding of the internecine conflict. In effect, Buyniak was positing that the politics to these movements could be irreconcilable if current trajectories continued.

In the aftermath of the unveiling, the AUUC released a statement detailing the story of how Ukrainka finally found her place on the campus. Naturally, the statement was exceptionally critical of the nationalists and their efforts to derail the event. Yet it also served as an opportunity for the organization to reflect on how the monument should be remembered and celebrated by future generations of Ukrainians. "Years will pass," their statement read, "and nothing will remain of the Saskatoon UCC or of the Banderist league, but the statue of Ukrainka will continue

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[689] Buyniak speech, 30 October 1976, VOB, MG134, file 1, US; "Musical Setting for Unveiling Ceremony," November 19, 1976, *On Campus.*

[690] Malvern Lumsden, "Peace by Peace? Socio-economic structure and the role of the Peace People in Northern Ireland." *Current Research on Peace and Violence* (1978): 41-52. The two founding members and their re-named organization, the Community of Peace People were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year. Judith Stiehm, *Champions for Peace: Women Winners of the Nobel Peace Prize* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 61-80.

to grace the university campus in all its beauty. It will, along with the statues of Shevchenko and Franko, add to the glory of Ukraine, its people, and to those Ukrainians who settled and were born in Canada. Only researchers into the history of Ukrainian settlement, leafing through the yellowed pages of their year books," they predicted, "will see how blind these individuals are in their malice and hatred towards those who thought differently. What foolish and harmful actions they instigated in their nationalist fanaticism. All this," they hypothesized, "will surely come to pass."[691]

Conclusion

Posterity has not been kind to the remarks of the AUUC. Of the three monuments they unveiled, only the Franko monument remains standing and in possession of the association. In fact, since its erection on the grounds of Winnipeg's labour temple in 1956, the monument has seen surprisingly little fuss, perhaps the result of its tucked-away location on the association's private property.

The same cannot be said for Shevchenko, whom the AUUC continued to enthusiastically celebrate as their membership rolls dwindled.[692] Even in the association's somewhat diminished capacity the monument remained a lightning rod, attracting steady attention from the nationalists who never relented in their desires to claim the poet as their exclusive domain. Over the years, Red Shevchenko was the frequent victim of vandalism and arson. In 2002, the Palermo campground was vandalized, and a bust of Shevchenko was stolen. Four years later, the

[691] "Let the People Judge: The True Story Behind the Monument to Lesya Ukrainka in Saskatoon," February 1977, *The Ukrainian Canadian*.

[692] "Taras Shevchenko: A Tribute in Concert," 7 March 1982, AUUC, MG28 V154, vol. 39, LAC; "Re: 1989 AUUC Organizational Campaign," March 1989, MG28 V154, vol. 5, LAC.

monument itself was decapitated and sold for its metal and copper.[693] While the head was recovered a decade later, efforts to restore the monument and revitalize the land were fruitless. Several years later, the land was sold to developers, closing the chapter on Shevchenko's stay in Palermo and, more importantly, the communists' hold over the poet.

In 2013, Ukrainka was taken down, refurbished, and moved to a new spot on campus. The project was initiated after Buyniak had left a generous donation to restore the monument in his will. Further funding for the restoration was spearheaded by the UCC and its various constituent groups.[694] As a result, they were able to negotiate the removal of the monument's original plaque and its replacement with a new one written from the nationalist perspective. While the original benefactors are acknowledged, their efforts to bring Ukrainka to Canada are somewhat underplayed. In contrast to its allegedly sinister origins, the monument is now sanctioned as a proper marker of Ukrainian culture and identity in Canada. At its unveiling on 1 August 2013, the centenary of Ukraine's death, no representatives of the AUUC were present. In fact, no mention of the association was made. Buyniak, once called a professional climber, traitor, and hostage, was transmogrified into a visionary nation builder and a true Ukrainian patriot.[695] Also gone were the accusations that the monument was a Soviet plot. Now, the monument was a favourite gathering site for the nationalists to commemorate special occasions or anniversaries. Rarely, if ever, is this understood as imbuing the monument, or Ukrainka herself, with their own version of history. Rather, it is seen as a neutral approach to a history without a past.

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[693] Brendan Kennedy, "Stolen Taras Shevchenko statue returned after ten years," February 5, 2012, *The Toronto Star.*

[694] "Lesya Ukrainka Garden Officially Opens at Murray Library," August 28, 2013, *University of Saskatchewan Donor News Releases.*

[695] "Departed Nation Builder," 2013, *Visnyk*; "Lesya Ukrainka Garden set to open August 1," 2013, *Visnyk*.

The UCC continued their own promotion of Shevchenko across the globe. Beginning in 1971, they worked in collaboration with members of the OUN-b who had migrated to South America to place monuments to the poet in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The monument in Paraguay was especially troublesome, requiring the active collaboration of dictator Alfredo Stroessner, a strong supporter of the nationalists. Back in Canada, the nationalists sustained their grip on the poet in Winnipeg through their monument's perpetual use for community rallies and junctures. They also further expanded their claims to him in more institutionalized ways, including the establishment of the Shevchenko Medal Award, the highest honour bestowed by the committee on community leaders, politicians, and members of the public who worked on behalf of the nationalist community. The committee's national philanthropic outfit, dedicated to promoting Ukrainian Canadian cultural content, was similarly named after Shevchenko.[696] With no one left to challenge them, the nationalists had fulfilled Diefenbaker's prophecy. They had become Shevchenko's children in Canada and the sole inheritors of his legacy. Bolstered by unchecked convictions and a nescience for reasoning otherwise, their narratives of the poet were normalized and, in time, entrenched so firmly that they simply became common sense.

[696] Eleventh Ukrainian Canadian Congress, July 1974, UC, Box 18, MHSO.

Conclusion

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, and in particular the dissolution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, precipitated a new era for the Ukrainian Canadian community. As this dissertation shows, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC) was already in decline in the decades preceding the nineties due to the aggressive assault of the state and its nationalist collaborators. Chapter One details the mutually beneficial relationship between the state and Ukrainian nationalists in the early years of the Second World War. It pays particular attention to the government's establishment of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), which served as an important monitor for the state and boosted the legitimacy of the nationalist leaders before their community and the public at large. At the same time, the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) was outlawed, and its members were met with increasing repression.

Chapter Two explores the changing nature of the government's relationship with Canada's Ukrainian population because of new geopolitical mandates implemented in the aftermath of Operation Barbarossa. While the worst excesses of anti-communism lifted after the Soviet Union became a brief wartime ally, domestic communists stayed under strict surveillance, internment continued, and their halls remained under nationalist control. Despite becoming increasingly vocal about European political affairs in ways that often directly contradicted Canadian foreign policy, the nationalists were coddled by a new, dedicated government bureaucracy in the Nationalities Branch. The branch not only helped the UCC navigate Canada's warmer relationship with the Soviets, but also assisted the committee in further legitimizing itself as the official representatives of Ukrainians in Canada. Eventually, however, the nationalists grew dissatisfied with this brief thaw. For the movement, anything less than direct confrontation was perceived as being too pro-communist. They began making objectionable political decisions

free of government input, all while the capriciousness of state discipline ensured their protection. The branch's eventual shuttering only deepened the nationalists' commitment to acting beyond established limits, again successfully navigating the shifting and multipolar nature of power.

Chapter Three examines the postwar period when an influx of Ukrainian displaced persons (DPs) arrived in Canada. Much more militant in their anti-communism, this group further pushed the acceptable boundaries of political participation. In particular, the DPs enthusiastically engaged the communists in physical confrontations, which discouraged participation in the AUUC by all but the most committed and hindered the association's ability to grow or even maintain itself. It also worked to quell the communists and their narratives. These acts of violence were consistently sanctioned at every step of the way by government officials and the security service. This evidence clearly shows just how flexible applications of law and justice can be when it comes to populations of ideological use to the powerful. The continued refusal to reprimand those responsible for the violence also helped define the era's social, political, and judicial boundaries.

Chapter Four emphasizes a later phase in the solidification of hegemonic Ukrainian-ness when seemingly innocuous arenas became the primary battleground. This chapter looks specifically at the cultural sphere, where the nationalists utilized the rhetoric of cultural pluralism to further advance their claims on Ukrainian identity. Capitalizing on their political power, the nationalists commandeered important national festivals to ensure their participation as the proper representatives of the community. Their integral roles in these events ensured that the communists, who were already largely delegitimized, could not meaningfully participate, which only further alienated them. The nationalists' exclusive hold over culture was further solidified with the coming of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission (Bi and Bi Commission), which prompted perhaps the most important socio-cultural debate of the era. The Bi and Bi

Commission provided further space for the nationalists to implant their ideas and narratives into public consciousness.

Chapter Five builds on the themes explored in the previous chapter by looking at the role of commemoration. Monuments became a key arena in which the nationalists and the communists engaged one another regarding community narratives. Due to their state sanctioning, the nationalists could use their monuments as a further way to speak on behalf of the community. They benefited tremendously from the inherent advantages of this sanctioning, while the communists were further cast as community interlopers. Nationalist monuments also popularized the nationalists' ideas before the broader public, which unwittingly consumed their accounts and believed them to be uncontested, apolitical, and true. This occurred despite the fact that these monuments, and the claims that they implicitly made, had always been contentious and surrounded by debate. More and more, the AUUC occupied a confused space that was explicitly demarcated from normative Ukrainian-ness.

The geopolitical callousness of the Soviets only further hindered the movement. Belated or lurching responses to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had even many on the left seeing imperialism, not internationalism. Often with mixed emotions, scores of followers left a movement that they believed had obviously lost its way. The hemorrhaging continued after Mikhail Gorbachev's call for *glasnost* (openness). Beyond a generalized atmosphere of government transparency, this period witnessed the beginnings of historical openness regarding some of the worst atrocities suffered by Ukrainians under Soviet rule. In particular, the diaspora learned more about the *Holodomor,* a famine in 1932-1933 that killed millions, and the death toll of the gulags, which continued to operate well into the 1950s. The elimination of the AUUC's affiliate abroad was the final nail in the coffin, removing the association's remaining layers of legitimacy.

Collectively, these developments spurred the departure of the AUUC's best and brightest and left behind a stunned rank-and-file guided by a new set of leaders bent on maintaining that the Soviet experiment had not, in fact, gone horribly wrong. Every attempt at nuanced and productive conversation regarding the mistakes of the association was resisted, as were the *mea culpas* issued by former prominent members who sought a realistic and fair assessment of the community's legacy. To be sure, those who distanced themselves from the AUUC had not turned their backs on the broader left. If anything, their rejection of what the Soviet Union had become was much more in line with conventional leftist thinking that understood it as either a state capitalist or totalitarian regime. Regardless, they were dismissed by the new guard as traitorous nationalist converts, and their painstaking efforts to remind the association of its once principled and progressive roots went unanswered. Some maintained a distant and hands-off relationship with the AUUC for the rest of their lives – it had, after all, been their home base for many years - but their days of active politicking on the association's behalf were over. A substantive legacy of militant working-class organization, anti-racist internationalism, and hall socialism was replaced with liberal and multicultural platitudes on one end and a warped Cold War bitterness on the other.[697]

The short-sightedness of those who filled new leadership positions in the AUUC is puzzling. It was clear that the nationalists would not show them any mercy and that any concessions made regarding the Soviet Union would be used against the association, tarnishing

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[697] The decline of the AUUC has seen very little scholarly attention, but is explored in some detail in John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of the Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1979); John Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990); Peter Krawchuk, *Our History: The Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907-1991* (Lugus Publications, 1996); John Boyd, *A Noble Cause Betrayed….but Hope Lives On: Pages from a Political Life* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1999); Rhonda Hinther, *Perogies and Politics: Canada's Ukrainian Left, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).

even its most positive legacies. At the same time, maintaining an uncritical approach to the Soviet Union as late as the 1990s was shockingly bad strategy. Anti-communism was clearly more than just a passing fad; it was a dominant political frame of reference. Refusing to adapt was peculiar, then, but perhaps it also speaks to the warped political outlooks of those who led the association into the new century.

For the rank-and-file, the decision to maintain a membership in the AUUC is somewhat more understandable. By the 1990s, the movement had sustained close to a century of repression, and some honestly believed that the new developments were just another roadblock on the long highway towards a better future. Most also clung to the association's bright history, remaining loyal to a group that had kept multiple generations of their family safe from xenophobia, state repression, and the worst excesses of capitalism. Others were undoubtedly exasperated, if not downright fearful, about what the fall of the Soviet Union might bring. Doubling down, however predictable in its foolish myopia, was the only defense mechanism they could muster.[698]

Predictably, the nationalists responded with glee to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They rightfully celebrated the emergence of an independent Ukraine and the opening of borders that had long separated them from their extended families. Some salivated over the birth of new markets ripe for exploitation and an era of capitalist privatization. In quick succession, businesspeople from the diaspora flooded into Ukraine. Alongside emerging domestic oligarchs, they quickly looted the country's collective wealth.

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[698] The psychological commitment to the movement, despite its clear problems, is cursorily explored in Jim Mochoruk, "Pop & Co vs. Buck and the Lenin School Boys: Ukrainian Canadian Radicals and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1931," in Rhonda Hinther and Jim Mochoruk, eds., *Reimagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010): 331-375; Kassandra Luciuk, "A Necessary Bridge to a Radical Consciousness: Rethinking the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association and the 'Peculiarity' of Ukrainian Canadian Identity," Master's thesis (Queen's University, 2013).

The incomers brought with them the diaspora's political adherences, instilling in the population that privatization was a frontline defense against communism's return – one of the most enduring and crippling legacies of the diaspora's involvement in Ukraine. Private investment and anti-corruption initiatives where, when scratched, revealed as disingenuous claims of benevolent intervention and self-serving and profit-driven ventures. Yet there remains a psychological block to thinking about creating a more equitable society through economic reform that demands parity and that eliminates monopolistic control. Today, it is not uncommon to hear objections to such suggestions on the grounds that they are "communist."

Anti-communism was further bolstered by the arrival of the diaspora's academics who quickly filled Ukrainian bookshelves with histories that they had preserved and written in Canada and the United States. This was admittedly helpful to Ukrainian historians who, for the first time, were trying to establish a national history. These histories were also clear outcomes of the process under review in this dissertation, and they influenced the writing of Ukrainian history accordingly. Nationalist narratives, nurtured in the diaspora for close to a century, were unpackaged and mobilized in Ukraine in quick succession.[699]

Yet others conceptualized the Soviet Union's elimination as an ideological victory against the AUUC. As predicted, the reproaches of clear-eyed communists were used as proof that the nationalists had been right all along rather than being offered as olive branches to mend the fractured community. In a broader sense, the collapse of the USSR was immediately transformed into a metaphor for the impossibility of communism in practice and was used as more fodder to solidify nationalist dominion. Over time, as the AUUC further waned, there was simply no one left to challenge these contentions.

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[699] This process is detailed best in David Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).

This common-sense milieu remains unchallenged today. In September 2019, for example, the reopening of the Shevchenko Museum in Toronto's High Park neighbourhood was announced. Once under the direct control of the AUUC, the museum had long ago distanced itself from the association, establishing a strictly cultural mandate that checked politics at the door. Currently, it serves as an important bridge for a fractured community by allowing Ukrainians of all political stripes to celebrate together Shevchenko and Ukrainian culture more generally.

Press coverage of the reopening brought renewed attention to the museum, however, and social media were flooded with angry cries from members of the nationalist community that the communists were setting out to dupe the public once more. "The Ukrainian Canadian community of Toronto is being tricked into believing we are getting a new museum to honour Shevchenko," wrote one critic in a post that was shared hundreds of times on Facebook. "Do not allow yourselves to be tricked by a trendy sign featuring our great poet," it warned. Beyond contentions of exclusive ownership of Shevchenko, a misrepresentation unpacked in Chapter Five, "our poet" had become an innate response. Community members weighed their options regarding how best to prevent the opening. Some alluded to past acts of violence, while others were more inclined towards modern tactics of slandering the museum on the internet. Yet others made plans to try to infiltrate the museum's board to get it into "pro-Ukrainian hands," again suggesting that there was only one way to be a Ukrainian.[700]

To be clear, the commemoration wars had not been reignited, nor was the broader struggle between the left and the right. On the contrary, unlike earlier battles, these displays of outrage amounted to very little. Instead, I suggest that the indignation shared across social media

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[700] Andrij Potichnyj. 2019. "The Ukrainian Canadian Community in Toronto is Being Tricked." 24 September 2019. https://www.facebook.com/andrij.potichnyj/posts/10157591539785912

is actually symptomatic of a victory having been reached in a totalized hegemony. For the first generation raised without the shadow of the Iron Curtain, the very notion that Shevchenko could be commemorated by anyone else – let alone the pilloried Reds – was simply unthinkable. Herein lies the peril of hegemony, where the collective is so often assumed, and contention is simply forgotten.

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